Section 263

Section 263 — the law in short

What the courts have decided on section 263, in one screen. Read this first; open an entry when you need the facts, the reasoning and the source.

• CIT v Paville Projects Pvt Ltd Supreme CourtHelps department
  The Assessing Officer allowed a deduction. Does the fact that a view was taken protect the assessment from section 263?
  Only if the view taken is one of two views genuinely open on the law. Where the Supreme Court is satisfied the assessment is both erroneous and prejudicial, the Commissioner's revision stands and the Tribunal and High Court orders setting it aside go.
• CIT v Amitabh Bachchan Supreme CourtHelps departmentNo later treatment found
  Can the Commissioner revise on a ground that was not in the show cause notice?
  Yes. Section 263 requires an opportunity of hearing, not a formal show cause notice, and the Commissioner is not confined to the issues listed in any notice. What he must give you is a full chance to answer before he finalises.
• CIT v Vatika Township P Ltd Supreme CourtHelps taxpayer
  An amendment adds a new levy. Does it reach back to earlier years?
  Not unless the statute says so. Legislation is presumed not to operate retrospectively, and that presumption applies with full force where the amendment imposes a new burden. Only clarificatory or beneficial amendments may be read back.
• CIT v Greenworld Corporation Supreme CourtCuts both ways
  The Assessing Officer passed the assessment after being told what to do by the Commissioner. What happens to that assessment, and to a later section 263 order on it?
  An assessment passed on the dictates of a higher authority is without jurisdiction and a nullity. And a Commissioner exercising section 263 cannot use that order to direct reopening of other assessment years; his revisional jurisdiction is confined to the year before him.
• CIT v Max India Ltd Supreme CourtHelps taxpayer
  What if the law itself was unsettled when the officer decided?
  Reported as following the two-views principle — where the provision was capable of more than one interpretation and the officer adopted one of them, revision under s.263 does not lie.
• CIT v Alagendran Finance Ltd Supreme CourtHelps taxpayer
  A reassessment was done in between. Does the two-year clock for s.263 restart from it?
  Not for an item the reassessment never touched. For that item, limitation runs from the ORIGINAL assessment order, because the doctrine of merger does not apply where the subject matter is different.
• Berger Paints India Ltd v. CIT, Calcutta (SC, 17 February 2004) — where the Revenue has accepted a High Court's statement of the law in one assessee's case it cannot challenge it in another without just cause Supreme CourtHelps taxpayer
  The department accepted a High Court decision in someone else's case and never appealed it, and is now arguing the opposite against my client. Can it?
  Not without just cause. The Supreme Court held that if the Revenue has not challenged the correctness of the law laid down by a High Court and has accepted it in the case of one assessee, it is not open to the Revenue to challenge its correctness in the case of other assessees, without just cause. The Gujarat High Court in Lakhanpal National Ltd had held that the whole of the excise and customs duty actually paid in a year is deductible under section 43B irrespective of how much of it is embedded in closing stock; that decision was never challenged, was followed by the Bombay and Madras High Courts and by a Special Bench of the Tribunal, and none of those was challenged either. The Court found no just cause for a departure, held that the Commissioner, the Tribunal and the Calcutta High Court had erred in permitting the Revenue to contend to the contrary, set aside the Calcutta High Court's judgments for all three assessment years and answered the questions in favour of the assessee.
• Sakthi Trading Co v CIT Supreme CourtHelps taxpayer
  Our firm dissolved when a partner died, but the remaining partners carried on the same business. Must the closing stock on the date of dissolution be revalued at market price?
  No. The Supreme Court held that where a firm is dissolved but the business is not discontinued, there is no warrant for revaluing the closing stock at market rate. The ordinary rule, cost or market price whichever is lower, continues to apply. Valuing stock at a market value higher than cost would tax notional profits the assessee has never realised. A.L.A. Firm and G.R. Ramachari, which required market valuation, were cases where the business itself came to an end. The Commissioner's order under section 263 was wrong and the question was answered for the assessee.
• Malabar Industrial Co Ltd v CIT Supreme CourtHelps department
  The Commissioner wants to revise my assessment. What does he actually have to establish?
  Both things, not one. The order must be erroneous AND prejudicial to the revenue. If the officer took one of two possible views, that is not an error.
• CIT v Shree Manjunathesware Packing Products Supreme CourtHelps department
  The Commissioner has issued a notice under section 263 on the strength of a Departmental Valuation Officer's report that reached the Assessing Officer only after my assessment was over. Can he revise on material that was not on the file when the order was passed?
  Yes, on these facts. The Supreme Court held that it was open to the Commissioner to take into consideration all the records available at the time of examination by him, and so to consider a valuation report that the Departmental Valuation Cell submitted after the assessment order had been passed. The Court read clause (b) of the Explanation to section 263(1), which declares that 'record' shall include and shall be deemed always to have included all records relating to any proceeding under the Act available at the time of examination by the Commissioner, and held that the Commissioner may look not only at the record of that proceeding but at the record relating to it. It also held that the narrower reading had never been the settled law, even for orders passed before the 1988 amendment.
