Section 92CA

Section 92CA — the law in short

What the courts have decided on section 92CA, in one screen. Read this first; open an entry when you need the facts, the reasoning and the source.

• SAP Labs India P Ltd v ITO Supreme CourtHelps department
  The Tribunal fixed my arm's length price and the department has gone to the High Court — can the High Court reopen the comparables, or is the Tribunal's finding final?
  No, the Tribunal's determination is not final. The Supreme Court held on 19 April 2023 that there is no absolute rule that an arm's length price fixed by the Tribunal cannot be examined under section 260A. Chapter X and Rules 10A to 10E lay down guidelines; a determination made in disregard of them is perverse, and perversity is itself a substantial question of law. The High Court may therefore examine comparability of companies, the selection of filters and whether non-comparable transactions were treated as comparable. The Karnataka High Court's contrary view in Softbrands India was rejected and the whole batch was remitted.
• PCIT v S.G. Asia Holdings (India) Pvt Ltd Supreme CourtCuts both ways
  The Assessing Officer worked out the arm's length price himself and added to my income without ever sending the transaction to the Transfer Pricing Officer. Is that adjustment good?
  No, but it does not follow that you keep the money. The Supreme Court held that the Assessing Officer breached the Board's mandatory instructions by not making the reference, so the adjustment could not stand as made. It then refused the Tribunal's remedy of simply deleting the adjustment, and restored the matter to the Assessing Officer so that the reference could be made and the Transfer Pricing Officer could do the work. The defect is one of procedure and the Court cured it by sending the file back.
• ADIT v E-Funds IT Solution Inc Supreme CourtHelps taxpayer
  We outsource back-office work to our Indian subsidiary. Does that give us a permanent establishment in India?
  No, not by itself. The Revenue must prove that a fixed place in India was at the disposal of the foreign company and that the foreign company carried on its own business through it. Close association between parent and subsidiary, and the fact that the Indian company depends on the group for its work, do not answer that question, and the functions-assets-risks analysis borrowed from transfer pricing is not the test for whether a fixed place permanent establishment exists.
• Benteler Automotive India Pvt Ltd v Union of India High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The DRP issued its directions years ago and the Assessing Officer has still not passed a final assessment order. Is the assessment now dead, or can he pass one whenever he likes?
  It is dead. Section 144C(13) requires the Assessing Officer, on receipt of the DRP's directions under s.144C(5), to complete the assessment in conformity with them within one month from the end of the month in which the directions are received, and he need not give any further hearing. Where that month passed — here even after the extension of the outer date under the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act 2020 — and no order was passed, the Bombay High Court held the assessment barred by limitation and quashed the pending proceedings on the assessee's writ petition.
• GE Oil & Gas India P Ltd v Addl/Jt/Dy/Asst CIT High CourtCuts both waysPartly overruled — read this first
  You are an eligible assessee with a transfer pricing adjustment and the faceless unit passed a final order instead of a draft. What relief will the court give?
  The order goes, but not always as a clean quashing. The Madras High Court set aside a final order passed three days after the show cause notice cum draft assessment order and directed that the impugned order be treated as a draft assessment order, leaving the assessee to work out its remedies against it under s.144B.
• Pfizer Healthcare India P Ltd v JCIT High CourtHelps taxpayerSuperseded by amendment
  The TPO's order was one day late. Does that kill the transfer pricing addition?
  Yes. The sixty days run backwards from the s.153 limitation date, excluding that date itself, so an order passed on the sixtieth day is out of time. The requirement is mandatory, not directory, limitation goes to jurisdiction, and an order a single day late is non est along with everything built on it. That was the law when the case was decided and it remains the reasoning of the judgment, but as at 8 September 2026 the arithmetic no longer holds where the limitation date is 31 March or 31 December: s.92CA(3AA), inserted retrospectively from 1 June 2007 by the Finance Act 2026, fixes the count for those two dates and gives the officer one day more. It says nothing about a 30 September expiry, where this decision still governs.
• PCIT v Texport Overseas P Ltd High CourtHelps taxpayer
  Clause (i) of s.92BA was omitted in 2017. Is the TPO adjustment for an earlier year still good?
  No. Omission of clause (i) of s.92BA by the Finance Act 2017 without a saving clause obliterates it as if it had never been enacted, so the reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer and the adjustment made under it are invalid even for the earlier year under assessment.
• Times Global Broadcasting Company Ltd v Union of India High CourtHelps taxpayerSuperseded by amendment
  The TPO has adjusted a domestic transaction that the Assessing Officer never referred to him and that I never reported in Form 3CEB. Did he have jurisdiction?
  On the law as it stood, no. The Bombay High Court held that s.92CA(2A) and s.92CA(2B), which let the TPO take up a transaction not referred to him and a transaction not reported under s.92E, spoke only of international transactions; specified domestic transactions were conspicuously absent. For a specified domestic transaction the TPO could therefore study only what the Assessing Officer had referred, and the adjustment of Rs 57.54 crores on the demerger creditors was quashed. CAUTION: that gap has since been closed. Both sub-sections were amended by Act No. 15 of 2024 with effect from 1 April 2025 to cover specified domestic transactions as well.
• JCB India Ltd v DCIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The Tribunal remanded my transfer pricing issue. The Assessing Officer has now passed a final assessment order straight off the TPO's fresh order, without any draft order. Is that good?
  No. Section 144C(1) requires a draft assessment order after receipt of the TPO's report, and there is nothing in its language confining that requirement to the first round; it applies equally where the TPO has acted on a remand by the Tribunal. The Delhi High Court held the resulting final assessment orders were without jurisdiction, that the defect was an incurable illegality and not a mere irregularity which s.292B could cure, and that the correct course was not to send the parties back to the draft order stage but to quash.
• Turner International India Pvt Ltd v DCIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  After the Tribunal remanded my transfer pricing case, the assessing officer went straight to a final assessment order without a draft order. Is that order valid?
  No. The Delhi High Court set aside the final assessment orders for assessment years 2007-08 and 2008-09, the demand notices and the penalty proceedings, because the assessing officer did not first pass a draft assessment order as section 144C(1) mandatorily requires. The Court held the point was no longer res integra, following Zuari Cement, whose affirmation by the Supreme Court through dismissal of the Revenue's special leave petition it noted, along with Vijay Television, ESPN Star Sports and International Air Transport Association. It rejected the Revenue's argument that the omission was a curable defect to be remedied by a remand.
• Indorama Synthetics (India) Ltd v Additional CIT High CourtHelps taxpayerHigh Courts differ
  The Assessing Officer referred my case to the TPO in a one-paragraph letter without dealing with my objection that there was no international transaction at all. Can I attack the reference itself?
