The notice has come from an officer in a place I have nothing to do with. Can I say he has no jurisdiction, who decides that, and have I already lost the point by filing my return and answering him?
Jurisdiction reaches an Assessing Officer through section 120: the Board issues directions, those directions may authorise another authority to issue written orders, and section 124(1) then gives the officer vested with an area jurisdiction over a business whose place or principal place is in that area and over every other person residing in it. A dispute about whether he has jurisdiction is not for him and not for the Tribunal in the first instance: section 124(2) sends it to the Principal Director General, Director General, Principal Chief Commissioner, Chief Commissioner, Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, and to the Board if two of them disagree. The provision that decides cases is section 124(3), which fixes three deadlines — one for a person who has filed a return, one for a person who has not, one where there has been a search or requisition — after which no person shall be entitled to call the jurisdiction in question at all. Section 124(4) then obliges the officer, on a timely objection he does not accept, to refer the matter for determination before he makes the assessment. Whether the section 124(3) bar is absolute is genuinely disputed: the Delhi and Karnataka High Courts have applied it against assessees, and the Gujarat High Court has held it no answer where no order under section 127 transferred the case at all. For a tax year beginning on or after 1 April 2026 the provision is section 242 of the Income-tax Act, 2025, where the bar sits in sub-section (4).
Decided by the CBDT Circulars & Instructions (Not applicable — statutory text) on 2016-06-01, reported as Section 124 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as amended up to 2026. It bears on section 124, section 124(3), section 124(1), section 124(2), section 124(4), section 124(5), section 120, section 127, section 139(1), section 142(1), section 143(2), section 144, section 148, section 132, section 132A, section 153A, section 153C, section 242 (Act of 2025), section 243 (Act of 2025) of the Income Tax Act 1961, in Assessment & Scrutiny, Reassessment & Reopening and How Tax Law Is Read matters.
Most jurisdiction objections are lost before they are made, and they are lost on a date rather than on an argument. Work a scrutiny timeline and you can see how little room clause (a) leaves. You file your return under section 139(1). A notice under section 143(2) is served on you on 12 June. Your month under section 124(3)(a) runs to 12 July, and it runs from service, so the date the officer signed the notice and the date it appeared on the portal are not the date you argue from — get the service record. If instead a notice under section 142(1) had been served earlier, on 2 May, the month ran from 2 May and expired on 2 June, because clause (a) attaches to the first of those notices you were served with, not to the one you happen to be replying to now. And if the assessment is completed on 30 June, the door closes on 30 June whether or not the month has run, because the clause ends “whichever is earlier”. A person who filed no return is in a worse position still: under clause (b) his deadline is simply the time the notice itself allowed for filing the return, which is often fifteen or thirty days and which nobody reads as a limitation period. So the practical rule is brutal and simple — if you think the officer is the wrong officer, say so in your first reply, in writing, and say it as an objection to jurisdiction under section 124, not as a sentence buried in a covering letter. The second half of the point is what a timely objection buys you. It engages section 124(4), and that sub-section does not let the officer decide the question himself: if he is not satisfied with your claim he must refer the matter for determination under section 124(2) before the assessment is made. An assessment order that deals with a timely jurisdiction objection by dismissing it in a paragraph is an order made in breach of section 124(4), and that is a much better ground of appeal than an objection taken for the first time at the Tribunal, which section 124(3) will usually shut out.
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Marginal note: “Jurisdiction of Assessing Officers”. 124. (1) Where by virtue of any direction or order issued under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 120, the Assessing Officer has been vested with jurisdiction over any area, within the limits of such area, he shall have jurisdiction— (a) in respect of any person carrying on a business or profession, if the place at which he carries on his business or profession is situate within the area, or where his business or profession is carried on in more places than one, if the principal place of his business or profession is situate within the area, and (b) in respect of any other person residing within the area. (2) Where a question arises under this section as to whether an Assessing Officer has jurisdiction to assess any person, the question shall be determined by the Principal Director General or Director General or the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner; or where the question is one relating to areas within the jurisdiction of different Principal Directors General or Directors General or Principal Chief Commissioners or Chief Commissioners or Principal Commissioners or Commissioners, by the Principal Directors General or Directors General or Principal Chief Commissioners or Chief Commissioners or Principal Commissioners or Commissioners concerned or, if they are not in agreement, by the Board or by such Principal Director General or Director General or Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner as the Board may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify. (3) No person shall be entitled to call in question the jurisdiction of an Assessing Officer— (a) where he has made a return under sub-section (1) of section 115WD or under sub-section (1) of section 139, after the expiry of one month from the date on which he was served with a notice under sub-section (1) of section 142 or sub-section (2) of section 115WE or sub-section (2) of section 143 or after the completion of the assessment, whichever is earlier; (b) where he has made no such return, after the expiry of the time allowed by the notice under sub-section (2) of section 115WD or sub-section (1) of section 142 or under sub-section (1) of section 115WH or under section 148 for the making of the return or by the notice under the first proviso to section 115WF or under the first proviso to section 144 to show cause why the assessment should not be completed to the best of the judgment of the Assessing Officer, whichever is earlier; (c) where an action has been taken under section 132 or section 132A, after the expiry of one month from the date on which he was served with a notice under sub-section (1) of section 153A or sub-section (2) of section 153C or after the completion of the assessment, whichever is earlier. (4) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), where an assessee calls in question the jurisdiction of an Assessing Officer, then the Assessing Officer shall, if not satisfied with the correctness of the claim, refer the matter for determination under sub-section (2) before the assessment is made. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section or in any direction or order issued under section 120, every Assessing Officer shall have all the powers conferred by or under this Act on an Assessing Officer in respect of the income accruing or arising or received within the area, if any, over which he has been vested with jurisdiction by virtue of the directions or orders issued under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 120. The source of the vesting, section 120 — “(1) Income-tax authorities shall exercise all or any of the powers and perform all or any of the functions conferred on, or, as the case may be, assigned to such authorities by or under this Act in accordance with such directions as the Board may issue for the exercise of the powers and performance of the functions by all or any of those authorities. (2) The directions of the Board under sub-section (1) may authorise any other income-tax authority to issue orders in writing for the exercise of the powers and performance of the functions by all or any of the other income-tax authorities who are subordinate to it.”
