Section 143(1)

What a section 143(1) notice is

Intimation. Computer-processed your return and found a difference. Most common notice by far. It is a low-severity notice in the processing family under the Income Tax Act 1961.

If you ignore it: Adjustment stands. Demand becomes payable and interest runs.

Time to reply: commonly stated as 30 days from the date of the notice — but the date printed on your own notice governs, and it overrides any general figure. This is a portal response window, not a statutory bar. Rectification u/s 154 remains available afterwards.

Under the Income Tax Act 2025: section 270(1). But read that as reference, not as the provision to cite. Under s.536(2) of the 2025 Act, a proceeding for any tax year beginning before 1 April 2026 stays under the Income Tax Act 1961 from the notice through to the appeal — so a notice arriving today for an earlier year is a 1961 Act matter, whatever today's date is.

Section 143(1) — the law in short

What the courts have decided on section 143(1), in one screen. Read this first; open an entry when you need the facts, the reasoning and the source.

• Dy. CIT v M.R. Shah Logistics Pvt Ltd Supreme CourtHelps department
  Another company declared the cash it put into my share capital under the Income Declaration Scheme. Does that stop the Department reopening my assessment on the same share money?
  No. The Supreme Court set aside the Gujarat High Court's order quashing a section 148 notice and allowed the assessing officer to complete the reassessment. The immunity in section 192 of the Finance Act 2016 runs to the declarant alone and only for limited purposes; a declaration by Garg Logistics could not immunise the assessee, a non-declarant. The reopening was in any case based on material seized in the search on an accommodation entry provider and correlated with the assessee's Registrar of Companies filings, not on the declaration. Where there is objective tangible material, the sufficiency of that material cannot dictate the validity of the notice.
• Vodafone Idea Ltd v ACIT Supreme CourtHelps departmentSuperseded by amendment
  My refund is being held back because scrutiny is pending. Can the officer simply sit on it?
  Not for AYs 2017-18 to 2022-23 without doing the statutory paperwork first. Section 241A required the Assessing Officer to separately record satisfaction that granting the refund would adversely affect the revenue, and to obtain the PCIT's previous approval with reasons in writing. On these facts the Court found that those steps had been taken — satisfaction recorded, approval obtained, order passed in time — so the withholding was upheld and the appeal was dismissed; the ₹733 crores the Court directed flowed from the final assessment order under s.143(3) for AY 2014-15, not from any failure under s.241A, and even that direction was made subject to any proceedings the Revenue might initiate, including set-off under s.245. For years before AY 2017-18 s.143(1D) governed, and issue of a s.143(2) notice was itself enough to hold back the refund until assessment was complete. Section 241A ceased to apply from 1 April 2023 (Finance Act 2023); for AY 2023-24 onwards the equivalent power, in the same terms, is s.245(2).
• Sky Light Hospitality LLP v ACIT Supreme CourtHelps department
  The reassessment notice was issued in the name of my old private limited company, which had already been converted into an LLP and dissolved. I am told that makes the notice void. Is that always right?
  Not always, and this is the decision the Revenue will cite against you. The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the issue of the notice in the name of the dissolved private limited company was an error and technical lapse which caused no prejudice, that there was no doubt and debate that the notice was meant for the petitioner and no one else, and that human errors and mistakes cannot and should not nullify proceedings which are otherwise valid — that being the effect and mandate of section 292B. The Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition with the words: 'In the peculiar facts of this case, we are convinced that wrong name given in the notice was merely a clerical error which could be corrected under Section 292B of the Income Tax Act.'
• Dy CIT v Zuari Estate Development & Investment Co Ltd Supreme CourtHelps department
  My return was only processed under section 143(1) and now the officer wants to reopen it. Can I say he is changing his opinion?
  No. The Supreme Court held that where a return is accepted under section 143(1), no assessment order is made and no opinion is formed, so the change of opinion objection simply does not arise. The point was held to be squarely covered by Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers. The Bombay High Court had quashed the reopening notice without addressing this contention at all, and its judgment was set aside. The Tribunal's order, which had merely followed the High Court, went with it, and the appeal was remitted to the Tribunal to be decided on merits.
• CIT v Tulsyan NEC Ltd Supreme CourtHelps taxpayer
  The Assessing Officer computed interest under s.234B and s.234C first and only then gave me credit for MAT under s.115JAA. My refund has turned into a demand. Is that the right order?
  No. MAT credit admissible under s.115JAA must be set off against the tax payable before interest under s.234B and s.234C is calculated, not after. The right to the set-off crystallises when the tax under s.115JA (now s.115JB) is paid and does not depend on any determination by the Assessing Officer, so an assessee may take the credit into account even when estimating advance tax on its current income.
• ACIT v Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers P Ltd Supreme CourtHelps department
  My return was only processed under 143(1). Does that stop the department reopening it later?
  No. An intimation under s.143(1) is not an assessment, so it does not bar the officer from later starting reassessment proceedings.
• Manohar Ramabtar Jhunjhunwala v PCIT High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My employer deducted tax but never deposited it, so the credit was denied on processing, a demand now sits on the portal and my later years' refunds are being eaten by it. Do I get the credit and the refund, or only a promise that nobody will recover from me?
  You get the credit and the refund, not merely a bar on recovery. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, hearing a batch of such petitions with the assistance of an amicus, held that where an assessee establishes that tax was in fact deducted at source, the Department must grant appropriate TDS credit and cannot recover the corresponding amount from the deductee directly or indirectly, that the consequential relief including refund must follow, and that pending disposal of a credit application the demand must be marked in the system as stayed or not recoverable so that no coercive recovery or refund adjustment takes place.
• Biswajit Deb v Union of India High CourtHelps taxpayerJudgment not reachable
  The recorded reasons admit the AO had no time to verify my transactions. Is the reopening valid?
  No. The Gauhati High Court quashed the s.148 notice on two independent grounds: an officer who records that he could not identify the transactions for want of time has formed no reason to believe, and the s.151 approval was mechanical.
• Kern Enterprise Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My client's New Zealand company filed Indian returns and paid tax believing its place of effective management was in India, and New Zealand has since taxed the same income. Can it get the Indian tax back?
  Yes, on these facts. The Madras High Court quashed the order refusing rectification and refund, holding that CBDT Circular No. 8 of 2017 — under which section 6(3)(ii) does not apply to a company with turnover or gross receipts of Rs 50 crore or less in a financial year — is binding on the Department, so the company was not liable to Indian tax at all and the tax it had paid ought to have been refunded, with the Court adding that tax paid in excess must be refunded notwithstanding the procedure in section 155(14A) where the income was taxed in a foreign country.
• Hosur Bata Employees Union v Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax High CourtCuts both waysNo later treatment found
  My clients settled a wage dispute and took VRS and compensation for loss of future salary in two instalments. The company deducted TDS on the whole amount without giving s.89 relief. Can we make the employer refund it?
  No — not from the employer. The Madras High Court held that the employer cannot be found at fault for deducting tax at source in the absence of an application in Form 10E under Rule 21A, because s.192(2A) is what obliges the employer to compute and give s.89 relief and it operates only on the particulars the employee furnishes. The Court's remedy was to direct the employees to file returns under s.139(1) within thirty days and the Income Tax Officer to process them under s.143(1) and refund within two months.
• Bedmutha Industries Ltd v ACIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The Assessing Officer refused me s.244A interest for the years the refund sat unpaid, saying my bank details were wrong. Can he do that on his own?
  No. Section 244A(2) allows a period to be excluded only where a question arises as to the period to be excluded, and that question must be decided by the Principal Chief Commissioner, Chief Commissioner, Principal Commissioner or Commissioner — the Assessing Officer has no jurisdiction to decide it and deny interest on that basis. Further, the delay contemplated by s.244A(2) is delay in the proceedings resulting in the refund, meaning the s.143(1) intimation and the s.143(3) assessment, not administrative delay in remitting a refund already determined.
• M/s Kanoria Energy and Infrastructure Ltd v CCIT High CourtHelps taxpayerHigh Courts differ
  The Commissioner rejected my Form 10-IC condonation application as time-barred under Circular 17/2024, counting from the date of my application and ignoring that I had actually filed the Form years earlier. Is that right?
  No. The Rajasthan High Court set aside the rejection, holding that it was legally unsustainable because it conflated the date of filing of Form 10-IC with the date of the formal condonation application. The Form having been filed on 30 January 2023, within three years of the end of AY 2020-21, and the s.115BAA option having been unambiguously exercised in the return itself, the delay was condoned and the matter remanded with a direction that the authority not consider delay or limitation again.
• P. S. Srijan Height Developers v ACIT High CourtCuts both waysHigh Courts differ
  The CPC gave me a section 245 intimation saying I had 21 days to respond, then adjusted my whole refund the very next day against a demand for a year that is under appeal. What do I actually get back, and do I get interest?
