Section 246A

Section 246A — the law in short

What the courts have decided on section 246A, in one screen. Read this first; open an entry when you need the facts, the reasoning and the source.

• Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v Mst. Katiji Supreme CourtCuts both ways
  Your appeal is late. How strictly will 'sufficient cause' be read?
  Liberally. A litigant gains nothing by filing late, refusal can destroy a meritorious cause at the threshold, and where substantial justice and technical considerations clash, substantial justice must win.
• CIT v Kanpur Coal Syndicate Supreme CourtCuts both ways
  How wide are the first appellate authority's powers when it disposes of an appeal?
  An association of persons was assessed as a single unit; it argued the members should have been assessed individually. The Supreme Court held that the first appellate authority has plenary powers in disposing of an appeal, coterminous with those of the Assessing Officer, and can direct the officer to do what he has failed to do. This is the foundation of every later statement about the CIT(A)'s powers under s.251.
• Deepak Maratha v Union of India High CourtHelps taxpayerHigh Courts differ
  My demonetisation cash deposit was added for the year ended 31 March 2017 and taxed at 60% under section 115BBE. Can that rate reach income of that year?
  The Rajasthan High Court held that it cannot. The rate in section 115BBE was raised from 30% to 60% by the Taxation Laws (Second Amendment) Act, 2016, which received assent on 15 December 2016 and came into force at once - but the amendment to section 115BBE(1) was separately expressed to take effect from 1 April 2017. The law applicable to an assessment year is the law in force on the first day of that year, and a change made after a financial year has begun cannot govern the tax liability for that year unless it is expressly made retrospective. Nothing in the 2016 Act says section 115BBE is retrospective. Doubling a rate alters existing rights and is not a procedural or clarificatory change. So for the financial year 2016-17 the law in force on 1 April 2016 governs, at 30%, and the 60% rate applies from the financial year 2017-18 onwards; section 271AAC, which depends on section 115BBE, is prospective in the same way.
• P. S. Srijan Height Developers v ACIT High CourtCuts both waysHigh Courts differ
  The CPC gave me a section 245 intimation saying I had 21 days to respond, then adjusted my whole refund the very next day against a demand for a year that is under appeal. What do I actually get back, and do I get interest?
  You get back everything adjusted in excess of 20 per cent of the disputed demand, but on these facts you get no interest on it. The Calcutta High Court held that adjusting the refund one day after issuing a 21-day section 245 intimation was a clear breach of the power to adjust and an abject violation of the law governing section 245, and directed refund of the excess over 20 per cent within eight weeks — but refused interest because the assessee had waited about two years before coming to court, and refused to touch an earlier adjustment made three years before the writ petition on the ground of laches.
• Saurav Chachra v CBDT High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  I have a stay on my demand and they still adjusted my refund against it. Can they do that?
  Not on these facts. The Revenue conceded that a refund of Rs. 14,80,270 for AY 2025-26 had been set off against the AY 2018-19 demand even though recovery of that demand stood stayed under s.220(6), and the Court found force in the submission that the action was illegal and arbitrary and the authorities' recourse perfunctory, directing the refund to be released with s.244A interest within four weeks. It gave no reasons beyond accepting that submission: it did not hold that adjustment is a mode of recovery, did not consider s.245, and did not formally quash the adjustment.
• Raj Kumar Bothra v DCIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  CPC disallowed my late-deposited PF and ESI under 143(1)(a). Was a summary adjustment even open to them?
  No, not for an intimation issued in December 2021. The Chhattisgarh High Court held the issue was genuinely debatable on that date, with conflicting High Court authority and the matter pending in the Supreme Court, so the officer had to take scrutiny under s.143(3) rather than adjust summarily.
• Rajendra Kumar v ACIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The CPC has adjusted my entire refund against a demand that is under appeal. Do I have to file a separate stay application before I can complain?
  No. The Rajasthan High Court held that nowhere in section 220(6) is it specified that a stay application has to be filed; once an appeal under section 246A has been filed within time and in the prescribed form, the assessee is not to be treated as an assessee in default. Adjusting the whole refund suo motu, without the intimation and opportunity that section 245 requires, was held to be de hors sections 245 and 220(6) and outside the recovery machinery of sections 222 and 223. The Court directed refund, with statutory interest, of everything adjusted beyond twenty per cent of the disputed demand.
