The other side says every day's delay must be explained; my client says the courts take a liberal view. Which line does the Supreme Court now apply?
Both, in a stated order. The Court held that s.5 of the Limitation Act is to be construed liberally but s.3, being mandatory and substantive, strictly; that a liberal or justice-oriented approach cannot be used to defeat the law of limitation and revive stale or dead matters; that the existence of sufficient cause is a condition precedent to the discretion; and that even where sufficient cause is established the discretion may still be refused for inordinate delay, negligence or want of due diligence. A delay of 5,659 days was not condoned and the special leave petition was dismissed.
Decided by the Supreme Court (Bela M. Trivedi J and Pankaj Mithal J (judgment delivered by Pankaj Mithal J)) on 2024-04-08, reported as 2024 INSC 286; Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 31248 of 2018, Supreme Court of India. It bears on section 253(5), section 249(3), section 260A, section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 of the Income Tax Act 1961, in Appeals matters.
This is the case to cite when you need the strict line, and paragraph 26 is why: the Court reduced the whole subject to eight numbered propositions, which is exactly what a Tribunal or a High Court wants when it has to choose between Katiji and the 'every day must be explained' authorities. Two of the eight are commonly overlooked and both help a respondent. Proposition (vii) is that the merits of the case are not to be considered when deciding condonation — so the standard argument that a meritorious matter should not be thrown out is, on this authority, beside the point at the condonation stage. Proposition (viii) is that condoning delay by imposing a condition instead of finding sufficient cause disregards the statute, which disposes of the practice of condoning on payment of costs where no cause is shown. Against that, the Court expressly retained the liberal construction of s.5 and reaffirmed Katiji's substance at paragraph 16, so this is not a repudiation of the liberal line but a boundary around it. Note it is a land acquisition matter, applied to tax limitation by analogy.
Binding on every court and authority in India.
Read aloud by your device. Press again to stop.
Land in village Gandluru, Guntur district, was acquired in about 1989 for the Telugu Ganga Project. Sixteen claimants sought a reference under s.18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Claimants 1, 3 and 11 died during the reference and no heirs were substituted. The reference was dismissed on merits on 24 September 1999. Fifteen of the sixteen claimants accepted that. More than five years later some of the heirs of the deceased claimant 11 proposed an appeal under s.54 of the Land Acquisition Act, with a delay of 5,659 days, explaining that the surviving daughter lived in her matrimonial home, had no knowledge of the reference, and learnt of its dismissal only on 28 May 2015 when a grandson visited the Land Acquisition Officer's office for a submersion certificate. The High Court refused to condone the delay by order dated 18 January 2017 and dismissed the proposed appeal as barred by time. The petitioners relied on Dhiraj Singh v. State of Haryana and Imrat Lal v. Land Acquisition Collector, in both of which delay had been condoned on terms, and on unreported orders condoning delay subject to forfeiture of statutory benefits.
The special leave petition was dismissed (paragraph 34). The High Court was justified in refusing to condone the delay: the claimants were negligent in pursuing the reference and then in filing the appeal, most claimants had accepted the reference court's decision, and the petitioners had never applied for procedural review, so there was no due diligence (paragraph 32). At paragraph 26 the Court summarised the law in eight propositions — limitation rests on public policy and forfeits the remedy, not the right; a remedy not availed of for long must cease; s.3 is construed strictly and s.5 liberally; a liberal or justice-oriented approach cannot defeat s.3; the discretion to condone may be refused even where sufficient cause is shown, for inordinate delay, negligence or want of due diligence; relief granted to others in similar matters does not entitle a party to condonation; merits are not to be considered in condoning delay; and condoning delay because conditions have been imposed disregards the statutory provision.
The Court began from the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and the character of limitation statutes as statutes of peace and repose (paragraphs 7 and 8), read s.3 as peremptory and mandatory even where limitation is not pleaded (paragraphs 9 to 12), and located s.5 as the only relevant exception, its exercise being discretionary and refusable notwithstanding sufficient cause (paragraph 12). It reconciled the two by holding that different provisions of the Limitation Act require different construction, following Bhag Mal alias Ram Bux v. Munshi (paragraph 14). It restated Katiji's liberal principles at paragraph 16 and then set the boundary in the same paragraph. It drew on Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields for the discretionary character of the power, Maqbul Ahmad for the absence of any equitable exemption, Brijesh Kumar against parity claims, Lanka Venkateswarlu against liberality overriding the substantive law where 3,703 days were condoned on an unsatisfactory explanation, Ashok Kumar Chokhani for excluding merits, and Basawaraj for the rigour of limitation (paragraphs 18 to 25). Applying that, it held that Dhiraj Singh and Imrat Lal did not assist because conditions cannot substitute for sufficient cause, and both were rendered in ignorance of Basawaraj (paragraph 30).