  You get back everything adjusted in excess of 20 per cent of the disputed demand, but on these facts you get no interest on it. The Calcutta High Court held that adjusting the refund one day after issuing a 21-day section 245 intimation was a clear breach of the power to adjust and an abject violation of the law governing section 245, and directed refund of the excess over 20 per cent within eight weeks — but refused interest because the assessee had waited about two years before coming to court, and refused to touch an earlier adjustment made three years before the writ petition on the ground of laches.
• Diebold Nixdorf India Pvt. Ltd. v CBDT High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  I opted for s.115BAA in my return but filed Form 10-IC late, and my return itself was belated. CBDT has refused to condone the delay because Circular No. 6/2022 requires the return to have been filed within the s.139(1) due date. Is that a good reason?
  No. The Bombay High Court held that filing the return within the s.139(1) due date is not a condition precedent for claiming the benefit of s.115BAA — s.115BAA(5) requires the declaration in Form 10-IC to be filed within that time, not the return — so the first condition in the Board's circular cannot by itself defeat a condonation application. And even where the circular's conditions are not met, the Board retains its independent power under s.119(2)(b) to condone the delay dehors the circular. The delay of 23 days was condoned and the assessment directed to be modified to tax the company under s.115BAA.
• Saurav Chachra v CBDT High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  I have a stay on my demand and they still adjusted my refund against it. Can they do that?
  Not on these facts. The Revenue conceded that a refund of Rs. 14,80,270 for AY 2025-26 had been set off against the AY 2018-19 demand even though recovery of that demand stood stayed under s.220(6), and the Court found force in the submission that the action was illegal and arbitrary and the authorities' recourse perfunctory, directing the refund to be released with s.244A interest within four weeks. It gave no reasons beyond accepting that submission: it did not hold that adjustment is a mode of recovery, did not consider s.245, and did not formally quash the adjustment.
• Herald Global Ventures Private Limited v CCIT-1, Ahmedabad High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My start-up's Inter-Ministerial Board certificate for s.80-IAC was refused, so I switched to s.115BAA and filed Form 10-IC 53 days late for AY 2022-23. There is no blanket circular for that year. Can the delay be condoned?
  Yes. The Gujarat High Court quashed the rejection under s.119(2)(b) and directed the competent authority to accept Form 10-IC for AY 2022-23. Where the assessee was otherwise eligible for s.115BAA, refusing to condone a 53-day delay produced a tax liability of Rs. 50,72,890 at the normal rate, and that financial consequence is itself the genuine hardship s.119(2)(b) is designed to relieve.
• Bax India Ventures v CPC High CourtHelps taxpayer
  CPC made a section 143(1)(a) adjustment without first putting the proposed adjustment to me. The department says my reply could not have changed anything. Does that save the intimation?
  No. The Bombay High Court held that the first proviso to section 143(1)(a) is mandatory, so no intimation making an adjustment to the return can be passed unless the proposed adjustment is first intimated to the assessee and he is given a chance to respond. The Court rejected the department's argument that giving the intimation would have been an exercise in futility, pointing out that the assessee could, for example, have obtained an order condoning the delay in filing Form 10-IC. The intimation of 1 December 2025 was quashed and set aside, and the department was left free to issue the notice, consider the response and pass a fresh intimation.
• Rama Industries Ltd v PCIT Mumbai-3 High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The portal would not accept Form 10-IC for FY 2019-20 before the Circular 6/2022 cut-off of 30 June 2022, and I filed it physically eleven days late. Is the s.115BAA benefit lost?
  No. The Bombay High Court quashed the rejection under s.119(2)(b) and condoned the delay where the assessee had selected s.115BAA in the return, had saved a draft Form 10-IC on the portal before the cut-off but could not submit it because the Financial Year 2019-20 option was not available, and filed a physical Form with the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer eleven days after the extended date.
• K2 Family Private Trust v DCIT — the return utility cannot block the set-off order the assessee is entitled to claim High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The e-filing utility forces my client's STT-paid short-term loss against STT-paid gains first and will not let him claim the sequence he wants. Is his only option to file the return the utility's way and argue later?
  No. The Bombay High Court held that the procedure of filing a return cannot bar an assessee from making a claim under the Act which he feels he is entitled to, and directed the CBDT to modify the utility so that the petitioner could set off the STT-paid short-term capital loss against the non-STT short-term capital gains first, failing which the Assessing Officer was to accept a revised return for AY 2025-26 in paper mode.
• People's Mobile Hospitals v CIT (Exemption) High CourtHelps taxpayer
  Form 10 was 51 days late because our accountant left mid-year, but it was on the file before the return was processed. The Commissioner still refused to condone. What now?
  The Bombay High Court quashed the refusal and condoned the delay itself. Where the delay is short, unexplained by any wilful default, and the Form was on record when the return was processed, refusing condonation is a pedantic rather than a justice-oriented approach and produces genuine hardship within the meaning of s.119(2)(b).
• Cell Com Teleservices Private Limited v Union of India High CourtHelps taxpayer
  I opted for the 22 per cent rate in my return but missed filing Form 10-IC by the due date. The Commissioner refused to condone the delay. Can the High Court help?
  Yes. The Allahabad High Court quashed the Principal Commissioner's order refusing condonation under section 119(2)(b) and directed him to condone the delay, accept Form 10-IC for assessment year 2020-21 and recompute the tax liability under section 115BAA. Filing Form 10-IC before the return is not mandatory; where genuine hardship is shown the delay may be condoned, and section 119(2)(b) is to be read as beneficial legislation. The Commissioner had taken an excessively strict view, ignored his own Assessing Officer's favourable report, and exercised his discretion arbitrarily.
• Mirae Asset Venture Investments India Pvt Ltd v PCIT-6 High CourtHelps taxpayer
  I filed my return in time and ticked s.115BAA in the ITR-6, but Form 10-IC went in late and the CPC has already processed the return and raised a demand. Can the delay still be condoned?
  Yes, for AY 2021-22, if the three conditions in CBDT Circular No. 19/2023 dated 23 October 2023 are met. The Bombay High Court held that the Circular imposes no fourth condition — neither the fact that the return was already processed under s.143(1) and a demand raised, nor the fact that the shortfall was detected by the Assessing Officer rather than volunteered, takes the case outside it.
• Huawei Telecommunications India P Ltd v ACIT High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  There is interim protection against recovery for that year. Can the department still adjust my refund?
  No. Adjustment of a refund against a demand may itself amount to a coercive measure, so doing it for years already covered by interim protection is not a neutral accounting entry. For the year where no prior s.245 notice or intimation had been issued at all, the mandatory procedure had simply not been followed. The adjustment was quashed and the refund ordered released with applicable interest within eight weeks.
• Royal LED Equipments Pvt. Ltd. v CCIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  I claimed the 15 per cent rate under s.115BAB in my return but the portal would not accept Form 10-ID before the due date. My s.119(2)(b) application was rejected before Circular No. 17/2024 came out, so the Department says it can do nothing. Where does that leave me?
  The Gujarat High Court set the rejection aside and directed the authorities to accept the Form 10-ID filed on 12 September 2022 as legal and valid. Once the benefit is claimed in the return, the filing of the separate form is merely procedural and should not be denied where the assessee shows sufficient cause; and the very fact that the Board had to issue Circulars 6/2022, 19/2023 and 17/2024 established that assessees had faced a real problem in filing Forms 10-IC and 10-ID in time.
• Bahar Infocons P Ltd v PCIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  I over-reported income by mistake and the time to file a revised return has gone. Can it be fixed?
  The Commissioner cannot reject a revision application under s.264 solely because a revised return was not filed within the s.139(5) time. The power exists to relieve against over-assessment and reaches a mistake the assessee detects after the assessment is complete. Here provisions for bonus written back had been taxed twice across assessment years 2019-20 to 2021-22, and the revision applications were sent back to the Principal Commissioner to decide the adjustment on merits - the Court did not itself order relief.
• Munchener Ruckversicherungs Gesellshaft AG v CIT (International Taxation) High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The deductor credited the TDS late, so it turned up in 26AS only after I had filed. The department says I should have revised my return, and refuses credit because I never offered the income to tax. Is there a way back?
  Yes - s.155(14). The Delhi High Court held that s.155(14) places the Assessing Officer under a statutory obligation to amend the assessment or intimation once the certificate or the updated Form 26AS is produced, and that the sub-section neither contemplates nor mandates the original return being amended or revised. It also held that the Commissioner was wrong to require the income to be offered to tax where the assessee had consistently and uncontestedly said the receipt was not taxable in India.
• Gopal Vazirani v Principal Commissioner of Income Tax High CourtHelps taxpayerUnder appeal
  The Commissioner says the proviso to section 240 shows that returned income is sacrosanct, so he cannot give my client a refund below what he himself returned. Is that right?
  No. The proviso to section 240 bites only in the two situations it describes — an assessment set aside or cancelled with a fresh assessment directed, and an assessment annulled — and says nothing about a case where neither has happened. There is no provision in the Act denying a refund of excess tax where the income ultimately assessable is less than the returned income; an assessee can be asked to pay only such tax as is legally due and nothing more.
