My return was defective and I cured the defect ten months later. Does the s.143(2) clock run from the original filing or from the day I removed the defect?
From the original filing. Where the defect is removed within the time the Assessing Officer allowed, the return relates back to the date on which it was originally furnished, and the six-month limitation for a s.143(2) notice is counted from the end of the financial year in which that original return was filed. On the facts the scrutiny notice was issued nearly a year after that period had run out and was held barred. The Revenue's special leave petition was dismissed.
Decided by the High Court (Gujarat High Court - Ms Harsha Devani and Ms Sangeeta K. Vishen JJ) on 2019-10-24, reported as [2020] 113 taxmann.com 577 / (2020) 269 Taxman 440 / (2020) 422 ITR 482 (Guj.)(HC); R/Special Civil Application No. 13924 of 2018; AY 2016-17. It bears on section 139, section 139(1), section 139(3), section 139(5), section 139(9), section 142(1), section 143(1), section 143(2), section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act 1961, in Assessment & Scrutiny matters.
It is the only point at which a s.139(9) defect notice does the assessee any good. Departmental practice is to treat the date of rectification as the date of the return, which pushes the scrutiny window forward by a whole financial year; this decision says the opposite. The counter to expect is that the return only became a valid return on rectification, so time should run from then — which is exactly the argument the Court rejected.
Binding within that High Court's jurisdiction. Persuasive elsewhere.
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For assessment year 2016-17 the company filed its return under s.139(1) on 10 September 2016. An intimation of a defective return under s.139(9) issued on 17 June 2017, and a reminder of 5 July 2017 extended the time to comply by fifteen days, to 20 July 2017. The company removed the defects on 7 July 2017, within the time allowed. The return was processed under s.143(1) on 12 August 2017, the intimation showing the date of the original return as 10 September 2016. A notice under s.143(2) was then issued on 9 August 2018, saying that the return filed on 7 July 2017 had been selected for scrutiny under the CASS system. The company challenged that notice under Articles 226 and 227 as barred by limitation.
The petition was allowed and the s.143(2) notice of 9 August 2018, together with all proceedings taken pursuant to it, was quashed (para 21). Sub-section (9) of s.139 does not require the assessee to file a fresh return; it requires him to remove the defects in the return already filed, and once they are removed within the time allowed it is the very same return that becomes valid (paras 11 and 12). There is no concept of a corrected return under the Act, so the reference in the notice to a return filed on 7 July 2017 was itself incorrect (paras 13 and 16). The removal of the defects therefore relates back to the filing of the original return on 10 September 2016, and the limitation under the proviso to s.143(2) expired on 30 September 2017, six months from the end of the financial year in which the s.139(1) return was filed (para 20). The Court added that a notice under s.143(2) is the statutory notice by which the officer assumes jurisdiction to make a scrutiny assessment, so that an assessee who receives none within the period is entitled to presume the return has become final and no assessment can proceed (para 19).
The Court compared the language of sub-sections (1), (3) and (5) of s.139, in each of which the assessee is required to furnish a return, with sub-section (9), which requires no return at all but only that the assessee be given an opportunity to rectify a defect, failing which the return is treated as invalid (paras 10 to 12). Unlike a revised return under s.139(5), which substitutes the original, a correction under s.139(9) leaves the original return in place and rectifies it. The Court reinforced that from the terms of the s.139(9) notice itself, which told the assessee to change no information other than the errors listed and to file a revised return, not a corrected return, if any change of income were involved; the assessee had filed no revised return (paras 14 and 15). Since there is no concept of a corrected return under the Act, the removal of defects relates back to the original filing (para 16). The revenue's authority, Pr. CIT v. Babubhai Ramanbhai Patel, and the Allahabad decision in Dhampur Sugar Mills v. CIT [1973] 90 ITR 236 on which it rested, were held to support the assessee, because both draw a clear distinction between a revised return, which substitutes the original, and a correction of a return, which does not (para 17). The authorities the Court followed were the Bombay High Court decisions cited for the assessee - Prime Securities Ltd. v. Varinder Mehta [2009] 182 Taxman 221 / 317 ITR 27 (Bom.) and Atul Projects India (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India, Writ Petition No. 3501 of 2018, order of 24 January 2019 - which had held that the date of filing is the date of original presentation (paras 4.5, 4.6 and 16). The previous statement here that Dhampur Sugar Mills was the authority relied on is corrected: it was cited by the revenue, and the Court used it to draw a distinction that told against the revenue.