• Aafreen Fatima Fazal Abbas Sayed v ACIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  I let the 30 days to appeal my 143(1) intimation lapse. Can I still go to the PCIT under s.264?
  Yes. Section 264(4) bars revision only in the situations it lists, essentially where an appeal is pending or has been decided; letting the appeal period run out without filing is not one of them. The revision application had to be decided on merits, and no formal waiver of the right of appeal could be demanded, because a right not exercised does not need to be waived.
• M/s. Queen Agencies v ACIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The Assessing Officer has rejected my stay application in two lines saying pay 20%. Is that order sustainable, and can he order less than 20% without going to the Principal Commissioner?
  No, a non-speaking order under s.220(6) that simply directs payment of 20% is liable to be set aside; the Assessing Officer must pass a speaking order applying the three parameters - prima facie case, financial stringency and balance of convenience. And yes: because the Assessing Officer exercises a quasi-judicial power, he can himself direct a deposit of LESS than 20% without any reference to the Principal Commissioner; a reference upward is needed only if he wants MORE than 20%.
• CIT v M/s. Syndicate Bank High CourtHelps taxpayer
  My refund was paid but the s.244A interest due on it was left out. Is the department liable to pay interest on that omitted interest, or is that the forbidden interest on interest?
  The Karnataka High Court held the department is liable, and that this is not interest on interest. Following the three-Judge Bench in CIT v. HEG Ltd., it held that the interest component partakes of the character of the 'amount' that becomes due to the assessee under s.244A, so an order of refund must include the interest payable, and if it does not, the Revenue is liable to pay interest on the shortfall.
• Bhupendra Murji Shah v DCIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  My appeal is filed and part-heard, but the Assessing Officer says pay 20% or recovery continues, and my bank account is attached. What can the High Court do?
  The Bombay High Court directed that during the pendency of the appeals the assessee not be called upon to pay any sum, much less 20%, and that any attachment on his bank account be raised forthwith. The reasoning is that a statutory right of appeal must not be rendered illusory and nugatory by recovery that would make the appeal infructuous before it is heard. But read the order to the end: the Court itself said it cannot be treated as a precedent for all cases of this nature.
• Rajesh Kourani v Union of India High CourtHelps departmentHigh Courts differ
  Is there High Court authority that the s.234E fee runs from 1 July 2012 whatever the 2015 amendment to s.200A did, and does paying the fee buy me out of s.271H penalty?
  Yes on the first, no on the second. The Gujarat High Court held that s.234E is the charging provision and s.200A merely machinery, that a machinery provision cannot override a charging provision, and that even before 1 June 2015 the Revenue could always calculate and collect the fee. It also held, against Karnataka, that the s.234E fee is not in lieu of the s.271H penalty — the two are independent levies.
• Flipkart India Private Limited v ACIT High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  Did the 2016 Office Memorandum wipe out Instruction No. 1914 and its hardship tests?
  No. The 2016 memorandum only partially modifies Instruction No. 1914; both must be read together. The tests of an unreasonably high-pitched assessment and of genuine hardship survive, and a mechanical demand for a percentage without reasons will not stand.
• Utanka Roy v Director of Income Tax High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  I am a non-resident. I worked on a foreign employer's ship outside India for most of the year and was paid by that foreign company. The department says the salary is taxable in India. Where does salary accrue?
  Where the services are rendered. The Calcutta High Court held that for a non-resident, whose total income is governed by s.5(2), the place of accrual has to be found, and for that purpose the place where the services were rendered is what matters; the source of the income is not relevant. A marine engineer who had rendered services outside India for 286 days and had received his remuneration from a foreign company had received income outside India, and both the s.143(1) intimation and the s.264 order were set aside.
• CIT v Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF) High CourtHelps taxpayer
  You did not appear before the CIT(A). Can the appeal simply be dismissed for non-prosecution?
  No. Once an appeal is filed the CIT(A) must dispose of it on merits by a written order stating the points for determination, the decision and the reasons. There is no power to dismiss for non-prosecution — and no right to withdraw either.