  Yes. The Delhi High Court held that the Assessing Officer's satisfaction, even prima facie, that there IS an international transaction or specified domestic transaction is a sine qua non for a reference under s.92CA(1); where the assessee raises a threshold objection to jurisdiction, the officer must deal with it and must give a hearing before recording his satisfaction. The three references were set aside and the officer directed to decide afresh after hearing the assessee. The Court concurred with the Bombay High Court in Vodafone India Services and declined to follow the contrary Gujarat decision in Veer Gems, noting that CBDT Instruction No. 3 of 2016 has itself adopted the Bombay position.
• Bausch & Lomb Eyecare (India) Pvt Ltd v ACIT High CourtHelps taxpayerUnder appeal
  The TPO says my advertising and marketing spend built my foreign parent's brand and has added a mark-up. There is no agreement with the parent about it. Can he do that?
  No. The Delhi High Court held that before Chapter X can be used at all, the Revenue must show an international transaction exists. For advertising, marketing and promotion spend that means showing an agreement, arrangement or understanding with the associated enterprise obliging the Indian company to spend excessively to promote the foreign brand. It cannot be inferred from shareholding, from the incidental benefit to the brand owner, or from the bright line test, which Sony Ericsson had already rejected. There is no machinery provision to identify or price such a transaction. The assessee's appeals were allowed and the Revenue's dismissed.
• CIT v Pentair Water India P Ltd High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The TPO benchmarked my small captive unit against Infosys and Wipro. Can turnover be ignored?
  No. Turnover is obviously a relevant factor in judging comparability, because scale drives bargaining power, risk profile and margins. Companies with turnover 23 to 65 times that of the tested party were rightly excluded, and functional similarity alone does not conclude the enquiry.
• Rampgreen Solutions P Ltd v CIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  My company runs voice-based call centres, but the Transfer Pricing Officer has benchmarked me against high-margin analytics companies because we are all called ITeS — can he do that?
  No. The Delhi High Court held on 10 August 2015 that where the tested party is not a knowledge process outsourcing provider, a KPO cannot be used as a comparable. The broad label of information technology enabled services covers services of completely different content and value, and Rule 10B(2)(a) requires comparability to be judged by reference to service characteristics. eClerx and Vishal Information Technologies were both excluded — eClerx as a KPO doing data analytics and financial services work, Vishal because it outsourced most of its work and so had a wholly different cost structure. The Tribunal's order and the final assessment order were set aside.
• ChrysCapital Investment Advisors v DCIT High CourtCuts both ways
  The TPO kept a comparable with an abnormal profit margin. Can I get it excluded just for that?
  No, not on the margin alone. A company that otherwise satisfies Rule 10B(2) is not excluded merely because it presents a peculiar feature such as a huge profit or a huge turnover. What the high margin does is trigger an enquiry: the officer must ask whether it flows from a comparability defect that materially affects price or profit, and if it does, attempt to eliminate the difference under Rule 10B(3) — exclusion follows only if that cannot be done.
• Sony Ericsson Mobile Communications India P Ltd v CIT High CourtCuts both waysUnder appeal
  The TPO says my advertising spend is higher than comparables and has added the excess as brand building for my foreign parent. Can he do that?
  Not by that route. The bright line test — treating advertising, marketing and promotion spend above a comparable's level as a separate transaction of brand building for the foreign associated enterprise — has no statutory mandate, and the parameters the Special Bench laid down in L.G. Electronics do not bind either side. The Delhi High Court set the Tribunal's approach aside as based on an erroneous legal standard and sent the matters back for fresh consideration.
• Shell India Markets P Ltd v ACIT High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The TPO says we issued shares to our parent too cheaply. Can he tax the shortfall?
  No. The issue of equity to a non-resident parent is on capital account and gives rise to no income, and Chapter X is machinery for computing income at arm's length, not a charge. With no income there is nothing for the transfer pricing machinery to work on, and re-characterising the alleged shortfall as an interest-bearing loan has no statutory foundation.
• CIT v Cushman and Wakefield (India) P Ltd High CourtCuts both ways
  The Transfer Pricing Officer says my group companies gave me no benefit and has put the arm's length price at nil. Can he decide that, and can the Assessing Officer still disallow the payment after the reference?
  It depends on who is deciding what. The Delhi High Court held that the jurisdictions are distinct. The Transfer Pricing Officer determines the arm's length price of the referred transaction, and may find it to be nil if a comparable independent entity would pay nothing, but he cannot decide whether services were rendered or whether a benefit accrued - that is disallowance, and it belongs to the Assessing Officer under section 37. Equally, a reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer does not concede the deduction: the Assessing Officer can still verify whether the transactions are real, though he is bound by the arm's length price the Transfer Pricing Officer has approved. Both findings of the Tribunal were set aside and the matter remanded.
• Li & Fung India Pvt Ltd v CIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  I run a captive sourcing arm paid cost plus 5 per cent. The TPO has ignored my cost base and applied a mark-up to the FOB value of the goods my group company sources through me. Can he do that?
  No. The Delhi High Court held that broad-basing the profit determining denominator to the entire free-on-board value of contracts entered into by the associated enterprise is contrary to the Act and the Rules. The exercise finds no mention in either. The Transfer Pricing Officer had not disturbed the comparables or the method, and had shown neither how the Indian company bore significant risk nor what locational advantage the associated enterprise enjoyed. Findings of "significant risk" and "functional risk" cannot rest on vague generalities. The addition of Rs.57.65 crore was deleted and the Tribunal's order set aside.
• CIT v Agnity India Technologies P Ltd High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The Transfer Pricing Officer has put Infosys into my comparables. I am a small captive software unit working only for my parent - can I get it thrown out?
  Yes. The Delhi High Court upheld the Tribunal's exclusion of Infosys Technologies Ltd from the comparable set of a captive software developer. Infosys was a giant with Rs.9,028 crore of revenue against the assessee's Rs.16.09 crore, it bore full entrepreneurial risk, owned branded products, spent heavily on advertising and research, and delivered half its work onsite. The assessee was a risk-free captive doing only offshore contract development for its parent. With Infosys and Satyam out, the one surviving comparable gave 11.11%, below the assessee's own 17% margin. No substantial question of law arose and the Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
• CIT v EKL Appliances Ltd High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The Transfer Pricing Officer says our royalty to the parent is worth nil because we have been making losses for years — can he wipe out the whole payment?
  No. The Delhi High Court held on 29 March 2012 that a Transfer Pricing Officer must price the transaction the associated enterprises actually entered into, not decide whether they should have entered into it. Rule 10B(1)(a) does not authorise disallowance because the expenditure was unnecessary, imprudent or unremunerative, or because the assessee kept making losses. The quantum can be examined, but wholesale disallowance on that reasoning is not contemplated. The OECD guidelines allow a transaction to be recharacterised only in two exceptional cases, and neither applied. Brand fee of Rs.3,42,97,940 and Rs.3,99,51,000 for the two years was restored to the assessee.
