Can the officer treat what I said during a survey as sworn evidence against me?
No. The officer conducting a s.133A survey has no power to administer an oath or record a sworn statement, so the statement is not given evidentiary value and cannot by itself found an addition. Section 132(4), by contrast, expressly allows a search statement to be used as evidence.
Decided by the High Court (Kerala High Court — G. Sivarajan J and P.R. Raman J (judgment delivered by P.R. Raman J)) on 2003-02-17, reported as [2003] 129 Taxman 416 (Ker) / [2003] 263 ITR 101 (Ker) / [2003] 181 CTR 207 (Ker); IT Appeal Nos. 317 to 319 of 2002. It bears on section 133A, section 133A(3)(iii), section 132(4), section 263, section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act 1961, in Evidence & Burden of Proof and Search, Survey & Block Assessment matters.
This is the Kerala authority behind the standard survey-statement argument, and its force lies in the statutory contrast it draws rather than in any view about the honesty of the deponent. Use it where the assessment figure comes only from the survey statement with no document behind it. It leaves room for the statement to work as corroboration alongside other material, so it does not help where the department has independent evidence.
Binding within that High Court's jurisdiction. Persuasive elsewhere.
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The assessee is a contractor. Assessments for 1998-99, 1999-2000 and 2000-01 were completed under s.143(3) on 7 February 2001 and 8 March 2001 at incomes of Rs 10,08,090, Rs 13,81,760 and Rs 13,18,660. A survey under s.133A had been carried out on 23 January 2001, during which a statement was recorded from the managing partner, Roy Mathew. In answer to question 13 he admitted that the true income had not been disclosed, explained that Rs 19,00,000 had been introduced as advance for sale of land through the partners' accounts but that only Rs 6,00,000 had been confirmed by the two creditors, and offered the balance Rs 13,00,000 for 1998-99 together with Rs 10,00,000 for 1999-2000 and Rs 20,00,000 for 2000-01 — Rs 43 lakh in all, stated to be in addition to the income already declared. The Assessing Officer did not add that Rs 43 lakh. He completed the assessments on a net profit of 8 per cent of contract receipts, having accepted the explanation for Rs 13 lakh, telescoped the remaining Rs 6 lakh, and taken account of a written offer the assessee made by letter dated 6 February 2001. The Commissioner, by notice under s.263 dated 12 December 2001, took the view that the Rs 43 lakh disclosed at the survey was additional income which ought to have been brought to tax separately, set aside the assessments and directed them to be reframed. The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner, holding among other things that the Assessing Officer's failure to make proper enquiry itself gave the Commissioner jurisdiction under s.263. The assessee appealed to the High Court.
The appeals were allowed: the orders of the Tribunal and of the Commissioner were set aside and the Assessing Officer's assessments confirmed, the question being answered in the assessee's favour (para 20). On s.133A the Court held that the section enables an income-tax authority only to record a statement which may be useful, and does not authorise the taking of a sworn statement; the power to examine a person on oath is conferred expressly by s.132(4) in a search, and a statement made on such examination may be used in evidence. A statement recorded under s.133A is therefore not given any evidentiary value, because the officer is not authorised to administer an oath (para 11). On s.263 the Court held that the twin conditions were not satisfied: the Assessing Officer had not accepted the declared income mechanically but had applied his mind, had verified the advances against the creditors' own block assessment completed on 28 October 1999, well before the survey, and had accepted a written offer after examining the books; on those facts the admission in the survey statement was only a qualified one and had been explained. The view the Assessing Officer took could not be called unsustainable in law, so the order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the revenue (paras 18 and 20).
The Court set out s.133A and noted that s.133A(3)(iii) enables the authority to record the statement of any person which may be useful for or relevant to any proceeding under the Act. It then drew the contrast with s.132(4), which expressly empowers the authorised officer in a search to examine a person on oath and provides that such a statement may be used in evidence: where the Act thought it necessary to confer the power to examine on oath it said so, and s.133A does not confer it. It followed that a statement recorded under s.133A is given no evidentiary value, the officer not being authorised to administer an oath or take a sworn statement, which alone carries evidentiary value in law (para 11). Turning to the facts, the Court found that the Assessing Officer had been well aware of that evidentiary value, had verified the Rs 19 lakh advance against the block assessment of the creditor completed on 28 October 1999, had accepted an explanation for Rs 13 lakh and telescoped Rs 6 lakh, and had adopted 8 per cent of contract receipts after discussion and on the assessee's written offer of 6 February 2001. The Commissioner's assumption that the Rs 43 lakh was necessarily additional income, and that the survey statement had evidentiary value, was therefore erroneous; the admission in answer to question 13 was a qualified one which the assessee had explained with cogent material (para 18). Applying Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT, where the Supreme Court held that both limbs of s.263 must be satisfied and that a course permissible in law taken by the officer cannot be revised merely because the Commissioner prefers another view, and Smt. Tara Devi Aggarwal, the Court held the twin conditions unsatisfied (paras 19 and 20).