• T. Rajkumar v Union of India High CourtHelps departmentNo later treatment found
  Can Parliament override a tax treaty by notifying the other country as a notified jurisdictional area, and is section 94A constitutionally valid?
  The Madras High Court upheld section 94A(1) and dismissed all nine writ petitions, holding that the challenge to its constitutional validity was without merit and that the notification of 1 November 2013 specifying Cyprus as a notified jurisdictional area was equally unassailable. The Court reasoned that where a treaty partner fails to provide information, it is that partner and not section 94A which dilutes section 90(1)(c), and that the phrase 'any country or territory' in section 94A(1) cannot be read as excluding countries with which India has a treaty.
• Sony India Pvt Ltd v Additional CIT (Delhi) High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The AO rejected my stay application and issued a garnishee notice to my bank the same day. Is that permissible?
  The Delhi High Court held that issuing a notice under s.226(3) on the very day the stay application was rejected, and emptying the bank account two days later, carried an element of impropriety and arbitrariness, even though it could not be said to be illegal. The Court ordered the money reversed to the account and restrained coercive steps until the Tribunal decided the stay application.
• Maheshwari Agro Industries v Union of India High CourtHelps taxpayer
  My assessment is many times my returned income, the Assessing Officer has refused stay and attached my bank account. Can the Commissioner (Appeals) stay the demand while my appeal is pending?
  Yes. The Rajasthan High Court held that the first appellate authority - the Commissioner (Appeals) or Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) - has inherent, implied and ancillary power to stay recovery of a disputed demand while an appeal under section 246 or 246A is pending, even though the Act confers no express power. It followed ITO v. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi. It also held that section 220(6) is not a stay power at all but a discretion not to treat the assessee as in default, and that on a high-pitched assessment - in the spirit of CBDT Instruction No.95 of 1969, where the assessed income is twice the returned income or more - that discretion should ordinarily be exercised in the assessee's favour.
• Purnima Das v Union of India High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  Your bank account was attached while the stay application was still pending. Was that lawful?
  On this reasoning, no. Section 226(3)(iii) uses 'shall', so notice to you before attachment is mandatory, and where a stay application is on file with an appeal pending the officer should decide it before attaching.
• Marmo Home v DCIT ITATCuts both ways
  If I did not appeal the s.143(1) intimation, can I attack the same adjustment in the appeal against the s.143(3) order?
  The Tribunal rejected the argument that a s.143(1) intimation merges into the later s.143(3) assessment order. It held that the appealable orders listed together are independent of each other, so an adjustment made at the processing stage had to be challenged in an appeal against the intimation and could not be revived in the appeal against the scrutiny assessment.
• Orient Craft Ltd v DCIT ITATHelps department
  I withdrew my appeal against the section 143(1) intimation because the case went into scrutiny. Can the Assessing Officer now rectify under section 154 to bring back the intimation addition the scrutiny order left out?
  Yes, on these facts. The Delhi Bench of the Tribunal held that there was no merger of the section 143(1) intimation into the section 143(3) assessment, because the two orders proceeded on different issues, and that the intimation stood final once the assessee withdrew its appeal against it. The scrutiny order had started from the returned income instead of the income determined by the intimation, leaving the intimation's addition of Rs 12,82,64,760 out of the assessed figure. That, the Tribunal held, was a mistake apparent from the record, and the Assessing Officer was entitled to correct it under section 154.
• Dixit Rice Mill v DCIT (CPC) ITATCuts both ways
  Must an assessee first apply for rectification to CPC before appealing against a s.143(1) intimation?
  CPC made adjustments in a s.143(1) intimation without giving the assessee an opportunity, and the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal on the footing that the assessee should have applied online for rectification first. The Tribunal held that an appeal lies to the CIT(A) against a s.143(1) intimation and that there is no requirement in law to approach CPC for rectification before appealing.
• Statutory position — s.275 as substituted: penalty limitation now runs from the end of the QUARTER CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  I am checking whether a penalty order is out of time. Is the old six-months-from-the-end-of-the-month rule still the test?
  No. Section 275 has been substituted, and under the substituted provision no penalty order under Chapter XXI may be passed after the expiry of six months from the end of the QUARTER in which the triggering event occurs, with five separate triggers in clauses (a) to (e). The financial-year limb and the month-end limb of the old sub-section (1), and the old proviso giving one year from the end of the financial year in which the appellate order was received, are gone.