• Avana Global FZCO v DCIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  My refund was simply taken against another year's demand and I was never told. Does the notice have to come first?
  Yes. Section 245(1) permits a set-off only after an intimation in writing of the proposed action. The Bombay High Court held that adjustments made without that intimation are contrary to the words of the statute and to its own settled decisions, made the rule absolute and ordered the refunds paid within four weeks. It also noted that no reasons had been recorded under s.245(2) either.
• K S Bilawala v PCIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  I paid tax on a receipt that was never taxable and the deadline has passed. Is that genuine hardship?
  Yes. Genuine hardship under s.119(2)(b) is not confined to financial distress — where an assessee feels he has paid more tax than he was liable to pay, that is hardship enough to warrant condonation. The rejection was set aside and the authority directed to condone the delay and decide the matter on its substantive merits.
• Blackstone Capital Partners Singapore VI v ACIT High CourtHelps taxpayerUnder appeal
  I hold a valid TRC. Can the AO go behind it and reopen my assessment for lack of substance?
  No. A valid tax residency certificate is statutorily the only evidence required to be eligible for treaty benefit, and the Indian authorities cannot disregard a certificate issued by another State's tax authority. Since Article 13(4) of the India-Singapore treaty then protected the capital gains, no income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment and the s.148 notice was invalidated.
• Jet Privilege Pvt Ltd v DCIT High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  Your refund was adjusted against an old demand. Did they have to tell you first?
  Yes, and beforehand. Intimation under s.245 must be given before the set-off is effected — not at the same time, and not afterwards. Failure to do so made the adjustment wholly illegal, and the refund was ordered with interest.
• Aafreen Fatima Fazal Abbas Sayed v ACIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  I let the 30 days to appeal my 143(1) intimation lapse. Can I still go to the PCIT under s.264?
  Yes. Section 264(4) bars revision only in the situations it lists, essentially where an appeal is pending or has been decided; letting the appeal period run out without filing is not one of them. The revision application had to be decided on merits, and no formal waiver of the right of appeal could be demanded, because a right not exercised does not need to be waived.
• Tata Communications Ltd v Union of India High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  Your refund was adjusted against demands that were already stayed. Is that lawful?
  No. Section 245 requires previous intimation of the proposed adjustment, not simultaneous intimation — and the demands adjusted were covered by subsisting stay orders. The full refund was ordered paid within four weeks.
• GE Capital Mauritius Overseas Investments v DCIT High CourtHelps departmentSuperseded by amendment
  The s.241A order gives detailed reasons I say are legally wrong. Will the High Court quash it in a writ?
  Usually not. The Delhi High Court dismissed this petition, holding that in a challenge to a s.241A order the writ court will not determine the tax liability that the pending scrutiny is meant to determine. Its scrutiny is confined to whether there is any basis at all for the opinion that granting the refund would adversely affect the revenue; only in a gross case, where nothing at all controverts the return, will it quash the order. The year was AY 2018-19 and the provision was s.241A, which ceased to apply from 1 April 2023; for AY 2023-24 onwards the withholding power is s.245(2), and this reasoning about the limits of writ review reads across to an order under that provision.
• Trust for Reaching the Unreached v CIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  Our audit report was not e-filed with the return and exemption was denied. Can the delay be condoned?
  Yes. The requirement to furnish the audit report with the return is procedural and directory, so exemption under ss.11 and 12 cannot be refused merely for late filing. The Commissioner's refusal to condone was set aside because the s.119(2)(b) discretion must be exercised equitably and judiciously, not on an exclusively pro-revenue view.
• Kunal Structure (India) Pvt Ltd v Dy CIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  My return was defective and I cured the defect ten months later. Does the s.143(2) clock run from the original filing or from the day I removed the defect?
  From the original filing. Where the defect is removed within the time the Assessing Officer allowed, the return relates back to the date on which it was originally furnished, and the six-month limitation for a s.143(2) notice is counted from the end of the financial year in which that original return was filed. On the facts the scrutiny notice was issued nearly a year after that period had run out and was held barred. The Revenue's special leave petition was dismissed.
• Maple Logistics P Ltd v Pr Chief CIT High CourtHelps taxpayerSuperseded by amendment
  My refund is being withheld under s.241A because my case is in scrutiny. Is a scrutiny notice enough?
  No — but fix the year first. For AYs 2017-18 to 2022-23 the return had to be processed and the refund determined, and s.241A was the only route to hold it back: it needed a written, reasoned, approved order showing why paying THIS refund was likely to hurt the revenue, and repeating the words of the section, or pointing to the s.143(2) notice, is not a reason. Section 241A ceased to apply from 1 April 2023 (Finance Act 2023) and the withholding power now sits in s.245(2), which requires the same written reasons and the same previous approval of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner. The reasoning below transfers, but for AY 2023-24 onwards the order to demand, and to attack, is a s.245(2) order.
• R. Banumathy v Commissioner of Income Tax-I High CourtHelps taxpayer
  My client missed the s.10(10C) exemption in the original return, filed a revised return that the officer lodged as invalid, and the Commissioner rejected the s.264 revision. Is there anything left?
  Yes. The Madras High Court set aside the s.264 order and directed refund of the excess tax, holding that the exemption under s.10(10C) up to five lakh rupees was available to the employee of a bank under an early retirement option scheme and that Rule 2BA cannot cut down the section. It added that where an assessee pays excess tax it is the Department's bounden duty to tell him of the reliefs he is entitled to and to refund the excess.
• Naresh Bhavani Shah (HUF) v CIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The HUF's money was invested in the karta's own name, so the TDS certificate and the 26AS entry carry his individual PAN. The HUF offered the interest to tax and the karta claimed no credit. The department says PAN mismatch, no credit. What now?
  The credit was directed to be given to the HUF. The Court held that the ordinary route is Rule 37BA(2) - the deductee files a declaration with the deductor, and the deductor issues the certificate in the name of the person entitled to credit - and that this procedure must invariably be completed before credit can be claimed where the certificate shows someone else's name and PAN. But it also held there is no dearth of power in the department to give credit in a genuine case, and on these special facts it directed credit on the karta filing an affidavit that the money and the income were not his and that he had claimed no credit.
• PCIT v RMG Polyvinyl (I) Ltd High CourtHelps taxpayer
  My reassessment notice says I never filed a return and gets the amount wrong. Does that make the reopening bad?
  Yes, on these facts. The Delhi High Court dismissed the Revenue's appeal, holding that no error had been committed by the Tribunal in finding the reopening under section 147 bad in law. The reasons recorded contained two glaring errors: the Assessing Officer proceeded on the footing that no return had been filed when one had been filed and processed under section 143(1), and put the accommodation entries at Rs 1.56 crore when the correct figure on his own assessment order was Rs 78 lakh. That showed a failure of application of mind, and the Court could not discern the link between the tangible material and the formation of the reasons to believe.
• PCIT v Meenakshi Overseas Pvt Ltd High CourtHelps taxpayerSuperseded by amendment
  The reasons recorded just repeat what the Investigation Wing said. Is that enough to reopen?
  No. The satisfaction that s.147 requires is the Assessing Officer's own and cannot be borrowed. Reasons that reproduce another authority's conclusions, without showing the link from tangible material to the belief, do not sustain a reopening.
• Utanka Roy v Director of Income Tax High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  I am a non-resident. I worked on a foreign employer's ship outside India for most of the year and was paid by that foreign company. The department says the salary is taxable in India. Where does salary accrue?
  Where the services are rendered. The Calcutta High Court held that for a non-resident, whose total income is governed by s.5(2), the place of accrual has to be found, and for that purpose the place where the services were rendered is what matters; the source of the income is not relevant. A marine engineer who had rendered services outside India for 286 days and had received his remuneration from a foreign company had received income outside India, and both the s.143(1) intimation and the s.264 order were set aside.
• Vijay Gupta v CIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  I made a mistake in my own return and paid tax I did not owe. The time to revise has gone. Can the Commissioner give me relief under section 264?
  Yes. The Delhi High Court held that the revisional power under section 264 is very wide and is not confined to correcting the officer's errors - it extends to errors made by the assessee, including a legitimate claim never made in the return and raised for the first time in the revision application. An intimation under section 143(1) is an "order" for section 264. Paying the Rs.500 fee late is a curable irregularity, not a bar. The Commissioner's rejection was set aside and the revision restored for fresh consideration on merits.
• CIT v Kabul Chawla High CourtHelps taxpayer
  A search was carried out at my premises and the Assessing Officer has reopened six years under section 153A — can he add to years already assessed when nothing incriminating was found?
  No. The Delhi High Court held on 28 August 2015 that a completed assessment can be interfered with in a section 153A assessment only on the basis of incriminating material unearthed in the search, or undisclosed income or property discovered in it, which was not produced or disclosed in the original assessment. Where an assessment for a year is not pending on the date of the search it does not abate, and in the absence of such material the completed assessment can only be reiterated. Here the assessments for 2002-03, 2005-06 and 2006-07 stood completed, nothing was found, and the deemed dividend and other additions fell.