The phrases 'liberal approach', 'justice-oriented approach' and cause for the advancement of 'substantial justice' cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
Upload it and we will read it, work out your deadline and draft the reply. A CA reviews before anything is filed.
Handle my notice → Ask a CA on WhatsAppBoth, in a stated order. The Court held that s.5 of the Limitation Act is to be construed liberally but s.3, being mandatory and substantive, strictly; that a liberal or justice-oriented approach cannot be used to defeat the law of limitation and revive stale or dead matters; that the existence of sufficient cause is a condition precedent to the discretion; and that even where sufficient cause is established the discretion may still be refused for inordinate delay, negligence or want of due diligence. A delay of 5,659 days was not condoned and the special leave petition was dismissed. This was decided by the Supreme Court (Bela M. Trivedi J and Pankaj Mithal J (judgment delivered by Pankaj Mithal J)) and bears on section 253(5), section 249(3), section 260A, section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 of the Income Tax Act 1961. It is reported as 2024 INSC 286; Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 31248 of 2018, Supreme Court of India. This is the case to cite when you need the strict line, and paragraph 26 is why: the Court reduced the whole subject to eight numbered propositions, which is exactly what a Tribunal or a High Court wants when it has to choose between Katiji and the 'every day must be explained' authorities. Two of the eight are commonly overlooked and both help a respondent. Proposition (vii) is that the merits of the case are not to be considered when deciding condonation — so the standard argument that a meritorious matter should not be thrown out is, on this authority, beside the point at the condonation stage. Proposition (viii) is that condoning delay by imposing a condition instead of finding sufficient cause disregards the statute, which disposes of the practice of condoning on payment of costs where no cause is shown. Against that, the Court expressly retained the liberal construction of s.5 and reaffirmed Katiji's substance at paragraph 16, so this is not a repudiation of the liberal line but a boundary around it. Note it is a land acquisition matter, applied to tax limitation by analogy. If it applies to you, the first step is this: Where you resist condonation, lead with paragraph 26 and take the eight propositions in order, and specifically with (vii) to keep the merits out of the condonation hearing.
Land in village Gandluru, Guntur district, was acquired in about 1989 for the Telugu Ganga Project. Sixteen claimants sought a reference under s.18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Claimants 1, 3 and 11 died during the reference and no heirs were substituted. The reference was dismissed on merits on 24 September 1999. Fifteen of the sixteen claimants accepted that. More than five years later some of the heirs of the deceased claimant 11 proposed an appeal under s.54 of the Land Acquisition Act, with a delay of 5,659 days, explaining that the surviving daughter lived in her matrimonial home, had no knowledge of the reference, and learnt of its dismissal only on 28 May 2015 when a grandson visited the Land Acquisition Officer's office for a submersion certificate. The High Court refused to condone the delay by order dated 18 January 2017 and dismissed the proposed appeal as barred by time. The petitioners relied on Dhiraj Singh v. State of Haryana and Imrat Lal v. Land Acquisition Collector, in both of which delay had been condoned on terms, and on unreported orders condoning delay subject to forfeiture of statutory benefits. The matter was decided on 2024-04-08 by the Supreme Court (Bela M. Trivedi J and Pankaj Mithal J (judgment delivered by Pankaj Mithal J)). On those facts the Supreme Court held as follows. The special leave petition was dismissed (paragraph 34). The High Court was justified in refusing to condone the delay: the claimants were negligent in pursuing the reference and then in filing the appeal, most claimants had accepted the reference court's decision, and the petitioners had never applied for procedural review, so there was no due diligence (paragraph 32). At paragraph 26 the Court summarised the law in eight propositions — limitation rests on public policy and forfeits the remedy, not the right; a remedy not availed of for long must cease; s.3 is construed strictly and s.5 liberally; a liberal or justice-oriented approach cannot defeat s.3; the discretion to condone may be refused even where sufficient cause is shown, for inordinate delay, negligence or want of due diligence; relief granted to others in similar matters does not entitle a party to condonation; merits are not to be considered in condoning delay; and condoning delay because conditions have been imposed disregards the statutory provision.