• Statutory position — s.200A: the CPC computes tax, interest and the s.234E fee on a TDS statement and issues an intimation CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both waysSuperseded by amendment
  CPC has sent me an intimation under section 200A with a late fee on it. What does section 200A actually let them compute, when did the fee limb go in, and can I appeal it?
  Section 200A is the machinery for processing a quarterly TDS statement under the Income-tax Act, 1961. Sub-section (1) runs (a) to (f): correct arithmetical errors and incorrect claims apparent from the statement, compute interest, compute the fee under section 234E, determine the sum payable or the refund, send an intimation, and grant the refund. The fee limb is clause (c), and the old clauses (c), (d) and (e) became (d), (e) and (f) when section 52 of the Finance Act, 2015 substituted clauses (c) to (f) for clauses (c) to (e) with effect from 1 June 2015 — so a submission that still calls the intimation clause (d) or the refund clause (e) is describing the law before that date. Under the 1961 Act the intimation cannot be sent after one year from the end of the financial year in which the statement is filed, and that limit sits in the proviso to sub-section (1), not in sub-section (2); under the successor provision, section 399 of the Income-tax Act, 2025, the same one-year limit is sub-section (2) itself. The intimation is deemed a notice of demand under the proviso to section 156, is appealable to the Commissioner (Appeals) under section 246A(1)(a), and can be rectified under section 154(1)(c). Whether a section 234E fee can be charged in a section 200A intimation for a quarter before 1 June 2015 is the point on which the High Courts have split — Karnataka and Kerala for the deductor, Gujarat, Rajasthan and Madras for the Revenue — and which High Court you are in decides it.
• Statutory position — the block charge: sixty per cent under section 113, interest at one and a half per cent, and a flat fifty per cent penalty under section 158BFA(2) CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  What will a block assessment actually cost my client, and is there any way to keep the penalty off?
  Tax at sixty per cent of the total undisclosed income of the block period under section 113, plus surcharge under the proviso; interest under section 158BFA(1) at one and a half per cent per month where the block return is late or not filed; and a penalty under section 158BFA(2) of a sum 'equal to fifty per cent of tax so leviable' on the undisclosed income determined by the Assessing Officer. The first proviso to section 158BFA(2) gives complete immunity from that penalty, and from penalty under sections 271AAD(1), 271D, 271DA and 271E for the block period, if four conditions are met — the return was furnished under section 158BC(1)(a), the tax on it was paid or the seized money offered for adjustment, evidence of payment accompanied the return, and no appeal is filed against the assessment of the income shown in the return.
• Statutory position — section 249: the fee, the thirty days, condonation, and the section 249(4) bar that must be cleared before the appeal is admitted CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  I am filing a first appeal to the Commissioner (Appeals). What exactly must I have done before the appeal can even be admitted, and from what date do the thirty days run?
  Section 249(4) is a bar on admission, not a ground of dismissal on the merits: no appeal under Chapter XX shall be admitted unless, at the time of filing, the assessee has paid the tax due on the income returned (clause (a)) or, where no return was filed, an amount equal to the advance tax that was payable (clause (b)). Only clause (b) can be relaxed — on an application by the appellant, the Joint Commissioner (Appeals) or Commissioner (Appeals) may for any good and sufficient reason recorded in writing exempt him from clause (b); there is no such escape from clause (a). The appeal itself must be presented within thirty days of the date of service of the notice of demand (or, in the other cases, of intimation of the order appealed against), and s.249(3) lets the appellate authority admit a late appeal on sufficient cause.
• Statutory position — s.245MA and the e-Dispute Resolution Scheme, 2022: ten lakh rupees of variation, fifty lakh rupees of returned income, and a committee that can waive the penalty CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both waysNo later treatment found
  The variation in my assessment order is about six lakh rupees and my returned income was thirty-eight lakh. Filing a first appeal will take years. Is there anything else I can do, and what do I lose if I go that way?