• CIT-15 v Relcom High CourtHelps taxpayer
  A vendor billed my sister concern but put my PAN on the TDS certificate, so my 26AS shows receipts and TDS that are not mine. The tax has been paid by the sister concern. Can I claim the credit without offering that income?
  On these facts, yes. The Delhi High Court refused to let s.199 be used as a technical bar where the corresponding income had been assessed in the sister concern's hands, that concern had claimed no credit and raised no objection, and the deduction was undisputed. The Court declined to require the assessee to first chase the vendor for a corrected certificate, holding that procedure is the handmaid of justice.
• CIT-II v Gujarat State Financial Services Ltd High CourtHelps department
  My Tribunal order cancelling s.234D interest relied on Ekta Promoters. Is that still worth anything after the 2012 amendment?
  No. The Gujarat High Court held that the Special Bench view in Ekta Promoters — that s.234D operates only from AY 2004-05 — is incorrect, and followed the Bombay High Court in Indian Oil Corporation that Explanation 2 is declaratory. Where excess refund has been granted, s.234D applies even for earlier assessment years if the assessment was framed after 1 June 2003.
• Court On Its Own Motion v CIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  CPC has refused my TDS credit and adjusted the refund against an old demand. What did the Delhi High Court actually direct?
  Taking up the problem on its own motion, the Delhi High Court issued directions on both limbs. A TDS claim supported by the deductor's certificate is not to be rejected merely because the uploaded information does not tally, and unmatched challans are to be verified and corrected within a fixed time. And s.245 is a two-stage provision: prior intimation of the proposed adjustment, a reply from the assessee, consideration of that reply by the Assessing Officer, an order under s.245, and communication of the outcome. A computerised set-off without that sequence does not comply with the section.
• CIT v Usha International Ltd High CourtCuts both ways
  I disclosed everything in a scrutiny assessment, the Assessing Officer never asked about one particular item, and now he wants to reopen within four years — is that a change of opinion?
  It depends on what happened at the original assessment. The Delhi High Court Full Bench, on 21 September 2012, took up four referred questions on the meaning of change of opinion under section 147 after the 1989 amendment. Two propositions are settled on the face of the judgment. Where the return was only processed under section 143(1) and no scrutiny assessment was made, there is no opinion and so no change of opinion. Where the assessment order itself records that the issue was raised and decided for the assessee, reopening is barred. The hard case — full disclosure, a section 143(3) assessment, but silence in the order — is where the Bench divided.
• CIT v Indian Oil Corporation Ltd High CourtHelps department
  My assessment for an early year was completed after 1 June 2003 but the s.143(1) refund was issued before that date. Can they charge me s.234D interest on it?
  Yes. Explanation 2 to s.234D, inserted by the Finance Act 2012 with retrospective effect from 1 June 2003, is declaratory, so s.234D reaches an assessment year commencing before 1 June 2003 provided the assessment proceeding was completed after that date. The date on which the s.143(1) refund was actually granted is irrelevant; what fixes liability is the date the assessment was completed.
• CIT v Anil Kumar Bhatia High CourtHelps departmentNo later treatment found
  I was searched, and my earlier returns had only been processed under section 143(1). Can the Assessing Officer reopen all six years under section 153A and add things that have nothing to do with the search?
  Yes, section 153A is validly invoked. The Delhi High Court held the Tribunal was wrong to say section 153A cannot be used where the six years' returns had only been processed under section 143(1). Section 153A opens with a non obstante clause that removes the fetters of sections 147, 148, 149, 151 and 153, and it empowers the Assessing Officer to assess or reassess the total income - disclosed and undisclosed - for each of the six years. Pending proceedings abate; completed ones do not, and are simply reopened. The Court expressly left open what happens where no incriminating material at all is found.
• Dr. M. Manohar v. ACIT (Madras High Court) — the s.115H benefit does not extend to interest earned on interest that was re-deposited with the original sum; 'derived from' requires a direct nexus with the foreign exchange asset High CourtHelps departmentNo later treatment found
  My client, a returned NRI, keeps renewing his bank deposits by rolling the accrued interest back into the principal, and has claimed the concessional rate under section 115H on the whole of the interest each year. The Commissioner has revised the assessment under section 263. Is the claim on the interest-on-interest sustainable?
  No. The Madras High Court held that section 115H does not allow that elasticity: the concessional rate is available only to investment income DERIVED FROM the foreign exchange asset, and unless the interest income has a direct nexus with the foreign exchange asset the benefit cannot be extended. The section 263 revision and the Tribunal's order confirming it were upheld and the assessee's appeal was dismissed.
• Sarthak Securities Co Pvt Ltd v ITO High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The Assessing Officer has reopened my assessment purely on an investigation wing list saying my share application money was an accommodation entry. Can I get the notice quashed?
  Yes, on these facts. The Delhi High Court quashed the section 147 proceedings and the section 148 notice. The recorded reasons reproduced the investigation wing's information and nothing more; neither the reasons nor the order rejecting objections showed any independent application of mind by the Assessing Officer. The four investor companies were named, their existence was not disputed, they had bank accounts and paid through banking channels - all of which the Assessing Officer knew from the outset. On those facts Lovely Exports applied squarely, and the Court held it would be unwarranted to make the assessee go through the whole gamut of reassessment proceedings.
• CIT v Dwarkadhish Investment (P) Ltd High CourtHelps taxpayer
  I gave the officer the share applicants' PAN, incorporation papers, affidavits and bank statements, but he could not find them at their addresses and has added the money under section 68. Is that right?
  No. The Delhi High Court held that the onus under section 68 is not static. The initial burden is on the assessee, but once he proves the identity of the share applicants by furnishing a permanent account number or assessment particulars and shows the genuineness of the transaction by producing the money received through account payee cheque, draft or other traceable mode, the onus shifts to the Revenue. That the applicants could not be found at the addresses given does not by itself let the officer invoke section 68 - it is the Revenue that has the power and the machinery to trace people. The assessee need not prove the source of the source.
• Balmukund Acharya v DCIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  I offered a receipt to tax in my return by mistake and it was never chargeable. Can I still appeal, or am I stuck with what I declared?
  You can still appeal. The Bombay High Court held that the appeal against the intimation was maintainable and restored it to the Commissioner (Appeals) to decide on merits. There is no estoppel against the statute: Article 265 permits tax only by authority of law, and acquiescence cannot deprive a party of relief where tax has been collected without authority. The Assessing Officer was obliged to apply his mind to the facts disclosed in the return and to assess in accordance with the law holding the field, not simply to accept an erroneous offer. For the year in question an intimation under section 143(1) was itself a deemed appealable order.
• CIT v Smt. Premlata Jalani High CourtHelps taxpayer
  My capital gain arose after 15 March, so I could not have paid advance tax on it in any instalment. The Assessing Officer has charged s.234C interest from the first instalment date. Can he?
  No. The Rajasthan High Court held that the liability to pay advance tax on a capital gain arises only once the gain has accrued, so interest under s.234C on the shortfall attributable to that gain can run only from the date the advance tax on it became payable, and not from any earlier instalment date. Where the gain arose after 15 March, the proviso required only that the tax be paid by 31 March, and interest ran for that period alone.
• Ramamoorthy Sundar v ITO ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My client sat on an NFAC order restricting his leave encashment exemption for over a year, and only came to me after hearing that the limit is now Rs 25,00,000. Is the appeal dead on limitation?
  Not necessarily. The Tribunal condoned a delay of the order of five hundred days and then allowed the enhanced exemption of Rs 25,00,000 under s.10(10AA), treating the subsequent development on the judicial front and the CBDT notification as themselves part of the sufficient cause for the delay.
• Adit Nilesh Shah v Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My consultant filed Form 10-IEA opting me out of the new regime by mistake, but my return was computed under s.115BAC(1A). The CPC has processed me under the old regime. Can the return prevail over the form?
  Yes, on these facts. The Bangalore Tribunal directed the CPC to process the return for AY 2025-26 under the new regime under s.115BAC(1A) as opted in the return, holding that a bona fide procedural mistake in filing Form 10-IEA should not subject the assessee to a regime contrary to the choice clearly reflected in the return filed afterwards. It rejected the Commissioner (Appeals)' view that digital verification of the Form made it conclusive.
• Vaishali Baban Bhosale v ITO ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My s.89 relief on salary arrears was disallowed in the intimation because Form 10E was not filed with the return. Is it lost?
  Not necessarily. The Pune Tribunal restored the claim to the Assessing Officer with a direction to verify it and allow the relief, where the assessee had filed Form 10E only years after the intimation. The Bench followed coordinate bench decisions holding that a delay in filing the form should not by itself defeat a relief the assessee is otherwise entitled to.