Jurisdiction under this Act is administrative, and it travels downwards. Section 120(1) makes every income-tax authority exercise its powers in accordance with the Board's directions; section 120(2) lets those directions authorise another authority to issue written orders for subordinate authorities. Section 124(1) then does the territorial work: an officer vested with an area has jurisdiction, within that area, over a person carrying on business or profession whose place of business is there — or, where there are several, whose principal place is there — and over any other person residing there. Two tests, and only two. Residence for the non-business person, place or principal place of business for everyone else. Section 124(5) is the safety net and it is easy to miss. Notwithstanding anything in the section or in any section 120 order, every Assessing Officer has all the powers of an Assessing Officer in respect of income accruing, arising or received within the area over which he is vested. It is drafted to stop a gap opening between two officers, not to give an officer a roving commission over a person who is nothing to do with his area. Sub-section (2) decides who answers a jurisdiction question, and the answer is not the Assessing Officer. It goes to the Principal Director General or Director General or the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner. If the areas fall under different such authorities, they determine it together, and if they cannot agree, the Board or an authority the Board notifies decides. So the correct destination of a jurisdiction objection is a superior officer, and the correct output is a determination, not a line in an assessment order. Sub-section (3) is the operative rule and the one a reader will act on. It is drafted as a bar on the assessee, not as a power in the officer: “No person shall be entitled to call in question the jurisdiction of an Assessing Officer” after the point it fixes, and each of the three clauses ends with “whichever is earlier”, so the earlier of the two events closes the door. Clause (a) — you filed a return under section 139(1). You have one month from the date you were served with a notice under section 142(1) or section 143(2), or until the assessment is completed, whichever is earlier. The clock runs from service, not from the date on the notice, and a completed assessment shuts the door even if the month has not run out. Clause (b) — you filed no return. You have until the time allowed by the notice under section 142(1), or under section 148, for making the return, or until the time given by a notice under the first proviso to section 144 to show cause why a best-judgment assessment should not be made, whichever is earlier. There is no separate month here: the deadline is whatever period the notice itself gave you. Clause (c) — there has been a search under section 132 or a requisition under section 132A. One month from service of a notice under section 153A(1) or section 153C(2), or completion of the assessment, whichever is earlier. Check the date of the search before you rely on this clause, because it is largely spent. Clause (c) was itself inserted only with effect from 1 June 2016, and both notices it keys to have since been switched off: section 153A(1) applies only where the search was initiated, or the requisition made, “after the 31st day of May, 2003 but on or before the 31st day of March, 2021”, and section 153C(3) provides that nothing in that section applies in relation to a search initiated, or a requisition made, on or after 1 April 2021. So for a search from 1 April 2021 onwards no notice under section 153A(1) or section 153C(2) issues at all, clause (c) has nothing to attach to, and your clock is the one in clause (a) or clause (b) instead. Do not sit waiting for a section 153A notice that is not coming. The references in clause (a) and clause (b) to sections 115WD, 115WE, 115WF and 115WH are the fringe benefit tax machinery. That tax is spent and those limbs are dead letters; they are reproduced above because they are in the section, not because they do anything. Sub-section (4) is the assessee's remedy and it is often the strongest point on the file. It is expressly “subject to the provisions of sub-section (3)”, so it only helps you if you objected in time. But if you did, and the officer is not satisfied that your claim is correct, he “shall … refer the matter for determination under sub-section (2) before the assessment is made”. The obligation is mandatory and the timing is mandatory. An officer who rejects a timely objection in his own assessment order, without referring it upwards first, has not done what sub-section (4) required of him. Section 127 is a different thing and the two are constantly confused. Section 124 says which officer has a case; section 127 is the power to move a case from an officer who has it to another officer. It is exercised by the Principal Director General, Director General, Principal Chief Commissioner, Chief Commissioner, Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, after giving the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard wherever it is possible to do so and after recording reasons; the hearing requirement drops away where the offices are in the same city, locality or place; a transfer may be made at any stage and notices already issued need not be reissued. A case that has simply moved, with no order under section 127 anywhere on the record, is the situation in which the section 124(3) bar is most seriously contested. And that is the live fight: is the sub-section (3) bar absolute? Two High Courts have applied it. In Abhishek Jain v Income Tax Officer, Ward 55(1), New Delhi the Delhi High Court — Sanjiv Khanna and Chander Shekhar JJ, 1 June 2018, in WP(C) 11844/2016 — held that the petitioner “had lost his right to question jurisdiction” in terms of sub-section (3), that section 127 “would come into play when the case is to be transferred from the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction to a third officer” and did not arise on those facts, and dismissed the petition. In Chandrika Investments v Income Tax Officer the Karnataka High Court — K.S. Mudagal and T.G. Shivashankare Gowda JJ, 28 January 2025, in Review Petition No. 436 of 2023, neutral citation 2025:KHC:3831-DB — went further, holding that section 124(3)(a) covers both territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction and that it is not possible to restrict it to territorial jurisdiction, and that the objection must be taken at the earliest opportunity and not at a later stage. Weigh it for what it is: the review petition was dismissed, so the court was declining to disturb its own earlier decision rather than deciding the question afresh. The other side is Diamond TMT and Procon Private Limited v Income Tax Officer, Ward (1)(1)(3), Ahmedabad, Gujarat High Court, Bhargav D. Karia and Pranav Trivedi JJ, 16 September 2025, in Special Civil Application 5370 of 2022. The Revenue argued precisely the bar — that no objection had been taken under section 124(3) and therefore no order under section 127 was needed to move the case. The Court did not accept it, made the rule absolute and quashed the notice, holding the want of a transfer order too fundamental to be cured, and distinguished Abhishek Jain on the footing that “before the Delhi High Court the facts were totally different”. So the honest statement of the law is: the bar is real and is regularly applied, and it is not yet settled that it can supply jurisdiction where an officer never had the case at all. The boundary. Section 124 is a provision of the Income-tax Act, 1961, repealed on 1 April 2026 by section 536(1) of the Income-tax Act, 2025. Section 536(2) keeps it alive for assessment, reassessment, rectification, penalty, revision and appeal in respect of any tax year beginning before 1 April 2026, including proceedings begun after that date, and the Department's transition FAQ says the same at Q1.18. For a tax year 2026-27 onwards the provision is section 242 of the Income-tax Act, 2025. The shape is the same and the numbers move: the two territorial tests stay in sub-section (1); the determining authority becomes “the specified income-tax authority”, defined in section 243(7) as the Principal Director General, Director General, Principal Chief Commissioner, Chief Commissioner, Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, with sub-section (2) for a single authority and sub-section (3) where two are involved; and the bar moves to sub-section (4), keyed to a return under section 263(1), notices under sections 268(1), 270(8), 280(2) and 271(2), and, in clause (c), to action under section 247 or 248 with a notice under section 294(1)(a). The fringe benefit tax references are gone. The transfer power is section 243.