• Tech Mahindra Ltd v DCIT — two independent answers to a secondary adjustment: the assessment year commenced before 1 April 2016, so the first proviso to s.92CE(1) shuts the section out; and there was no surviving primary adjustment for a consequential adjustment to attach to ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The TPO has re-characterised a payment to my associated enterprise as an interest-free loan and imputed notional interest on it, calling it a consequential adjustment. My year is well before 2016 and the underlying adjustment was itself deleted. Can he do that?
  No, on either of two grounds, and the ITAT Mumbai gave both on 24 August 2026 for assessment year 2008-09. First, there was nothing left for the imputed interest to attach to: the primary adjustment of Rs 440.12 crores on the exclusivity payment "was not ultimately made in the final assessment, pursuant to the directions of the Ld. DRP and after verification by the Ld.AO", and "Consequently, there was no surviving primary adjustment to which a consequential adjustment on account of notional interest could attach". Second, and independently, the year was out of range: "A.Y. 2008-09 is an assessment year commencing prior to 01/04/2016. Consequently, in view of proviso (ii) to section 92CE(1) of the Act, the provisions relating to secondary adjustment were not applicable to the transaction under consideration." The Tribunal deleted the notional-interest adjustment of Rs 72.34 lakhs on the exclusivity payment and the adjustment of Rs 69.82 crores on the upfront discount of Rs 524.93 crores carried forward from assessment year 2007-08, and applied the same reasoning mutatis mutandis to the transition fee. The appeal was partly allowed.
• Tetra Pak India Pvt Ltd v DCIT ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My APA has expired. The TPO now wants to benchmark an open year against the margin agreed in it. Can he?
  No. The Pune Bench held that comparing the operating profit margin agreed in an advance pricing agreement covering assessment years 2014-15 to 2018-19 with the actual operating margin earned in assessment year 2020-21, which is not a covered year of that agreement, is inappropriate and against the provisions of the Act. Section 92CC(4) read with sub-section (9A) confines an agreement to the years specified in it, and the confinement runs against the department as much as against the assessee. The issue was restored to the Assessing Officer and the TPO and the appeal was partly allowed.
• Standard Chartered Bank v ACIT (Mumbai Tribunal, 2026) ITATCuts both waysNo later treatment found
  The officer has treated expatriate salaries paid by our London head office as head office expenditure and capped them under s.44C. Is that correct, and does the treaty's non-discrimination article get me out of s.44C altogether?
  On the first question, no. Section 44C restricts only executive and general administrative expenditure incurred outside India in connection with the management of the non-resident's affairs; salary of expatriate employees deputed to and working exclusively for the India branch is not head office expenditure merely because the head office paid it first. On the second, the Tribunal declined to hold that Article 26(2) of the India-UK treaty knocks out s.44C in every case — that has to be decided on the nature of the expenditure and the facts, read with Article 7(4).
• ACIT v Transworld Garnet India Private Limited ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The officer took the TPO's adjustment straight into a final order without giving me a draft order. The department says s.292B cures it. Does it?
  It does not, on this line of authority. The Tribunal held that once the assessee answers the description of an 'eligible assessee' under s.144C(15)(b) and a variation prejudicial to it is proposed, s.144C(1) is mandatory, and passing the final order without first forwarding a draft is a failure of a jurisdictional condition precedent, not a procedural lapse. Section 292B cures only technical or clerical defects in proceedings otherwise validly initiated and cannot confer a jurisdiction that was never lawfully assumed. The Revenue's alternative plea for a remand to let the officer start again was also rejected: a nullity cannot be revived by remand.
• DCIT v Kantar GDC India Private Limited ITATHelps departmentNo later treatment found
  The TPO is charging notional interest on my overdue receivables from my associated enterprise. Can I argue for a 90-day credit period by analogy to the secondary adjustment repatriation window in s.92CE and Rule 10CB?
  No, on this Tribunal's view. Section 92CE read with Rule 10CB operates only where a primary adjustment has been made in one of the specific situations the section lists, and the 90-day repatriation window attaches to that specific machinery; it cannot be borrowed as a general benchmark for the credit period allowable on outstanding receivables. The Tribunal instead directed the officer to adopt the credit period the TPO himself had adopted in the assessee's own case for the immediately preceding year that had reached the Tribunal.
• ACIT v Citigroup Global Markets India Pvt Ltd ITATCuts both waysNo later treatment found
  The CIT(A) held my TPO order time barred because it was digitally signed a day after the date printed on it. The Revenue is now relying on a new sub-section. Where does that leave me?
  The Tribunal applied clause (c) of s.92CA(3AA) — then still the proposed clause 4 of the Finance Bill 2026, enacted three days after the order was pronounced — and held the TPO's order within time. The order was dated 31 October 2019 but digitally signed and issued on 1 November 2019, and the CIT(A) had annulled the transfer pricing adjustment on the footing that a 31 December 2019 assessment deadline required the TPO's order by 31 October. Because s.92CA(3AA)(c) deems that where limitation expires on 31 December the order may be made up to 1 November, the Tribunal allowed the Revenue's grounds on limitation and remanded the merits of the adjustment to the CIT(A), who had never decided them.
• Vestas Wind Technology India P Ltd v ITO ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The AO disallowed interest paid to my foreign parent under s.94B. Does the treaty help?
  It did here. Section 94B restricts deduction only where the lender is a non-resident associated enterprise and not where the lender is domestic, which the Tribunal held is discrimination caught by Article 24(4) of the India-Denmark treaty; the treaty prevailed and the entire disallowance was deleted, including the amount the assessee had disallowed itself.
• Noida Towers Private Limited v DCIT ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  I already disallowed the whole of the interest paid to my associated enterprise under s.94B in my own computation. The TPO has still made a transfer pricing adjustment on the same interest. Can he?
  Not on these facts. Where the assessee had itself added back the entire interest paid to its associated enterprises on non-convertible debentures under s.94B in its computation of income and paid tax on it, the Tribunal held that a further disallowance out of the same interest by way of a transfer pricing adjustment would amount to double taxation of the same income and was not permissible, and it directed the adjustment to be deleted.
• Beauty Etoile Private Limited v Assessment Unit ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The TPO has used the 30 per cent EBITDA cap in s.94B as his benchmarking method and has applied it to interest I capitalised to work in progress rather than claimed. Can he do either?
  Neither. Section 94B is a restriction on the deduction of interest, not a method of determining an arm's length price, and it cannot be imported into the 'other method' under Rule 10AB, which requires a price charged or paid in an uncontrolled transaction with or between non-associated enterprises. And s.94B bites only on interest which is deductible in computing business income, so interest capitalised to work in progress and not claimed as a deduction in the year cannot be brought into the disallowance at all.