• Avendus Enhanced Return Fund v ACIT — a Category III AIF is assessed in its own name, and a s.14A disallowance the fund overstated in its own return goes back to the Assessing Officer for verification ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My client is a Category III Alternative Investment Fund. It filed its own return, overstated a section 14A disallowance by more than a crore, and the Assessing Officer and the Commissioner (Appeals) both refused to correct it, citing Goetze. Is a revised computation before the Assessing Officer really worthless?
  No. The Mumbai Tribunal set aside the appellate order and restored the issue to the Assessing Officer, holding that Goetze (India) is confined to the powers of the Assessing Officer while the Bombay High Court in Pruthvi Brokers & Shareholders has held that the appellate authorities are competent to entertain a legitimate claim even if it was not made through a revised return. It did not decide the merits: because the nature and quantum of the exempt income, the applicability of section 115BBDA and the consequential section 14A disallowance all required verification from the assessment records, the matter went back with all contentions open. Note what the case also shows on the facts — a Category III AIF is assessed in its own name, on its own income, under the ordinary provisions; the section 115UB pass-through has nothing to do with it.
• Manmohan Singh v ITO ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  I filed my return under the new regime by default, then filed a revised return within time switching to the old regime and claiming my exemptions and Chapter VI-A deductions. The CPC has processed it under the new regime saying the regime cannot be changed in a revised return. Can it?
  On this order, yes, for a salaried assessee with no business or professional income. The Tribunal held that a revised return filed in time under s.139(5) supersedes the original, that the proviso to s.115BAC(6) restricting the number of times the option may be exercised does not apply where there is no business or professional income, and that the filing of Form 10-IEA is procedural — the delay in filing it was condoned and the fact of filing it satisfied the requirement. The Assessing Officer was directed to process the revised return under the old regime with the exemptions and deductions claimed.
• Tanisha Chaudhary v Income-tax Officer, Ward 5(2)(4), Noida ITATHelps departmentNo later treatment found
  My AY 2020-21 return was 72 days late because of Covid and the short-term capital loss was refused. Four years on I want to set that loss off against this year's gains. Can I argue the delay in the current year's appeal?
  No. The Delhi Tribunal dismissed the appeal, holding that s.80 makes it mandatory to file the return of loss in terms of s.139(3), and that where the carry forward was denied when the loss year's return was processed under s.143(1), the remedy against that denial does not lie in an appeal for the later set-off year. Kulu Valley Transport was distinguished on its facts.
• Humanitarian Hands v ITO (Exemptions) Ward-1, Bengaluru ITATCuts both waysNo later treatment found
  Our auditor filed Form 10BB when Form 10B was required for AY 2023-24, and CPC has taxed us under s.13(10). We filed the right form only in 2025 and the condonation application is still pending. What can the Tribunal do?
  The Tribunal remitted the matter to the Assessing Officer to pass an order in accordance with the outcome of the pending s.119(2)(b) condonation application before the CIT (Exemptions). It recorded that this was not a case of no audit report at all but of a report filed both belatedly and in the incorrect form, and that CBDT Circular No. 2/2024 did not rescue the trust because that circular only covered wrong-form reports furnished on or before 31 October 2023.
• Awadhesh Kumar Dixit v DCIT ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My client retired from a nationalised bank in April 2018 and CPC capped his leave encashment exemption at Rs 3,00,000. The Rs 25,00,000 limit came only in May 2023. Can he still get it for AY 2019-20?
  This Tribunal said yes. It held that the enhanced ceiling of Rs 25,00,000 notified under s.10(10AA)(ii) is a remedial and beneficial measure and directed the Assessing Officer to allow exemption up to Rs 25,00,000 or the actual amount received, whichever is lower, even though the assessee had retired on 30 April 2018, nearly five years before the notification.
• ITO v Western Developers Private Limited — once the s.115BAA option stands, s.115JB has no application at all ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  CPC has processed our return under s.143(1), rejected the s.115BAA option because Form 10-IC was late, and raised a demand by computing book profit under s.115JB. Can it do both?
  No. Sub-section (5A) of s.115JB says in terms that the section shall not apply to a person who has exercised the option under s.115BAA or s.115BAB. Once the option is held good, the MAT provisions cease to apply and the tax liability must be computed under s.115BAA without invoking s.115JB — and here the option was held good because it had been accepted for three earlier years on a Form 10-IC filed in March 2021.
• Saguna Rural Foundation v Exemption Ward 2(3), Mumbai ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  CPC denied my s.11(2) accumulation because Form 10 was filed after the s.139(1) due date, and the CIT(A) said s.13(9) settles it. Can the Tribunal still help me?
  Yes. Following the jurisdictional High Court in CIT v Sakal Relief Fund, the Mumbai Tribunal held that filing Form No. 10 before completion of assessment satisfies s.11(2), so a s.143(1) denial founded only on the s.139(1) due date cannot stand. The matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for the limited purpose of checking that the stated purpose of accumulation matches the objects and is backed by a trustees' resolution, with an express direction not to deny exemption on merely technical grounds.
• Khalsae-Vehicles Pvt. Ltd. v DCIT, Circle-3(1)(1) ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  I filed Form 10-ID and my first return under s.115BAB after the s.139(1) due date but within the s.139(4) time. The CPC has now denied me the 15 per cent rate in a later year. Is the option gone for good?
  Not on these facts. The Delhi Tribunal held that where the substantive conditions of s.115BAB are undisputedly satisfied, the failure to file Form 10-ID on or before the s.139(1) due date is a procedural lapse and is not a fatal flaw, and allowed the appeal for AY 2023-24. The Form there had been filed in the very first year, along with a first return that was belated but within the s.139(4) window.
• CDO Jain Education Society v ACIT (CPC) ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My institution filed its audit report on time but in Form 10B when Form 10BB was the right form, and the CPC has denied the exemption and raised a demand on the gross receipts. Is filing the wrong audit form fatal?
  No. Where the accounts were in fact audited by a chartered accountant and an audit report was uploaded within time, the choice of the wrong form is a procedural lapse and not a failure of the substantive condition, and exemption cannot be denied on that ground alone. The Tribunal set aside the appellate order and directed the Assessing Officer to verify substantive compliance and, if satisfied, to condone the procedural lapse, allow the exemption and reduce the demand to nil.
• DCIT (Exemptions) v Society of the Servants of the Holy Spirit ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  CPC has taxed our AY 2017-18 accumulation in AY 2023-24 saying the Finance Act 2022 took away the sixth year. We spent the money in FY 2022-23. Is the amendment good against an old accumulation?
  No, on this Tribunal's view. Where the accumulation was made in AY 2017-18 under a law that allowed utilisation within five years and also in the immediately following year, the Finance Act 2022 amendment to s.11(3) — though applicable from AY 2023-24 — cannot be read so as to take away the vested right accrued at the time of accumulation. The addition of Rs.29,04,39,083 made in the s.143(1) intimation was deleted and the Revenue's appeal dismissed.
• Lodha Maharana Pratap Nagar Co-operative Housing Society Limited v ITO ITATCuts both waysNo later treatment found
  The CPC taxed my society's receipts from members. Can I get that corrected under section 154, or have I lost the claim by not making it in the return?
  Section 154 will not carry it. The Mumbai Tribunal agreed with the Assessing Officer and the CIT(A) that mutuality and eligibility under s.80P require examination of foundational facts and cannot be a mistake apparent from the record. But the claim was not lost: Goetze (India) restricts only the Assessing Officer, not the appellate authorities, so the Tribunal restored the matter to the Assessing Officer to examine the claim on merits.
• Electronfab Engineering Pvt Ltd v ITO ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  You forgot to opt for s.115BAA in the original return and then filed Form 10-IC and a corrected return in answer to a s.139(9) notice. Does the option hold?
  The Tribunal held that it does. Form 10-IC filed on 2 December 2024 and the corrected return filed on 6 December 2024 in answer to the defect notice sufficiently demonstrated the intention to opt for the concessional regime, and the procedural lapse in not exercising the option in the original return could not defeat the substantive claim where the statutory conditions were otherwise met.
• Getinge Medical India Private Limited v DCIT 2(2)(1), Mumbai ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  Can the Tribunal itself give me the s.115BAA rate where Form 10-IC was late, or must I go to the Commissioner under s.119(2)(b)?
  The Mumbai Tribunal held that where the option was clearly exercised in the return itself and the tax computed accordingly, the substantive requirement of s.115BAA(5) is satisfied and the later filing of Form 10-IC is procedural, so the time limit for the Form is directory. It condoned a delay of about 45 days and directed the Assessing Officer to accept the option and recompute the tax at the concessional rate, without sending the assessee to the Commissioner.
• Bicholim Electricity Employees Cooperative Credit Society Ltd v ITO ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My co-operative credit society filed Form 10-IF opting into s.115BAD and then claimed deduction under s.80P in the same return. CPC has disallowed the whole s.80P deduction under s.143(1). Is there anything to be said?
