Section 133A

Section 133A — the law in short

What the courts have decided on section 133A, in one screen. Read this first; open an entry when you need the facts, the reasoning and the source.

• Sanand Properties P Ltd v Jt CIT Supreme CourtHelps department
  My company is a member of an AOP and takes 35% of the AOP's gross sale proceeds under the AOP deed. We showed it as an exempt share of the AOP's profit. After a survey the AO reopened two years and now says it is revenue. Can he reopen, and is the money taxable in my hands?
  No on the reopening challenge and no on the exemption. Where the assessment order shows the Assessing Officer never applied his mind to the character of the receipt at all, there is no opinion to change, and material coming out of a s.133A survey that reveals the true nature of the receipt is tangible material for s.147. On the merits the Court read Clause 7 of the AOP deed itself and held that a member's entitlement to 35% of gross sale proceeds, taken upfront and untouched by the AOP's expenses, is not a share of profit but a diversion of the AOP's receipts by overriding title, taxable in the member's hands as a business receipt. Two Revenue appeals were allowed and the assessee's appeal dismissed.
• State Bank of India v Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Supreme CourtHelps department
  My client is an employer facing a s.201 order for not deducting on LTC where the employees' itineraries included a foreign leg but the reimbursement was limited to the domestic shortest-route fare. Is the bona fide estimate defence available?
  No. The Supreme Court held that the moment an employee undertakes travel with a foreign leg it is not travel within India and the payment is outside s.10(5), so the employer was bound to deduct under s.192(1) and was rightly held an assessee in default. It rejected the argument that the reimbursement having been confined to the shortest domestic route saved the exemption, and it rejected the bona fide mistake defence because the employer had the complete travel details before it when settling the bills.
• MAK Data P Ltd v CIT Supreme CourtHelps department
  You surrendered the amount to buy peace and avoid litigation. Does that stop the penalty?
  No. The statute does not recognise 'to avoid litigation' or 'to buy peace' as an explanation at all. A surrender made only after the department confronts you with documents is not voluntary, and the penalty stood.
• CIT v S. Khader Khan Son Supreme CourtHelps taxpayer
  They recorded your statement in a survey. Can the addition rest on that alone?
  No. Section 133A gives no power to examine anyone on oath, so a survey statement has no evidentiary value on its own and does not bind you — especially once it is retracted. Something more is needed.
• Zoho Corporation Private Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax — no equalisation levy on an Indian parent's reimbursement to its US subsidiary of Google advertising costs, and the corporate veil cannot be pierced to create the charge High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My Indian client reimburses its overseas subsidiary for online advertising the subsidiary bought abroad. The department says the levy is payable because the money really came from India. Is a reimbursement within the charge?
  It is not. The equalisation levy is charged by Chapter VIII of the Finance Act, 2016 and not by the Income-tax Act, and on a textual reading of sections 164 and 165 the charge falls on consideration for a specified service received by a non-resident FROM an Indian resident carrying on business. Where a US subsidiary bought Google advertising from Google USA and the Indian parent merely reimbursed it, the service was provided by one non-resident to another and the levy cannot be imposed on the Indian parent unless reimbursement is itself a specified service — and it is not. The Committee on Taxation of E-Commerce had expressly recommended that reimbursements be brought within the levy, and Parliament did not do it. The Court also refused to pierce the corporate veil, the subsidiary having been incorporated and reimbursed in this way long before the levy existed, and held that statements recorded in a section 133A survey could not fix the liability.
• M/s Sivasakthi Threads v Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  A survey during a search on a connected group threw up excess stock, and it was added for AY 2007-08. The department says my unabsorbed depreciation cannot be set off against it, and now cites section 79A. Is that right?
  No, on both counts, for a year before AY 2022-23. The Madras High Court held that unabsorbed depreciation carried forward takes the character of current year depreciation under s.32(2) and, read with ss.71 and 72, can be set off against income of the current year other than capital gains — including an addition of unaccounted stock in business; and it recorded that s.79A, inserted by the Finance Act 2022 with effect from 1 April 2022, does not assist the Revenue for an earlier year.
• CIT v Dr Balabhai Nanavati Hospital High CourtCuts both waysNo later treatment found
  After a survey the TDS officer says my consultant doctors are employees and wants 192 instead of 194J. Is he right?