Not applicable — this is a statement of the statutory text as printed on the departmental section pages, with the amendment history taken from the footnote apparatus on those pages. The judicial decisions named in the body were each read in their own text.
No person shall be entitled to call in question the jurisdiction of an Assessing Officer— (a) where he has made a return under sub-section (1) of section 115WD or under sub-section (1) of section 139, after the expiry of one month from the date on which he was served with a notice under sub-section (1) of section 142 or sub-section (2) of section 115WE or sub-section (2) of section 143 or after the completion of the assessment, whichever is earlier
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Handle my notice → Ask a CA on WhatsAppJurisdiction reaches an Assessing Officer through section 120: the Board issues directions, those directions may authorise another authority to issue written orders, and section 124(1) then gives the officer vested with an area jurisdiction over a business whose place or principal place is in that area and over every other person residing in it. A dispute about whether he has jurisdiction is not for him and not for the Tribunal in the first instance: section 124(2) sends it to the Principal Director General, Director General, Principal Chief Commissioner, Chief Commissioner, Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, and to the Board if two of them disagree. The provision that decides cases is section 124(3), which fixes three deadlines — one for a person who has filed a return, one for a person who has not, one where there has been a search or requisition — after which no person shall be entitled to call the jurisdiction in question at all. Section 124(4) then obliges the officer, on a timely objection he does not accept, to refer the matter for determination before he makes the assessment. Whether the section 124(3) bar is absolute is genuinely disputed: the Delhi and Karnataka High Courts have applied it against assessees, and the Gujarat High Court has held it no answer where no order under section 127 transferred the case at all. For a tax year beginning on or after 1 April 2026 the provision is section 242 of the Income-tax Act, 2025, where the bar sits in sub-section (4). This was decided by the CBDT Circulars & Instructions (Not applicable — statutory text) and bears on section 124, section 124(3), section 124(1), section 124(2), section 124(4), section 124(5), section 120, section 127, section 139(1), section 142(1), section 143(2), section 144, section 148, section 132, section 132A, section 153A, section 153C, section 242 (Act of 2025), section 243 (Act of 2025) of the Income Tax Act 1961. It is reported as Section 124 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as amended up to 2026. Most jurisdiction objections are lost before they are made, and they are lost on a date rather than on an argument. Work a scrutiny timeline and you can see how little room clause (a) leaves. You file your return under section 139(1). A notice under section 143(2) is served on you on 12 June. Your month under section 124(3)(a) runs to 12 July, and it runs from service, so the date the officer signed the notice and the date it appeared on the portal are not the date you argue from — get the service record. If instead a notice under section 142(1) had been served earlier, on 2 May, the month ran from 2 May and expired on 2 June, because clause (a) attaches to the first of those notices you were served with, not to the one you happen to be replying to now. And if the assessment is completed on 30 June, the door closes on 30 June whether or not the month has run, because the clause ends “whichever is earlier”. A person who filed no return is in a worse position still: under clause (b) his deadline is simply the time the notice itself allowed for filing the return, which is often fifteen or thirty days and which nobody reads as a limitation period. So the practical rule is brutal and simple — if you think the officer is the wrong officer, say so in your first reply, in writing, and say it as an objection to jurisdiction under section 124, not as a sentence buried in a covering letter. The second half of the point is what a timely objection buys you. It engages section 124(4), and that sub-section does not let the officer decide the question himself: if he is not satisfied with your claim he must refer the matter for determination under section 124(2) before the assessment is made. An assessment order that deals with a timely jurisdiction objection by dismissing it in a paragraph is an order made in breach of section 124(4), and that is a much better ground of appeal than an objection taken for the first time at the Tribunal, which section 124(3) will usually shut out. If it applies to you, the first step is this: Work out today which clause of section 124(3) you are in — return filed, no return, or search or requisition — because the three have different clocks and only one of them gives you a month. If your search was initiated on or after 1 April 2021, clause (c) is not your clause: no notice under section 153A(1) or section 153C(2) will issue, and clause (a) or clause (b) binds you instead.