  There is an argument, and the Tribunal let it be run — but it did not decide it. On these facts the Tribunal restored the matter for fresh adjudication on the merits, recording the case that the society did not satisfy the conditions in s.115BAD(2) and had filed Form 10-IF erroneously, and that the adjustment made under s.143(1) was not within the permissible adjustments. The underlying rule is unforgiving and should be understood before any co-operative society files Form 10-IF: s.115BAD(2)(i) requires total income to be computed 'without any deduction ... under any of the provisions of Chapter VI-A other than the provisions of section 80JJAA', and s.80P is in Chapter VI-A.
• School Managing Society Capt. Gurcharan Singh v DCIT/ITO (Exemptions) ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  We missed the s.12AB re-registration, CPC has taxed our entire gross receipts, and we never claimed s.10(23C)(iiiad) in the return. Can we claim it now, in appeal?
  Yes, on these facts. The Amritsar Bench held that a school whose annual receipts are well below the prescribed limit is legally entitled to s.10(23C)(iiiad) even though the claim was made for the first time before the appellate authorities, because it is a question of law arising from material already on record. The sub-clause requires no registration and no approval, so the loss of s.11 for want of s.12AB registration does not touch it.
• Rashmikant Bhaichandbhai Shah v ITO, Ward-5(3)(2), Ahmedabad ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The CPC disallowed my s.80GGA deduction in the s.143(1) intimation because I have business income. Can I still get relief for the same donation under s.35(1)(ii), and can I raise it in a s.154 application?
  The Ahmedabad Bench restored the matter to the Assessing Officer with a direction to examine the alternative claim under s.35(1)(ii) and to grant it if the assessee is found eligible. The Bench proceeded on the footing, recorded from the intimation, that s.80GGA is not available where the assessee has business income, and held that the authorities should assist an assessee in claiming eligible deductions rather than punish him for a bona fide mistake.
• Pudhureddiyur Raju Kalaimani v ITO ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  CPC denied my leave encashment exemption under s.10(10AA) because Form 26AS shows the gross salary, and the Department says I resigned and joined another employer in the same year. Can I still get it?
  Yes on both points. Leave encashment received on resignation is exempt under s.10(10AA), and nothing in the statute disentitles an employee who takes up fresh employment in the same year; what matters is that the receipt was on cessation of employment. A Form 26AS mismatch thrown up in s.143(1) processing is not a sustainable ground to tax the amount where the claim is supported by the employer's Form 16.
• Kae Capital Fund v ITO — the live question whether a SEBI 1996-Regulations venture capital fund is an "investment fund" under s.115UB, and why the Tribunal never reached it ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The Commissioner (Appeals) has directed the Assessing Officer to allow my fund's section 10(23FB) exemption only if it proves it is not an investment fund under Explanation 1 to section 115UB, without ever hearing us. Has anyone decided whether a SEBI venture capital fund registered under the 1996 Regulations is inside section 115UB?
  Not in this order, and that is the point to take from it. The Mumbai Tribunal set the Commissioner (Appeals)' order aside and restored the appeal for de novo adjudication because a request for a personal hearing through video conferencing had been made and not granted, which clause 12 of the Faceless Appeal Scheme, 2021 does not permit — the Commissioner (Appeals) "shall allow such request". Having remitted on that ground the Tribunal expressly held that the assessee's other grievances did not call for adjudication at that stage. So the substantive question — whether a fund holding a certificate under the SEBI (Venture Capital Funds) Regulations, 1996 that has not migrated to the SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012 is an "investment fund" within clause (a) of Explanation 1 to section 115UB, and so loses section 10(23FB) by the proviso inserted with effect from 1 April 2016 — remains undecided.
• Kapoor Industries Ltd v CPC ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  You asked for seized cash to be adjusted against your self-assessment tax and the CPC simply refused the credit. Should it have issued a s.139(9) notice instead?
  The Tribunal allowed the appeal and directed that the money lying seized be appropriated towards the self-assessment tax liability. It recorded that no notice under s.139(9) had been issued by either the CPC or the jurisdictional Assessing Officer treating the return as defective, and that the assessee's request having been neither rejected nor decided amounted to acceptance.
• Kailash Narayan Shridhar v DCIT ITATHelps taxpayer
  The processing centre cut down my exemption claim in the intimation without ever telling me it proposed to. Is the intimation valid?
  No. The Ahmedabad Tribunal held the intimation invalid and quashed it. The first proviso to section 143(1)(a) permits no adjustment unless intimation of the proposed adjustment is first given to the assessee and any response is considered. That requirement is not merely procedural: it goes to the root of the validity of the proceedings. Here the processing centre restricted the leave encashment exemption from Rs 17,71,010 to Rs 3,00,000 without any prior notice, which was admitted. Following coordinate bench decisions and in the absence of any contrary decision of the jurisdictional High Court, the Tribunal held the intimation bad and did not go into the merits of the exemption.
• Brahmos Realty Private Limited v ITO ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My staff filed Form 10-IC by mistake, then I filed the return under the normal provisions and set off my brought-forward MAT credit. CPC has taxed me under s.115BAA and wiped the credit out. Section 115BAA says the option cannot be withdrawn. Am I stuck?
  Not necessarily. The Tribunal held that the option cannot be WITHDRAWN, but it can FAIL: because s.115JAA(8) bars MAT credit to a company that has exercised the s.115BAA option, a company that claims MAT credit in its return has not satisfied the conditions in s.115BAA(2), and the proviso to s.115BAA(1) then makes the option invalid as if it had never been exercised. The Form 10-IC was construed as invalidated and the matter was restored to the CIT(A) to compute the tax under the old regime and allow the legitimate MAT credit.
• Manish Kumar Vijay v ITO ITATHelps taxpayer
  CPC added income because Form 26AS shows more receipts than my 44AD turnover. Can they do that?
  Not on the 26AS entry alone. Form 26AS is a third-party information source and is subject to error; here the deductor had reported the TDS against the wrong PAN, so the figure evidenced no receipt at all. An adjustment made without verifying the underlying transaction was deleted.
• Dr. Rangasamy Sudha v ITO, Erode ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  I meant to stay in the new regime but a wrong Form 10-IE put me back in the old one, and CPC has taxed me under the old regime with no Chapter VI-A deductions because I claimed none in the return. Can I claim them now?
  Yes. The Chennai Tribunal held that a fresh claim of deduction made for the first time before the first appellate authority has to be entertained, and directed the Assessing Officer to recompute the income allowing Rs 2,00,000 of Chapter VI-A deductions — Rs 1,50,000 under s.80C and Rs 50,000 under s.80TTB — that had never been claimed in the return. If CPC has processed the return on the old regime, the assessee is entitled to the old regime's deductions.
• Smt. Madhu Khatri v DCIT ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My employer allowed my HRA and conveyance allowance in Form 16 after taking my Form 12BB with the landlord's name, address and PAN. The CPC has still added them back. Does the employer's Form 16, backed by the Rule 26C declaration, carry the claim?
  On these facts, yes. The Tribunal held the assessee eligible for the s.10(13A) exemption of Rs 7,41,983 and the s.10(14) conveyance allowance of Rs 19,200 because the claim was supported by the requisite documents — bank statement as proof of payment, the declaration under Rule 26C, Form 12BB carrying the landlord's name, address, PAN and rent receipts, and a Form 16 in which the employer had allowed both exemptions after satisfying itself — and because the Commissioner (Appeals) had ignored all of that. The Form 16 was disputed neither by the Commissioner (Appeals) nor by the Departmental Representative.
• Nikita Rameshchandra Shankarwala v ITO ITATHelps taxpayer
  CPC disallowed my client's s.89 relief on arrears of salary because Form 10E had not been filed when the return was processed. He filed it later. Is the relief gone?
  No. Filing Form No. 10E is a procedural requirement, and the Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to accept a Form 10E filed after the s.143(1) intimation and to grant the relief after verification. The Indore Bench reasoning it follows is that where a prescribed form goes to a relief or exemption, courts hold the requirement procedural and allow the substantive benefit even on a belated form, absent mala fides.
• Gopikishan Pallod v. ITO, Ward 7(1), Hyderabad (ITAT Hyderabad) — the Central Processing Centre cannot cut section 194-O credit proportionately because the platform deducted on gross sales while the seller reported net of returns ITATHelps taxpayer
  I sell on a marketplace. The operator deducted under section 194-O on my gross sales, but I reported turnover net of sales returns, and the CPC has allowed me only proportionate TDS credit under Rule 37BA. How do I get the rest?
  By reconciling the difference and showing that the whole of the income relatable to the TDS credit has been offered to tax. The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer had misunderstood the facts, that gross sales less sales returns tallied with the net turnover declared, and that the Assessing Officer ought to have allowed the full credit of Rs 1,62,412 as per Form 26AS; the Commissioner (Appeals)'s contrary reasoning was based on assumption and presumption, not on fact.
• Polynova Industries Limited v DCIT 14(1)(1), Mumbai ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  An internal audit objection has produced a s.263 notice saying CSR spending is not voluntary and so is not a 'donation' at all for s.80G. Does that argument let the Commissioner revise my assessment?