The Court began from the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and the character of limitation statutes as statutes of peace and repose (paragraphs 7 and 8), read s.3 as peremptory and mandatory even where limitation is not pleaded (paragraphs 9 to 12), and located s.5 as the only relevant exception, its exercise being discretionary and refusable notwithstanding sufficient cause (paragraph 12). It reconciled the two by holding that different provisions of the Limitation Act require different construction, following Bhag Mal alias Ram Bux v. Munshi (paragraph 14). It restated Katiji's liberal principles at paragraph 16 and then set the boundary in the same paragraph. It drew on Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields for the discretionary character of the power, Maqbul Ahmad for the absence of any equitable exemption, Brijesh Kumar against parity claims, Lanka Venkateswarlu against liberality overriding the substantive law where 3,703 days were condoned on an unsatisfactory explanation, Ashok Kumar Chokhani for excluding merits, and Basawaraj for the rigour of limitation (paragraphs 18 to 25). Applying that, it held that Dhiraj Singh and Imrat Lal did not assist because conditions cannot substitute for sufficient cause, and both were rendered in ignorance of Basawaraj (paragraph 30). In the words reproduced by the source cited on this page: "The phrases 'liberal approach', 'justice-oriented approach' and cause for the advancement of 'substantial justice' cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act." The decision followed or applied Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer — relied on and quoted at paragraphs 24 and 25; Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd — relied on; Lanka Venkateswarlu v. State of Andhra Pradesh — relied on; Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji — restated and confined; Dhiraj Singh v. State of Haryana — not followed; Imrat Lal v. Land Acquisition Collector — not followed.
It was decided by the Supreme Court on 2024-04-08 and is reported as 2024 INSC 286; Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 31248 of 2018, Supreme Court of India. Binding on every court and authority in India. A Supreme Court decision binds every assessing officer, every Commissioner (Appeals), every bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and every High Court in India. An officer who declines to follow it is acting contrary to law, and that refusal is itself a ground of appeal. On section 253(5), section 249(3), section 260A, section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the practical question is whether the facts of your own notice match the facts of this case closely enough for the same rule to apply.
It helps the department, and it appears in this library for that reason — you need to know what the Assessing Officer will cite against you. The special leave petition was dismissed (paragraph 34). The High Court was justified in refusing to condone the delay: the claimants were negligent in pursuing the reference and then in filing the appeal, most claimants had accepted the reference court's decision, and the petitioners had never applied for procedural review, so there was no due diligence (paragraph 32). At paragraph 26 the Court summarised the law in eight propositions — limitation rests on public policy and forfeits the remedy, not the right; a remedy not availed of for long must cease; s.3 is construed strictly and s.5 liberally; a liberal or justice-oriented approach cannot defeat s.3; the discretion to condone may be refused even where sufficient cause is shown, for inordinate delay, negligence or want of due diligence; relief granted to others in similar matters does not entitle a party to condonation; merits are not to be considered in condoning delay; and condoning delay because conditions have been imposed disregards the statutory provision. It arises in Appeals matters, on section 253(5), section 249(3), section 260A, section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 of the Income Tax Act 1961, and was decided by Bela M. Trivedi J and Pankaj Mithal J (judgment delivered by Pankaj Mithal J). Before relying on it, read the source linked on this page and check whether it has since been distinguished, overruled or overtaken by an amendment to the Income Tax Act. In practice the steps that follow from it are these. Where you seek condonation, do not stop at asserting a liberal approach — establish sufficient cause first, because the Court treats it as a condition precedent, and then address diligence separately, because the discretion can be refused even after sufficient cause is shown. Do not offer, and do not accept, condonation on terms such as forgoing interest where no cause has been shown; paragraph 30 holds that imposing conditions is not warranted where sufficient cause is absent, and paragraph 26(viii) calls it a disregard of the statute. Do not argue parity — that delay was condoned for someone else in a similar matter. Paragraph 26(vi) and paragraph 31 reject it. In a Tribunal appeal under s.253(5) or a first appeal under s.249(3), build the condonation affidavit around the two questions this judgment asks: what prevented filing in time, and was the applicant diligent throughout.