  There is one alternative, and it is narrow. Section 245MA lets the Central Government constitute Dispute Resolution Committees for persons the Board specifies, who may opt for dispute resolution in respect of a dispute arising from any variation in a 'specified order' and who fulfil the 'specified conditions'. The Explanation fixes two numbers: the aggregate sum of variations proposed or made in the order must not exceed ten lakh rupees, and where a return has been filed for the relevant assessment year the total income as per that return must not exceed fifty lakh rupees. An order based on a search under section 132, a requisition under section 132A, a survey under section 133A, or information received under an agreement referred to in section 90 or section 90A is outside the definition altogether. The committee may reduce or waive a penalty imposable under the Act and grant immunity from prosecution. The application is in Form No. 34BC under rule 44DAB with a fee of one thousand rupees. The section itself says nothing about section 246A at all.
• Statutory position — s.144C(15)(b): who is an "eligible assessee", the two limbs, and the substitution by Act No. 12 of 2020 with effect from 1 April 2020 that brought in every non-resident not being a company CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  The Assessing Officer has forwarded a draft order to our partnership firm, which is non-resident but is not a company, and there is no Transfer Pricing Officer's order in the case. Is the firm an eligible assessee at all, and does it matter which assessment year we are in?
  It matters a great deal which year you are in. As s.144C(15)(b) stands on the departmental edition stamped Year 2025 it reads: "(b) 'eligible assessee' means,— (i) any person in whose case the variation referred to in sub-section (1) arises as a consequence of the order of the Transfer Pricing Officer passed under sub-section (3) of section 92CA; and (ii) any non-resident not being a company, or any foreign company:". Sub-clause (ii) in that form was substituted by Act No. 12 of 2020 with effect from 1 April 2020 — footnote 97 on the departmental edition stamped Year 2021 reads verbatim "Sub. by the Act No. 12 of 2020, w.e.f. 1-4-2020.", and footnote 91 on the Year 2022 edition repeats it. Before that substitution, and as printed on the editions stamped Year 2009 and Year 2019 (No. 2), sub-clause (ii) read simply "any foreign company". So a non-resident firm, a non-resident individual, a non-resident association of persons — any non-resident that is not a company — became an eligible assessee in its own right on 1 April 2020 and was not one before, unless it was brought in by limb (i). Limb (i) is independent of status: it catches ANY person, resident or not, company or not, where the variation in sub-section (1) arises as a consequence of an order of the Transfer Pricing Officer under s.92CA(3). Two things were added with effect from 1 September 2024 by Act No. 15 of 2024: a proviso to clause (b) reading "Provided that such eligible assessee shall not include person referred to in sub-section (1) of section 158BA or other person referred to in section 158BD.", and s.144C(16), "The provisions of this section shall not apply to any proceedings under Chapter XIV-B."
• Sections 15 to 19 of the Black Money Act - the appeal machinery CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both waysNo later treatment found
  What are the time limits, forms and fees for an appeal under the Black Money Act, and where do they differ from the Income-tax Act?
  An appeal to the Commissioner (Appeals) lies under s.15(1) against the amount of tax on undisclosed foreign income or assets, against liability to be assessed under the Act, against a penalty, and against a rectification order or a refusal to rectify. It is filed in Form 2 with a fee of Rs 10,000 within thirty days, and Rule 6(4) bars admission unless the tax with penalty and interest on the liability not objected to has been paid. An appeal to the Tribunal lies within sixty days in Form 3 with a fee of Rs 25,000, with cross-objections in Form 4 within thirty days. An appeal to the High Court on a substantial question of law lies within 120 days. The critical departure from the Income-tax Act is that the power to condone delay is capped: one year before the Commissioner (Appeals) under s.15(4) and one year before the Tribunal under s.18(5), where ss.249(3) and 253(5) of the Income-tax Act contain no such ceiling.
• Statutory position — s.144C(1) to (5): the Assessing Officer must, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Act, forward a draft order to an eligible assessee before he makes any prejudicial variation, and the assessee has thirty days to accept or to object to the Dispute Resolution Panel AND to the Assessing Officer CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  The Assessing Officer has served a final assessment order on our foreign company raising a transfer pricing addition, without ever serving a draft order. Was he obliged to serve one first, and what was I supposed to do with it if he had?
