If I did not appeal the s.143(1) intimation, can I attack the same adjustment in the appeal against the s.143(3) order?
The Tribunal rejected the argument that a s.143(1) intimation merges into the later s.143(3) assessment order. It held that the appealable orders listed together are independent of each other, so an adjustment made at the processing stage had to be challenged in an appeal against the intimation and could not be revived in the appeal against the scrutiny assessment.
Decided by the ITAT (ITAT Delhi Bench 'A' — Madhumita Roy (Judicial Member) and Amitabh Shukla (Accountant Member); ITA No. 8833/Del/2025; assessment year 2018-19) on 2026-06-05, reported as IT Appeal No. 8833 (Del) of 2025 (ITAT Delhi Bench 'A'). It bears on section 246, section 246(1)(a), section 246A, section 143 of the Income Tax Act 1961, in Appeals matters.
Binding on the AO and CIT(A) within the Tribunal's jurisdiction. Persuasive elsewhere.
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Adjustments were made when the return was processed under section 143(1). A scrutiny assessment under section 143(3) followed, in which the Assessing Officer made no fresh additions and simply carried forward the figures already determined at processing. The assessee, having not effectively challenged the intimation, sought to dispute those adjustments in the appeal against the section 143(3) order. The Tribunal considered whether the doctrine of merger allowed this.
The categories of appealable order are independent of each other and the doctrine of merger does not apply. An assessee aggrieved by an order under section 143(1) cannot resort to a remedy by invoking section 143(3) and vice versa; adjustments made in processing ought to have been contested in the appeal against the section 143(1) order. Since the assessing officer made no fresh addition in the section 143(3) order, there was no cause for grievance in that appeal.
The Bench worked from section 246(1), which it set out and construed at para 9. The right of appeal, it said, has two essential components: the taxpayer must be aggrieved by an order of an Assessing Officer, and the order must be one of those in sub-clauses (a) to (h) of section 246(1); sub-clause (a) names orders under sections 143(1), 143(3) and 144. From that the Bench concluded that all three of those sections run independently, that an assessee aggrieved under any of them has to appeal against that order, and that an assessee aggrieved by an order under section 143(3) cannot resort to a remedy by invoking section 143(1) and vice versa - so the three sections in section 246(1)(a) are independent of each other and the doctrine of merger would not apply. Applied to the facts, the assessee ought to have contested the adjustment in an appeal against the order under section 143(1); and since the Assessing Officer made no fresh addition in the section 143(3) order and only adopted the figures already determined, there was no cause for grievance in that appeal. The assessee must therefore pick the right order to appeal against, and do it in time.
all the three sections in section 246(1)(a) are independent to each other and doctrine of merger would not apply
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Handle my notice → Ask a CA on WhatsAppThe Tribunal rejected the argument that a s.143(1) intimation merges into the later s.143(3) assessment order. It held that the appealable orders listed together are independent of each other, so an adjustment made at the processing stage had to be challenged in an appeal against the intimation and could not be revived in the appeal against the scrutiny assessment. This was decided by the ITAT (ITAT Delhi Bench 'A' — Madhumita Roy (Judicial Member) and Amitabh Shukla (Accountant Member); ITA No. 8833/Del/2025; assessment year 2018-19) and bears on section 246, section 246(1)(a), section 246A, section 143 of the Income Tax Act 1961. It is reported as IT Appeal No. 8833 (Del) of 2025 (ITAT Delhi Bench 'A'). If it applies to you, the first step is this: Treat every s.143(1) intimation with an adjustment as a separately appealable order and appeal it within 30 days, even if scrutiny is expected.
Adjustments were made when the return was processed under section 143(1). A scrutiny assessment under section 143(3) followed, in which the Assessing Officer made no fresh additions and simply carried forward the figures already determined at processing. The assessee, having not effectively challenged the intimation, sought to dispute those adjustments in the appeal against the section 143(3) order. The Tribunal considered whether the doctrine of merger allowed this. The matter was decided on 2026-06-05 by the ITAT (ITAT Delhi Bench 'A' — Madhumita Roy (Judicial Member) and Amitabh Shukla (Accountant Member); ITA No. 8833/Del/2025; assessment year 2018-19). On those facts the ITAT held as follows. The categories of appealable order are independent of each other and the doctrine of merger does not apply. An assessee aggrieved by an order under section 143(1) cannot resort to a remedy by invoking section 143(3) and vice versa; adjustments made in processing ought to have been contested in the appeal against the section 143(1) order. Since the assessing officer made no fresh addition in the section 143(3) order, there was no cause for grievance in that appeal.