Still good law. The judgment is not carried in indiankanoon's citedby index, but a search on the case name returns some 2,580 decisions citing it, the most recent a Gujarat High Court judgment of 12 March 2026 — it has become the standard citation on condonation of delay. The Supreme Court itself has reiterated it: a coordinate Bench in State of Odisha v Managing Committee of Namatara Girls' High School (9 February 2026) records that 'a coordinate Bench in Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector(LA) very recently reiterated that the law of limitation is founded on public' policy, and it is cited as authority in Suresh Kumar v The State of Haryana (23 April 2025) and Inder Singh v The State of Madhya Pradesh (21 March 2025). High Courts apply it routinely, including the Calcutta High Court in MMTC Limited v M/s R. Priyarelall Iron & Steel (11 March 2025) and the Gujarat High Court in Masuriben v Special Land Acquisition Officer (12 March 2026). Nothing overruling, doubting or referring it to a larger bench was found in any of the Supreme Court decisions citing it. No source could be cited for that finding. Checking whether an authority still stands matters as much as knowing what it held: a decision may be overruled on one point and survive on another, or the provision it interprets may have been amended since. Read the source and the editor's note on this page before relying on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal.
This is a land acquisition special leave petition, not an income-tax matter; it is carried because it is the Supreme Court's current consolidated statement on s.5 of the Limitation Act, which is the provision the Tribunal and the High Courts apply through s.253(5), s.249(3) and s.260A. The judgment runs to thirty-four numbered paragraphs and ends at paragraph 34, 'The Special Leave Petition, as such, lacks merit and is dismissed.' Paragraphs 24 and 25 reproduce paragraphs 12 and 15 of Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer within quotation marks; those are the words of the earlier judgment and are not quoted here as this Court's own. The eight propositions at paragraph 26 and the quoted sentence at paragraph 16 are this Court speaking. The neutral citation printed on the judgment is 2024 INSC 286. This library shows the verification state of every entry openly. This entry has not yet been read in full by a chartered accountant. The summary reflects the sources listed on this page. Read the source before you rely on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
The special leave petition was dismissed (paragraph 34). The High Court was justified in refusing to condone the delay: the claimants were negligent in pursuing the reference and then in filing the appeal, most claimants had accepted the reference court's decision, and the petitioners had never applied for procedural review, so there was no due diligence (paragraph 32). At paragraph 26 the Court summarised the law in eight propositions — limitation rests on public policy and forfeits the remedy, not the right; a remedy not availed of for long must cease; s.3 is construed strictly and s.5 liberally; a liberal or justice-oriented approach cannot defeat s.3; the discretion to condone may be refused even where sufficient cause is shown, for inordinate delay, negligence or want of due diligence; relief granted to others in similar matters does not entitle a party to condonation; merits are not to be considered in condoning delay; and condoning delay because conditions have been imposed disregards the statutory provision.
TaxSphere, “Pathapati Subba Reddy v Special Deputy Collector (LA) — the Supreme Court's current summary on condonation: section 5 is construed liberally, section 3 strictly, and even sufficient cause need not be excused”, https://taxnotice.vittsphere.com/caselaw/case/pathapati-subba-reddy-limitation-liberal-approach-cannot-defeat-section-3/ (validity last checked 2026-09-08)
The judgment itself is a government work and may be quoted freely. The summary, the validity note and the reasoning on this page are this library's own writing: quote them with attribution, and please do not present either as the words of the court — this page keeps the two apart and so should a quotation of it.
Every entry in this library links to where it was found, so you can check it yourself rather than take our word for it.
The department has filed its appeal hundreds of days late and its condonation application recites nothing but a list of file movements. Does the usual latitude for government litigants save it?
What are the time limits, forms and fees for an appeal under the Black Money Act, and where do they differ from the Income-tax Act?
Can the Tribunal condone delay in a section 254(2) miscellaneous application, or extend the six months for an order passed before 1 June 2016?
My client sat on an NFAC order restricting his leave encashment exemption for over a year, and only came to me after hearing that the limit is now Rs 25,00,000. Is the appeal dead on limitation?