• Aditanar Educational Institution v Addl CIT Supreme CourtHelps taxpayer
  My society runs a college and ended the year with a surplus. Does that surplus mean we no longer exist solely for educational purposes and not for profit?
  No. The Supreme Court held that if a surplus results incidentally, after meeting expenditure, from an activity lawfully carried on by an educational institution, the institution does not cease to exist solely for educational purposes, because its object is not to make profit. The decisive test is whether, on an overall view, the object is to make profit. The Court also held that a society or trust running an educational institution solely for educational purposes and not for profit is itself an other educational institution, and rejected as unreal and hyper-technical the argument that such a body is merely a financing body.
• Punjab State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd v CIT Supreme CourtHelps department
  I paid the Registrar of Companies a filing fee to increase my authorised share capital. Is that fee deductible as revenue expenditure?
  No. The Supreme Court held that the fee paid to the Registrar of Companies for expansion of a company's capital base is capital expenditure. Although the enlarged capital incidentally helps the business and may help it earn profits, the outgoing was directly related to the expansion of the capital base and keeps that character. Deciding a conflict between the High Courts on a reference made directly to it under section 257, the Court preferred the line of decisions in favour of the Revenue over the Madras view in Kisenchand Chellaram. The question was answered against the assessee.
• Tara Devi Aggarwal v CIT Supreme CourtHelps department
  Can an assessment be revised where the officer taxed income that was never yours?
  Yes. An assessment made merely because the assessee wanted the amount taxed in her hands, to help someone else escape a larger assessment, can be erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue — and may be cancelled in revision.
• CIT v Electro House Supreme CourtHelps department
  The Commissioner's show cause notice before revising my assessment was defective. Does that knock out his jurisdiction to revise at all?
  No. The Supreme Court held that the revision section, unlike the reassessment section, prescribes no notice at all. It requires only that the Commissioner give the assessee an opportunity of being heard before he reaches his decision, not before he begins the enquiry. That requirement belongs to natural justice, not to jurisdiction. A breach of it may make the resulting order illegal, but it does not take away the Commissioner's power to proceed. Since no notice was a condition precedent, the question what the notice should have contained did not arise. The Calcutta High Court's contrary view was set aside.
• Raj Kumar Singh Hukam Chandji v CIT Supreme CourtHelps taxpayer
  I am the karta and my family's funds bought the shares that qualified me to be managing director. Is my managing director's salary my own income or the family's?
  Your own, on these facts. The Supreme Court held that the managing director's remuneration received by Raj Kumar Singh was assessable as his individual income and not as the income of his Hindu undivided family. The broad test is whether the remuneration was in substance a return to the family for the investment of its funds in the business, or compensation for the services of the individual coparcener. Here he was elected managing director by the board, was paid for personal services, and was not appointed as a result of any outlay or detriment to family property. The office was one of personal responsibility and ability.
• Rampyari Devi Saraogi v CIT Supreme CourtHelps department
  The Commissioner set aside my assessments in revision relying on enquiries he never showed me. Is his order bad for want of a fair opportunity?
  No, on these facts. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The Commissioner had used material from his own enquiries which was never put to the assessee, but the Court held that this was supporting material and not the basic ground of the order. On the face of the record the assessments were prejudicial to the revenue: a new assessee had filed nine years' voluntary returns at once, her own declaration about initial capital, marriage ornaments and gifts should have put any officer on his guard, no books or bank account existed, and short stereotyped orders followed within days without any enquiry.
• Mirum Digital Pvt Ltd v PCIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The assessee did not appear before the Commissioner in the revision proceedings. Does that alone justify the revision order?
  No. Non-appearance before the Commissioner does not convert an assessment made after specific queries and full replies into an order passed without enquiry. The Commissioner still has to make his own enquiry and satisfy both conditions, and prejudice to the revenue must actually exist.
• CIT v Eastman Exports Global Clothing Pvt Ltd High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The Commissioner has issued a s.263 notice saying the transferor companies had not been in business for three years, so the losses we took over cannot be carried forward. Our arrangement was a demerger, not an amalgamation. Does the three-year condition apply?
  No. The three-year condition is in s.72A(2), which governs amalgamation. A demerger is governed by s.72A(4), which contains no such condition. The Madras High Court held that a revision order built on the wrong sub-section, and which merely remitted the matter to the assessing officer for enquiry, did not satisfy the requirement that the order sought to be revised be erroneous.
• Optum Global Solutions India Pvt Ltd v PCIT High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  You signed an APA and filed a modified return under s.92CD. The Commissioner has now issued a s.263 notice on the old assessment order. Can he?
  Not on this reasoning. Once a modified return is filed under the APA it has to be treated as a return filed under s.139, and the earlier return and earlier assessment order lose their efficacy for all practical purposes; a fresh assessment order is what has to be passed. Allowing the s.263 notice on the superseded order to run would make the APA and the modified return inconsequential, and nothing stops the Assessing Officer from taking the very same points while re-scrutinising the modified return. Both writ petitions were allowed and the show cause notices set aside.
