There is a direction but not a deadline. Section 250(6A) says the CIT(A), where it is possible, may hear and decide the appeal within one year from the end of the financial year in which it is filed. The words "where it is possible" and "may" carry no consequence for breach — nothing lapses, and no order becomes bad because the year has gone. The remedy for delay is a direction to decide, not relief on the merits.
The provision reads: "In every appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals), where it is possible, may hear and decide such appeal within a period of one year from the end of the financial year in which such appeal is filed before him under sub-section (1) of section 246A."
Three things about that wording decide the question. It is cast as "may" and not "shall". It is qualified by "where it is possible". And it attaches no consequence to non-compliance — nothing in s.250 or s.251 says what happens if the year passes. Compare it with s.250(6), in the same section, which says the order "shall be in writing and shall state the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reason for the decision", and with s.251(2), which says the CIT(A) "shall not" enhance without a reasonable opportunity of showing cause. Those are obligations; s.250(6A) is a direction addressed to the administration.
That matters because of what practitioners try to do with it. The delay does not make the assessment unenforceable, it does not extinguish the demand, and it gives no ground of appeal to the Tribunal on the merits. What it can support is a writ seeking a direction that the appeal be heard and decided within a stated period, and it strengthens an application under s.220(6) to hold the demand while the appeal is pending, since the delay is not the assessee's doing.
On the authorities I could reach, two points are worth recording, and both need checking before use. The Delhi High Court in All India Federation of Tax Practitioners v. Union of India (6 November 2023) dismissed a public interest petition seeking directions to Commissioners (Appeals) to dispose of pending appeals within the s.250(6A) period, on the footing that the Board's road map, the Finance Act 2023 provision for Joint and Additional Commissioners (Appeals) and the faceless appeal system already addressed the pendency. That is authority against the general grievance, not against an individual direction. Separately, a representation to the Board carried on a commentary site reports the Bombay High Court in City Centre Mall Nasik directing the first appellate authority to dispose of an appeal within three months where it had been pending for eight years, and reading "where it is possible" as covering delay attributable to the assessee's own conduct rather than delay at large. I could not obtain that judgment and it is recorded here as second-hand.
The practical position, then, is that the one-year direction is worth quoting in a letter and in a writ petition, and is worth nothing as a ground of appeal.
Delay before the first appellate authority is where recovery pressure builds, and the instinct is to look for a time bar. There is none, so the effort is better spent on the two things that do work — a stay application that uses the delay as a reason, and, if it comes to it, a writ seeking a direction to decide by a date. It also matters for expectation-setting: an appeal decided four years late is not defective for that reason and cannot be attacked on that ground before the Tribunal.
How wide are the first appellate authority's powers when it disposes of an appeal?
Can the CIT(A) use the enhancement power to tax a source of income the Assessing Officer never examined?
Can an appellate authority under the Income-tax Act throw out an appeal because the appellant did not turn up?
Your appeal is late. How strictly will 'sufficient cause' be read?
My appeal is pending before the Tribunal and recovery of the demand is going on. Can the Tribunal stay recovery when no section gives it that power?
Can you raise a ground before the CIT(A) that you never raised before the officer?
Is 20% of the disputed demand a fixed price for a stay, or can the officer take less?
My s.220(6) application against a penalty demand was rejected only because I filed no evidence of financial hardship. Is that a good enough reason?
Every page in this library links to what it was written from, so you can check it rather than take our word for it.