• Unilever Industries P. Ltd. v ACIT ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  A bilateral APA signed years after the assessment fixes my margin for a run of years and MAP has settled the rest. What do I do with the appeals still pending for those years, and do my other grounds go with them?
  The transfer pricing grounds go, the rest stay. Where a bilateral APA executed with both revenue authorities fixes the arm's length margin for the years under appeal and the MAP proceedings have been settled, the Tribunal allows the assessee to withdraw its transfer pricing grounds in compliance with Rule 44G and dismisses the Revenue's transfer pricing grounds as settled. The corporate tax grounds are decided on their merits in the same order.
• VVF (India) Limited v NFAC — the secondary adjustment on a corporate guarantee deleted in the same order that sent the guarantee fee itself back to the TPO, and Rule 10CB's interest clock identified as running from the s.139(1) due date ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The TPO has fixed a guarantee commission rate I dispute AND imputed interest on the delay as a secondary adjustment. Can the secondary adjustment stand while the underlying rate is still being fought over?
  The ITAT Mumbai deleted it. On 14 February 2025, for assessment year 2020-21, the Tribunal remitted the corporate guarantee adjustment itself to the Assessing Officer and Transfer Pricing Officer for fresh adjudication in the light of the OECD's February 2020 report on the transfer pricing of financial transactions, holding that the Transfer Pricing Officer's use of external bank guarantee rates with a discount was "not in accordance with the transfer pricing principles". In the very next paragraph it dealt with the secondary adjustment separately and allowed the ground, noting "that as per rule 10CB computation of interest commences from the due date of filing the return of income" and that for the year under consideration that due date was 15 February 2021, and concluding that it did "not find any basis for making the secondary adjustment for the year under consideration". The appeal was partly allowed for statistical purposes.
• DCIT v Priya Blue Industries P Ltd ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The AO has levied a s.271AA penalty saying I did not maintain transfer pricing documentation, without saying which documents. Does that penalty stand?
  No, on this decision. A penalty under s.271AA has to identify the information or document prescribed by s.92D read with rule 10D that was not maintained or furnished; a general assertion will not do, and here neither the assessment order nor the penalty order said which document was missing. The Tribunal gave a second and independent ground: the penalty was passed in a perfunctory manner without the requisite show-cause notice and without proper opportunity, the officer having called for rule 10D documents without naming any clause of the rule. That the transactions the penalty was levied on had not been adjusted by the Transfer Pricing Officer at all was added as a further point, not as the basis of the decision.
• Samsung R&D Institute India Bangalore P Ltd v JCIT ITATHelps taxpayer
  My foreign group companies ship me handsets, network equipment and other test gear free of cost so that I can test the software I write for them, and I send it back or scrap it when the testing is done. The AO has added the value under s.28(iv) as a benefit arising from my business. Can he?
  No, on these facts. The Bangalore Bench deleted an addition of Rs 7,37,33,056 under s.28(iv) on equipment supplied free of cost by the assessee's associated enterprises for testing software the assessee had developed for them. Two things carried it: the equipment was either returned or destroyed after testing, so nothing irretrievable or of enduring nature was made available to the assessee, and the price for the software development services had already been settled under a Mutual Agreement Procedure resolution between the competent authorities of India and Korea, in which the cost of indirect benefits should have been embedded - so if there were a nexus at all it belongs in a transfer pricing adjustment and not in a second addition under s.28(iv). The same order also deleted a s.40(a)(i) disallowance of depreciation on capitalised software, following the coordinate bench in the assessee's own case. Note what the order does not do: it decides nothing under s.194R.
• Mando Automotive India Pvt Ltd v ACIT ITATCuts both waysNo later treatment found
  Your MAP resolution settles the transactions with the treaty-country associated enterprise. Can the same treatment be claimed for your associated enterprises in other countries?
  Not automatically, but the claim is arguable and the Tribunal will not shut it out. The Chennai Bench restored the adjustment on the transactions with the non-Korean associated enterprises to the Transfer Pricing Officer to examine whether they are similar in nature to those covered by the India-Korea MAP resolution, and, if they are found to be so, to consider giving them the same treatment as adopted in the MAP. The relief is a remand on a similarity test, not a direction to apply the agreed margin.
• Iomedia India Pvt Ltd v ACIT ITATCuts both waysNo later treatment found
  I opted into the safe harbour and billed my AE at the prescribed mark-up. The TPO has still made an adjustment for interest on receivables collected late. Can he do that?
  Yes. Safe harbour under s.92CB and the Rule 10T series covers only an 'eligible international transaction' as exhaustively defined in Rule 10TC, and interest on outstanding receivables is not among clauses (i) to (x) of that definition. So the adjustment on delayed receivables is not subsumed in the mark-up offered under the safe harbour rules. On quantum, the Tribunal substituted LIBOR plus 200 basis points for the LIBOR plus 400 basis points adopted by the TPO and DRP.
• STEAG Energy Services (India) P Ltd v ACIT ITATHelps taxpayerJudgment not reachable
  Only a small adjustment survived my appeal. Does the tolerance band wipe it out completely?
  Yes, if the surviving variation is within the notified percentage of the transaction value. The proviso to s.92C(2) is a deeming provision: once the variation is inside the band, the price actually charged is taken to be the arm's length price and there is nothing left to adjust.
• Mondelez India Foods P. Ltd v Addl CIT ITATHelps taxpayerSuperseded by amendment
  The TPO's order is dated one day inside the sixty-day window as I count it, but the department counts it differently. Is the order time barred, and if it is, does the assessment fall with it?
  On the counting the Tribunal applied Pfizer Healthcare and the Madras High Court Division Bench in DCIT v Saint Gobain India: the s.153 expiry date is EXCLUDED, sixty days are counted back from it, and the TPO must pass his order BEFORE the sixtieth day. On that arithmetic a 31 March 2014 assessment deadline meant a TPO order by 29 January 2014, and the order of 30 January 2014 was barred by one day. THAT ARITHMETIC HAS SINCE BEEN REVERSED RETROSPECTIVELY: s.92CA(3AA), inserted by the Finance Act 2026 (Act 4 of 2026) with effect from 1 June 2007 and expressly notwithstanding any judgment of any court, deems the sixty days to be counted so that a 31 March (non-leap year) deadline permits a TPO order up to 30 January, a 31 March (leap year) deadline up to 31 January, and a 31 December deadline up to 1 November. The second holding survives the amendment: where the TPO's order IS invalid, there is no order under s.92CA(3), so there is no 'eligible assessee' within s.144C(15)(b), no reference to the DRP could be made, and the subsequent proceedings are without jurisdiction.
• Aker Powergas Pvt Ltd v DCIT ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  Your APA with the Board covers later years only. Can you use it to settle the transfer pricing in an earlier year that is still open?