Marginal note: “Jurisdiction of Assessing Officers”. 124. (1) Where by virtue of any direction or order issued under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 120, the Assessing Officer has been vested with jurisdiction over any area, within the limits of such area, he shall have jurisdiction— (a) in respect of any person carrying on a business or profession, if the place at which he carries on his business or profession is situate within the area, or where his business or profession is carried on in more places than one, if the principal place of his business or profession is situate within the area, and (b) in respect of any other person residing within the area. (2) Where a question arises under this section as to whether an Assessing Officer has jurisdiction to assess any person, the question shall be determined by the Principal Director General or Director General or the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner; or where the question is one relating to areas within the jurisdiction of different Principal Directors General or Directors General or Principal Chief Commissioners or Chief Commissioners or Principal Commissioners or Commissioners, by the Principal Directors General or Directors General or Principal Chief Commissioners or Chief Commissioners or Principal Commissioners or Commissioners concerned or, if they are not in agreement, by the Board or by such Principal Director General or Director General or Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner as the Board may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify. (3) No person shall be entitled to call in question the jurisdiction of an Assessing Officer— (a) where he has made a return under sub-section (1) of section 115WD or under sub-section (1) of section 139, after the expiry of one month from the date on which he was served with a notice under sub-section (1) of section 142 or sub-section (2) of section 115WE or sub-section (2) of section 143 or after the completion of the assessment, whichever is earlier; (b) where he has made no such return, after the expiry of the time allowed by the notice under sub-section (2) of section 115WD or sub-section (1) of section 142 or under sub-section (1) of section 115WH or under section 148 for the making of the return or by the notice under the first proviso to section 115WF or under the first proviso to section 144 to show cause why the assessment should not be completed to the best of the judgment of the Assessing Officer, whichever is earlier; (c) where an action has been taken under section 132 or section 132A, after the expiry of one month from the date on which he was served with a notice under sub-section (1) of section 153A or sub-section (2) of section 153C or after the completion of the assessment, whichever is earlier. (4) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), where an assessee calls in question the jurisdiction of an Assessing Officer, then the Assessing Officer shall, if not satisfied with the correctness of the claim, refer the matter for determination under sub-section (2) before the assessment is made. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section or in any direction or order issued under section 120, every Assessing Officer shall have all the powers conferred by or under this Act on an Assessing Officer in respect of the income accruing or arising or received within the area, if any, over which he has been vested with jurisdiction by virtue of the directions or orders issued under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 120. The source of the vesting, section 120 — “(1) Income-tax authorities shall exercise all or any of the powers and perform all or any of the functions conferred on, or, as the case may be, assigned to such authorities by or under this Act in accordance with such directions as the Board may issue for the exercise of the powers and performance of the functions by all or any of those authorities. (2) The directions of the Board under sub-section (1) may authorise any other income-tax authority to issue orders in writing for the exercise of the powers and performance of the functions by all or any of the other income-tax authorities who are subordinate to it.” The matter was decided on 2016-06-01 by the CBDT Circulars & Instructions (Not applicable — statutory text). On those facts the CBDT Circulars & Instructions held as follows. Jurisdiction under this Act is administrative, and it travels downwards. Section 120(1) makes every income-tax authority exercise its powers in accordance with the Board's directions; section 120(2) lets those directions authorise another authority to issue written orders for subordinate authorities. Section 124(1) then does the territorial work: an officer vested with an area has jurisdiction, within that area, over a person carrying on business or profession whose place of business is there — or, where there are several, whose principal place is there — and over any other person residing there. Two tests, and only two. Residence for the non-business person, place or principal place of business for everyone else. Section 124(5) is the safety net and it is easy to miss. Notwithstanding anything in the section or in any section 120 order, every Assessing Officer has all the powers of an Assessing Officer in respect of income accruing, arising or received within the area over which he is vested. It is drafted to stop a gap opening between two officers, not to give an officer a roving commission over a person who is nothing to do with his area. Sub-section (2) decides who answers a jurisdiction question, and the answer is not the Assessing Officer. It goes to the Principal Director General or Director General or the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner. If the areas fall under different such authorities, they determine it together, and if they cannot agree, the Board or an authority the Board notifies decides. So the correct destination of a jurisdiction objection is a superior officer, and the correct output is a determination, not a line in an assessment order. Sub-section (3) is the operative rule and the one a reader will act on. It is drafted as a bar on the assessee, not as a power in the officer: “No person shall be entitled to call in question the jurisdiction of an Assessing Officer” after the point it fixes, and each of the three clauses ends with “whichever is earlier”, so the earlier of the two events closes the door. Clause (a) — you filed a return under section 139(1). You have one month from the date you were served with a notice under section 142(1) or section 143(2), or until the assessment is completed, whichever is earlier. The clock runs from service, not from the date on the notice, and a completed assessment shuts the door even if the month has not run out. Clause (b) — you filed no return. You have until the time allowed by the notice under section 142(1), or under section 148, for making the return, or until the time given by a notice under the first proviso to section 144 to show cause why a best-judgment assessment should not be made, whichever is earlier. There is no separate month here: the deadline is whatever period the notice itself gave you. Clause (c) — there has been a search under section 132 or a requisition under section 132A. One month from service of a notice under section 153A(1) or section 153C(2), or completion of the assessment, whichever is earlier. Check the date of the search before you rely on this clause, because it is largely spent. Clause (c) was itself inserted only with effect from 1 June 2016, and both notices it keys to have since been switched off: section 153A(1) applies only where the search was initiated, or the requisition made, “after the 31st day of May, 2003 but on or before the 31st day of March, 2021”, and section 153C(3) provides that nothing in that section applies in relation to a search initiated, or a requisition made, on or after 1 April 2021. So for a search from 1 April 2021 onwards no notice under section 153A(1) or section 153C(2) issues at all, clause (c) has nothing to attach to, and your clock is the one in clause (a) or clause (b) instead. Do not sit waiting for a section 153A notice that is not coming. The references in clause (a) and clause (b) to sections 115WD, 115WE, 115WF and 115WH are the fringe benefit tax machinery. That tax is spent and those limbs are dead letters; they are reproduced above because they are in the section, not because they do anything. Sub-section (4) is the assessee's remedy and it is often the strongest point on the file. It is expressly “subject to the provisions of sub-section (3)”, so it only helps you if you objected in time. But if you did, and the officer is not satisfied that your claim is correct, he “shall … refer the matter for determination under sub-section (2) before the assessment is made”. The obligation is