Therefore, upon such defects being removed, the return would relate back to the date of filing of the original return, that is, 10.09.2016 and consequently, the limitation for issuance of notice under sub-section (2) of section 143 of the Act would be 30.09.2017, viz. six months from the end of the financial year in which the return under sub-section (1) of section 139 came to be filed.
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Handle my notice → Ask a CA on WhatsAppFrom the original filing. Where the defect is removed within the time the Assessing Officer allowed, the return relates back to the date on which it was originally furnished, and the six-month limitation for a s.143(2) notice is counted from the end of the financial year in which that original return was filed. On the facts the scrutiny notice was issued nearly a year after that period had run out and was held barred. The Revenue's special leave petition was dismissed. This was decided by the High Court (Gujarat High Court - Ms Harsha Devani and Ms Sangeeta K. Vishen JJ) and bears on section 139, section 139(1), section 139(3), section 139(5), section 139(9), section 142(1), section 143(1), section 143(2), section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act 1961. It is reported as [2020] 113 taxmann.com 577 / (2020) 269 Taxman 440 / (2020) 422 ITR 482 (Guj.)(HC); R/Special Civil Application No. 13924 of 2018; AY 2016-17. It is the only point at which a s.139(9) defect notice does the assessee any good. Departmental practice is to treat the date of rectification as the date of the return, which pushes the scrutiny window forward by a whole financial year; this decision says the opposite. The counter to expect is that the return only became a valid return on rectification, so time should run from then — which is exactly the argument the Court rejected. If it applies to you, the first step is this: Fix the two dates first: the date the original return was furnished under s.139(1), and the date the defect was actually removed.
For assessment year 2016-17 the company filed its return under s.139(1) on 10 September 2016. An intimation of a defective return under s.139(9) issued on 17 June 2017, and a reminder of 5 July 2017 extended the time to comply by fifteen days, to 20 July 2017. The company removed the defects on 7 July 2017, within the time allowed. The return was processed under s.143(1) on 12 August 2017, the intimation showing the date of the original return as 10 September 2016. A notice under s.143(2) was then issued on 9 August 2018, saying that the return filed on 7 July 2017 had been selected for scrutiny under the CASS system. The company challenged that notice under Articles 226 and 227 as barred by limitation. The matter was decided on 2019-10-24 by the High Court (Gujarat High Court - Ms Harsha Devani and Ms Sangeeta K. Vishen JJ). On those facts the High Court held as follows. The petition was allowed and the s.143(2) notice of 9 August 2018, together with all proceedings taken pursuant to it, was quashed (para 21). Sub-section (9) of s.139 does not require the assessee to file a fresh return; it requires him to remove the defects in the return already filed, and once they are removed within the time allowed it is the very same return that becomes valid (paras 11 and 12). There is no concept of a corrected return under the Act, so the reference in the notice to a return filed on 7 July 2017 was itself incorrect (paras 13 and 16). The removal of the defects therefore relates back to the filing of the original return on 10 September 2016, and the limitation under the proviso to s.143(2) expired on 30 September 2017, six months from the end of the financial year in which the s.139(1) return was filed (para 20). The Court added that a notice under s.143(2) is the statutory notice by which the officer assumes jurisdiction to make a scrutiny assessment, so that an assessee who receives none within the period is entitled to presume the return has become final and no assessment can proceed (para 19).
The Court compared the language of sub-sections (1), (3) and (5) of s.139, in each of which the assessee is required to furnish a return, with sub-section (9), which requires no return at all but only that the assessee be given an opportunity to rectify a defect, failing which the return is treated as invalid (paras 10 to 12). Unlike a revised return under s.139(5), which substitutes the original, a correction under s.139(9) leaves the original return in place and rectifies it. The Court reinforced that from the terms of the s.139(9) notice itself, which told the assessee to change no information other than the errors listed and to file a revised return, not a corrected return, if any change of income were involved; the assessee had filed no revised return (paras 14 and 15). Since there is no concept of a corrected return under the Act, the removal of defects relates back to the original filing (para 16). The revenue's authority, Pr. CIT v. Babubhai Ramanbhai Patel, and the Allahabad decision in Dhampur Sugar Mills v. CIT [1973] 90 ITR 236 on which it rested, were held to support the assessee, because both draw a clear distinction between a revised return, which substitutes the original, and a correction of a return, which does not (para 17). The authorities the Court followed were the Bombay High Court decisions cited for the assessee - Prime Securities Ltd. v. Varinder Mehta [2009] 182 Taxman 221 / 317 ITR 27 (Bom.) and Atul Projects India (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India, Writ Petition No. 3501 of 2018, order of 24 January 2019 - which had held that the date of filing is the date of original presentation (paras 4.5, 4.6 and 16). The previous statement here that Dhampur Sugar Mills was the authority relied on is corrected: it was cited by the revenue, and the Court used it to draw a distinction that told against the revenue. In the words reproduced by the source cited on this page: "Therefore, upon such defects being removed, the return would relate back to the date of filing of the original return, that is, 10.09.2016 and consequently, the limitation for issuance of notice under sub-section (2) of section 143 of the Act would be 30.09.2017, viz. six months from the end of the financial year in which the return under sub-section (1) of section 139 came to be filed."