  Not as of right, but it is not to be ignored either. Where the transfer pricing issues are identical and the business model has not changed between the year under appeal and the later years covered by the APA, the Mumbai Bench held the APA has persuasive value and the principle it lays down for benchmarking has guidance value for the earlier year. The relief obtained is a remand: the matter goes back to the TPO to decide afresh in the light of the APA.
• Faith Intertrade v ITO ITATHelps taxpayer
  I obtained Form 3CEB from my accountant but never uploaded it, and the officer has levied the flat Rs 1 lakh penalty under s.271BA. Is that penalty automatic?
  It is not automatic. Section 271BA says the officer 'may' direct payment of the penalty, not 'shall', and s.273B forbids the penalty where the assessee proves reasonable cause. The Tribunal quashed a Rs 1,00,000 penalty on an assessee who had obtained the accountant's report dated 7 September 2013 but failed to upload it electronically, in the first year in which specified domestic transactions were brought within s.92E, where the TPO had made no adjustment at all.
• Barracuda Networks India Pvt Ltd v DCIT ITATHelps taxpayer
  The TPO has taken a three-year weighted average margin for a comparable under Rule 10CA, but the company fails my turnover filter in the two earlier years. Must those years still go into the weighted average?
  No. The Tribunal held that the provisos to Rule 10CA(2) must be read harmoniously with Rule 10B(3) and the proviso to Rule 10B(4), and that where a filter makes an enterprise non-comparable in the earlier two years, the data for those years can have no influence on the determination of transfer prices for the current year and must be ignored. On the facts, if R.S. Software (India) Ltd. was to be a comparable at all, its margins for the two earlier years had to be dropped, because in those years its turnover exceeded Rs 200 crores and it was not comparable.
• ACIT v Rambus Chip Technologies (India) P. Ltd. ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My transfer pricing dispute has been settled under MAP and I want to withdraw my appeal. The department has its own cross-appeal before the Tribunal. Does that survive?
  It does not. Once the transfer pricing adjustment that is the subject matter of both appeals has been resolved under the Mutual Agreement Procedure and the assessee is permitted to withdraw, the department's cross-appeal on the same adjustment has nothing left to bite on. The Tribunal dismissed both appeals.
• Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd v ACIT ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  Your APA for a later year accepts the foreign associated enterprise as the tested party. Can the TPO still make you the tested party in an open earlier year?
  Not without the question being looked at again on the APA's basis. Following the Ahmedabad Bench's order in the assessee's own group for assessment year 2009-10, this Bench took the same view and restored the tested party issue to the Transfer Pricing Officer for fresh adjudication treating the associated enterprises as the tested party. The ground was allowed for statistical purposes.
• Metal One Corporation India Pvt Ltd v DCIT ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  Your APA was concluded after the appeal was filed. Can you raise it as a fresh ground before the Tribunal for an earlier year, and does it dispose of the comparables fight?
  Yes on both. The Delhi Bench admitted an additional ground raising the APA as a legal issue and held that once an APA has been concluded in the assessee's own case, the same approach and basis are to be adopted for the assessment year before it, where the facts, the law and the FAR are similar. Having allowed that ground, the Bench found it unnecessary to decide the comparability disputes on merits.
• Raipur Steel Casting India (P) Ltd v PCIT ITATHelps taxpayerUnder appeal
  The Commissioner has issued me a s.263 notice saying the Assessing Officer should have referred my s.40A(2)(b) payments to the TPO. Clause (i) of s.92BA was omitted in 2017. Can he still revise?
  No. Clause (i) of s.92BA was omitted by the Finance Act 2017 with effect from 1 April 2017 without any saving clause, and an omission is not a repeal, so s.6 of the General Clauses Act does not preserve anything built on it. The Tribunal held the provision must be treated as never having existed, and the Commissioner's revision order founded on a failure to refer specified domestic transactions to the TPO was quashed, the jurisdiction exercised being, in the order's own register, null in the eye of law.
• Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd v DCIT ITATHelps taxpayer
  Your APA has no rollback for the year under appeal. Can you still make the TPO benchmark that year on the APA's method and tested party?
  On this order, yes. The Bench held that although the APA signed for assessment year 2014-15 carried no rollback for the years in appeal, the principles it laid down for comparability analysis have persuasive value, and it drew support from Rule 10MA in applying the methodology accepted in the APA to the year in appeal. It held that the foreign associated enterprises, accepted as the tested party in the APA, were to be the tested party for the year in appeal too, and remitted the computation to the TPO with a direction to give due weight to the APA on the other issues as well.
• ACIT v Dilipkumar V. Lakhi ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The TPO wants segment-wise profit and loss accounts for my AE and non-AE business and I cannot produce them. He has levied 2 per cent of the transaction value under s.271G. Can I resist it?
  Yes, where the failure is backed by a reasonable cause, because s.273B applies to s.271G. The Tribunal upheld the deletion of a Rs 56,72,162 penalty on a diamond trader who had furnished entity-level margins but could not split AE from non-AE segments, holding that in a trade where rough and polished diamonds move in mixed lots it is practically impossible to trace which rough stone became which polished stone, and that the assessee had substantially complied to the extent the trade allowed.
• Statutory position — section 158BA(2) to (6): what abates on a search, what revives if the block order falls, and why the search year is assessed twice CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  A search took place in November 2024 while my client's scrutiny assessment for an earlier year was pending. What happens to that assessment, and what happens if the block assessment is later annulled?
  The pending assessment abates. Section 158BA(2)(a) provides that any assessment, reassessment or recomputation under provisions other than Chapter XIV-B, pertaining to any assessment year falling in the block period and pending on the date of initiation of the search or the making of the requisition, shall abate and be deemed to have abated on that date. If the block proceeding or the block order is later annulled in appeal or other legal proceedings, section 158BA(5) revives the abated proceeding from the date the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner receives the order of annulment — and the revival itself ceases if the annulment is set aside.
• Statutory position — section 158BB: how the block figure is built, what is kept out of it, and why Abhisar Buildwell does not simply carry across CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  The block assessment adds amounts for which nothing was found in the search. Can I take the Abhisar Buildwell point that there must be incriminating material?
  Not in the form in which that case decides it, because Abhisar Buildwell construes section 153A and section 158BB is worded differently. Section 158BB(1) makes the total undisclosed income of the block period the aggregate of only two things — what the assessee declares as undisclosed income in his section 158BC return, and what the Assessing Officer determines under section 158BB(2); and section 158BB(2) requires that determination to be made 'on the basis of evidence found as a result of search or survey or requisition of books of account or other documents and any other material or information as are either available with the Assessing Officer or come to his notice during the course of proceedings under this Chapter'.
• Statutory position — section 158BE: the block assessment is barred twelve months from the end of the QUARTER, not the month CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  The last panchnama in my client's search is dated 9 April 2025. By when must the block assessment order be passed?