mandatory and the timing is mandatory. An officer who rejects a timely objection in his own assessment order, without referring it upwards first, has not done what sub-section (4) required of him. Section 127 is a different thing and the two are constantly confused. Section 124 says which officer has a case; section 127 is the power to move a case from an officer who has it to another officer. It is exercised by the Principal Director General, Director General, Principal Chief Commissioner, Chief Commissioner, Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, after giving the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard wherever it is possible to do so and after recording reasons; the hearing requirement drops away where the offices are in the same city, locality or place; a transfer may be made at any stage and notices already issued need not be reissued. A case that has simply moved, with no order under section 127 anywhere on the record, is the situation in which the section 124(3) bar is most seriously contested. And that is the live fight: is the sub-section (3) bar absolute? Two High Courts have applied it. In Abhishek Jain v Income Tax Officer, Ward 55(1), New Delhi the Delhi High Court — Sanjiv Khanna and Chander Shekhar JJ, 1 June 2018, in WP(C) 11844/2016 — held that the petitioner “had lost his right to question jurisdiction” in terms of sub-section (3), that section 127 “would come into play when the case is to be transferred from the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction to a third officer” and did not arise on those facts, and dismissed the petition. In Chandrika Investments v Income Tax Officer the Karnataka High Court — K.S. Mudagal and T.G. Shivashankare Gowda JJ, 28 January 2025, in Review Petition No. 436 of 2023, neutral citation 2025:KHC:3831-DB — went further, holding that section 124(3)(a) covers both territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction and that it is not possible to restrict it to territorial jurisdiction, and that the objection must be taken at the earliest opportunity and not at a later stage. Weigh it for what it is: the review petition was dismissed, so the court was declining to disturb its own earlier decision rather than deciding the question afresh. The other side is Diamond TMT and Procon Private Limited v Income Tax Officer, Ward (1)(1)(3), Ahmedabad, Gujarat High Court, Bhargav D. Karia and Pranav Trivedi JJ, 16 September 2025, in Special Civil Application 5370 of 2022. The Revenue argued precisely the bar — that no objection had been taken under section 124(3) and therefore no order under section 127 was needed to move the case. The Court did not accept it, made the rule absolute and quashed the notice, holding the want of a transfer order too fundamental to be cured, and distinguished Abhishek Jain on the footing that “before the Delhi High Court the facts were totally different”. So the honest statement of the law is: the bar is real and is regularly applied, and it is not yet settled that it can supply jurisdiction where an officer never had the case at all. The boundary. Section 124 is a provision of the Income-tax Act, 1961, repealed on 1 April 2026 by section 536(1) of the Income-tax Act, 2025. Section 536(2) keeps it alive for assessment, reassessment, rectification, penalty, revision and appeal in respect of any tax year beginning before 1 April 2026, including proceedings begun after that date, and the Department's transition FAQ says the same at Q1.18. For a tax year 2026-27 onwards the provision is section 242 of the Income-tax Act, 2025. The shape is the same and the numbers move: the two territorial tests stay in sub-section (1); the determining authority becomes “the specified income-tax authority”, defined in section 243(7) as the Principal Director General, Director General, Principal Chief Commissioner, Chief Commissioner, Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, with sub-section (2) for a single authority and sub-section (3) where two are involved; and the bar moves to sub-section (4), keyed to a return under section 263(1), notices under sections 268(1), 270(8), 280(2) and 271(2), and, in clause (c), to action under section 247 or 248 with a notice under section 294(1)(a). The fringe benefit tax references are gone. The transfer power is section 243.
Not applicable — this is a statement of the statutory text as printed on the departmental section pages, with the amendment history taken from the footnote apparatus on those pages. The judicial decisions named in the body were each read in their own text. In the words reproduced by the source cited on this page: "No person shall be entitled to call in question the jurisdiction of an Assessing Officer— (a) where he has made a return under sub-section (1) of section 115WD or under sub-section (1) of section 139, after the expiry of one month from the date on which he was served with a notice under sub-section (1) of section 142 or sub-section (2) of section 115WE or sub-section (2) of section 143 or after the completion of the assessment, whichever is earlier"
It was decided by the CBDT Circulars & Instructions on 2016-06-01 and is reported as Section 124 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as amended up to 2026. Binding on the department, not on the assessee or the courts. An assessee may rely on a circular that is beneficial to them. A CBDT circular or instruction binds officers of the department but not the assessee and not the courts. Where a circular helps you, you may hold the department to it. Where it hurts you, it cannot override the Act or a judgment. On section 124, section 124(3), section 124(1), section 124(2), section 124(4), section 124(5), section 120, section 127, section 139(1), section 142(1), section 143(2), section 144, section 148, section 132, section 132A, section 153A, section 153C, section 242 (Act of 2025), section 243 (Act of 2025), the practical question is whether the facts of your own notice match the facts of this case closely enough for the same rule to apply.
It cuts both ways and is cited by both sides. Jurisdiction under this Act is administrative, and it travels downwards. Section 120(1) makes every income-tax authority exercise its powers in accordance with the Board's directions; section 120(2) lets those directions authorise another authority to issue written orders for subordinate authorities. Section 124(1) then does the territorial work: an officer vested with an area has jurisdiction, within that area, over a person carrying on business or profession whose place of business is there — or, where there are several, whose principal place is there — and over any other person residing there. Two tests, and only two. Residence for the non-business person, place or principal place of business for everyone else. Section 124(5) is the safety net and it is easy to miss. Notwithstanding anything in the section or in any section 120 order, every Assessing Officer has all the powers of an Assessing Officer in respect of income accruing, arising or received within the area over which he is vested. It is drafted to stop a gap opening between two officers, not to give an officer a roving commission over a person who is nothing to do with his area. Sub-section (2) decides who answers a jurisdiction question, and the answer is not the Assessing Officer. It goes to the Principal Director General or Director General or the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner. If the areas fall under different such authorities, they determine it together, and if they cannot agree, the Board or an authority the Board notifies decides. So the correct destination of a jurisdiction objection is a superior officer, and the correct output is a determination, not a line in an assessment order. Sub-section (3) is the operative rule and the one a reader will act on. It is drafted as a bar on the assessee, not as a power in the officer: “No person shall be entitled to call in question the jurisdiction of an Assessing Officer” after the point it fixes, and each of the three clauses ends with “whichever is earlier”, so the earlier of the two events closes the door. Clause (a) — you filed a return under section 139(1). You have one month from the date you were served with a notice under section 142(1) or section 143(2), or until the assessment is completed, whichever is earlier. The clock runs from service, not from the date on the notice, and a completed assessment shuts the door even if the month has not run out. Clause (b) — you filed no return. You have until the time allowed by the notice under section 142(1), or under section 148, for making the return, or until the time given by a notice under the first proviso to section 144 to show cause why a best-judgment assessment should not be made, whichever is earlier. There is no separate month here: the deadline is whatever period the notice itself