  Not on these facts, and only part of the case was decided. On the doctors the High Court found no substantial question of law: they are appointed on probation for qualification and specialisation, receive no fixed monthly remuneration, are free to practise at other hospitals, get no PF or ESIC and no perquisites, attend according to patients' needs, and the hospital exercises no real supervisory control; the doctors had also returned the receipts as business or professional income. The separate maintenance-contract question was not answered — the Tribunal's order on it was set aside and the matter sent back for a contract-by-contract finding, and the assessee-in-default question on that limb goes with it.
• Ghanshyam Dalmia v Pr. CIT (Central) High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My 2024 Vivad se Vishwas application was rejected under section 96 as a search case, but the only departmental action in my case was a survey. Can the authority do that?
  No. Section 96(a)(i) of the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Scheme, 2024 excludes an assessment year only where the assessment under section 143(3), 144, 147, 153A or 153C was made on the basis of a search initiated under section 132 or a requisition under section 132A. A survey under section 133A is consciously omitted from section 96, so the embargo does not operate; the Orissa High Court quashed the rejection and remitted the declaration for fresh consideration on merits.
• PCIT v Forum Sales Pvt Ltd — an estimate cannot be made without first rejecting the books under s.145(3) High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The Assessing Officer has disallowed forty per cent of my client's purchases on an estimate, but has not rejected the books. Is that open to him?
  No. The Delhi High Court held that it is the settled position of law that the books of account have to be necessarily rejected before the Assessing Officer proceeds to a best judgment assessment on fulfilment of the conditions in the Act, and that any pick and choose method of rejecting certain entries while accepting others, without appropriate justification, is arbitrary. Since the additions in question had been made on an estimate basis without rejecting the books, no substantial question of law arose and the Revenue's appeals were dismissed.
• Dr Mathew Cherian v ACIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  I'm a consultant doctor at a hospital. Can the AO reopen and tax my fees as salary?
  Not on this material. The Madras High Court set aside the s.148A(d) order and s.148 notice: the contracts showed professional autonomy, a variable fee tied to patient volume, no statutory employment benefits and freedom to practise privately, so there was no information suggesting escapement of income.
• State Bank of India v ACIT (TDS) High CourtHelps departmentNo later treatment found
  Staff booked a consolidated package tour with a foreign leg. Can we exempt the Indian part as LTC?
  No. Where the tour operator charges a consolidated amount for the whole journey including the domestic portion, there is no severable Indian leg on which s.10(5) can operate, and the employer was rightly treated as an assessee in default under s.201(1) and s.201(1A).
• M/s. Queen Agencies v ACIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The Assessing Officer has rejected my stay application in two lines saying pay 20%. Is that order sustainable, and can he order less than 20% without going to the Principal Commissioner?
  No, a non-speaking order under s.220(6) that simply directs payment of 20% is liable to be set aside; the Assessing Officer must pass a speaking order applying the three parameters - prima facie case, financial stringency and balance of convenience. And yes: because the Assessing Officer exercises a quasi-judicial power, he can himself direct a deposit of LESS than 20% without any reference to the Principal Commissioner; a reference upward is needed only if he wants MORE than 20%.
• Karti P. Chidambaram v Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation) High CourtHelps taxpayerUnder appeal
  The Deputy Director (Investigation) has filed a complaint under s.276C(1) and s.277 based on material seized from third parties, with no assessment or reassessment order against me. Can that prosecution stand?
  On this judgment, no. Although the Deputy Director can launch a prosecution under s.279 and although P. Jayappan holds that a prosecution need not await the assessment, the Madras High Court held that this is so where the complaint rests on the assessee's own statements under s.132(4) and incriminating material seized from him; where the material is collected from third parties and the prosecution itself treats it as merely corroborative, the Department must wait for the Assessing Officer's finding, and a complaint launched in the meantime is premature. The revisions were allowed and the prosecution held not maintainable, with liberty to the Department to act after a finding under s.153.
• Pawan Kumar Goel v Union of India High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The officers came in on a survey, I cooperated and showed them everything, and then they turned it into a search and took away the cash. Can they do that?