• PCIT v Rajkot Lodhika Sahakari Kharid Vechan Sangh High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The PCIT revised my assessment saying a co-operative bank is not a co-operative society. Is that right?
  Not on the Gujarat view. A co-operative bank is itself a co-operative society registered under the State Co-operative Societies Act, so it falls within 'any other co-operative society' in s.80P(2)(d); the interest was deductible and the s.263 revision was set aside.
• PCIT v Sangeeta Jain High CourtCuts both waysNo later treatment found
  The Commissioner says my assessment was made without any inquiry. Is that by itself enough to revise it under s.263?
  It depends on which side of the line the file falls. The Delhi High Court restored a revision because the officer had accepted the claim that the land sold was agricultural without verifying it at all. The twin conditions still have to be met, but a complete absence of inquiry satisfies the first of them; an inquiry the Commissioner merely thinks was too thin does not.
• PCIT v Mohak Real Estate Pvt Ltd High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  How much work must the Commissioner do before he can hold an assessment erroneous and prejudicial?
  At least a minimal enquiry, and he must record the reasons for his conclusion. A revision order that does not engage with the reply to the show cause notice and does not record why the assessment is erroneous is not sustainable in law.
• Mastek Limited v ACIT High CourtHelps taxpayerHigh Courts differ
  The officer says my section 154 notice is in time because he is rectifying the order giving effect to the appeal. Is that right where the point was never in appeal?
  The Gujarat High Court said no. Following its own decision in Poonjabhai Vanmalidas, it held that where the issue was not the subject matter of the appeal the appellate order does not subsume the original order, so the time for correcting the mistake relates back to the original order and not to the appellate or appeal effect order. It also held that a notice founded on the interpretation of a Supreme Court decision cannot be a mistake apparent from the record.
• ACIT v Satish Kumar Keshri High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The search on me turned up nothing but the AO still made additions for an old year. Can he?
  Where the assessment for a year stood completed before the search and nothing was pending to abate, an order under s.153A cannot simply reopen it. A completed assessment can be reassessed under s.153A only on incriminating material found in the search having some nexus to undisclosed income - and the Court left that route open, upholding a remand to the Assessing Officer to reassess if such material exists.
• PCIT v Shreeji Prints Pvt Ltd High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The Commissioner did not mention Explanation 2 in the show cause notice but relied on it in the revision order. Does that matter?
  Yes. The Tribunal held, and the High Court and Supreme Court left undisturbed, that invoking Explanation 2 in the order without having put it to the assessee in the show cause notice is not appropriate or sustainable in law. On the merits, the Assessing Officer had made full inquiries into the loans and taken a plausible view, so there was nothing to revise.
• M/s. Indira Industries v Principal Commissioner of Income Tax High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The Commissioner has issued a section 263 notice raising issues the reassessment never touched. Does the two-year limit run from the reassessment order or from the original assessment, and can I challenge the notice itself?
  From the original assessment, and yes. The Madras High Court held that where a section 263 notice raises issues that were not the subject matter of the reassessment, the two years in section 263(2) run from the end of the financial year in which the original assessment was passed, not the reassessment. Here scrutiny assessment was made on 25 February 2015, so time ran from 31 March 2015, and the notice of 16 August 2017 was out of time. Being barred by law, the notice suffered from lack of jurisdiction, and the settled principles allow a show cause notice to be assailed on that ground. The writ appeal was allowed and the notice quashed.
• Rajmandir Estates P Ltd v PCIT High CourtHelps departmentNo later treatment found
  Can the officer look past my subscriber at where the subscriber's own subscribers got their money?
  It depends on what the file shows. This is the decision the department relies on for going up the chain. Upholding a revision under s.263, the Calcutta High Court quoted the Special Bench in Sophia Finance for the width of the words 'any sum found credited in the books' and held that the officer is not precluded from enquiring into the true nature and source of a credit even where it is entered as share application money; it recorded that the submission that the source of the source is irrelevant did not appear to be correct. What it decides is that the enquiry could be directed on this file, not that the credits were bogus.
• CIT v Fr. Mullers Charitable Institutions High CourtHelps taxpayer
  One deposit of ours breaks the s.11(5) modes. Will the department tax the trust's entire income?
  No. Only the income from the investment or deposit made in violation of s.11(5) is taxed; a breach of s.13(1)(d) does not take the trust's total income out of s.11. On that footing the s.263 revision was held unsustainable.
• CIT v State Bank of Mysore High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My VRS does not satisfy Rule 2BA. The Commissioner says that kills my s.35DDA deduction as employer. Does it?
  No. The Karnataka High Court held that Rule 2BA is a guideline for the purposes of s.10(10C) — the exemption in the retiring employee's hands — and has nothing to do with the employer's claim under s.35DDA. s.35DDA makes no mention of any rule. The employer's deduction is nevertheless confined to one-fifth in the year of payment, with the balance spread over the four succeeding years.
• DIT v Jyoti Foundation High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The Commissioner says the Assessing Officer's inquiry was not deep enough. Can he set the assessment aside and tell the officer to inquire further?