whatever statement recorded under Section 133A of the IT Act is not given any evidentiary value obviously for the reason that the officer is not authorised to administer oath and to take any sworn in statement which alone has the evidentiary value as contemplated under law
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Handle my notice → Ask a CA on WhatsAppNo. The officer conducting a s.133A survey has no power to administer an oath or record a sworn statement, so the statement is not given evidentiary value and cannot by itself found an addition. Section 132(4), by contrast, expressly allows a search statement to be used as evidence. This was decided by the High Court (Kerala High Court — G. Sivarajan J and P.R. Raman J (judgment delivered by P.R. Raman J)) and bears on section 133A, section 133A(3)(iii), section 132(4), section 263, section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act 1961. It is reported as [2003] 129 Taxman 416 (Ker) / [2003] 263 ITR 101 (Ker) / [2003] 181 CTR 207 (Ker); IT Appeal Nos. 317 to 319 of 2002. This is the Kerala authority behind the standard survey-statement argument, and its force lies in the statutory contrast it draws rather than in any view about the honesty of the deponent. Use it where the assessment figure comes only from the survey statement with no document behind it. It leaves room for the statement to work as corroboration alongside other material, so it does not help where the department has independent evidence. If it applies to you, the first step is this: Ask the officer to identify the material other than the survey statement that supports the figure, and record that there is none if that is the position.
The assessee is a contractor. Assessments for 1998-99, 1999-2000 and 2000-01 were completed under s.143(3) on 7 February 2001 and 8 March 2001 at incomes of Rs 10,08,090, Rs 13,81,760 and Rs 13,18,660. A survey under s.133A had been carried out on 23 January 2001, during which a statement was recorded from the managing partner, Roy Mathew. In answer to question 13 he admitted that the true income had not been disclosed, explained that Rs 19,00,000 had been introduced as advance for sale of land through the partners' accounts but that only Rs 6,00,000 had been confirmed by the two creditors, and offered the balance Rs 13,00,000 for 1998-99 together with Rs 10,00,000 for 1999-2000 and Rs 20,00,000 for 2000-01 — Rs 43 lakh in all, stated to be in addition to the income already declared. The Assessing Officer did not add that Rs 43 lakh. He completed the assessments on a net profit of 8 per cent of contract receipts, having accepted the explanation for Rs 13 lakh, telescoped the remaining Rs 6 lakh, and taken account of a written offer the assessee made by letter dated 6 February 2001. The Commissioner, by notice under s.263 dated 12 December 2001, took the view that the Rs 43 lakh disclosed at the survey was additional income which ought to have been brought to tax separately, set aside the assessments and directed them to be reframed. The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner, holding among other things that the Assessing Officer's failure to make proper enquiry itself gave the Commissioner jurisdiction under s.263. The assessee appealed to the High Court. The matter was decided on 2003-02-17 by the High Court (Kerala High Court — G. Sivarajan J and P.R. Raman J (judgment delivered by P.R. Raman J)). On those facts the High Court held as follows. The appeals were allowed: the orders of the Tribunal and of the Commissioner were set aside and the Assessing Officer's assessments confirmed, the question being answered in the assessee's favour (para 20). On s.133A the Court held that the section enables an income-tax authority only to record a statement which may be useful, and does not authorise the taking of a sworn statement; the power to examine a person on oath is conferred expressly by s.132(4) in a search, and a statement made on such examination may be used in evidence. A statement recorded under s.133A is therefore not given any evidentiary value, because the officer is not authorised to administer an oath (para 11). On s.263 the Court held that the twin conditions were not satisfied: the Assessing Officer had not accepted the declared income mechanically but had applied his mind, had verified the advances against the creditors' own block assessment completed on 28 October 1999, well before the survey, and had accepted a written offer after examining the books; on those facts the admission in the survey statement was only a qualified one and had been explained. The view the Assessing Officer took could not be called unsustainable in law, so the order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the revenue (paras 18 and 20).