gave you. Clause (c) — there has been a search under section 132 or a requisition under section 132A. One month from service of a notice under section 153A(1) or section 153C(2), or completion of the assessment, whichever is earlier. Check the date of the search before you rely on this clause, because it is largely spent. Clause (c) was itself inserted only with effect from 1 June 2016, and both notices it keys to have since been switched off: section 153A(1) applies only where the search was initiated, or the requisition made, “after the 31st day of May, 2003 but on or before the 31st day of March, 2021”, and section 153C(3) provides that nothing in that section applies in relation to a search initiated, or a requisition made, on or after 1 April 2021. So for a search from 1 April 2021 onwards no notice under section 153A(1) or section 153C(2) issues at all, clause (c) has nothing to attach to, and your clock is the one in clause (a) or clause (b) instead. Do not sit waiting for a section 153A notice that is not coming. The references in clause (a) and clause (b) to sections 115WD, 115WE, 115WF and 115WH are the fringe benefit tax machinery. That tax is spent and those limbs are dead letters; they are reproduced above because they are in the section, not because they do anything. Sub-section (4) is the assessee's remedy and it is often the strongest point on the file. It is expressly “subject to the provisions of sub-section (3)”, so it only helps you if you objected in time. But if you did, and the officer is not satisfied that your claim is correct, he “shall … refer the matter for determination under sub-section (2) before the assessment is made”. The obligation is mandatory and the timing is mandatory. An officer who rejects a timely objection in his own assessment order, without referring it upwards first, has not done what sub-section (4) required of him. Section 127 is a different thing and the two are constantly confused. Section 124 says which officer has a case; section 127 is the power to move a case from an officer who has it to another officer. It is exercised by the Principal Director General, Director General, Principal Chief Commissioner, Chief Commissioner, Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, after giving the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard wherever it is possible to do so and after recording reasons; the hearing requirement drops away where the offices are in the same city, locality or place; a transfer may be made at any stage and notices already issued need not be reissued. A case that has simply moved, with no order under section 127 anywhere on the record, is the situation in which the section 124(3) bar is most seriously contested. And that is the live fight: is the sub-section (3) bar absolute? Two High Courts have applied it. In Abhishek Jain v Income Tax Officer, Ward 55(1), New Delhi the Delhi High Court — Sanjiv Khanna and Chander Shekhar JJ, 1 June 2018, in WP(C) 11844/2016 — held that the petitioner “had lost his right to question jurisdiction” in terms of sub-section (3), that section 127 “would come into play when the case is to be transferred from the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction to a third officer” and did not arise on those facts, and dismissed the petition. In Chandrika Investments v Income Tax Officer the Karnataka High Court — K.S. Mudagal and T.G. Shivashankare Gowda JJ, 28 January 2025, in Review Petition No. 436 of 2023, neutral citation 2025:KHC:3831-DB — went further, holding that section 124(3)(a) covers both territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction and that it is not possible to restrict it to territorial jurisdiction, and that the objection must be taken at the earliest opportunity and not at a later stage. Weigh it for what it is: the review petition was dismissed, so the court was declining to disturb its own earlier decision rather than deciding the question afresh. The other side is Diamond TMT and Procon Private Limited v Income Tax Officer, Ward (1)(1)(3), Ahmedabad, Gujarat High Court, Bhargav D. Karia and Pranav Trivedi JJ, 16 September 2025, in Special Civil Application 5370 of 2022. The Revenue argued precisely the bar — that no objection had been taken under section 124(3) and therefore no order under section 127 was needed to move the case. The Court did not accept it, made the rule absolute and quashed the notice, holding the want of a transfer order too fundamental to be cured, and distinguished Abhishek Jain on the footing that “before the Delhi High Court the facts were totally different”. So the honest statement of the law is: the bar is real and is regularly applied, and it is not yet settled that it can supply jurisdiction where an officer never had the case at all. The boundary. Section 124 is a provision of the Income-tax Act, 1961, repealed on 1 April 2026 by section 536(1) of the Income-tax Act, 2025. Section 536(2) keeps it alive for assessment, reassessment, rectification, penalty, revision and appeal in respect of any tax year beginning before 1 April 2026, including proceedings begun after that date, and the Department's transition FAQ says the same at Q1.18. For a tax year 2026-27 onwards the provision is section 242 of the Income-tax Act, 2025. The shape is the same and the numbers move: the two territorial tests stay in sub-section (1); the determining authority becomes “the specified income-tax authority”, defined in section 243(7) as the Principal Director General, Director General, Principal Chief Commissioner, Chief Commissioner, Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, with sub-section (2) for a single authority and sub-section (3) where two are involved; and the bar moves to sub-section (4), keyed to a return under section 263(1), notices under sections 268(1), 270(8), 280(2) and 271(2), and, in clause (c), to action under section 247 or 248 with a notice under section 294(1)(a). The fringe benefit tax references are gone. The transfer power is section 243. It arises in Assessment & Scrutiny, Reassessment & Reopening and How Tax Law Is Read matters, on section 124, section 124(3), section 124(1), section 124(2), section 124(4), section 124(5), section 120, section 127, section 139(1), section 142(1), section 143(2), section 144, section 148, section 132, section 132A, section 153A, section 153C, section 242 (Act of 2025), section 243 (Act of 2025) of the Income Tax Act 1961, and was decided by Not applicable — statutory text. Before relying on it, read the source linked on this page and check whether it has since been distinguished, overruled or overtaken by an amendment to the Income Tax Act. In practice the steps that follow from it are these. Get the date of service of the first notice under section 142(1) or section 143(2), not the date on the notice. Under clause (a) the month runs from service, and the completion of the assessment cuts it short. If you filed no return, read the notice itself for your deadline. Under clause (b) you have only the time the notice under section 142(1) or section 148 allowed for filing the return, or the time given by a show-cause notice under the first proviso to section 144, whichever ends first. Put the objection in writing in your first reply and head it as an objection to jurisdiction under section 124. Do not merely ask which officer is handling the file. Say which limb of section 124(1) you say fails: that your place or principal place of business is not in his area, or that you do not reside in it. An objection that does not engage either test is not an objection to jurisdiction. Once you have objected in time, press section 124(4): the officer must refer the matter for determination under section 124(2) before making the assessment if he does not accept your claim. Ask for the reference in terms and record that you have asked. Ask, in writing, for the order under section 127 if the case has moved between officers. If none exists, say so on the record — that is the fact on which the Gujarat High Court quashed the notice in Diamond TMT and Procon, notwithstanding section 124(3). Ask also for the section 120 direction or order that vests the officer with your area. Section 124(1) operates only “by virtue of” such a direction or order. Do not assume the bar is confined to territory. The Karnataka High Court in Chandrika Investments held section 124(3) reaches pecuniary jurisdiction too, so an objection that the case was above or below the officer's monetary limit is on the same clock. If the time under section 124(3) has already gone, stop arguing jurisdiction and look for a defect that is not subject to it — sanction, limitation, service, or the absence of any order at all under section 127. For a tax year beginning on or after 1 April 2026, read section 242 of the Income-tax Act, 2025 instead, and note that the bar is in sub-section (4) with different cross-references.