  Twelve months from the end of the QUARTER in which the last of the authorisations was executed — so, on those facts, from the end of the quarter ending 30 June 2025, which gives 30 June 2026, subject to the exclusions and extensions in the section. The old Chapter ran the period from the end of the MONTH; the substituted section 158BE runs it from the end of the quarter, which can add up to nearly three months to the department's time.
• Statutory position — s.144C(15)(b): who is an "eligible assessee", the two limbs, and the substitution by Act No. 12 of 2020 with effect from 1 April 2020 that brought in every non-resident not being a company CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  The Assessing Officer has forwarded a draft order to our partnership firm, which is non-resident but is not a company, and there is no Transfer Pricing Officer's order in the case. Is the firm an eligible assessee at all, and does it matter which assessment year we are in?
  It matters a great deal which year you are in. As s.144C(15)(b) stands on the departmental edition stamped Year 2025 it reads: "(b) 'eligible assessee' means,— (i) any person in whose case the variation referred to in sub-section (1) arises as a consequence of the order of the Transfer Pricing Officer passed under sub-section (3) of section 92CA; and (ii) any non-resident not being a company, or any foreign company:". Sub-clause (ii) in that form was substituted by Act No. 12 of 2020 with effect from 1 April 2020 — footnote 97 on the departmental edition stamped Year 2021 reads verbatim "Sub. by the Act No. 12 of 2020, w.e.f. 1-4-2020.", and footnote 91 on the Year 2022 edition repeats it. Before that substitution, and as printed on the editions stamped Year 2009 and Year 2019 (No. 2), sub-clause (ii) read simply "any foreign company". So a non-resident firm, a non-resident individual, a non-resident association of persons — any non-resident that is not a company — became an eligible assessee in its own right on 1 April 2020 and was not one before, unless it was brought in by limb (i). Limb (i) is independent of status: it catches ANY person, resident or not, company or not, where the variation in sub-section (1) arises as a consequence of an order of the Transfer Pricing Officer under s.92CA(3). Two things were added with effect from 1 September 2024 by Act No. 15 of 2024: a proviso to clause (b) reading "Provided that such eligible assessee shall not include person referred to in sub-section (1) of section 158BA or other person referred to in section 158BD.", and s.144C(16), "The provisions of this section shall not apply to any proceedings under Chapter XIV-B."
• Statutory position — s.92BA: clause (i) was OMITTED with effect from 1 April 2017, so a s.40A(2)(b) payment is no longer a specified domestic transaction — what survives, the twenty crore threshold, and clause (va) added for s.115BAB companies CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  The TPO has been asked to benchmark our payments to related parties under s.40A(2)(b). Is that still a specified domestic transaction at all?
  No. Clause (i) of s.92BA — "any expenditure in respect of which payment has been made or is to be made to a person referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 40A" — was OMITTED by Act No. 7 of 2017 with effect from 1 April 2017, and the omitted words are set out in an amendment footnote, so there is no doubt what went. What survives is: clause (ii), any transaction referred to in s.80A; clause (iii), any transfer of goods or services referred to in s.80-IA(8); clause (iv), any business transacted between the assessee and another person as referred to in s.80-IA(10); clause (v), any transaction referred to in any other section under Chapter VI-A or s.10AA to which s.80-IA(8) or (10) applies; clause (va), any business transacted between the persons referred to in s.115BAB(6), inserted by Act No. 46 of 2019 with effect from 1 April 2020; and clause (vi), any other transaction as may be prescribed. The whole definition applies only "where the aggregate of such transactions entered into by the assessee in the previous year exceeds a sum of twenty crore rupees" — the word "twenty" having been substituted for "five" by the Finance Act, 2015 with effect from 1 April 2016.
• Statutory position — rule 10CA: the dataset, the arm's length range from the thirty-fifth to the sixty-fifth percentile where there are six or more entries, the median where the price falls outside it, and the arithmetical mean under sub-rule (7) where there are fewer than six CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  The Transfer Pricing Officer has rejected our margin and adopted the median of his comparables. When is he entitled to go to the median at all, how is the range built, and what happens if he is left with only four or five comparables?
  The range is built only where the dataset has six or more entries and the most appropriate method is not the profit split method or the other method. Rule 10CA(2) requires a dataset constructed by placing the prices in ascending order. Rule 10CA(4) then provides that where the most appropriate method applied is a method other than the method referred to in clause (d) or clause (f) of s.92C(1) and the dataset consists of six or more entries, "an arm's length range beginning from the thirty-fifth percentile of the dataset and ending on the sixty-fifth percentile of the dataset shall be constructed". Rule 10CA(5): if the price actually charged is within that range it "shall be deemed to be the arm's length price" — no adjustment. Rule 10CA(6): if it is outside the range, "the arm's length price shall be taken to be the median of the dataset". The median is therefore reached only on the footing that the range was properly constructed and the price fell outside it; there is no route to the median in a case where sub-rule (4) never applied. Where sub-rule (4) does not apply — fewer than six entries, or the profit split method or the other method — sub-rule (7) revives the older machinery: the arm's length price is the arithmetical mean of all the values in the dataset, subject to the proviso that if the variation does not exceed such percentage not exceeding three per cent as may be notified, the price actually charged is deemed to be the arm's length price. The thirty-fifth percentile, the sixty-fifth percentile and the median are all defined in sub-rule (8) on the same pattern, and the pattern is not the ordinary statistical one: each is the LOWEST value in the ascending dataset such that at least thirty-five, sixty-five or fifty per cent of the values are equal to or less than that value, with a proviso that if the number of values equal to or less than that value is a whole number, the percentile is the arithmetic mean of that value and the value immediately succeeding it.
• Statutory position — rule 10B(1)(e) and rule 10B(3): how the transactional net margin method is applied, and the second limb of rule 10B(3) under which reasonably accurate adjustments to eliminate the material effects of differences are the statutory basis for working capital and risk adjustments CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  The Transfer Pricing Officer has refused our working capital adjustment on the ground that no rule provides for it. Where in the Rules does the right to a working capital or risk adjustment come from, and does anything prescribe how it is computed?