  He was obliged to serve one first, if the company is an eligible assessee and the variation is prejudicial. Section 144C(1), as printed on the departmental edition stamped Year 2025, reads: "The Assessing Officer shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act, in the first instance, forward a draft of the proposed order of assessment (hereafter in this section referred to as the draft order) to the eligible assessee if he proposes to make, on or after the 1st day of October, 2009, any variation which is prejudicial to the interest of such assessee." Three things follow from the words themselves. The obligation is cast in the mandatory "shall"; it operates "notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act", so it overrides the ordinary assessment machinery; and it bites "in the first instance", that is, before and not after the order that would otherwise be the assessment order. Sub-section (2) gives the eligible assessee thirty days of the receipt by him of the draft order to do one of two things: "(a) file his acceptance of the variations to the Assessing Officer; or (b) file his objections, if any, to such variation with,— (i) the Dispute Resolution Panel; and (ii) the Assessing Officer." The "and" in clause (b) is conjunctive: an objection is filed with the Panel and with the Assessing Officer, not with one or the other. Sub-section (3) requires the officer to complete the assessment on the basis of the draft order if the assessee intimates acceptance of the variation or if no objections are received within the period specified in sub-section (2). Sub-section (4) fixes the time for that order — one month from the end of the month in which the acceptance is received or the period of filing objections expires, notwithstanding s.153 or s.153B. Sub-section (5) is the Panel's charging provision: where any objection is received under sub-section (2), the Panel "shall ... issue such directions, as it thinks fit, for the guidance of the Assessing Officer to enable him to complete the assessment".
• Statutory position — s.144C(8) with its Explanation, and s.144C(10) and (11): the Panel may confirm, reduce or ENHANCE but may not set aside or remit, the Explanation inserted by the Finance Act 2012 is retrospective to 1 April 2009, the direction binds the Assessing Officer, and no direction may issue without an opportunity of being heard — with what s.253 and s.246A provide about appeal CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  We are considering objecting to a draft order. Can the Dispute Resolution Panel make our position worse, can it send the matter back for fresh enquiry, and if we lose before it, do we appeal to the Commissioner (Appeals) or straight to the Tribunal?
  It can make your position worse; it cannot send the matter back; and the appeal lies to the Tribunal, not to the Commissioner (Appeals). Section 144C(8), as printed on the departmental edition stamped Year 2025, reads: "The Dispute Resolution Panel may confirm, reduce or enhance the variations proposed in the draft order so, however, that it shall not set aside any proposed variation or issue any direction under sub-section (5) for further enquiry and passing of the assessment order." The Explanation to that sub-section reads: "For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the power of the Dispute Resolution Panel to enhance the variation shall include and shall be deemed always to have included the power to consider any matter arising out of the assessment proceedings relating to the draft order, notwithstanding that such matter was raised or not by the eligible assessee." Footnote 76 on the departmental edition stamped Year 2014 records that Explanation verbatim as "Inserted by the Finance Act, 2012, w.r.e.f. 1-4-2009" — note the date: it is retrospective to 1 April 2009, the date the section itself was inserted from, and not 2012. The original edition stamped Year 2009 prints sub-section (8) with no Explanation at all. Sub-section (10): "Every direction issued by the Dispute Resolution Panel shall be binding on the Assessing Officer." Sub-section (11): "No direction under sub-section (5) shall be issued unless an opportunity of being heard is given to the assessee and the Assessing Officer on such directions which are prejudicial to the interest of the assessee or the interest of the revenue, respectively." Sub-section (9) resolves a difference of opinion among the members by the opinion of the majority. On appeal: s.246A(1)(a), on the departmental edition stamped Year 2025, excepts from the first appeal "an order passed in pursuance of directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel", and s.253(1)(d), on the edition stamped Year 2024 (No. 2), gives a direct right of appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against "an order passed by an Assessing Officer under sub-section (3), of section 143 or section 147 or section 153A or section 153C in pursuance of the directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel or an order passed under section 154 in respect of such order". Sub-sections (2A) and (3A) of s.253 are printed as "[***]" on the current editions, and the departmental edition stamped Year 2016 carries footnotes against both reading "Omtt. by Act No. 28 of 2016 (w.e.f. 1-6-2016)."

Listed strongest first: Supreme Court, then High Court, then Tribunal, then CBDT. Nothing here has yet been read in full by a chartered accountant — open an entry to see where it came from.