  No, not on this record. The Punjab and Haryana High Court quashed the action. Section 133A(4) forbids an income-tax authority acting under that section from removing any cash, stock or valuable article from the premises, and it is only where the person refuses or evades cooperation that section 133A(6) lets the authority fall back on the powers in section 131(1). Here the assessee had voluntarily disclosed and handed over Rs 2,09,89,090, the department produced no material to show non-cooperation, and no satisfaction was ever recorded for converting the survey into a search. The summons under section 131 was also vague, specifying nothing that was required of him. The action was quashed with consequential benefits.
• Ganpati Fincap Services Pvt Ltd v CIT High CourtHelps department
  The same officer is the Assessing Officer of the searched person and of our client. Does he still have to record a satisfaction note, and does he need two?
  He must record one, and it must exist before the s.153C proceedings are started. He does not have to write two notes. The single note is recorded in his capacity as the Assessing Officer of the searched person, it is a note about the other person, and it is placed in the other person's file. It does not have to say in terms that the documents do not belong to the searched person.
• PCIT v Meeta Gutgutia High CourtHelps taxpayer
  A search was carried out on us and the department has reopened six years under section 153A. Can it add to a year where nothing incriminating was found?
  No. The Delhi High Court held that the Revenue was not justified in invoking section 153A against the assessee for assessment years 2000-01 to 2003-04, there being no incriminating material for each of those years. It declined the Revenue's invitation to reconsider Kabul Chawla in the light of Dayawanti Gupta, holding that Dayawanti Gupta turned on distinguishing features - an admission under section 132(4) that transactions were not recorded, a year-wise chart of unrecorded transactions, and habitual concealment - none of which was present here. There was no justification for the Assessing Officer to proceed on surmises and estimates. The appeals were dismissed.
• Pr CIT v Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd High CourtHelps taxpayer
  Our erection and commissioning contractor uses its own engineers. Should we deduct under 194J, not 194C?
  No. Payments for construction, erection and commissioning of a plant do not become fees for technical services merely because the contractor deploys technical personnel to perform its contract; deduction under s.194C is correct.
• DIT (International Taxation) v. GE Packaged Power Inc. — filing a NIL return at reassessment does not make a non-resident liable to s.234B interest for a pre-2012 year High CourtHelps taxpayer
  My non-resident client filed a NIL return after a s.148 notice, the Assessing Officer found a permanent establishment and charged s.234B interest for years before 2012. Does the fact that he denied taxability defeat the s.209(1)(d) argument?
  The Delhi High Court held that it does not. For assessment years before the Finance Act, 2012 proviso, s.209(1)(d) allowed the non-resident to reduce his advance tax by the tax that was deductible at source from the remittances, whether or not it was actually deducted, so no advance tax was payable and no s.234B interest could be charged — and the Court held that this remained so 'even though they filed returns declaring NIL income at the stage of reassessment'. It read the earlier decision in DIT v. Alcatel Lucent USA Inc. as turning on that assessee's initial denial of permanent establishment status followed by its volte face admitting it, not on the mere filing of a NIL return.
• CIT v JDS Apparels Pvt Ltd High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The bank keeps a small percentage of every credit card sale before crediting me. Should I have deducted tax at source on it under section 194H?
  No. The Delhi High Court held that what the acquiring bank retains when settling a credit card sale is a fee for banking services, not commission or brokerage. Section 194H catches a payment received by a person acting on behalf of another, and the bank and the retailer deal as independent parties on a principal to principal basis; the bank is a middleman for nobody and is indifferent to the goods being sold. The disallowance of Rs.44,65,654 under section 40(a)(ia) therefore fell away. The Court added that section 40(a)(ia) is a deterrent and penal provision that should be construed strictly.
• Dipen Laljibhai Mandalia v DGIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The department is justifying my search warrant with discrepancies it discovered after the satisfaction note was recorded. Can material found later prop up the authorisation?
  No. The Gujarat High Court held that material collected after the satisfaction note is recorded and the search authorisation issued cannot be pressed into service to support that authorisation. The Court read the satisfaction note itself, found that the department already knew of the gold, had the lease documents and the assessee's books before it, and that the explanation offered was corroborated by the goldsmiths' statements. There was therefore no material on which a reasonable belief under section 132(1)(c) could be formed. The petitions were allowed and the search and seizure operations were quashed.