Superseded by amendment. Not superseded in its own terms. The text set out here is the current text of section 124 and it still governs. Income earned in financial year 2025-26 stays under the Income-tax Act, 1961 and is assessed in assessment year 2026-27 — the last assessment year under the old Act, not 2025-26 — and section 536(2) of the Income-tax Act, 2025 continues the repealed Act for assessment, reassessment, rectification, penalty, revision and appeal in respect of any tax year beginning before 1 April 2026, including proceedings begun after that date, which the Department's transition FAQ repeats at Q1.18. For a tax year beginning on or after 1 April 2026 the provision is section 242 of the 2025 Act, and the bar on a late objection sits there in sub-section (4). Version relied on: the departmental page for section 124 stamped Year 2026, checked against the Year 2025 and Year 2024 (No. 2) prints, which are word for word the same. Thirteen year-stamped versions were compared, back to 1966. The Department records two amendments to the present text: Act No. 25 of 2014, with retrospective effect from 1 June 2013, which put the “Principal” ranks into the list of determining authorities in sub-section (2); and Act No. 28 of 2016, with effect from 1 June 2016, which inserted the whole of clause (c) of sub-section (3). The 2016 date is the one this entry is filed under. Be warned that the unsuffixed departmental page for this section still serves the Year 2000 text, which has no clause (c) at all and carries the pre-2014 designations; do not cite it. Two things are open. The central question — whether the section 124(3) bar can supply jurisdiction to an officer who never had the case, with no order under section 127 on the record — is unresolved between High Courts, with the Delhi and Karnataka Courts applying the bar and the Gujarat Court holding it no answer. No Supreme Court decision on the point was found. And clause (c) of sub-section (3) has been left in the Act after the notices it keys to were confined to searches initiated on or before 31 March 2021; nothing has been put in its place, so a person searched later falls back on clause (a) or clause (b), and no case deciding that was found. No source could be cited for that finding. Checking whether an authority still stands matters as much as knowing what it held: a decision may be overruled on one point and survive on another, or the provision it interprets may have been amended since. Read the source and the editor's note on this page before relying on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal.
Statutory text transcribed from the departmental page for section 124 stamped Year 2026 and checked word for word against the Year 2025 and Year 2024 (No. 2) prints, which are identical. Thirteen year-stamped versions were read in all, back to the Year 1966 print, headed “Jurisdiction of Income-tax Officers”, which shows where the heading changed. Section 120(1) and (2) are quoted from two prints, Year 2025 and Year 2026. Section 127 is described rather than quoted, only one print of it having been reached. The amendment history is taken from the footnote apparatus on the Year 2016 print, which is the one vintage that renders the markers in place: the footnote crediting Act No. 25 of 2014 sits against each of the “Principal” designations running through sub-section (2), and the footnote crediting Act No. 28 of 2016 sits against the opening of clause (c) of sub-section (3), so that clause is an insertion of 1 June 2016 rather than part of the original scheme. The cut-off dates that have since emptied clause (c) were read on the section 153A pages stamped Year 2026 and Year 2021, and on the section 153C page stamped Year 2021. The three judgments named in the body were each read in their own text, not in any account of them. Abhishek Jain: Delhi High Court, WP(C) 11844/2016, Sanjiv Khanna and Chander Shekhar JJ, 1 June 2018, petition dismissed and the stay vacated. Chandrika Investments: Karnataka High Court, Review Petition No. 436 of 2023, K.S. Mudagal and T.G. Shivashankare Gowda JJ, 28 January 2025, neutral citation 2025:KHC:3831-DB, review petition dismissed. Diamond TMT and Procon: Gujarat High Court, Special Civil Application 5370 of 2022, Bhargav D. Karia and Pranav Trivedi JJ, 16 September 2025, rule made absolute and the notice quashed. The report of Abhishek Jain at [2018] 405 ITR 1 and at (2018) 94 taxmann.com 355 is taken from citation strings printed inside the Gujarat and Karnataka judgments; no headnote or editorial summary was used. That cross-reading is also the check: Abhishek Jain is followed by the later Karnataka decision and distinguished by the later Gujarat one, which confirms which way it went independently of its own text. Section 242 of the Income-tax Act, 2025 was read twice on the Department's own pages, on the prints stamped Year 2025 and Year 2026, which agree; section 243, the transfer power, was read on the Year 2025 print and is the source for the definition of “specified income-tax authority”. The correspondence from section 124 to section 242 is the Department's own. Section 115WD and its companions are quoted above because the section still contains them, but they carry no section label here: the fringe benefit tax is spent and a hub for it would mislead. This library shows the verification state of every entry openly. This entry has not yet been read in full by a chartered accountant. The summary reflects the sources listed on this page. Read the source before you rely on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
Jurisdiction under this Act is administrative, and it travels downwards. Section 120(1) makes every income-tax authority exercise its powers in accordance with the Board's directions; section 120(2) lets those directions authorise another authority to issue written orders for subordinate authorities. Section 124(1) then does the territorial work: an officer vested with an area has jurisdiction, within that area, over a person carrying on business or profession whose place of business is there — or, where there are several, whose principal place is there — and over any other person residing there. Two tests, and only two. Residence for the non-business person, place or principal place of business for everyone else. Section 124(5) is the safety net and it is easy to miss. Notwithstanding anything in the section or in any section 120 order, every Assessing Officer has all the powers of an Assessing Officer in respect of income accruing, arising or received within the area over which he is vested. It is drafted to stop a gap opening between two officers, not to give an officer a roving commission over a person who is nothing to do with his area. Sub-section (2) decides who answers a jurisdiction question, and the answer is not the Assessing Officer. It goes to the Principal Director General or Director General or the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner. If the areas fall under different such authorities, they determine it together, and if they cannot agree, the Board or an authority the Board notifies decides. So the correct destination of a jurisdiction objection is a superior officer, and the correct output is a determination, not a line in an assessment order. Sub-section (3) is the operative rule and the one a reader will act on. It is drafted as a bar on the assessee, not as a power in the officer: “No person shall be entitled to call in question the jurisdiction of an Assessing Officer” after the point it fixes, and each of the three clauses ends with “whichever is earlier”, so the earlier of the two events closes the door. Clause (a) — you filed a return under section 139(1). You have one month from the date you were served with a notice under section 142(1) or section 143(2), or until the assessment is completed, whichever is earlier. The clock runs from service, not from the date on the notice, and a completed