  No. Where inquiry was made but the Commissioner thinks it insufficient, the Commissioner must conduct the inquiry himself and record a finding that the order is erroneous. He cannot remit the question of whether the order is erroneous to the Assessing Officer.
• CIT v D.G. Housing Projects Ltd High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The Commissioner has set aside my assessment under section 263 saying the Assessing Officer did not examine an issue properly — can he do that without deciding the issue himself?
  No. The Delhi High Court held that a finding that the assessment order is erroneous is a jurisdictional precondition for section 263. Where the Assessing Officer has made an enquiry but the Commissioner thinks it inadequate, the Commissioner must himself examine or verify the matter and record a clear finding, supported by reasons, that the order is erroneous and unsustainable in law. He cannot remit the matter for the Assessing Officer to find out whether the order was erroneous. The revision order here, which said only that the point had not been properly examined, was rightly cancelled and the Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
• Dr. M. Manohar v. ACIT (Madras High Court) — the s.115H benefit does not extend to interest earned on interest that was re-deposited with the original sum; 'derived from' requires a direct nexus with the foreign exchange asset High CourtHelps departmentNo later treatment found
  My client, a returned NRI, keeps renewing his bank deposits by rolling the accrued interest back into the principal, and has claimed the concessional rate under section 115H on the whole of the interest each year. The Commissioner has revised the assessment under section 263. Is the claim on the interest-on-interest sustainable?
  No. The Madras High Court held that section 115H does not allow that elasticity: the concessional rate is available only to investment income DERIVED FROM the foreign exchange asset, and unless the interest income has a direct nexus with the foreign exchange asset the benefit cannot be extended. The section 263 revision and the Tribunal's order confirming it were upheld and the assessee's appeal was dismissed.
• Amrit Sales Promotion Pvt Ltd v Union of India High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  I applied under s.144A and the Additional Commissioner directed the Assessing Officer in my favour. Two years later the department has issued a s.148 notice on exactly the same point. Can it do that?
  No. A direction issued under s.144A binds the Assessing Officer, and once the assessment has been framed in accordance with it the department cannot reopen the same issue on the same facts under s.147/148 — that is a mere change of opinion. If the department thought the s.144A direction was prejudicial to the revenue its remedy was s.263; not having taken it, the direction became final.
• Paul Mathews and Sons v CIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  Can the officer treat what I said during a survey as sworn evidence against me?
  No. The officer conducting a s.133A survey has no power to administer an oath or record a sworn statement, so the statement is not given evidentiary value and cannot by itself found an addition. Section 132(4), by contrast, expressly allows a search statement to be used as evidence.
• CIT v Sardari Lal & Co High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  Can the CIT(A) enhance my assessment by taxing a source the AO never looked at?
  No. The power of enhancement is confined to the subject matter of the assessment under appeal — the items the AO considered, expressly or by necessary implication. A new source has to be brought to tax by reassessment or by revision, each of which carries its own safeguards and time limits.
• Commissioner of Income-Tax v Shambhu Investment Pvt Ltd High CourtHelps department
  I let furnished table space with security, electricity, water and common amenities for a single monthly charge. Is that business income or income from house property?
  Income from house property, on these facts. The Calcutta High Court held that the mere attachment of income to immovable property is not by itself decisive; what must be seen is the assessee's primary object in exploiting the property. If the main intention is to let the property or a portion of it, the receipt is rental income; if it is to exploit the property by way of complex commercial activities, it is business income. Here there was no separate charge or agreement for furniture, fixtures or services, the monthly rent was comprehensive, and interest-free security advances of Rs 4,25,000 had already recovered the whole cost of the let portion. Applying the Sultan Brothers tests, the letting was inseparable and the object was letting.
• Indwell Constructions v CIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The officer rejected my firm's books and estimated the profit. Can he then also add back the interest and remuneration the firm paid its partners?
  No. Once the books are rejected and the profit is estimated, the estimate stands in substitution for a computation under s.29, and every deduction that s.29 brings in is deemed to have been taken into account in arriving at it. The Court added that the embargo in s.40 is taken into account in the same way. To add back one specific item out of the profit and loss account is to rely on the very books that have been rejected, which the officer cannot do. The separate addition of Rs 63,859 for interest and remuneration paid to partners was held not permissible, and the reference was answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Read the reasoning carefully before relying on it, because it cuts both ways: the same sentence that stops the Revenue adding an item back is the sentence the Revenue uses to resist a further deduction claimed on top of an estimate.
• CIT v M.K. Chandrakanth High CourtHelps taxpayer
  My client's trust deed says that if the purpose fails after twenty years the fund reverts to the settlor. Does that clause alone make the trust revocable, so that the income is taxed in the settlor's hands from day one?
  No. A clause that operates only on the failure of the settlement, after a fixed period, does not make the trust revocable while the settlement is running. For the years in which the contingency has not arisen the deed must be read without that clause, and if during the operation of the settlement the settlor can neither enjoy the income nor reassume power over the income or assets, s.63 is not attracted and s.61 does not apply.
• CIT v Sophia Finance Ltd High CourtHelps department
  My company received share application money. Can the Assessing Officer use section 68 on it at all, or is share capital simply a capital receipt he cannot touch?
