Your appeal is late. How strictly will 'sufficient cause' be read?
Liberally. A litigant gains nothing by filing late, refusal can destroy a meritorious cause at the threshold, and where substantial justice and technical considerations clash, substantial justice must win.
Decided by the Supreme Court (M.P. Thakkar J and B.C. Ray J) on 1987-02-19, reported as AIR 1987 SC 1353; (1987) 2 SCC 107. It bears on section 246A, section 249, section 253 of the Income Tax Act 1961, in Appeals matters.
Every late appeal begins with this case. It does not make delay costless — you still need a reason and an affidavit — but it settles the standard against which the reason is judged.
Binding on every court and authority in India.
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The State of Jammu & Kashmir appealed against a decision enhancing compensation for land acquired for a public purpose by nearly Rs 14 lakh, an upward revision of 800 per cent from Rs 1,000 to Rs 8,000 per kanal, which also raised questions on the principles of valuation. The High Court dismissed the appeal as time-barred, it being four days beyond time, and refused to condone the delay. The State appealed by special leave.
The Supreme Court condoned the four-day delay, set aside the High Court's dismissal of the State's appeal as time-barred, and remitted the appeal to the High Court to be disposed of on merits after hearing both sides. 'Sufficient cause' in s.5 of the Limitation Act is elastic enough to let courts apply the law in a way that serves the ends of justice. The Court also held expressly that the fact that it was the State seeking condonation, and not a private party, was altogether irrelevant: equality before the law requires that all litigants, the State included, be treated the same, and there is no warrant for step-motherly treatment of the State as an applicant.
The power in s.5 exists so that courts can do substantial justice by disposing of matters on their merits, and a liberal approach is adopted on principle for six reasons the Court set out. A litigant ordinarily gains nothing by lodging an appeal late and in fact runs a serious risk. Refusing to condone can throw a meritorious matter out at the threshold and defeat justice, whereas the worst that follows from condoning is that the cause is decided on merits after hearing the parties. 'Every day's delay must be explained' is not to be applied pedantically - why not every hour's, every second's - but rationally and pragmatically. Where substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, substantial justice is to be preferred, because the other side has no vested right in injustice being done through a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is deliberate, culpably negligent or mala fide. And the judiciary is respected not for its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it can remove injustice and is expected to do so. On the State's position, the Court acknowledged that delay by an impersonal machinery, with its note-making and file-pushing, is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but held that the State represents the collective cause of the community and does not deserve the status of a litigant non grata.
When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
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Handle my notice → Ask a CA on WhatsAppLiberally. A litigant gains nothing by filing late, refusal can destroy a meritorious cause at the threshold, and where substantial justice and technical considerations clash, substantial justice must win. This was decided by the Supreme Court (M.P. Thakkar J and B.C. Ray J) and bears on section 246A, section 249, section 253 of the Income Tax Act 1961. It is reported as AIR 1987 SC 1353; (1987) 2 SCC 107. Every late appeal begins with this case. It does not make delay costless — you still need a reason and an affidavit — but it settles the standard against which the reason is judged. If it applies to you, the first step is this: File the condonation application with the appeal, not after a query — with a dated affidavit setting out the cause.
The State of Jammu & Kashmir appealed against a decision enhancing compensation for land acquired for a public purpose by nearly Rs 14 lakh, an upward revision of 800 per cent from Rs 1,000 to Rs 8,000 per kanal, which also raised questions on the principles of valuation. The High Court dismissed the appeal as time-barred, it being four days beyond time, and refused to condone the delay. The State appealed by special leave. The matter was decided on 1987-02-19 by the Supreme Court (M.P. Thakkar J and B.C. Ray J). On those facts the Supreme Court held as follows. The Supreme Court condoned the four-day delay, set aside the High Court's dismissal of the State's appeal as time-barred, and remitted the appeal to the High Court to be disposed of on merits after hearing both sides. 'Sufficient cause' in s.5 of the Limitation Act is elastic enough to let courts apply the law in a way that serves the ends of justice. The Court also held expressly that the fact that it was the State seeking condonation, and not a private party, was altogether irrelevant: equality before the law requires that all litigants, the State included, be treated the same, and there is no warrant for step-motherly treatment of the State as an applicant.