It was decided by the High Court on 2019-10-24 and is reported as [2020] 113 taxmann.com 577 / (2020) 269 Taxman 440 / (2020) 422 ITR 482 (Guj.)(HC); R/Special Civil Application No. 13924 of 2018; AY 2016-17. Binding within that High Court's jurisdiction. Persuasive elsewhere. A High Court decision binds the assessing officer, the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal within that state, and is persuasive elsewhere. If your assessment is in a different jurisdiction, check whether your own High Court has taken the same view before relying on it. On section 139, section 139(1), section 139(3), section 139(5), section 139(9), section 142(1), section 143(1), section 143(2), section 143(3), the practical question is whether the facts of your own notice match the facts of this case closely enough for the same rule to apply.
It helps the taxpayer. The petition was allowed and the s.143(2) notice of 9 August 2018, together with all proceedings taken pursuant to it, was quashed (para 21). Sub-section (9) of s.139 does not require the assessee to file a fresh return; it requires him to remove the defects in the return already filed, and once they are removed within the time allowed it is the very same return that becomes valid (paras 11 and 12). There is no concept of a corrected return under the Act, so the reference in the notice to a return filed on 7 July 2017 was itself incorrect (paras 13 and 16). The removal of the defects therefore relates back to the filing of the original return on 10 September 2016, and the limitation under the proviso to s.143(2) expired on 30 September 2017, six months from the end of the financial year in which the s.139(1) return was filed (para 20). The Court added that a notice under s.143(2) is the statutory notice by which the officer assumes jurisdiction to make a scrutiny assessment, so that an assessee who receives none within the period is entitled to presume the return has become final and no assessment can proceed (para 19). It arises in Assessment & Scrutiny matters, on section 139, section 139(1), section 139(3), section 139(5), section 139(9), section 142(1), section 143(1), section 143(2), section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act 1961, and was decided by Gujarat High Court - Ms Harsha Devani and Ms Sangeeta K. Vishen JJ. Before relying on it, read the source linked on this page and check whether it has since been distinguished, overruled or overtaken by an amendment to the Income Tax Act. In practice the steps that follow from it are these. Check that the rectification was within the fifteen days or the further period the officer allowed — the relation-back reasoning is framed on removal 'within the time allowed by the Assessing Officer'. Compute the s.143(2) limitation from the end of the financial year in which the original return was filed, and take the point at the threshold rather than after the assessment is made. Keep the acknowledgement of the defect notice and of the response on the portal; the whole argument turns on dates, not on merits.
Still good law. Followed, and the Revenue's challenge disposed of. On following: the Ahmedabad Bench in Aark Infosoft (P.) Ltd. v. ACIT [2024] 161 taxmann.com 440 / 206 ITD 354 (Ahd.)(Trib.), IT Appeal No. 681 (Ahd) of 2023 for assessment year 2017-18, decided 21 February 2024, applied this judgment to quash an assessment framed on a s.143(2) notice issued more than a year after the limitation had run from the original return. It also carried the ratio a step further, holding that the answer is the same where the defect was cured after the s.139(9) period, because an officer who accepts the cure, processes the return and issues a refund has condoned the delay under the proviso. The Delhi Bench in Aditi Infrabuild and Services v. DCIT (4 December 2024) and the Bangalore Bench in Sindhu Cargo Services (P) Ltd v. DCIT (16 September 2020) also reproduce and apply it. On appeal history: the Revenue's special leave petition was dismissed - Dy. CIT v. Kunal Structure (India) (P.) Ltd. [2021] 123 taxmann.com 392 / (2021) 277 Taxman 401 (SC), Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy and M.R. Shah JJ., SLP (Civil) Diary No. 15576 of 2020, decided 20 November 2020 - but the order runs to three sentences, condoning the delay and dismissing the petition without reasons. That disposes of the Revenue's challenge and leaves this judgment standing; it approves nothing and is not itself authority on the point. Nothing doubting or refusing to follow the judgment has been found. The limit to note is that the ratio is expressly framed on removal of the defect 'within the time allowed by the Assessing Officer', so a case of late cure depends on the proviso and on Aark Infosoft rather than on this judgment directly. No source could be cited for that finding. Checking whether an authority still stands matters as much as knowing what it held: a decision may be overruled on one point and survive on another, or the provision it interprets may have been amended since. Read the source and the editor's note on this page before relying on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal.