  He can. The Delhi High Court, sitting as a Full Bench, held that section 68 is widely worded - it covers any sum found credited in the books, whatever colour the assessee gives it - so the officer has jurisdiction, and indeed a duty, to enquire whether the alleged shareholders actually exist. If they are identified and shown to have invested, the money is a capital receipt and nothing more happens. If they do not exist, there is no valid issue of share capital, because shares cannot be issued to non-existent persons, and the credit may be charged as the company's income.
• CIT v Gabriel India Ltd High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The Commissioner has issued a section 263 notice saying my assessment order does not discuss a deduction the officer allowed. Is a brief order by itself erroneous?
  No. The Bombay High Court held that an order is erroneous only if it is not in accordance with law, or was passed without any enquiry in undue haste. Where the officer raised a query, got a written explanation and allowed the claim on it, his order cannot be branded erroneous merely because he did not discuss the matter elaborately or because the Commissioner would have decided differently. And the Commissioner must himself reach a finding that the order is erroneous and prejudicial before he sets it aside; he cannot simply remit the point for the officer to look at again.
• Aamrakunj Realty Limited v PCIT, Ahmedabad-1 ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The Principal Commissioner has passed a s.263 order saying my AO was wrong not to initiate a s.271AAD penalty on a disallowed payment, and has directed him to initiate and levy it. Can he do that?
  No. The Tribunal held that s.271AAD names the Assessing Officer, the Commissioner (Appeals) and, since the Finance Act 2023, the Joint Commissioner (Appeals), and that even after those amendments it still does not empower the Principal Commissioner or the Commissioner to initiate or levy the penalty. What the Commissioner cannot do himself he cannot get done through the Assessing Officer by exercising revisional powers, and the s.263 order was quashed.
• Wadhwa Group Holdings Pvt Ltd v PCIT (Central), Mumbai-3 ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The Commissioner has revised your assessment for a year before AY 2024-25 saying the officer never verified MSME trade payables. Can s.43B(h) support that?
  No. Clause (h) of s.43B was inserted by the Finance Act 2023 with effect from 1 April 2024 and operates prospectively from AY 2024-25. For AY 2022-23 the Tribunal held the Commissioner could not found prejudice to the Revenue on the non-application of a provision that did not apply, and set the s.263 order aside.
• Thailammal Charitable Trust v Exemption Ward, Salem ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The CIT (Exemptions) has revised my AY 2022-23 assessment under s.263 because the Assessing Officer did not check whether the expenditure funded by the loan had already been claimed as application. Was he obliged to check?
  No. For AY 2022-23, Explanation 4(ii) to s.11(1) simply postponed recognition of the application from the year of expenditure to the year of repayment, and imposed no further condition requiring the Assessing Officer to revisit the end use of the borrowing or to verify whether it had already been claimed. The further provisos imposing those conditions were inserted only by the Finance Act 2023 with effect from 1 April 2023, so the s.263 order, which read them into AY 2022-23, was quashed and the assessment restored.
• ACIT v Reliance Industrial Investments and Holdings Ltd — a compound financial instrument needs a liability component before s.115JB(2C) bites ITATHelps taxpayer
  On conversion to Ind AS our convertible debentures were parked under "other equity" and a note called them the equity component of a compound financial instrument. The Assessing Officer has treated the whole amount as transition amount and is adding one-fifth a year to book profit. Can he?
  Not if the instrument has no liability component. Ind AS 32 requires a compound financial instrument to have both a liability component and an equity component, and where the balance sheet shows the debentures as an instrument entirely equity in nature, they are not a compound financial instrument, are therefore no part of the transition amount defined in s.115JB(2C), and no one-fifth adjustment can be made.
• ACIT v Transworld Garnet India Private Limited ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The officer took the TPO's adjustment straight into a final order without giving me a draft order. The department says s.292B cures it. Does it?
  It does not, on this line of authority. The Tribunal held that once the assessee answers the description of an 'eligible assessee' under s.144C(15)(b) and a variation prejudicial to it is proposed, s.144C(1) is mandatory, and passing the final order without first forwarding a draft is a failure of a jurisdictional condition precedent, not a procedural lapse. Section 292B cures only technical or clerical defects in proceedings otherwise validly initiated and cannot confer a jurisdiction that was never lawfully assumed. The Revenue's alternative plea for a remand to let the officer start again was also rejected: a nullity cannot be revived by remand.
• Neeraj v PCIT — a s.263 revision directing a s.68 addition against a s.44AD return quashed for want of jurisdiction ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The Principal Commissioner has revised my client's assessment under s.263 and directed the officer to tax his cash deposits under s.68, although he filed under s.44AD and keeps no books. Can that order stand?
  The Delhi Bench quashed it. Once an assessee has surrendered himself to a particular statute he becomes entitled to all its attending benefits; an assessee under s.44AD computes income as a percentage of turnover and is not required to maintain books of account, so the Principal Commissioner's direction to make a s.68 addition was questionable and the revision order suffered from a lack of requisite jurisdiction. The Bench recorded that it has consistently held that invocation of s.263 is not permissible in cases where the assessee files his return under s.44AD.