  The right comes from rule 10B(3)(ii), read with rule 10B(1)(e)(iii); nothing in the Rules prescribes how either adjustment is computed. Rule 10B(3) is in two limbs and the word between them is "or": an uncontrolled transaction is comparable to an international transaction or a specified domestic transaction if "(i) none of the differences, if any, between the transactions being compared, or between the enterprises entering into such transactions are likely to materially affect the price or cost charged or paid in, or the profit arising from, such transactions in the open market; or (ii) reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the material effects of such differences." So a comparable is not disqualified by a material difference. It is disqualified only if the difference is material AND no reasonably accurate adjustment can be made for it. That second limb is the statutory basis for the working capital adjustment and the risk adjustment, and an officer who refuses an adjustment must, to be consistent, either say the difference is not material — in which case limb (i) is satisfied and the comparable stands unadjusted — or say the adjustment proposed is not reasonably accurate, which is a question of the assessee's computation and not of the existence of the power. Rule 10B(1)(e) carries the same idea inside the transactional net margin method itself: sub-clause (iii) requires that the net profit margin arising in comparable uncontrolled transactions "is adjusted to take into account the differences, if any, between the international transaction or the specified domestic transaction and the comparable uncontrolled transactions, or between the enterprises entering into such transactions, which could materially affect the amount of net profit margin in the open market". On the words of sub-clause (iii) the adjustment is mandatory, not discretionary. What the Rules do not do is prescribe a method. Rule 10B, rule 10C and rule 10CA have all been read in full and none of them prescribes a formula, a base or a rate for computing a working capital adjustment or a risk adjustment.
• Statutory position — rule 10B(3): the Income-tax Rules expressly contemplate a comparability adjustment and prescribe NO method for computing one — a proved negative across rules 10A, 10AB, 10B, 10C, 10CA, 10D and 10TA and s.92F, with nothing in any CBDT circular, instruction or departmental transfer pricing page either CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  The Transfer Pricing Officer has thrown out my working capital adjustment saying there is no prescribed method for it. Is he right that there is no prescribed method, and if he is, what does that do to the claim?
  He is right on the first half and wrong on the second. No provision of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 prescribes a formula, a base, a period, a source of interest rates or any other method for computing a working capital adjustment or a risk adjustment. Rules 10A, 10AB, 10B, 10C, 10CA, 10D and 10TA have each been read in full, and s.92F, and none of them does. But the absence of a method is not the absence of a power. Rule 10B(3) reads: "An uncontrolled transaction shall be comparable to an international transaction or a specified domestic transaction if— (i) none of the differences, if any, between the transactions being compared, or between the enterprises entering into such transactions are likely to materially affect the price or cost charged or paid in, or the profit arising from, such transactions in the open market; or (ii) reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the material effects of such differences." The two limbs are joined by "or", and limb (ii) is an express statutory contemplation of the adjustment. Rule 10B(1)(e)(iii) goes further inside the net margin method itself: the net profit margin arising in comparable uncontrolled transactions "is adjusted to take into account the differences, if any, between the international transaction or the specified domestic transaction and the comparable uncontrolled transactions, or between the enterprises entering into such transactions, which could materially affect the amount of net profit margin in the open market" — the words are "is adjusted", not "may be adjusted". Rule 10C(2)(e) makes "the extent to which reliable and accurate adjustments can be made to account for differences" a statutory factor in selecting the most appropriate method, and rule 10D(1)(j) and (l) require the assessee to keep a record of "adjustments, if any, which were made to account for differences" and "details of the adjustments, if any, made to transfer prices". So the Rules name the adjustment four times over and never once say how to work it out. The expression "reasonably accurate" is not defined anywhere that has been found: not in rule 10A, which is the definitions rule for rules 10A to 10E, and not in s.92F, which is the definitions section for ss.92 to 92E.
• Statutory position — s.92C(2): the second proviso tolerance band, and the third proviso which disapplies the first and second provisos for any international transaction or specified domestic transaction undertaken on or after 1 April 2014 CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  The Transfer Pricing Officer's adjustment is within three per cent of our price. Can I still claim the tolerance band under the proviso to s.92C(2), or has that gone?
  For a transaction undertaken on or after 1 April 2014 the second proviso does not apply, because the third proviso disapplies it — but the band itself has not gone. It has moved into rule 10CA(7) and it now operates only where the arm's length range machinery does not. The third proviso to s.92C(2) reads: "Provided also that where more than one price is determined by the most appropriate method, the arm's length price in relation to an international transaction or specified domestic transaction undertaken on or after the 1st day of April, 2014, shall be computed in such manner as may be prescribed and accordingly the first and second proviso shall not apply." The first proviso was the arithmetical mean rule; the second was the tolerance band — variation not exceeding such percentage not exceeding three per cent of the transaction price as may be notified, in which case the transaction price is deemed to be the arm's length price. The prescribed manner is rule 10CA. Where rule 10CA(4) applies, six or more entries and a method other than profit split or the other method, the answer is the range and there is no band at all: within the range the price is deemed to be the arm's length price under rule 10CA(5), outside it the arm's length price is the median under rule 10CA(6). Where rule 10CA(4) does not apply, rule 10CA(7) gives the arithmetical mean and carries its own proviso in the same words as the old second proviso, and it is under that proviso, read with the third proviso to s.92C(2), that the band is now notified. The current notification is Notification No. 157/2025 dated 6 November 2025, S.O. 5053(E), issued expressly under "the third proviso to sub-section (2) of section 92C of the Income-tax Act, 1961, read with the proviso to sub-rule (7) of rule 10CA of the Income-tax Rules, 1962", and it fixes the variation at one per cent of the transaction price in respect of wholesale trading and three per cent in all other cases, for assessment year 2025-2026.
• Statutory position — section 94A: the consequences of dealing with a person located in a notified jurisdictional area, and whether any area is notified today CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  My client is remitting money to a company in a low-tax jurisdiction. Does section 94A apply, and is any country actually notified as a notified jurisdictional area at the moment?
  Section 94A lets the Central Government notify a country or territory as a notified jurisdictional area having regard to the lack of effective exchange of information, and once notified the consequences are severe and automatic: all parties to a transaction with a person located there are deemed associated enterprises, the transaction is deemed an international transaction so the entire transfer-pricing machinery applies, deductions are barred unless prescribed authorisations and documents are furnished, unexplained receipts from such a person are deemed to be income, and withholding is at the highest of the rate in force, the rate in the relevant provision and thirty per cent. The only notification under section 94A(1) that could be located was Notification No. 86/2013 notifying Cyprus, and it was rescinded by Notification No. 114/2016 with retrospective effect from 1 November 2013. No subsisting notification was found and no departmental list of notified jurisdictional areas could be opened, so nothing here certifies that no jurisdiction is notified today — section 94A should be neither treated as live against a jurisdiction nor written off as a dead letter without checking the current list.
• Statutory position — s.144C(1) to (5): the Assessing Officer must, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Act, forward a draft order to an eligible assessee before he makes any prejudicial variation, and the assessee has thirty days to accept or to object to the Dispute Resolution Panel AND to the Assessing Officer CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  The Assessing Officer has served a final assessment order on our foreign company raising a transfer pricing addition, without ever serving a draft order. Was he obliged to serve one first, and what was I supposed to do with it if he had?