assessment shuts the door even if the month has not run out. Clause (b) — you filed no return. You have until the time allowed by the notice under section 142(1), or under section 148, for making the return, or until the time given by a notice under the first proviso to section 144 to show cause why a best-judgment assessment should not be made, whichever is earlier. There is no separate month here: the deadline is whatever period the notice itself gave you. Clause (c) — there has been a search under section 132 or a requisition under section 132A. One month from service of a notice under section 153A(1) or section 153C(2), or completion of the assessment, whichever is earlier. Check the date of the search before you rely on this clause, because it is largely spent. Clause (c) was itself inserted only with effect from 1 June 2016, and both notices it keys to have since been switched off: section 153A(1) applies only where the search was initiated, or the requisition made, “after the 31st day of May, 2003 but on or before the 31st day of March, 2021”, and section 153C(3) provides that nothing in that section applies in relation to a search initiated, or a requisition made, on or after 1 April 2021. So for a search from 1 April 2021 onwards no notice under section 153A(1) or section 153C(2) issues at all, clause (c) has nothing to attach to, and your clock is the one in clause (a) or clause (b) instead. Do not sit waiting for a section 153A notice that is not coming. The references in clause (a) and clause (b) to sections 115WD, 115WE, 115WF and 115WH are the fringe benefit tax machinery. That tax is spent and those limbs are dead letters; they are reproduced above because they are in the section, not because they do anything. Sub-section (4) is the assessee's remedy and it is often the strongest point on the file. It is expressly “subject to the provisions of sub-section (3)”, so it only helps you if you objected in time. But if you did, and the officer is not satisfied that your claim is correct, he “shall … refer the matter for determination under sub-section (2) before the assessment is made”. The obligation is mandatory and the timing is mandatory. An officer who rejects a timely objection in his own assessment order, without referring it upwards first, has not done what sub-section (4) required of him. Section 127 is a different thing and the two are constantly confused. Section 124 says which officer has a case; section 127 is the power to move a case from an officer who has it to another officer. It is exercised by the Principal Director General, Director General, Principal Chief Commissioner, Chief Commissioner, Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, after giving the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard wherever it is possible to do so and after recording reasons; the hearing requirement drops away where the offices are in the same city, locality or place; a transfer may be made at any stage and notices already issued need not be reissued. A case that has simply moved, with no order under section 127 anywhere on the record, is the situation in which the section 124(3) bar is most seriously contested. And that is the live fight: is the sub-section (3) bar absolute? Two High Courts have applied it. In Abhishek Jain v Income Tax Officer, Ward 55(1), New Delhi the Delhi High Court — Sanjiv Khanna and Chander Shekhar JJ, 1 June 2018, in WP(C) 11844/2016 — held that the petitioner “had lost his right to question jurisdiction” in terms of sub-section (3), that section 127 “would come into play when the case is to be transferred from the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction to a third officer” and did not arise on those facts, and dismissed the petition. In Chandrika Investments v Income Tax Officer the Karnataka High Court — K.S. Mudagal and T.G. Shivashankare Gowda JJ, 28 January 2025, in Review Petition No. 436 of 2023, neutral citation 2025:KHC:3831-DB — went further, holding that section 124(3)(a) covers both territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction and that it is not possible to restrict it to territorial jurisdiction, and that the objection must be taken at the earliest opportunity and not at a later stage. Weigh it for what it is: the review petition was dismissed, so the court was declining to disturb its own earlier decision rather than deciding the question afresh. The other side is Diamond TMT and Procon Private Limited v Income Tax Officer, Ward (1)(1)(3), Ahmedabad, Gujarat High Court, Bhargav D. Karia and Pranav Trivedi JJ, 16 September 2025, in Special Civil Application 5370 of 2022. The Revenue argued precisely the bar — that no objection had been taken under section 124(3) and therefore no order under section 127 was needed to move the case. The Court did not accept it, made the rule absolute and quashed the notice, holding the want of a transfer order too fundamental to be cured, and distinguished Abhishek Jain on the footing that “before the Delhi High Court the facts were totally different”. So the honest statement of the law is: the bar is real and is regularly applied, and it is not yet settled that it can supply jurisdiction where an officer never had the case at all. The boundary. Section 124 is a provision of the Income-tax Act, 1961, repealed on 1 April 2026 by section 536(1) of the Income-tax Act, 2025. Section 536(2) keeps it alive for assessment, reassessment, rectification, penalty, revision and appeal in respect of any tax year beginning before 1 April 2026, including proceedings begun after that date, and the Department's transition FAQ says the same at Q1.18. For a tax year 2026-27 onwards the provision is section 242 of the Income-tax Act, 2025. The shape is the same and the numbers move: the two territorial tests stay in sub-section (1); the determining authority becomes “the specified income-tax authority”, defined in section 243(7) as the Principal Director General, Director General, Principal Chief Commissioner, Chief Commissioner, Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, with sub-section (2) for a single authority and sub-section (3) where two are involved; and the bar moves to sub-section (4), keyed to a return under section 263(1), notices under sections 268(1), 270(8), 280(2) and 271(2), and, in clause (c), to action under section 247 or 248 with a notice under section 294(1)(a). The fringe benefit tax references are gone. The transfer power is section 243.
TaxSphere, “Statutory position — s.124: how an Assessing Officer gets jurisdiction over you, who decides a dispute about it, and the three deadlines in s.124(3) after which you cannot object at all”, https://taxnotice.vittsphere.com/caselaw/case/statutory-position-124-jurisdiction-of-assessing-officers-and-the-124-3-deadlines-after-which-you-cannot-object-at-all/ (validity last checked 2026-09-23)
The judgment itself is a government work and may be quoted freely. The summary, the validity note and the reasoning on this page are this library's own writing: quote them with attribution, and please do not present either as the words of the court — this page keeps the two apart and so should a quotation of it.
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My file has been moved to another city under section 127. The order says only that it was for facility of investigation, and nobody has given me the reasons. Is that enough?
The section 276CC complaint against me was filed by an Assistant Commissioner although my case was with the Income-tax Officer, and no assessment was ever made on the capital gain the complaint alleges. Can that prosecution stand?
The reassessment notice was issued in the name of my old private limited company, which had already been converted into an LLP and dissolved. I am told that makes the notice void. Is that always right?
Your bank accounts are provisionally attached and the business cannot operate. Is there a way out short of paying?