• Jagran Prakashan Ltd v DCIT (TDS) High CourtHelps taxpayer
  I publish a newspaper and allow accredited advertising agencies the standard 15 per cent trade discount. The TDS officer says that is commission under section 194H and has raised a demand on me. Is that right?
  No, on the reasoning available in this judgment. The Allahabad High Court held that section 194H applies only where the recipient acts on behalf of the payer, and here there was no agreement between the newspaper and the advertising agencies and no agency had ever been appointed. The Kerala decision in Director, Prasar Bharati, on which the department relied, turned on a written agency agreement containing an express clause about withholding tax, and was held to be inapplicable. The Delhi High Court had already decided the same question against the department in Living Media India, and the Supreme Court had dismissed the department's special leave petition against it on 11 December 2009.
• CIT v Dhingra Metal Works High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  A partner surrendered income during a survey and we have since reconciled the stock. Can we withdraw it?
  Yes. Section 133A does not give a statement recorded in a survey evidentiary value, and an admission is not conclusive: the maker may show it to be wrong. Once the stock difference was reconciled from the records and the officer had made no independent enquiry, nothing was left to support the addition.
• Paul Mathews and Sons v CIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  Can the officer treat what I said during a survey as sworn evidence against me?
  No. The officer conducting a s.133A survey has no power to administer an oath or record a sworn statement, so the statement is not given evidentiary value and cannot by itself found an addition. Section 132(4), by contrast, expressly allows a search statement to be used as evidence.
• ITO (TDS) v Sashwat Energy P Ltd ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My deductee has returned the income and paid the tax, and I have filed Form 26A. I know the s.201(1) demand goes — but for how long does s.201(1A) interest run against me?
  To the date the resident payee furnished his return of income, not to the date you eventually pay. The Mumbai Bench stated the rule expressly: where the payer is not deemed to be an assessee in default under s.201(1) because the resident payee paid the tax, interest under s.201(1A)(i) is payable from the date on which the tax was deductible to the date of furnishing of the return of income by that resident payee. The s.201(1) demand itself was set aside subject to verification.
• Viswateja Spinning Mills (P) Ltd v ITO (TDS), Ward-1 ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My spinning mill sells the cotton waste that comes off the process. The TDS officer says that is scrap and wants one per cent. Is it?
  No, not where the waste goes back in as raw material. The Tribunal held that on a plain reading of Explanation (b) to s.206C the assessee ought not to have collected tax on sales of cotton waste, because material that is usable as such — here reused as raw material by open-ended spinning mills — does not answer the definition. It remitted the matter to the Assessing Officer to verify that the supplies went to open-ended spinning mills where the cotton waste is used as raw material, and then to allow the claim.
• Shankar Lal Ludhani v DCIT, Central Circle, Ajmer ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  I left the surrendered cash out of my original return and brought it in only by a revised return under s.139(5). Does the proviso to s.271AAC(1) still protect me?
  On this decision, yes. The Jaipur Bench held that once a revised return is filed the original stands withdrawn and is substituted by the revised return, so where the revised return has been accepted as a return under s.139 the proviso to s.271AAC(1) is answered and the penalty cannot stand.
• ACIT v Hirapanna Jewellers ITATHelps taxpayer
  My cash sales are already in my books and already in my turnover. The officer has added the same money again under section 68 and taxed it at 60%. Can he?
  Not on these facts. The Tribunal upheld the deletion of an addition of Rs 4,71,31,500 made under section 68 read with section 115BBE on a jeweller's cash sales of 8 November 2016. The Assessing Officer had accepted the sales and the stock, had not disturbed the closing stock, and had found no defect in the stock register on either of two surveys; purchases, sales and stock are interlinked and inseparable, every purchase increases the stock and every sale reduces it, and where the movement matches the sales there is no basis to disbelieve them. Because the receipts had already been admitted as revenue receipts and offered as turnover, the Tribunal held there was no case for adding them under section 68 or taxing them again under section 115BBE. Suspicion, however strong, cannot decide the matter against the assessee without tangible evidence disproving the sales.