  No, not while the point remains genuinely open. The Tribunal held that the eligibility of CSR expenditure for s.80G is a question on which Benches differ — the Bangalore and Kolkata Benches allow it, the Delhi Bench in Agilent Technologies disallows it — so an Assessing Officer who allows it has adopted one of two reasonably possible views and the s.263 jurisdiction does not arise.
• Shree Maheshwari Vidyalaya v ITO ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The CPC adjusted your return under s.143(1)(a) without warning. Can it do that?
  No. An adjustment under s.143(1)(a) requires a prior show cause notice. Made without one, a Rs 4.20 crore disallowance was deleted — and on the facts the audit report had in any event been filed on time.
• Shree Dhamel Seva Sahkari v ADIT (CPC) ITATCuts both waysNo later treatment found
  CPC denied my society's 80P in a 143(1) intimation because the return was late. Can it?
  Not outright. The Tribunal accepted the submission that a debatable issue cannot be adjusted under s.143(1)(a), and said that a co-operative society whose s.80P claim is valid and substantiated should not be denied it merely because the return was late - but it did not quash the intimations and did not decide the s.80AC(ii) question. It remitted all three appeals to the Assessing Officer to examine the claims, allowing them for statistical purposes, and expressly directed that the decision is confined to its own facts and is not to be treated as a precedent.
• Paramsukh Infradevelopers LLP v Income-tax Officer, Ward 1(1)(1), Agra ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My LLP was not required to be audited, but the partners had the accounts audited anyway. The CPC treated the return as belated and refused the carry forward of the business loss. Was the return late?
  No. The Agra Tribunal held that where the partners of an LLP that is exempt from audit under the first proviso to Rule 24(8) of the LLP Rules 2009 decide to have the accounts audited, the second proviso requires the audit to be carried out in accordance with those Rules, and the LLP then becomes a person whose accounts are 'required to be audited ... under any other law for the time being in force' within Explanation 2(a)(ii) to s.139(1). The due date accordingly moved to 30 September, the return filed on 17 September was in time, and the business loss was allowed to be carried forward.
• Sarvajanik Seva Trust v DCIT ITATHelps taxpayer
  The CPC has processed my trust's return at the maximum marginal rate, saying s.115TD applies. But the trust gave up its registration back in March 2015. Can s.115TD reach it at all?
  Not on those facts. Section 115TD was inserted by the Finance Act 2016; the order records it as taking effect from 1 June 2016 in one place and from assessment year 2016-17 in another. On either date, where the trust's registration had already ceased with effect from 20 March 2015 there was no registered trust for the section to bite on, and the total income had to be charged at the slab rates and not at the maximum marginal rate.
• Investcorp Real Estate Yield Fund v ITO — an AIF assessed as a representative assessee under s.160(1)(iv) read with s.164(1) gets credit for advance tax and TDS paid under its beneficiaries' PANs ITATCuts both waysNo later treatment found
  Our fund is a SEBI-registered AIF trust that offers the whole of its income as a representative assessee. Part of the year's advance tax and TDS went in under the beneficiaries' PANs and part under the fund's own. The CPC has refused the beneficiary-PAN credits. Can the fund claim them?
  Yes, on these facts. The Mumbai Tribunal upheld the appellate finding that because the corresponding income had been offered by the trust in its capacity as representative assessee within the meaning of section 160(1)(iv) read with section 164(1), the trust deserved the credit for the advance tax and the tax deducted at source as claimed in its return, including the advance tax of Rs.2,84,60,753 paid under the beneficiaries' permanent account numbers and the TDS of Rs.65,57,000 that had been disallowed. The Assessing Officer was directed, while allowing those credits, to ensure that no similar credit was availed by the beneficiaries. The assessee's appeal — which was against that anti-duplication direction and against the interest under sections 234B and 234C — was dismissed.
• DCIT v ANI Integrated Services Ltd ITATHelps taxpayer
  My Tribunal order on employees' contributions became final before Checkmate and no appeal was filed. The department now wants it recalled under section 254(2). Is finality any answer?
  On this bench's view it is a complete answer. Once the order has attained finality between the parties and no lis is pending, a subsequent decision of a superior court cannot be a ground to recall or review it under section 254(2), and the Revenue's remedy was to have appealed to the High Court. The Revenue's miscellaneous application was dismissed.
• South India Club v ITO ITATCuts both ways
  CPC denied my trust's section 11 exemption in a section 143(1) intimation for a late Form 10B, and a regular assessment has since been completed and separately appealed. What happens to my appeal against the intimation, and to the demand in it?
  It becomes infructuous. The Delhi Bench of the Tribunal held that when the return has been taken up in regular assessment the intimation loses its individuality and merges with the regular assessment, so the appeal against the intimation no longer serves any purpose. The first appellate authority was right to say so. But he was wrong to go further and record findings on the section 11 claim on merits when he knew an appeal against the regular assessment on the same issue was pending; the Tribunal said in terms that he should have stopped. The exemption question itself was not decided here.
• Aark Infosoft Pvt Ltd v ACIT ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  You cured a s.139(9) defect months after filing. Does the six-month clock for the s.143(2) notice run from the original return or from the corrected one?
  From the original return - on the authority of the jurisdictional High Court, which the Tribunal reproduced and adopted. The Gujarat High Court in Kunal Structure (India) (P.) Ltd. v DCIT held that there is no concept of a corrected return under the Act, that s.139(9) calls for removal of the defects in the return already filed and not for a fresh return, and that the removal of the defects relates back to the filing of the original return, so that it is the original filing date that governs the limitation under s.143(2). The Tribunal set that judgment out at para 16 and then held, in its own words at para 17, that the s.143(2) notice having been issued beyond the limit prescribed under the Act, the assessment framed was without jurisdiction and was directed to be quashed.
• Adroit Structural Engineers Pvt Ltd v ADIT (CPC) ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The payer deducted and reported my TDS one year early, so it sits in the previous year's 26AS. CPC disallowed the credit in the year I offered the income, and the CIT(A) said 26AS is 26AS. What is the answer?
  Rule 37BA(3)(i) gives credit for the assessment year for which the income is assessable, so credit belongs to the year in which the income was offered, not the year in which the deductor happened to report it. The Tribunal held that where there is no double claim the assessee is entitled to credit in the year the corresponding income was offered and the invoices were raised, and restored the matter to the Assessing Officer to verify that the same credit had not been claimed in another year.
• Orient Craft Ltd v DCIT ITATHelps department
  I withdrew my appeal against the section 143(1) intimation because the case went into scrutiny. Can the Assessing Officer now rectify under section 154 to bring back the intimation addition the scrutiny order left out?
  Yes, on these facts. The Delhi Bench of the Tribunal held that there was no merger of the section 143(1) intimation into the section 143(3) assessment, because the two orders proceeded on different issues, and that the intimation stood final once the assessee withdrew its appeal against it. The scrutiny order had started from the returned income instead of the income determined by the intimation, leaving the intimation's addition of Rs 12,82,64,760 out of the assessed figure. That, the Tribunal held, was a mistake apparent from the record, and the Assessing Officer was entitled to correct it under section 154.
• BNY Mellon International Operations (India) P Ltd v National e-Assessment Centre ITATHelps departmentNo later treatment found
  My PF due date fell on Independence Day and I remitted the next working day. Checkmate says nothing about that. Can I still save the deduction?
  No, not for a period after January 2016 and not where the remittance channel was internet banking. The five-day grace period under the EPF Manual of Accounting Procedure was withdrawn by the EPFO circular of 8 January 2016 with effect from the February 2016 remittance, and section 10 of the General Clauses Act does not help because the fund's designated internet banking account is open 24x7, so the recipient office cannot be said to have been closed on the holiday.
• International Fresh Farm Products (India) Ltd v ITO ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  CPC has refused to let me carry forward my s.35AD specified-business loss because the return went in late. Can the officer of the loss year decide that at all?
  On this Tribunal's view, no. Carry forward and set off are two separate stages: the officer of the loss year determines and notifies the loss, and it is the officer of the later year, when set-off is actually claimed, who decides whether s.80 read with s.139(3) bars it. The Bench set aside the CIT(A)'s order and directed the AO/CPC to remove the direction denying carry forward, expressly leaving the due-date objection alive for the year of set-off.
• Sameer Kishore Koticha v DCIT ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The CPC has restricted my s.24(b) interest to Rs 2,00,000 by treating my only property as self-occupied. It is a commercial unit that I cannot live in. Can the cap apply?
  No. The second proviso to s.24(b) caps the deduction only for a property referred to in s.23(2), and s.23(2) speaks of a house or part of a house in the owner's occupation for his own residence, which can only be a residential property. The Tribunal held the cap inapplicable to a commercial unit, allowed the whole interest of Rs 1,31,39,560, and directed that the resulting house property loss be carried forward under s.71B.
• Prashant Vijay Kale v CPC, Bengaluru ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  I filed my return on time and then revised it. CPC has ignored the original, treated the revised return as my first return, and charged s.234F fee and s.234A interest. Can that be undone?