The Court set out s.133A and noted that s.133A(3)(iii) enables the authority to record the statement of any person which may be useful for or relevant to any proceeding under the Act. It then drew the contrast with s.132(4), which expressly empowers the authorised officer in a search to examine a person on oath and provides that such a statement may be used in evidence: where the Act thought it necessary to confer the power to examine on oath it said so, and s.133A does not confer it. It followed that a statement recorded under s.133A is given no evidentiary value, the officer not being authorised to administer an oath or take a sworn statement, which alone carries evidentiary value in law (para 11). Turning to the facts, the Court found that the Assessing Officer had been well aware of that evidentiary value, had verified the Rs 19 lakh advance against the block assessment of the creditor completed on 28 October 1999, had accepted an explanation for Rs 13 lakh and telescoped Rs 6 lakh, and had adopted 8 per cent of contract receipts after discussion and on the assessee's written offer of 6 February 2001. The Commissioner's assumption that the Rs 43 lakh was necessarily additional income, and that the survey statement had evidentiary value, was therefore erroneous; the admission in answer to question 13 was a qualified one which the assessee had explained with cogent material (para 18). Applying Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT, where the Supreme Court held that both limbs of s.263 must be satisfied and that a course permissible in law taken by the officer cannot be revised merely because the Commissioner prefers another view, and Smt. Tara Devi Aggarwal, the Court held the twin conditions unsatisfied (paras 19 and 20). In the words reproduced by the source cited on this page: "whatever statement recorded under Section 133A of the IT Act is not given any evidentiary value obviously for the reason that the officer is not authorised to administer oath and to take any sworn in statement which alone has the evidentiary value as contemplated under law" The decision followed or applied Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT [2000] 243 ITR 83 / 109 Taxman 66 (SC); Smt. Tara Devi Aggarwal v. CIT [1973] 88 ITR 323 (SC).
It was decided by the High Court on 2003-02-17 and is reported as [2003] 129 Taxman 416 (Ker) / [2003] 263 ITR 101 (Ker) / [2003] 181 CTR 207 (Ker); IT Appeal Nos. 317 to 319 of 2002. Binding within that High Court's jurisdiction. Persuasive elsewhere. A High Court decision binds the assessing officer, the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal within that state, and is persuasive elsewhere. If your assessment is in a different jurisdiction, check whether your own High Court has taken the same view before relying on it. On section 133A, section 133A(3)(iii), section 132(4), section 263, section 143(3), the practical question is whether the facts of your own notice match the facts of this case closely enough for the same rule to apply.
It helps the taxpayer. The appeals were allowed: the orders of the Tribunal and of the Commissioner were set aside and the Assessing Officer's assessments confirmed, the question being answered in the assessee's favour (para 20). On s.133A the Court held that the section enables an income-tax authority only to record a statement which may be useful, and does not authorise the taking of a sworn statement; the power to examine a person on oath is conferred expressly by s.132(4) in a search, and a statement made on such examination may be used in evidence. A statement recorded under s.133A is therefore not given any evidentiary value, because the officer is not authorised to administer an oath (para 11). On s.263 the Court held that the twin conditions were not satisfied: the Assessing Officer had not accepted the declared income mechanically but had applied his mind, had verified the advances against the creditors' own block assessment completed on 28 October 1999, well before the survey, and had accepted a written offer after examining the books; on those facts the admission in the survey statement was only a qualified one and had been explained. The view the Assessing Officer took could not be called unsustainable in law, so the order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the revenue (paras 18 and 20). It arises in Evidence & Burden of Proof and Search, Survey & Block Assessment matters, on section 133A, section 133A(3)(iii), section 132(4), section 263, section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act 1961, and was decided by Kerala High Court — G. Sivarajan J and P.R. Raman J (judgment delivered by P.R. Raman J). Before relying on it, read the source linked on this page and check whether it has since been distinguished, overruled or overtaken by an amendment to the Income Tax Act. In practice the steps that follow from it are these. Set out the s.132(4) contrast expressly in the reply, since that is what carries the point rather than a general complaint about survey practice. Do not rest only on the absence of an oath; produce the books or documents that answer the discrepancy, because a corroborated survey statement can still be acted on.
