The department has filed its appeal hundreds of days late and its condonation application recites nothing but a list of file movements. Does the usual latitude for government litigants save it?
Not on an explanation of that kind. The Supreme Court refused to condone a delay of 427 days by the Postal Department, holding that the department could not claim a separate period of limitation when it had competent persons familiar with court proceedings, that the plea of impersonal machinery and note-making cannot be accepted given modern technology, and that the law of limitation binds the Government like everyone else. The appeals were dismissed on the ground of delay alone and the merits were left open.
Decided by the Supreme Court (P. Sathasivam J and J. Chelameswar J (judgment delivered by P. Sathasivam J)) on 2012-02-24, reported as Civil Appeal Nos. 2474-2475 of 2012 (arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 7595-96 of 2011), Supreme Court of India. It bears on section 253, section 253(5), section 249(3), section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 of the Income Tax Act 1961, in Appeals matters.
This is the authority to put against a departmental condonation application under s.253(5), s.249(3) or s.260A that consists of a chronology of file movements without explaining any of them. The Court recorded at paragraph 8 that there was no quarrel about the propositions in Katiji, G. Ramegowda, Chandra Mani, Harish Chandra, Giga Ram and Lipok Ao, adding that in each of them condonation had turned on the peculiar facts; and at paragraph 7, in setting those decisions out, it had noted the actual delay in each — four days in Katiji, 109 days in Chandra Mani, 480 days in Harish Chandra, 57 days in Lipok Ao. State the holding with the care the Court used: paragraph 12 does not withdraw the latitude allowed to government litigants, it expressly retains the liberal concession where there is no gross negligence, deliberate inaction or want of bona fides, and then holds that on these facts the Department could not take advantage of it. What defeated the department was the absence of any explanation for a four-month gap before even applying for the certified copy, and the fact that the affidavit gave dates without reasons. Paragraph 13 is the sentence that gets quoted: condonation is an exception, not an anticipated benefit for government departments. The case is a Post Office matter under the Indian Post Office Act 1898, not an income-tax appeal, so it is applied to tax limitation by analogy; but it is the Supreme Court's general statement on government delay and is routinely used that way.
Binding on every court and authority in India.
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Living Media India Ltd. publishes Reader's Digest and India Today, both registered newspapers entitled to concessional postage. The Postal Department refused permission to post the December 2005 issue of Reader's Digest carrying a Toyota advertisement booklet with a 2006 calendar, and later refused the same concession for the 26 December 2005 issue of India Today carrying an Amway booklet, on the ground that the booklets were neither a supplement nor part and parcel of the publication. A single Judge of the Delhi High Court allowed the company's writ petitions on 28 March 2007. A Division Bench dismissed the department's letters patent appeals on 11 September 2009. The department applied for a certified copy of that judgment only on 8 January 2010, nearly four months later, and filed its special leave petitions on 10 February 2011, 427 days late. The condonation application dated 10 February 2011 was found not to contain acceptable and plausible reasons, and the Court permitted a better affidavit, which was filed on 26 December 2011 and set out a chronology of file movements between the Chief Postmaster General, the Postal Directorate, the Central Agency Section, the Ministry of Law and Justice and the Additional Solicitor General.
The appeals were dismissed on the ground of delay, with no order as to costs, and the questions of law were left open (paragraph 14). The Court began the operative passage by keeping in view that in a matter of condonation of delay, where there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice — but held that on the facts and circumstances the Department could not take advantage of the various earlier decisions (paragraph 12). The persons concerned were well aware of the prescribed period of limitation; they could not claim a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed of competent persons familiar with court proceedings; the claim of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes could not be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available; and the law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government (paragraph 12). Unless a government body has a reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months or years due to a considerable degree of procedural red tape; government departments are under a special obligation to perform their duties with diligence and commitment; and condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments (paragraph 13).
At paragraph 7 the Court took the six decisions relied on by the Additional Solicitor General one by one — Katiji, G. Ramegowda, Chandra Mani, Harish Chandra, Giga Ram and Lipok Ao — and, in setting them out, recorded the actual delay involved in each: four days in Katiji, 109 days in Chandra Mani, 480 days in Harish Chandra and 57 days in Lipok Ao. At paragraph 8 it said there was no quarrel about the propositions inferred from those decisions, but that in each of them the Court had condoned the delay, or upheld the High Court's condonation, on the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case. At paragraph 10 it turned to the decisions cited for the respondents by Mr Soli J. Sorabjee — Amateur Riders Club, where a stereotyped affidavit was rejected, and Pundlik Jalam Patil, where it was said that the court helps those who are vigilant and do not slumber over their rights. It then examined the better affidavit itself (paragraph 11) and found that the Department knew the date of the Division Bench judgment yet gave no explanation for not applying for the certified copy for nearly four months, and that the remaining dates showed delay at every stage, with the fact of receipt recorded but no reason given.
Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments.