• Polynova Industries Limited v DCIT 14(1)(1), Mumbai ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  An internal audit objection has produced a s.263 notice saying CSR spending is not voluntary and so is not a 'donation' at all for s.80G. Does that argument let the Commissioner revise my assessment?
  No, not while the point remains genuinely open. The Tribunal held that the eligibility of CSR expenditure for s.80G is a question on which Benches differ — the Bangalore and Kolkata Benches allow it, the Delhi Bench in Agilent Technologies disallows it — so an Assessing Officer who allows it has adopted one of two reasonably possible views and the s.263 jurisdiction does not arise.
• Bharti Airtel Limited v. PCIT, Delhi-1 (ITAT Delhi) — a section 263 revision holding a demerger was really an acquisition, and why it did not survive ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The Commissioner has revised our assessment under section 263 saying the scheme was an acquisition and not a demerger, so the section 72A(4) losses go. What did the Tribunal make of that argument?
  The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal. It held that the Principal Commissioner had drawn his inferences without taking cognizance of the Composite Scheme of Arrangement on the record, that a scheme of arrangement approved by the court carries the force of a statute, and that a restructuring in the telecom sector could not be branded an exercise to claim set-off of brought forward losses by a bald allegation. It recorded that section 2(19AA) refers to the provisions of the Companies Act for determining whether there is a demerger, and that the basic requirement for eligibility under section 72A(4) is that the transfer of the undertaking be in pursuance of a scheme of arrangement under the Companies Act by the demerged company. On the facts it found that the demerged company had been engaged in the consumer wireless mobile business, had been incurring loss since inception, that the entire business loss related to that undertaking alone, and that all the assets and liabilities relating to the demerged business had been transferred and vested in the assessee.
• Jaybhole Cold Storage v Pr. CIT — s.35AD(7) imports s.80-IA(7), so a specified business must file the accountant's report, and an Assessing Officer who never asked about it leaves the order open to s.263 ITATHelps departmentNo later treatment found
  The Principal Commissioner has revised my client's assessment under section 263 because no accountant's report was filed with the section 35AD claim for its agricultural warehouse. The section itself says nothing about a form. Can the revision stand?
  On this Tribunal's view, yes. On 31 July 2024 the ITAT Ahmedabad held that section 35AD(7), which applies section 80A(6) and section 80-IA(7) and (10) to section 35AD in respect of goods, services or assets held for the specified business, carries with it the obligation to furnish the report required by section 80-IA(7); and that an assessee claiming section 35AD is "required under law to furnish requisite form, duly certified by Chartered Accountant in terms of Section 80-IA(7) of the Act". The assessee, a firm operating a warehousing facility for storage of agricultural produce, had claimed Rs 7,75,12,899 under section 35AD for AY 2017-18. The Principal Commissioner revised the assessment under section 263 on the ground that no report in Form No. 10CCB had been filed and that the Assessing Officer had neither called for it nor verified it. The assessee's answer was that Form 10CCB and rule 18BBB make no reference to section 35AD, and that the auditors had certified the deduction in Form 3CD. The Tribunal did not decide whether the filing is mandatory or merely procedural. It rested on the failure to enquire: no specific query about the section 35AD claim had been raised in the assessment, the claim was substantial, and the Assessing Officer had not enquired whether the requisite form had been furnished. On that ground it held that the assessment order was erroneous in so far as it was prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue.
• Pricol Engineering Industries Ltd v ACIT ITATHelps taxpayer
  We gave away a loss-making division at zero consideration; its liabilities exceeded its assets. The Principal Commissioner has revised the assessment under s.263 saying the negative net worth should have been taxed. Is that revision sustainable?
  Not on those facts. The Chennai Tribunal accepted that a negative net worth is to be taken into account in computing the capital gain, but only where there is a positive consideration; where the slump sale consideration is nil, reducing a negative net worth from nil still produces nil, so no tax was lost. The revision failed the second limb of s.263 — no prejudice to the Revenue — and was quashed.
• M/s DFE Pharma India LLP v DCIT — AMT is charged on total income, so brought-forward losses are set off first ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The Assessing Officer accepted nil income under the normal computation after setting off brought-forward losses, but then charged AMT at 18.5 per cent on the net profit without allowing that set-off. Can he compute total income one way for the normal provisions and another way for AMT?
  No. Section 115JC charges the minimum tax on adjusted total income, and adjusted total income starts from the total income, which by s.2(45) is computed after giving effect to the provisions of the Act — including the set-off of brought-forward losses under s.72. The Assessing Officer's contrary interpretation, treating total income as net profit for AMT purposes only, was rejected.
• JMS Mining Pvt Ltd v PCIT-2, Kolkata ITATHelps taxpayer
  I added back my company's CSR spend under Explanation 2 to s.37(1) and then claimed 50 per cent of it under s.80G. The Commissioner says s.37 blocks that and has revised the assessment under s.263. Is he right?