  He was obliged to serve one first, if the company is an eligible assessee and the variation is prejudicial. Section 144C(1), as printed on the departmental edition stamped Year 2025, reads: "The Assessing Officer shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act, in the first instance, forward a draft of the proposed order of assessment (hereafter in this section referred to as the draft order) to the eligible assessee if he proposes to make, on or after the 1st day of October, 2009, any variation which is prejudicial to the interest of such assessee." Three things follow from the words themselves. The obligation is cast in the mandatory "shall"; it operates "notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act", so it overrides the ordinary assessment machinery; and it bites "in the first instance", that is, before and not after the order that would otherwise be the assessment order. Sub-section (2) gives the eligible assessee thirty days of the receipt by him of the draft order to do one of two things: "(a) file his acceptance of the variations to the Assessing Officer; or (b) file his objections, if any, to such variation with,— (i) the Dispute Resolution Panel; and (ii) the Assessing Officer." The "and" in clause (b) is conjunctive: an objection is filed with the Panel and with the Assessing Officer, not with one or the other. Sub-section (3) requires the officer to complete the assessment on the basis of the draft order if the assessee intimates acceptance of the variation or if no objections are received within the period specified in sub-section (2). Sub-section (4) fixes the time for that order — one month from the end of the month in which the acceptance is received or the period of filing objections expires, notwithstanding s.153 or s.153B. Sub-section (5) is the Panel's charging provision: where any objection is received under sub-section (2), the Panel "shall ... issue such directions, as it thinks fit, for the guidance of the Assessing Officer to enable him to complete the assessment".
• Statutory position — s.144C(2), (4), (5), (12) and (13): the thirty days to object run from receipt, but the officer's one month and the Panel's nine months both run from the END OF THE MONTH, and the two one-month clocks start on different events CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  We received a draft order on 12 March. Nobody objected. When was the final order due, and if we had objected, by when must the Dispute Resolution Panel have issued its directions and by when must the officer have given effect to them?
  Four clocks, and only one of them runs from a date. Section 144C(2) gives the eligible assessee thirty days "of the receipt by him of the draft order" to file acceptance with the Assessing Officer or objections with the Panel and the Assessing Officer — that one runs from the date of receipt. The other three run from the end of a month, and that is where the counting goes wrong. Section 144C(4): where the assessee accepts or files no objection, "The Assessing Officer shall, notwithstanding anything contained in section 153 or section 153B, pass the assessment order under sub-section (3) within one month from the end of the month in which,— (a) the acceptance is received; or (b) the period of filing of objections under sub-section (2) expires." Section 144C(12): "No direction under sub-section (5) shall be issued after nine months from the end of the month in which the draft order is forwarded to the eligible assessee." Section 144C(13): "Upon receipt of the directions issued under sub-section (5), the Assessing Officer shall, in conformity with the directions, complete, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in section 153 or section 153B, the assessment without providing any further opportunity of being heard to the assessee, within one month from the end of the month in which such direction is received." Note the four different starting EVENTS. The thirty days in (2) start on RECEIPT by the assessee. The nine months in (12) start at the end of the month in which the draft order is FORWARDED — the officer's act of despatch, not the assessee's receipt, so the (2) clock and the (12) clock can start in different months on the same draft order. The one month in (4) starts at the end of the month in which the acceptance is received or the thirty-day period expires. The one month in (13) starts at the end of the month in which the DIRECTION is received by the officer. Both (4) and (13) run notwithstanding s.153 and s.153B.
• Statutory position — s.144C(8) with its Explanation, and s.144C(10) and (11): the Panel may confirm, reduce or ENHANCE but may not set aside or remit, the Explanation inserted by the Finance Act 2012 is retrospective to 1 April 2009, the direction binds the Assessing Officer, and no direction may issue without an opportunity of being heard — with what s.253 and s.246A provide about appeal CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  We are considering objecting to a draft order. Can the Dispute Resolution Panel make our position worse, can it send the matter back for fresh enquiry, and if we lose before it, do we appeal to the Commissioner (Appeals) or straight to the Tribunal?
  It can make your position worse; it cannot send the matter back; and the appeal lies to the Tribunal, not to the Commissioner (Appeals). Section 144C(8), as printed on the departmental edition stamped Year 2025, reads: "The Dispute Resolution Panel may confirm, reduce or enhance the variations proposed in the draft order so, however, that it shall not set aside any proposed variation or issue any direction under sub-section (5) for further enquiry and passing of the assessment order." The Explanation to that sub-section reads: "For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the power of the Dispute Resolution Panel to enhance the variation shall include and shall be deemed always to have included the power to consider any matter arising out of the assessment proceedings relating to the draft order, notwithstanding that such matter was raised or not by the eligible assessee." Footnote 76 on the departmental edition stamped Year 2014 records that Explanation verbatim as "Inserted by the Finance Act, 2012, w.r.e.f. 1-4-2009" — note the date: it is retrospective to 1 April 2009, the date the section itself was inserted from, and not 2012. The original edition stamped Year 2009 prints sub-section (8) with no Explanation at all. Sub-section (10): "Every direction issued by the Dispute Resolution Panel shall be binding on the Assessing Officer." Sub-section (11): "No direction under sub-section (5) shall be issued unless an opportunity of being heard is given to the assessee and the Assessing Officer on such directions which are prejudicial to the interest of the assessee or the interest of the revenue, respectively." Sub-section (9) resolves a difference of opinion among the members by the opinion of the majority. On appeal: s.246A(1)(a), on the departmental edition stamped Year 2025, excepts from the first appeal "an order passed in pursuance of directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel", and s.253(1)(d), on the edition stamped Year 2024 (No. 2), gives a direct right of appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against "an order passed by an Assessing Officer under sub-section (3), of section 143 or section 147 or section 153A or section 153C in pursuance of the directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel or an order passed under section 154 in respect of such order". Sub-sections (2A) and (3A) of s.253 are printed as "[***]" on the current editions, and the departmental edition stamped Year 2016 carries footnotes against both reading "Omtt. by Act No. 28 of 2016 (w.e.f. 1-6-2016)."
• PCIT v Softbrands India Pvt Ltd High CourtCuts both waysOverruled
  The Tribunal excluded some comparables in my transfer pricing case. Can the department take that to the High Court as a question of law?
  Not without showing perversity. The Karnataka High Court dismissed the Revenue's appeal, holding that no substantial question of law arises where the dispute is about whether comparables were rightly picked or filters rightly applied. Following its own judgment of 25 June 2018 in the same assessee's case, it held that unless ex facie perversity in the Tribunal's findings is established, an appeal under section 260A does not lie, at the instance of either side. Mere dissatisfaction with the Tribunal's findings of fact is not a sufficient reason to invoke section 260A. The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

Listed strongest first: Supreme Court, then High Court, then Tribunal, then CBDT. Nothing here has yet been read in full by a chartered accountant — open an entry to see where it came from.