  Yes. The Mumbai Bench found that the original return had been filed within the s.139(1) due date and that CPC and the CIT(A) had simply ignored it, and deleted both the Rs 5,000 fee under s.234F and the interest under s.234A charged on the footing that the revised return's date was the date of filing. Revising a return does not make a timely return late.
• Brinda Ramakrishna v ITO ITATHelps taxpayer
  I filed Form 67 late and my foreign tax credit was disallowed. Does missing the deadline kill the claim?
  No, on this decision. The Bangalore Tribunal held that Rule 128(9) does not provide for disallowance of foreign tax credit where Form 67 is filed late; filing Form 67 is directory, not mandatory; and the treaty overrides the Act, with the Rules unable to run contrary to the Act. The assessee had claimed credit of Rs 4,73,779 for Australian tax under section 90 read with Article 24 of the India-Australia treaty, filed Form 67 only on 18 April 2020, and had the credit refused. The Tribunal allowed the appeal, and also held the point could be taken in rectification proceedings under section 154.
• ITO v Ketan Bhanuchandra Mahta ITATCuts both waysNo later treatment found
  The Assessing Officer has included the company's share premium account in accumulated profits to support a s.2(22)(e) addition. Can he?
  No. The Tribunal held that share premium is not available for distribution as dividend and is required to be treated as part of the share capital, so it cannot be commercial profits and cannot be included in accumulated profits for s.2(22)(e). The same order confirms, against the assessee, that current year's profits up to the date of each payment must be included, because Explanation 2 defines accumulated profits to include all profits up to the date of payment.
• Jagtar Singh Purewal v CIT Advance RulingHelps taxpayerSuperseded by amendment
  My tenant has paid me a lump sum of back rent after a long-delayed rent revision. Is that taxable as house property income in the year I receive it?
  No - on the law as it stood in 1994, and only then. The Authority ruled that Jagtar Singh Purewal, a non-resident with a one-sixth share in a Jalandhar building let to Madras Rubber Factory Ltd, was not liable to tax on his Rs. 1,05,083 share of arrears of rent for periods up to 31 March 1992, received on 6 July 1992. Income from house property computed under s.23 cannot exceed the actual rent for the previous year in question, and the Act as it then stood made no provision for taxing the excess referable to earlier years. Nor could the sum be taxed as income from other sources, on the principle in Nalinikant Ambalal Mody. Parliament has since reversed the outcome by enacting a specific charge on arrears of rent.
• Statutory position — section 158BB: how the block figure is built, what is kept out of it, and why Abhisar Buildwell does not simply carry across CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  The block assessment adds amounts for which nothing was found in the search. Can I take the Abhisar Buildwell point that there must be incriminating material?
  Not in the form in which that case decides it, because Abhisar Buildwell construes section 153A and section 158BB is worded differently. Section 158BB(1) makes the total undisclosed income of the block period the aggregate of only two things — what the assessee declares as undisclosed income in his section 158BC return, and what the Assessing Officer determines under section 158BB(2); and section 158BB(2) requires that determination to be made 'on the basis of evidence found as a result of search or survey or requisition of books of account or other documents and any other material or information as are either available with the Assessing Officer or come to his notice during the course of proceedings under this Chapter'.
• Statutory position — section 158BC: the sixty-day notice, the two approvals, and the traps that kill a block assessment CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  My client has a section 158BC notice for a March 2025 search. How long has he got, what happens if he files late, and is there a section 153D approval to attack?
  The notice must give a period not exceeding sixty days for the block return, and that period can be extended by a further thirty days only in the narrow audit case described in the fifth proviso. If the return goes in after the period allowed, the second proviso says in terms that it 'shall not be deemed to be a return under section 139' — so a late block return is non est, with consequences that run all the way to the notice under section 143(2). There is no section 153D approval in a block assessment; the approvals are elsewhere — section 158BC(3) requires the prior approval of the Additional or Joint Commissioner or Director BEFORE the section 158BC notice is issued, and section 158BG requires the previous approval of the same rank BEFORE the assessment order is passed.
• CBDT Instruction No. 12/2013 on adjustment of refunds CBDT Circulars & InstructionsHelps taxpayerSuperseded by amendment
  Is there a departmental instruction I can quote when CPC adjusts my refund without notice?
  Yes. Instruction No. 12/2013 dated 9 September 2013 directs that the provisions of s.245 be strictly adhered to before any adjustment of refund is made. It follows the Delhi High Court's directions in Court On Its Own Motion v. UOI, W.P.(C) 2659/2012 dated 14 March 2013, and requires prior intimation, an opportunity to the assessee to respond, examination of that response by the Assessing Officer, and communication of the final adjustment, with the Assessing Officer to respond to CPC within 45 days of the communication.
• CBDT Instruction No. 5/2013 — TDS credit where 26AS does not match CBDT Circulars & InstructionsHelps taxpayer
  Form 26AS does not show my TDS but I hold the deductor's certificate. Must the officer still verify and give me credit?
  Yes. Issued to give effect to the Delhi High Court's directions in Court On Its Own Motion v. CIT [2013] 352 ITR 273 (Delhi), the Instruction tells the assessing officer that where the assessee produces the TDS certificate as evidence against a mismatched amount, the officer must verify whether the deductor has paid the tax into the Government account and, if he has, give the credit. The Allahabad High Court has since decided a refund case on the strength of it.
• Statutory position — s.234D: interest on a refund granted under s.143(1) that regular assessment shows should not have been granted — the rate, the period, the reduction under sub-section (2), and Explanation 2 for assessment years commencing before 1 June 2003 CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  We were given a refund when the return was processed under s.143(1). On scrutiny the Assessing Officer has now raised a demand and has also charged interest under s.234D on the refund. Is that right, for how long does the interest run, and can he do it for an assessment year that is older than the section itself?
  Yes, on the conditions in sub-section (1). Section 234D charges simple interest where a refund is granted to the assessee under s.143(1) and either (a) no refund is due on regular assessment, or (b) the amount refunded under s.143(1) exceeds the amount refundable on regular assessment. The rate is one-half per cent, on the whole or the excess amount so refunded, for every month or part of a month comprised in the period from the date of grant of refund to the date of such regular assessment. The section was inserted by the Finance Act, 2003 with effect from 1 June 2003, and the words "one-half per cent" were substituted for "two-third" by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2003 with effect from 8 September 2003 — both recorded in footnotes printed against the section. Sub-section (2) provides that where, as a result of an order under s.154, s.155, s.250, s.254, s.260, s.262, s.263 or s.264, or an order of the Settlement Commission under s.245D(4), the refund granted under s.143(1) is held to be correctly allowed either in whole or in part, the interest chargeable under sub-section (1) shall be reduced accordingly. Explanation 1 makes a first-time assessment under s.147 or s.153A a regular assessment for the purposes of the section. Explanation 2, which the later editions of the section print and the earlier ones do not, reads: "For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the provisions of this section shall also apply to an assessment year commencing before the 1st day of June, 2003 if the proceedings in respect of such assessment year is completed after the said date." Which amending Act inserted Explanation 2, and from what date, is not established here — the editions of the section that print it carry no footnotes, and the editions that carry footnotes do not print it.
• EPCOS Electronic Components SA v UOI High CourtHelps taxpayerOverruled
  My return was accepted as filed and no demand was raised. Is a s.264 revision still open to me?
  Yes. An intimation under s.143(1) that simply accepts the return is still an order capable of revision, and 'prejudicial to the interest of the assessee' does not mean 'raised a demand'. The prejudice was that the assessee had paid more than the applicable treaty provisions required, even though the tax computed in the intimation was unchanged.
• ITO v Kalpesh Synthetics Pvt Ltd (miscellaneous applications) ITATHelps departmentOverruled
  I won my section 36(1)(va) appeal in the Tribunal before Checkmate. The department has now filed a miscellaneous application to recall the order. Can it do that?
  This bench held it can. Non-consideration of a Supreme Court decision is a mistake apparent from the record within section 254(2), and because a judicial decision operates retrospectively — the judge discovers the law rather than makes it — a decision handed down after the Tribunal's order can equally found a recall. Both favourable orders were recalled for a fresh hearing.
• Kalpesh Synthetics Pvt Ltd v DCIT, CPC ITATHelps taxpayerOverruled
  The CPC disallowed my late PF under section 143(1)(a) purely because my auditor filled in clause 20(b) of Form 3CD. Is the auditor's entry enough to found the adjustment?
  This order held it was not, and read down section 143(1)(a)(iv) so that an adjustment cannot be made where the audit report takes a stand contrary to the law laid down by the courts above. It is set out here because it is the most fully reasoned statement of that argument, but the reader must know at once that it no longer stands: it was recalled by the Tribunal itself under section 254(2) on 13 April 2023 and the appeals were re-decided against the assessee on 20 June 2023, following Checkmate Services.

Listed strongest first: Supreme Court, then High Court, then Tribunal, then CBDT. Nothing here has yet been read in full by a chartered accountant — open an entry to see where it came from.