The Bench worked from section 246(1), which it set out and construed at para 9. The right of appeal, it said, has two essential components: the taxpayer must be aggrieved by an order of an Assessing Officer, and the order must be one of those in sub-clauses (a) to (h) of section 246(1); sub-clause (a) names orders under sections 143(1), 143(3) and 144. From that the Bench concluded that all three of those sections run independently, that an assessee aggrieved under any of them has to appeal against that order, and that an assessee aggrieved by an order under section 143(3) cannot resort to a remedy by invoking section 143(1) and vice versa - so the three sections in section 246(1)(a) are independent of each other and the doctrine of merger would not apply. Applied to the facts, the assessee ought to have contested the adjustment in an appeal against the order under section 143(1); and since the Assessing Officer made no fresh addition in the section 143(3) order and only adopted the figures already determined, there was no cause for grievance in that appeal. The assessee must therefore pick the right order to appeal against, and do it in time. In the words reproduced by the source cited on this page: "all the three sections in section 246(1)(a) are independent to each other and doctrine of merger would not apply"
It was decided by the ITAT on 2026-06-05 and is reported as IT Appeal No. 8833 (Del) of 2025 (ITAT Delhi Bench 'A'). Binding on the AO and CIT(A) within the Tribunal's jurisdiction. Persuasive elsewhere. A Tribunal decision binds the assessing officer and the Commissioner (Appeals) within that Tribunal's jurisdiction, and is persuasive before other benches. It is not binding on a High Court, and a contrary co-ordinate bench decision will be argued against you, so check whether the point has been taken the other way before you build a reply around it. On section 246, section 246(1)(a), section 246A, section 143, the practical question is whether the facts of your own notice match the facts of this case closely enough for the same rule to apply.
It cuts both ways and is cited by both sides. The categories of appealable order are independent of each other and the doctrine of merger does not apply. An assessee aggrieved by an order under section 143(1) cannot resort to a remedy by invoking section 143(3) and vice versa; adjustments made in processing ought to have been contested in the appeal against the section 143(1) order. Since the assessing officer made no fresh addition in the section 143(3) order, there was no cause for grievance in that appeal. It arises in Appeals matters, on section 246, section 246(1)(a), section 246A, section 143 of the Income Tax Act 1961, and was decided by ITAT Delhi Bench 'A' — Madhumita Roy (Judicial Member) and Amitabh Shukla (Accountant Member); ITA No. 8833/Del/2025; assessment year 2018-19. Before relying on it, read the source linked on this page and check whether it has since been distinguished, overruled or overtaken by an amendment to the Income Tax Act. In practice the steps that follow from it are these. Do not rely on merger to keep a processing adjustment alive until the s.143(3) appeal - at least one bench says the remedy is lost. If a scrutiny order simply repeats the CPC figures, say so and cite the merger cases that go the other way; the law is not uniform. Where you have already lost the window, consider s.154 rectification or s.264 revision against the intimation rather than a merger argument. In the s.143(3) appeal, take the processing adjustment as an additional ground and support it with the Kanpur Coal Syndicate line on plenary powers, as a fallback.
Still good law. A separate check on the merger question found the case law divided: the Madras High Court in Tamil Nadu Magnesite Ltd v CIT and the Calcutta High Court in C.E.S.C. Ltd v DCIT have held that the intimation merges into the section 143(3) order, while recent Tribunal decisions (Areca Trust, Bangalore; Orient Craft, Delhi) restrict merger. Commentary confirms that both the intimation and the assessment order are independently appealable under section 246A. That finding was checked against a published source, which is linked on this page, on 2026-08-19. Checking whether an authority still stands matters as much as knowing what it held: a decision may be overruled on one point and survive on another, or the provision it interprets may have been amended since. Read the source and the editor's note on this page before relying on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal.
The order has now been read and the particulars are settled from it: ITAT Delhi Bench 'A', ITA No. 8833/Del/2025, assessment year 2018-19, heard 25 March 2026 and pronounced 5 June 2026, before Madhumita Roy (Judicial Member) and Amitabh Shukla (Accountant Member). The sentence quoted here is the Bench's own, at para 9. Note the statutory footing carefully before citing it: the Bench built its reasoning on section 246(1) and its sub-clause (a), not on section 246A. Section 246A appears in the order only in the assessee's grounds of appeal, and is retained in the tags here because it is the provision a reader will search under for the right of appeal, not because this Bench construed it. Read that together with the alert: High Court authority goes the other way on merger. This library shows the verification state of every entry openly. This entry has not yet been read in full by a chartered accountant. The summary reflects the sources listed on this page. Read the source before you rely on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
The categories of appealable order are independent of each other and the doctrine of merger does not apply. An assessee aggrieved by an order under section 143(1) cannot resort to a remedy by invoking section 143(3) and vice versa; adjustments made in processing ought to have been contested in the appeal against the section 143(1) order. Since the assessing officer made no fresh addition in the section 143(3) order, there was no cause for grievance in that appeal.
TaxSphere, “Marmo Home v DCIT”, https://taxnotice.vittsphere.com/caselaw/case/marmo-home-v-dcit-143-1-no-merger-separate-appeal/ (validity last checked 2026-08-19)
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