• Bharat Financial Inclusion Ltd v DCIT (TDS) — s.17(2)(vi) fixes only the VALUE of the ESOP perquisite; the s.192 withholding obligation arises when the shares are actually allotted ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My employee exercised his options in one year but the shares were only allotted in the next, after he satisfied conditions in his separation agreement. In which year was I obliged to deduct tax under s.192?
  This is stage one — the perquisite on exercise — and the Tribunal drew a line between valuing it and withholding on it. It held that the amended s.17(2)(vi) is only to determine the VALUE of the ESOP transaction, and that the obligation to withhold under s.192 accrues only when the shares are ALLOTTED after the person who exercised the option has completed his commitments; a mere exercise is only acceptance of a general proposal. The assessee's appeal against a short-deduction order was allowed.
• P. Murali Mohana Rao v Addl. CIT, Range-1, Hyderabad ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The Additional Commissioner has levied Rs 30,000 on me personally, as the chartered accountant representing my client, for not attending on three dates in answer to section 131 summons. Does he even have the power to pass that order?
  On this reasoning, no. Because section 272A(1) imposes Rs 10,000 for each default, the penalty in law was Rs 10,000 per default and not Rs 30,000 in aggregate; and on the thresholds in section 274(2) a penalty of that amount is for the Income-tax Officer to impose, so the Tribunal held the Addl. CIT had no jurisdiction to pass the order. It also held there was reasonable cause under section 273B, that one show-cause notice cannot support penalties for three separate defaults, and that the completion of the client's assessment under section 143(3) rather than section 144 showed the subsequent compliance was good compliance.
• DDE ORG Systems (P) Ltd v ACIT (TDS) ITATHelps departmentNo later treatment found
  We pay our staff a fixed monthly attire allowance and washing allowance and treat it as exempt under s.10(14). Nobody actually wears a uniform. Can the TDS officer make us an assessee in default?
  Yes. The Tribunal held that Rule 2BB(1)(f) exempts expenditure incurred on the purchase or maintenance of a uniform for wear during the performance of duties, and that where the employees wore dress of different colour, different design and texture according to their own choice, there was no uniform and nothing to show the allowance was granted to meet expenses wholly, necessarily and exclusively incurred in the performance of duties. Tax was required to be deducted on both the attire allowance and the washing allowance, and the employer was in default under s.201(1).
• Statutory position — section 139(8A) and section 140B: the updated return, its five provisos, and the additional tax CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  My client never declared his crypto gains. Can he still put them right by an updated return, how long has he got, and what will it cost him?
  An updated return under s.139(8A) may now be furnished at any time within FORTY-EIGHT months from the end of the relevant assessment year — the Finance Act 2025 substituted 'forty-eight' for 'twenty-four' with effect from 1 April 2025 — but only if none of five provisos bars it. It cannot be used at all if the updated return would be a return of a loss, or would decrease the total tax liability determined on the earlier return, or would produce or increase a refund; it cannot be used where a search under s.132, a requisition under s.132A or a survey under s.133A other than s.133A(2A) has taken place, or where seized assets or books of another person have been notified as belonging or pertaining to the assessee; and it cannot be used where an updated return has already been furnished for that year, or where ANY proceeding for assessment, reassessment, recomputation or revision is pending or has been completed for that year, or where SAFEMA, Benami, PMLA or Black Money Act information or information under a s.90 or s.90A agreement has been communicated to the assessee, or where prosecution under Chapter XXII has been initiated, or where the person is notified by the Board. A fourth proviso, inserted by the same Finance Act 2025, bars an updated return altogether where a show-cause notice under s.148A has been issued after thirty-six months from the end of the relevant assessment year, and a fifth proviso disapplies that bar where an order under s.148A(3) has determined that it is not a fit case to issue a notice under s.148. The price is set by s.140B: additional income-tax of twenty-five per cent of the aggregate of tax and interest if filed within twelve months of the end of the assessment year, fifty per cent within twenty-four months, sixty per cent within thirty-six months and seventy per cent within forty-eight months, over and above the tax, interest and fee otherwise payable.
• Statutory position — section 79A: no set-off against undisclosed income found in a search, requisition or survey, from AY 2022-23 CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  A search threw up unaccounted stock and cash and the Assessing Officer has added it. I have a large brought-forward loss and unabsorbed depreciation sitting there. Can I set them off against the addition?