  No. Explanation 2 to s.37(1) operates only while computing business income under Chapter IV-D; it says nothing about Chapter VI-A, so a CSR contribution that independently satisfies s.80G remains deductible under s.80G. Parliament carved out only two CSR items in s.80G itself — clauses (iiihk) and (iiihl), the Swachh Bharat Kosh and the Clean Ganga Fund — and by expressio unius that exclusion implies every other qualifying donation survives.
• Hi-Tech Estates and Promoters Pvt Ltd v PCIT — s.43CB cannot be used to revise an assessment for a year before AY 2017-18 ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The Commissioner has revised my client's assessment under s.263 saying he should have followed percentage of completion. The year is before AY 2017-18. Is that revision good?
  No. The Tribunal held that percentage of completion became mandatory for revenue recognition only from 1 April 2017, that is AY 2017-18, by the insertion of s.43CB, and that this method was not mandatory or compulsory for AY 2013-14; the Commissioner therefore could not revise or revisit the assessment order by pressing s.43CB into service. It quashed the s.263 order, the s.263 notice and all proceedings and orders passed in pursuance of it.
• Raipur Steel Casting India (P) Ltd v PCIT ITATHelps taxpayerUnder appeal
  The Commissioner has issued me a s.263 notice saying the Assessing Officer should have referred my s.40A(2)(b) payments to the TPO. Clause (i) of s.92BA was omitted in 2017. Can he still revise?
  No. Clause (i) of s.92BA was omitted by the Finance Act 2017 with effect from 1 April 2017 without any saving clause, and an omission is not a repeal, so s.6 of the General Clauses Act does not preserve anything built on it. The Tribunal held the provision must be treated as never having existed, and the Commissioner's revision order founded on a failure to refer specified domestic transactions to the TPO was quashed, the jurisdiction exercised being, in the order's own register, null in the eye of law.
• Technopolis Premises Co-operative Society Ltd v Pr. CIT — s.80P is expressly carved out of the AMT add-back ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The Commissioner has revised my co-operative society's assessment under s.263 because AMT on adjusted total income came out higher than the normal tax. The department's working grossed up my total income by the s.80P deduction. Is that right?
  It is not. Clause (i) of s.115JC(2) requires total income to be increased by deductions claimed under any section "other than section 80P" included in Chapter VI-A under heading C. The Assessing Officer's internal working had added back the s.80P deduction of Rs.56,16,242, producing an adjusted total income of Rs.1,13,55,916 instead of the correct Rs.57,39,674; on the correct figure the AMT was lower than the normal tax, so there was no prejudice to the Revenue and no ground for revision.
• Brahma Center Development P Ltd v PCIT ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The Commissioner has revised my assessment saying no inquiry was made, but the officer did ask about the very item. Is that revision good?
  No, on this Tribunal's view. The Delhi Bench quashed both revision orders because the Assessing Officer had put the point on the interest adjusted against project expenditure, the company had explained it and the officer had accepted the explanation - so there was an enquiry - while the Principal Commissioner made no independent enquiry of his own. The order also records, at para 13, a Mumbai Bench observation and a Delhi Bench decision that Explanation 2 to s.263 is prospective, but it states no view of its own on that, so this is not authority for the prospectivity point.
• Pankil Garg v PCIT ITATHelps taxpayer
  I received money from my HUF. Is it taxable because an HUF is not my 'relative'?
  No. A sum received by a member from his HUF, even out of its capital or estate, is a capital receipt in his hands and not income, and s.10(2) was also available. The s.263 revision built on the contrary view was set aside.
• M/s Divya Creation v Pr. CIT — AMT under s.115JC is not attracted where the deduction claimed is under s.10A ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The Commissioner has revised my assessment under s.263 saying the Assessing Officer never examined AMT. My only deduction is under s.10A. Does s.115JC even apply to me?
  It does not. Section 115JC(2) is a closed list: adjusted total income is the total income increased only by deductions under Chapter VI-A heading C other than s.80P, by a deduction under s.10AA, and by a deduction under s.35AD net of the notional depreciation. A deduction under s.10A is not in that list, so where that is the only claim the provisions of s.115JC are clearly not applicable and the Assessing Officer was under no duty to enquire into them.
• Torrent Pharmaceuticals Ltd v DCIT ITATHelps taxpayer
  After Explanation 2 to s.263, can the Commissioner revise simply by saying the enquiry was not thorough enough?
  No. Explanation 2 is clarificatory and does not dilute the basic requirements of s.263(1). Revision needs a gross inadequacy of enquiry, or an enquiry the record demanded and which was simply not made.
• Subodh Gupta (HUF) v Pr CIT ITATCuts both waysNo later treatment found
  My mother gifted shares to my HUF. Is she a 'relative' of the HUF?
  No. For a Hindu undivided family the Explanation makes only a member of that family a 'relative'. The karta's mother was not a member - the gift deed itself recited that the gift was to the family of her son - so 75,000 shares gifted by her were chargeable under s.56(2)(vii), and the list of relatives that applies to an individual does not travel across to a receipt in the family's hands. The decision has a second limb: the Principal Commissioner's valuation by reference to a later sale price was rejected, fair market value has to be computed under Rule 11UA, and the computation was restored to the Assessing Officer, so the amount was never determined. The appeal was partly allowed.