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Handle my notice → Ask a CA on WhatsAppNot on an explanation of that kind. The Supreme Court refused to condone a delay of 427 days by the Postal Department, holding that the department could not claim a separate period of limitation when it had competent persons familiar with court proceedings, that the plea of impersonal machinery and note-making cannot be accepted given modern technology, and that the law of limitation binds the Government like everyone else. The appeals were dismissed on the ground of delay alone and the merits were left open. This was decided by the Supreme Court (P. Sathasivam J and J. Chelameswar J (judgment delivered by P. Sathasivam J)) and bears on section 253, section 253(5), section 249(3), section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 of the Income Tax Act 1961. It is reported as Civil Appeal Nos. 2474-2475 of 2012 (arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 7595-96 of 2011), Supreme Court of India. This is the authority to put against a departmental condonation application under s.253(5), s.249(3) or s.260A that consists of a chronology of file movements without explaining any of them. The Court recorded at paragraph 8 that there was no quarrel about the propositions in Katiji, G. Ramegowda, Chandra Mani, Harish Chandra, Giga Ram and Lipok Ao, adding that in each of them condonation had turned on the peculiar facts; and at paragraph 7, in setting those decisions out, it had noted the actual delay in each — four days in Katiji, 109 days in Chandra Mani, 480 days in Harish Chandra, 57 days in Lipok Ao. State the holding with the care the Court used: paragraph 12 does not withdraw the latitude allowed to government litigants, it expressly retains the liberal concession where there is no gross negligence, deliberate inaction or want of bona fides, and then holds that on these facts the Department could not take advantage of it. What defeated the department was the absence of any explanation for a four-month gap before even applying for the certified copy, and the fact that the affidavit gave dates without reasons. Paragraph 13 is the sentence that gets quoted: condonation is an exception, not an anticipated benefit for government departments. The case is a Post Office matter under the Indian Post Office Act 1898, not an income-tax appeal, so it is applied to tax limitation by analogy; but it is the Supreme Court's general statement on government delay and is routinely used that way. If it applies to you, the first step is this: When resisting a departmental condonation application, tabulate every gap in the department's own chronology and ask what explains each one — the Court's objection was to dates without reasons, not to the length of the delay alone.
Living Media India Ltd. publishes Reader's Digest and India Today, both registered newspapers entitled to concessional postage. The Postal Department refused permission to post the December 2005 issue of Reader's Digest carrying a Toyota advertisement booklet with a 2006 calendar, and later refused the same concession for the 26 December 2005 issue of India Today carrying an Amway booklet, on the ground that the booklets were neither a supplement nor part and parcel of the publication. A single Judge of the Delhi High Court allowed the company's writ petitions on 28 March 2007. A Division Bench dismissed the department's letters patent appeals on 11 September 2009. The department applied for a certified copy of that judgment only on 8 January 2010, nearly four months later, and filed its special leave petitions on 10 February 2011, 427 days late. The condonation application dated 10 February 2011 was found not to contain acceptable and plausible reasons, and the Court permitted a better affidavit, which was filed on 26 December 2011 and set out a chronology of file movements between the Chief Postmaster General, the Postal Directorate, the Central Agency Section, the Ministry of Law and Justice and the Additional Solicitor General. The matter was decided on 2012-02-24 by the Supreme Court (P. Sathasivam J and J. Chelameswar J (judgment delivered by P. Sathasivam J)). On those facts the Supreme Court held as follows. The appeals were dismissed on the ground of delay, with no order as to costs, and the questions of law were left open (paragraph 14). The Court began the operative passage by keeping in view that in a matter of condonation of delay, where there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice — but held that on the facts and circumstances the Department could not take advantage of the various earlier decisions (paragraph 12). The persons concerned were well aware of the prescribed period of limitation; they could not claim a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed of competent persons familiar with court proceedings; the claim of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes could not be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available; and the law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government (paragraph 12). Unless a government body has a reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months or years due to a considerable degree of procedural red tape; government departments are under a special obligation to perform their duties with diligence and commitment; and condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments (paragraph 13).
At paragraph 7 the Court took the six decisions relied on by the Additional Solicitor General one by one — Katiji, G. Ramegowda, Chandra Mani, Harish Chandra, Giga Ram and Lipok Ao — and, in setting them out, recorded the actual delay involved in each: four days in Katiji, 109 days in Chandra Mani, 480 days in Harish Chandra and 57 days in Lipok Ao. At paragraph 8 it said there was no quarrel about the propositions inferred from those decisions, but that in each of them the Court had condoned the delay, or upheld the High Court's condonation, on the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case. At paragraph 10 it turned to the decisions cited for the respondents by Mr Soli J. Sorabjee — Amateur Riders Club, where a stereotyped affidavit was rejected, and Pundlik Jalam Patil, where it was said that the court helps those who are vigilant and do not slumber over their rights. It then examined the better affidavit itself (paragraph 11) and found that the Department knew the date of the Division Bench judgment yet gave no explanation for not applying for the certified copy for nearly four months, and that the remaining dates showed delay at every stage, with the fact of receipt recorded but no reason given. In the words reproduced by the source cited on this page: "Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments." The decision followed or applied Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club, Bombay 1994 Supp (2) SCC 603 — relied on; Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by LRs. v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project (2008) 17 SCC 448 — relied on; Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107 — distinguished on the facts; G. Ramegowda, Major v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore (1988) 2 SCC 142 — distinguished on the facts; State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani (1996) 3 SCC 132 — distinguished on the facts; State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao (2005) 3 SCC 752 — distinguished on the facts.