  For AY 2022-23 and every later year, no. Section 79A, inserted by the Finance Act 2022 (Act No. 6 of 2022) with effect from 1 April 2022, says that where, consequent to a search under s.132, a requisition under s.132A or a survey under s.133A other than s.133A(2A), the total income of any previous year includes undisclosed income, no set-off of any loss — brought forward or of the current year — and no set-off of unabsorbed depreciation under s.32(2) shall be allowed against that undisclosed income under any provision of the Act.
• Statutory position — s.245MA and the e-Dispute Resolution Scheme, 2022: ten lakh rupees of variation, fifty lakh rupees of returned income, and a committee that can waive the penalty CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both waysNo later treatment found
  The variation in my assessment order is about six lakh rupees and my returned income was thirty-eight lakh. Filing a first appeal will take years. Is there anything else I can do, and what do I lose if I go that way?
  There is one alternative, and it is narrow. Section 245MA lets the Central Government constitute Dispute Resolution Committees for persons the Board specifies, who may opt for dispute resolution in respect of a dispute arising from any variation in a 'specified order' and who fulfil the 'specified conditions'. The Explanation fixes two numbers: the aggregate sum of variations proposed or made in the order must not exceed ten lakh rupees, and where a return has been filed for the relevant assessment year the total income as per that return must not exceed fifty lakh rupees. An order based on a search under section 132, a requisition under section 132A, a survey under section 133A, or information received under an agreement referred to in section 90 or section 90A is outside the definition altogether. The committee may reduce or waive a penalty imposable under the Act and grant immunity from prosecution. The application is in Form No. 34BC under rule 44DAB with a fee of one thousand rupees. The section itself says nothing about section 246A at all.
• CBDT Instruction No. 03/2017 — the demonetisation cash verification SOP CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  Is there a departmental instruction telling the officer how to verify my demonetisation cash deposits, and what comparisons is he supposed to make?
  Yes. The Board issued a Standard Operating Procedure on 21 February 2017 for the online verification of cash deposits made in the demonetisation window. It fixes deposit levels at which no further verification is to be made — up to 2.5 lakh for an individual without business income, and Rs. 5.0 lakh for a person above 70 — and it lists the comparisons an officer is to run before treating recorded cash sales as back-dated, the first of which is an abnormal jump in cash sales for November and December 2016 against the assessee's own earlier history.
• CBDT letter of 18 December 2014 — coercion in recording statements CBDT Circulars & InstructionsHelps taxpayer
  What is the department's own position if you were pressured into an admission?
  That it will be viewed adversely. The Board directed strict compliance with its earlier instructions, told officers to avoid obtaining admissions under pressure, and repeated that the focus must be on gathering evidence.
• CBDT Instruction of 10 March 2003 — no confessions in search or survey CBDT Circulars & InstructionsHelps taxpayer
  Are officers allowed to press you for an admission during a search or survey?
  No. The Board's own instruction says no attempt should be made to obtain a confession as to undisclosed income. Officers are to collect evidence instead, because confessions without credible evidence get retracted and achieve nothing.
• DIT (International Taxation) v. Alcatel Lucent USA Inc. — the 'volte face' ground for charging s.234B interest on a non-resident, and its reversal by the Supreme Court High CourtHelps departmentOverruled
  The Assessing Officer is relying on the Delhi High Court's Alcatel Lucent judgment to charge my non-resident client s.234B interest because it first denied a permanent establishment and then accepted the assessment. Is that judgment still good?
  It is not. The Delhi High Court did hold, on 7 November 2013, that where a non-resident first denies that it has a permanent establishment and then accepts its tax liability at the first appellate stage, it must take responsibility for its volte face and cannot shift the blame for non-deduction to the Indian payers, so s.234B interest was payable; it answered the question of law in favour of the Revenue and allowed the appeals. But the assessees' special leave petitions were entertained, and in the Supreme Court's judgment of 17 September 2021 in the Mitsubishi Corporation batch the Court, having set out the Alcatel Lucent history at paragraph 23, recorded at paragraph 25: 'Accordingly, these Civil Appeals are allowed.'

Listed strongest first: Supreme Court, then High Court, then Tribunal, then CBDT. Nothing here has yet been read in full by a chartered accountant — open an entry to see where it came from.