• Statutory position — s.150(2): a finding or direction cannot revive a year that was already time-barred when the order under appeal was passed, and from 1 February 2026 the notice itself has a deadline CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both waysSuperseded by amendment
  The officer has reopened a very old year and says he is only giving effect to a finding in an appellate order, so limitation does not apply. Is that right, and what stops him?
  Section 150(1) lifts the time limit in section 149: where an assessment, reassessment or recomputation is in consequence of or to give effect to a finding or direction in an order passed on appeal, reference or revision, or by a court, the section 148 notice may be issued at any time. Section 150(2) is the limit on that power and it is the provision that decides cases — sub-section (1) does not apply where the year in question could not have been assessed, by reason of any other time limit, at the moment the order that was the subject-matter of the appeal, reference or revision was made, so a year already dead on that date stays dead. The Supreme Court so held in K.M. Sharma, quashing notices for assessment years 1968-69 to 1971-72 and 1981-82, and the Constitution Bench in Murlidhar Bhagwan Das had already confined “finding” and “direction” to what was necessary for the year under appeal, so a remark about another year does not open it. Section 150 was substituted with retrospective effect from 1 February 2026: sub-section (1) is re-lettered and widened to a court in a proceeding under this Act, sub-section (2) gains a second measuring date, and a new sub-section (3) gives the department only three months from the end of the quarter in which the certified copy of the order reaches the jurisdictional Principal Commissioner or Commissioner. For a tax year beginning on or after 1 April 2026 the provision is section 283 of the Income-tax Act, 2025.
• Statutory position — s.275 as substituted: penalty limitation now runs from the end of the QUARTER CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  I am checking whether a penalty order is out of time. Is the old six-months-from-the-end-of-the-month rule still the test?
  No. Section 275 has been substituted, and under the substituted provision no penalty order under Chapter XXI may be passed after the expiry of six months from the end of the QUARTER in which the triggering event occurs, with five separate triggers in clauses (a) to (e). The financial-year limb and the month-end limb of the old sub-section (1), and the old proviso giving one year from the end of the financial year in which the appellate order was received, are gone.
• Statutory position — the block charge: sixty per cent under section 113, interest at one and a half per cent, and a flat fifty per cent penalty under section 158BFA(2) CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  What will a block assessment actually cost my client, and is there any way to keep the penalty off?
  Tax at sixty per cent of the total undisclosed income of the block period under section 113, plus surcharge under the proviso; interest under section 158BFA(1) at one and a half per cent per month where the block return is late or not filed; and a penalty under section 158BFA(2) of a sum 'equal to fifty per cent of tax so leviable' on the undisclosed income determined by the Assessing Officer. The first proviso to section 158BFA(2) gives complete immunity from that penalty, and from penalty under sections 271AAD(1), 271D, 271DA and 271E for the block period, if four conditions are met — the return was furnished under section 158BC(1)(a), the tax on it was paid or the seized money offered for adjustment, evidence of payment accompanied the return, and no appeal is filed against the assessment of the income shown in the return.
• Statutory position — s.234D: interest on a refund granted under s.143(1) that regular assessment shows should not have been granted — the rate, the period, the reduction under sub-section (2), and Explanation 2 for assessment years commencing before 1 June 2003 CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  We were given a refund when the return was processed under s.143(1). On scrutiny the Assessing Officer has now raised a demand and has also charged interest under s.234D on the refund. Is that right, for how long does the interest run, and can he do it for an assessment year that is older than the section itself?
  Yes, on the conditions in sub-section (1). Section 234D charges simple interest where a refund is granted to the assessee under s.143(1) and either (a) no refund is due on regular assessment, or (b) the amount refunded under s.143(1) exceeds the amount refundable on regular assessment. The rate is one-half per cent, on the whole or the excess amount so refunded, for every month or part of a month comprised in the period from the date of grant of refund to the date of such regular assessment. The section was inserted by the Finance Act, 2003 with effect from 1 June 2003, and the words "one-half per cent" were substituted for "two-third" by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2003 with effect from 8 September 2003 — both recorded in footnotes printed against the section. Sub-section (2) provides that where, as a result of an order under s.154, s.155, s.250, s.254, s.260, s.262, s.263 or s.264, or an order of the Settlement Commission under s.245D(4), the refund granted under s.143(1) is held to be correctly allowed either in whole or in part, the interest chargeable under sub-section (1) shall be reduced accordingly. Explanation 1 makes a first-time assessment under s.147 or s.153A a regular assessment for the purposes of the section. Explanation 2, which the later editions of the section print and the earlier ones do not, reads: "For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the provisions of this section shall also apply to an assessment year commencing before the 1st day of June, 2003 if the proceedings in respect of such assessment year is completed after the said date." Which amending Act inserted Explanation 2, and from what date, is not established here — the editions of the section that print it carry no footnotes, and the editions that carry footnotes do not print it.

Listed strongest first: Supreme Court, then High Court, then Tribunal, then CBDT. Nothing here has yet been read in full by a chartered accountant — open an entry to see where it came from.