It was decided by the Supreme Court on 2012-02-24 and is reported as Civil Appeal Nos. 2474-2475 of 2012 (arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 7595-96 of 2011), Supreme Court of India. Binding on every court and authority in India. A Supreme Court decision binds every assessing officer, every Commissioner (Appeals), every bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and every High Court in India. An officer who declines to follow it is acting contrary to law, and that refusal is itself a ground of appeal. On section 253, section 253(5), section 249(3), section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the practical question is whether the facts of your own notice match the facts of this case closely enough for the same rule to apply.
It helps the taxpayer. The appeals were dismissed on the ground of delay, with no order as to costs, and the questions of law were left open (paragraph 14). The Court began the operative passage by keeping in view that in a matter of condonation of delay, where there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice — but held that on the facts and circumstances the Department could not take advantage of the various earlier decisions (paragraph 12). The persons concerned were well aware of the prescribed period of limitation; they could not claim a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed of competent persons familiar with court proceedings; the claim of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes could not be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available; and the law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government (paragraph 12). Unless a government body has a reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months or years due to a considerable degree of procedural red tape; government departments are under a special obligation to perform their duties with diligence and commitment; and condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments (paragraph 13). It arises in Appeals matters, on section 253, section 253(5), section 249(3), section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 of the Income Tax Act 1961, and was decided by P. Sathasivam J and J. Chelameswar J (judgment delivered by P. Sathasivam J). Before relying on it, read the source linked on this page and check whether it has since been distinguished, overruled or overtaken by an amendment to the Income Tax Act. In practice the steps that follow from it are these. Take the certified-copy point first: the failure to apply for the certified copy promptly was the specific default the Court fastened on, and it is a default the department commits routinely. Do not let the department rely on Katiji and G. Ramegowda in the abstract. Point out, as the Court did, the actual length of the delay condoned in each of those cases. When you act for the department, file an affidavit that explains the reason for each interval rather than listing file movements, and be ready to say why a certified copy was not applied for at once — a 'better affidavit' that repeats the same list will not do, as the second affidavit here did not. Remember that the Court left the questions of law open. A dismissal on delay decides nothing on the merits and does not bind the same issue in a later year.
Validity check could not be completed. Validity check could not be completed: no search for later treatment of this decision was run. It is consistent with, and in the same direction as, the Supreme Court's later general statement in Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector (LA), 8 April 2024, which was read this pass; but whether any later Bench has doubted or distinguished Living Media specifically has NOT been checked. No source could be cited for that finding. Checking whether an authority still stands matters as much as knowing what it held: a decision may be overruled on one point and survive on another, or the provision it interprets may have been amended since. Read the source and the editor's note on this page before relying on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal.
This is not an income-tax case. The underlying dispute is about concessional postal rates for registered newspapers under the Indian Post Office Act 1898 and the Indian Post Office Rules 1933; the limitation holding is general and is invoked in tax matters by analogy, which is how it is presented here. The judgment runs to fourteen numbered paragraphs and ends at paragraph 14 with the disposal 'the appeals fail and are dismissed on the ground of delay. No order as to costs.' Paragraph 7 sets out the six Katiji principles and paragraphs 9 and 10 reproduce the department's affidavit and the passages relied on by the respondent's counsel; those are quoted material and none of it has been attributed to this Court. The quote used is from paragraph 13, which is the Court speaking, and it was re-confirmed on an independent retrieval route. The affidavit reproduced at paragraph 9 miscites G. Ramegowda as '(1998) 2 SCC 142' where the Court's own paragraph 7 gives '(1988) 2 SCC 142'; the 1988 citation is the one used here. This library shows the verification state of every entry openly. This entry has not yet been read in full by a chartered accountant. The summary reflects the sources listed on this page. Read the source before you rely on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
The appeals were dismissed on the ground of delay, with no order as to costs, and the questions of law were left open (paragraph 14). The Court began the operative passage by keeping in view that in a matter of condonation of delay, where there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice — but held that on the facts and circumstances the Department could not take advantage of the various earlier decisions (paragraph 12). The persons concerned were well aware of the prescribed period of limitation; they could not claim a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed of competent persons familiar with court proceedings; the claim of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes could not be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available; and the law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government (paragraph 12). Unless a government body has a reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months or years due to a considerable degree of procedural red tape; government departments are under a special obligation to perform their duties with diligence and commitment; and condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments (paragraph 13).
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