Section 249(3)

Section 249(3) — the law in short

What the courts have decided on section 249(3), in one screen. Read this first; open an entry when you need the facts, the reasoning and the source.

• Pathapati Subba Reddy v Special Deputy Collector (LA) — the Supreme Court's current summary on condonation: section 5 is construed liberally, section 3 strictly, and even sufficient cause need not be excused Supreme CourtHelps department
  The other side says every day's delay must be explained; my client says the courts take a liberal view. Which line does the Supreme Court now apply?
  Both, in a stated order. The Court held that s.5 of the Limitation Act is to be construed liberally but s.3, being mandatory and substantive, strictly; that a liberal or justice-oriented approach cannot be used to defeat the law of limitation and revive stale or dead matters; that the existence of sufficient cause is a condition precedent to the discretion; and that even where sufficient cause is established the discretion may still be refused for inordinate delay, negligence or want of due diligence. A delay of 5,659 days was not condoned and the special leave petition was dismissed.
• Office of the Chief Post Master General v Living Media India Ltd — a government department has no separate period of limitation, and red tape is not sufficient cause Supreme CourtHelps taxpayer
  The department has filed its appeal hundreds of days late and its condonation application recites nothing but a list of file movements. Does the usual latitude for government litigants save it?
  Not on an explanation of that kind. The Supreme Court refused to condone a delay of 427 days by the Postal Department, holding that the department could not claim a separate period of limitation when it had competent persons familiar with court proceedings, that the plea of impersonal machinery and note-making cannot be accepted given modern technology, and that the law of limitation binds the Government like everyone else. The appeals were dismissed on the ground of delay alone and the merits were left open.
• Ramamoorthy Sundar v ITO ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My client sat on an NFAC order restricting his leave encashment exemption for over a year, and only came to me after hearing that the limit is now Rs 25,00,000. Is the appeal dead on limitation?
  Not necessarily. The Tribunal condoned a delay of the order of five hundred days and then allowed the enhanced exemption of Rs 25,00,000 under s.10(10AA), treating the subsequent development on the judicial front and the CBDT notification as themselves part of the sufficient cause for the delay.
• Statutory position — section 249: the fee, the thirty days, condonation, and the section 249(4) bar that must be cleared before the appeal is admitted CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  I am filing a first appeal to the Commissioner (Appeals). What exactly must I have done before the appeal can even be admitted, and from what date do the thirty days run?
  Section 249(4) is a bar on admission, not a ground of dismissal on the merits: no appeal under Chapter XX shall be admitted unless, at the time of filing, the assessee has paid the tax due on the income returned (clause (a)) or, where no return was filed, an amount equal to the advance tax that was payable (clause (b)). Only clause (b) can be relaxed — on an application by the appellant, the Joint Commissioner (Appeals) or Commissioner (Appeals) may for any good and sufficient reason recorded in writing exempt him from clause (b); there is no such escape from clause (a). The appeal itself must be presented within thirty days of the date of service of the notice of demand (or, in the other cases, of intimation of the order appealed against), and s.249(3) lets the appellate authority admit a late appeal on sufficient cause.
• Sections 15 to 19 of the Black Money Act - the appeal machinery CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both waysNo later treatment found
  What are the time limits, forms and fees for an appeal under the Black Money Act, and where do they differ from the Income-tax Act?
  An appeal to the Commissioner (Appeals) lies under s.15(1) against the amount of tax on undisclosed foreign income or assets, against liability to be assessed under the Act, against a penalty, and against a rectification order or a refusal to rectify. It is filed in Form 2 with a fee of Rs 10,000 within thirty days, and Rule 6(4) bars admission unless the tax with penalty and interest on the liability not objected to has been paid. An appeal to the Tribunal lies within sixty days in Form 3 with a fee of Rs 25,000, with cross-objections in Form 4 within thirty days. An appeal to the High Court on a substantial question of law lies within 120 days. The critical departure from the Income-tax Act is that the power to condone delay is capped: one year before the Commissioner (Appeals) under s.15(4) and one year before the Tribunal under s.18(5), where ss.249(3) and 253(5) of the Income-tax Act contain no such ceiling.

Listed strongest first: Supreme Court, then High Court, then Tribunal, then CBDT. Nothing here has yet been read in full by a chartered accountant — open an entry to see where it came from.