WHAT THE DECISION SETTLES AND WHAT IT LEAVES. It settles the limitation consequence of curing a defect within the time allowed. It does not decide what happens where the defect is never cured - the return is then invalid by force of s.139(9) itself - and it does not deal with the proviso to s.139(9), under which the officer may condone a late rectification. On that, the Ahmedabad Bench in Aark Infosoft has since held that an officer who accepts a late cure and processes the return has condoned the delay, so the same relation-back applies. AN AUTHORITY CORRECTION. Dhampur Sugar Mills v. CIT [1973] 90 ITR 236 (All.) was cited by the Revenue, through Pr. CIT v. Babubhai Ramanbhai Patel, and the Court used its distinction between a revised return and a correction of a return against the Revenue. The decisions actually followed are the Bombay High Court's in Prime Securities Ltd. and in Atul Projects India (P.) Ltd. Do not cite Dhampur Sugar Mills as authority for this judgment's result. ONE SENTENCE WORTH CARRYING BEYOND THE FACTS. At paragraph 19 the Court says that a notice under s.143(2) is the statutory notice by which the officer assumes jurisdiction to make a scrutiny assessment, so that an assessee who receives none within the period is entitled to presume that the return has become final and that no assessment can proceed. That is a general proposition about jurisdiction and it is useful well outside the s.139(9) context. ON THE PARTICULARS. The judgment is dated 24 October 2019, was given by Ms Harsha Devani and Ms Sangeeta K. Vishen JJ. in R/Special Civil Application No. 13924 of 2018, and is reported at [2020] 113 taxmann.com 577 / (2020) 269 Taxman 440 / (2020) 422 ITR 482 (Guj.). The Supreme Court dismissed the Revenue's petition on 20 November 2020 without reasons. ON HOW THE TEXT ON THIS PAGE WAS CHECKED, and its one weak point. The judgment's text, including paragraphs 16, 19, 20 and 21 as cited in this entry, has been verified word for word against verbatim reproductions of it in three later Tribunal orders - Aark Infosoft (P) Ltd v. ACIT (Ahmedabad, 21 February 2024), Aditi Infrabuild and Services v. DCIT (Delhi, 4 December 2024) and Sindhu Cargo Services (P) Ltd v. DCIT (Bangalore, 16 September 2020). Every date in the facts, the petition number and the parties are confirmed by the ad-interim order of 10 September 2018 in the same petition. The Bench named here is the one point in this entry that no primary document confirms: that 2018 interim order was before a different Bench, Akil Kureshi and B.N. Karia, JJ. Check the Bench against the report before it goes into a citation. It does not tell you what happens where the defect is cured after the period allowed but before assessment, which is governed by the proviso to s.139(9) and which this judgment did not deal with, though the Ahmedabad Bench has since addressed it. It does not decide the position where the return is treated as invalid because the defect was never cured. And because the Supreme Court's dismissal carried no reasons, the point rests on High Court and Tribunal authority only. This library shows the verification state of every entry openly. This entry has not yet been read in full by a chartered accountant. The summary reflects the sources listed on this page. Read the source before you rely on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
The petition was allowed and the s.143(2) notice of 9 August 2018, together with all proceedings taken pursuant to it, was quashed (para 21). Sub-section (9) of s.139 does not require the assessee to file a fresh return; it requires him to remove the defects in the return already filed, and once they are removed within the time allowed it is the very same return that becomes valid (paras 11 and 12). There is no concept of a corrected return under the Act, so the reference in the notice to a return filed on 7 July 2017 was itself incorrect (paras 13 and 16). The removal of the defects therefore relates back to the filing of the original return on 10 September 2016, and the limitation under the proviso to s.143(2) expired on 30 September 2017, six months from the end of the financial year in which the s.139(1) return was filed (para 20). The Court added that a notice under s.143(2) is the statutory notice by which the officer assumes jurisdiction to make a scrutiny assessment, so that an assessee who receives none within the period is entitled to presume the return has become final and no assessment can proceed (para 19).
TaxSphere, “Kunal Structure (India) Pvt Ltd v Dy CIT”, https://taxnotice.vittsphere.com/caselaw/case/kunal-structure-v-dcit-139-9-defect-relates-back/ (validity last checked 2026-08-22)
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