Still good law. The s.133A proposition has held. The Kerala High Court itself applied it in Kottakkal Wood Complex v. DCIT (4 July 2016, Antony Dominic and Dama Seshadri Naidu JJ), and it is cited by that Court in Travancore Diagnostics (P.) Ltd. v. ACIT [2016] 74 taxmann.com 239 / [2017] 244 Taxman 316 / [2017] 390 ITR 167 / [2016] 290 CTR 241 (Ker) at para 24. The Madras High Court reached the same conclusion in CIT v. S. Khader Khan Son [2008] 300 ITR 157 (Mad), which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in CIT v. S. Khader Khan Son [2012] 25 taxmann.com 413 / 210 Taxman 248 / [2013] 352 ITR 480 / [2012] 254 CTR 228 (SC), decided 20 September 2012. Be precise about that Supreme Court order. It is three lines long and dismisses the Department's appeal 'In view of the concurrent findings of fact'. It contains no reasoning on s.133A, so it is not a reasoned endorsement of the proposition, whatever a digest headline may say. A Departmental Representative who points that out is right, and the answer is that the High Court authority stands on its own footing and has not been displaced. No decision overruling Paul Mathews has been found. Two things limit how far it carries, and both are recorded elsewhere on this page. Kottakkal Wood Complex, while applying it, upheld the assessment because the deponent later reaffirmed his survey statement in writing and nothing was produced to contradict it — so the line is about the absence of corroboration, not about immunity from survey admissions. And this judgment itself made no addition on the strength of a survey statement: what it struck down was a revision under s.263, and the editor's note sets out why that matters when the case is cited for the sustainability of an addition. What would displace it: an amendment conferring on a survey authority the power to examine on oath, which is the statutory contrast the whole reasoning rests on; or a reasoned decision of the Supreme Court on the evidentiary value of a s.133A statement, which the Khader Khan Son order is not. No source could be cited for that finding. Checking whether an authority still stands matters as much as knowing what it held: a decision may be overruled on one point and survive on another, or the provision it interprets may have been amended since. Read the source and the editor's note on this page before relying on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal.
The shape of this case is often misdescribed. There was no addition made on the strength of the survey statement; the Assessing Officer declined to act on the Rs 43 lakh offered at the survey and assessed on 8 per cent of contract receipts, and it was the Commissioner's attempt to revise that under s.263 which the High Court struck down. So the decision is authority for two things: that a statement recorded under s.133A carries no evidentiary value because the officer cannot administer an oath (para 11), and that an assessment in which the officer has applied his mind to a survey offer and verified it cannot be revised under s.263 merely because the Commissioner would have taxed the offered figure (paras 18 to 20). It is not authority on the sustainability of an addition founded on a survey statement, because no such addition was in issue. On later treatment, note that the Supreme Court order in CIT v. S. Khader Khan Son [2013] 352 ITR 480 (SC), which is routinely cited as approving this line, dismisses the Department's appeal in view of concurrent findings of fact and gives no reasons on s.133A. Kottakkal Wood Complex v. DCIT, named in the validity note, has not been read, and no citation for it has been traced. This library shows the verification state of every entry openly. This entry has not yet been read in full by a chartered accountant. The summary reflects the sources listed on this page. Read the source before you rely on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
The appeals were allowed: the orders of the Tribunal and of the Commissioner were set aside and the Assessing Officer's assessments confirmed, the question being answered in the assessee's favour (para 20). On s.133A the Court held that the section enables an income-tax authority only to record a statement which may be useful, and does not authorise the taking of a sworn statement; the power to examine a person on oath is conferred expressly by s.132(4) in a search, and a statement made on such examination may be used in evidence. A statement recorded under s.133A is therefore not given any evidentiary value, because the officer is not authorised to administer an oath (para 11). On s.263 the Court held that the twin conditions were not satisfied: the Assessing Officer had not accepted the declared income mechanically but had applied his mind, had verified the advances against the creditors' own block assessment completed on 28 October 1999, well before the survey, and had accepted a written offer after examining the books; on those facts the admission in the survey statement was only a qualified one and had been explained. The view the Assessing Officer took could not be called unsustainable in law, so the order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the revenue (paras 18 and 20).
TaxSphere, “Paul Mathews and Sons v CIT”, https://taxnotice.vittsphere.com/caselaw/case/paul-mathews-v-cit-133a-statement/ (validity last checked 2026-08-19)
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They recorded your statement in a survey. Can the addition rest on that alone?
A partner surrendered income during a survey and we have since reconciled the stock. Can we withdraw it?
The Deputy Director (Investigation) has filed a complaint under s.276C(1) and s.277 based on material seized from third parties, with no assessment or reassessment order against me. Can that prosecution stand?
A search was carried out on us and the department has reopened six years under section 153A. Can it add to a year where nothing incriminating was found?
