Section 253(5)

Section 253(5) — the law in short

What the courts have decided on section 253(5), in one screen. Read this first; open an entry when you need the facts, the reasoning and the source.

• Pathapati Subba Reddy v Special Deputy Collector (LA) — the Supreme Court's current summary on condonation: section 5 is construed liberally, section 3 strictly, and even sufficient cause need not be excused Supreme CourtHelps departmentValidity unconfirmed
  The other side says every day's delay must be explained; my client says the courts take a liberal view. Which line does the Supreme Court now apply?
  Both, in a stated order. The Court held that s.5 of the Limitation Act is to be construed liberally but s.3, being mandatory and substantive, strictly; that a liberal or justice-oriented approach cannot be used to defeat the law of limitation and revive stale or dead matters; that the existence of sufficient cause is a condition precedent to the discretion; and that even where sufficient cause is established the discretion may still be refused for inordinate delay, negligence or want of due diligence. A delay of 5,659 days was not condoned and the special leave petition was dismissed.
• Office of the Chief Post Master General v Living Media India Ltd — a government department has no separate period of limitation, and red tape is not sufficient cause Supreme CourtHelps taxpayerValidity unconfirmed
  The department has filed its appeal hundreds of days late and its condonation application recites nothing but a list of file movements. Does the usual latitude for government litigants save it?
  Not on an explanation of that kind. The Supreme Court refused to condone a delay of 427 days by the Postal Department, holding that the department could not claim a separate period of limitation when it had competent persons familiar with court proceedings, that the plea of impersonal machinery and note-making cannot be accepted given modern technology, and that the law of limitation binds the Government like everyone else. The appeals were dismissed on the ground of delay alone and the merits were left open.
• DCIT v Hita Land Private Limited ITATHelps taxpayerValidity unconfirmed
  Can the Tribunal condone delay in a section 254(2) miscellaneous application, or extend the six months for an order passed before 1 June 2016?
  On this Mumbai Tribunal view, no on both counts. The section as amended draws no distinction between orders passed before and after 1 June 2016, and the Tribunal has no power to condone delay in a miscellaneous application — unlike s.253(5), which gives it that power for an appeal. Applications filed beyond six months from the date of the order were dismissed as time barred.
• Statutory position — section 253: the appeal to the Tribunal is now due within two months from the END OF THE MONTH of communication, not sixty days CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  How long do I actually have to appeal to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal? I have always worked on sixty days from receipt of the order.
  Sixty days is no longer the rule. With effect from 1 October 2024 the Finance (No. 2) Act 2024 (Act 15 of 2024) substituted the opening of s.253(3): an appeal under s.253(1) or s.253(2) must now be filed 'within two months from the end of the month in which the order sought to be appealed against is communicated to the assessee or to the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, as the case may be'. A memorandum of cross-objections under s.253(4) is still due within thirty days of receipt of notice of the other side's appeal, and s.253(5) still lets the Tribunal admit a late appeal or cross-objection on sufficient cause.

Listed strongest first: Supreme Court, then High Court, then Tribunal, then CBDT. Nothing here has yet been read in full by a chartered accountant — open an entry to see where it came from.