The power in s.5 exists so that courts can do substantial justice by disposing of matters on their merits, and a liberal approach is adopted on principle for six reasons the Court set out. A litigant ordinarily gains nothing by lodging an appeal late and in fact runs a serious risk. Refusing to condone can throw a meritorious matter out at the threshold and defeat justice, whereas the worst that follows from condoning is that the cause is decided on merits after hearing the parties. 'Every day's delay must be explained' is not to be applied pedantically - why not every hour's, every second's - but rationally and pragmatically. Where substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, substantial justice is to be preferred, because the other side has no vested right in injustice being done through a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is deliberate, culpably negligent or mala fide. And the judiciary is respected not for its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it can remove injustice and is expected to do so. On the State's position, the Court acknowledged that delay by an impersonal machinery, with its note-making and file-pushing, is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but held that the State represents the collective cause of the community and does not deserve the status of a litigant non grata. In the words reproduced by the source cited on this page: "When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay."
It was decided by the Supreme Court on 1987-02-19 and is reported as AIR 1987 SC 1353; (1987) 2 SCC 107. Binding on every court and authority in India. A Supreme Court decision binds every assessing officer, every Commissioner (Appeals), every bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and every High Court in India. An officer who declines to follow it is acting contrary to law, and that refusal is itself a ground of appeal. On section 246A, section 249, section 253, the practical question is whether the facts of your own notice match the facts of this case closely enough for the same rule to apply.
It cuts both ways and is cited by both sides. The Supreme Court condoned the four-day delay, set aside the High Court's dismissal of the State's appeal as time-barred, and remitted the appeal to the High Court to be disposed of on merits after hearing both sides. 'Sufficient cause' in s.5 of the Limitation Act is elastic enough to let courts apply the law in a way that serves the ends of justice. The Court also held expressly that the fact that it was the State seeking condonation, and not a private party, was altogether irrelevant: equality before the law requires that all litigants, the State included, be treated the same, and there is no warrant for step-motherly treatment of the State as an applicant. It arises in Appeals matters, on section 246A, section 249, section 253 of the Income Tax Act 1961, and was decided by M.P. Thakkar J and B.C. Ray J. Before relying on it, read the source linked on this page and check whether it has since been distinguished, overruled or overtaken by an amendment to the Income Tax Act. In practice the steps that follow from it are these. Explain the period, not just the fact of delay; account for the whole gap even if the standard is liberal. Attach documentary proof of the cause where any exists — medical records, correspondence, portal screenshots.
Still good law. Not overruled, but materially diluted. In State of Odisha v Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School (9 February 2026, Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma JJ) the Supreme Court discussed Katiji at length and declined to apply its liberal framework, tracing the shift through Postmaster General v Living Media India Ltd (2012) and University of Delhi v Union of India (2020), and holding that condonation 'cannot be claimed as a matter of right' and that bureaucratic process is not sufficient cause. The Court dismissed an 11-year delay by a State litigant as 'utterly lethargic, tardy and indolent'. The page this note was read from was a commercial publisher's write-up and has been removed as a source; the status has not been re-verified against the judgment itself. No source could be cited for that finding. Checking whether an authority still stands matters as much as knowing what it held: a decision may be overruled on one point and survive on another, or the provision it interprets may have been amended since. Read the source and the editor's note on this page before relying on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal.
This is not a tax decision - it arises under s.5 of the Limitation Act in a land acquisition appeal, and is applied to income tax appeals by later benches. Describe it accurately when citing. The sections listed on this entry are where it is applied, not sections decided. Note who won: the applicant seeking condonation was the State, and the judgment holds in terms that the State is entitled to the same treatment as any other litigant. The merits of the valuation dispute were not decided; they were remitted to the High Court. Civil Appeal No. 460 of 1987, decided 19 February 1987 by Thakkar and B.C. Ray JJ. This library shows the verification state of every entry openly. This entry has not yet been read in full by a chartered accountant. The summary reflects the sources listed on this page. Read the source before you rely on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
The Supreme Court condoned the four-day delay, set aside the High Court's dismissal of the State's appeal as time-barred, and remitted the appeal to the High Court to be disposed of on merits after hearing both sides. 'Sufficient cause' in s.5 of the Limitation Act is elastic enough to let courts apply the law in a way that serves the ends of justice. The Court also held expressly that the fact that it was the State seeking condonation, and not a private party, was altogether irrelevant: equality before the law requires that all litigants, the State included, be treated the same, and there is no warrant for step-motherly treatment of the State as an applicant.
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