Section 264

Section 264 — the law in short

What the courts have decided on section 264, in one screen. Read this first; open an entry when you need the facts, the reasoning and the source.

• Sarla Holdings P Ltd v PCIT Supreme CourtHelps department
  I did not tick s.115BAA in the return and filed Form 10-IC late. Can I still get the concessional rate?
  No, if the return itself did not opt. Section 115BAA(5) requires the option to be exercised in the prescribed manner on or before the s.139(1) due date, and Circular 6/2022 condones only a late Form 10-IC where the option was in fact exercised in the return. A company that marked 'None of the above' cannot claim the benefit later, and s.115JB applies.
• Central Provinces Manganese Ore Co. Ltd. v. CIT — interest under s.215 can be disputed in appeal only on the ground of total non-liability, and waiver must first be asked of the Assessing Officer Supreme CourtHelps department
  The assessment order charges interest under s.215 (or s.217, or s.139(8)). Can I appeal against the interest, and if not, how do I get it reduced?
  The Supreme Court held that because the levy of interest is a part of the process of assessment, an assessee may dispute it in appeal, but only if he limits himself to the ground that he is not liable to the levy at all; a complaint about the quantum, or about the refusal of relief on the merits, is not within the appeal. The route for reduction is the statutory waiver power — s.215(4), and the corresponding provision for s.139(8) interest — and the Court held that where the assessee has made no application to the Income-tax Officer for reduction or waiver, there has been no improper denial of relief, so no revision petition to the Commissioner can be maintained in that regard either.
• Dwarka Nath v Income-Tax Officer Supreme CourtHelps taxpayer
  The Commissioner dismissed my revision and the officer will not issue a demand notice so I cannot appeal. Is the revisional order beyond the reach of a writ because it is administrative?
  No. The Supreme Court held that the revisional jurisdiction is prima facie judicial: the order brought before the Commissioner affects the assessee's rights, it is implicit in a revisional power that the parties be heard, and the nature of the jurisdiction carries with it a duty to act judicially. Certiorari therefore lies. And even if the revisional order were administrative, that would not help the Revenue, because the officer's failure to issue the statutory demand notice would still be a failure of a statutory duty, correctable by mandamus. The Court quashed the revisional order and directed the officer to pass an order and issue notice according to law.
• Manohar Lal Poddar v Union of India High CourtHelps taxpayer
  Two years after Form 5 the Assessing Officer has issued a section 154 notice saying the tax on my settled additions was computed at the wrong rate. Can he reopen a completed Vivad se Vishwas settlement?
  No. Section 154(1)(a) allows an income-tax authority to amend an order passed by it under the Income-tax Act, 1961; the certificate issued by the designated authority under section 5 of the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 is not such an order. The Patna High Court set aside both the rectification order and the section 264 revision order upholding it, and directed the refund to be paid within four weeks with statutory interest.
• Bahar Infocons P Ltd v PCIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  I over-reported income by mistake and the time to file a revised return has gone. Can it be fixed?
  The Commissioner cannot reject a revision application under s.264 solely because a revised return was not filed within the s.139(5) time. The power exists to relieve against over-assessment and reaches a mistake the assessee detects after the assessment is complete. Here provisions for bonus written back had been taxed twice across assessment years 2019-20 to 2021-22, and the revision applications were sent back to the Principal Commissioner to decide the adjustment on merits - the Court did not itself order relief.
• Munchener Ruckversicherungs Gesellshaft AG v CIT (International Taxation) High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The deductor credited the TDS late, so it turned up in 26AS only after I had filed. The department says I should have revised my return, and refuses credit because I never offered the income to tax. Is there a way back?
  Yes - s.155(14). The Delhi High Court held that s.155(14) places the Assessing Officer under a statutory obligation to amend the assessment or intimation once the certificate or the updated Form 26AS is produced, and that the sub-section neither contemplates nor mandates the original return being amended or revised. It also held that the Commissioner was wrong to require the income to be offered to tax where the assessee had consistently and uncontestedly said the receipt was not taxable in India.
• PCIT v MDLR Hotels Pvt Ltd High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The Additional Commissioner approved my search assessment along with hundreds of others in a single letter that says nothing but 'approved'. Is that enough under s.153D?
  No. Where the approving authority accorded approval to 246 proposed assessments by one letter that merely directed that the orders be passed before limitation and copies sent for record, the Delhi High Court held there was no substantial question of law in the Tribunal's conclusion that the approval was mechanical, and dismissed eighteen Revenue appeals. Approval that neither mentions the seized material nor shows that the draft orders were examined is a ritual, not the safeguard s.153D creates.
• Gopal Vazirani v Principal Commissioner of Income Tax High CourtHelps taxpayerUnder appeal
  The Commissioner says the proviso to section 240 shows that returned income is sacrosanct, so he cannot give my client a refund below what he himself returned. Is that right?
  No. The proviso to section 240 bites only in the two situations it describes — an assessment set aside or cancelled with a fresh assessment directed, and an assessment annulled — and says nothing about a case where neither has happened. There is no provision in the Act denying a refund of excess tax where the income ultimately assessable is less than the returned income; an assessee can be asked to pay only such tax as is legally due and nothing more.
• Chambal Fertilizers and Chemicals Ltd v PCIT, Udaipur High CourtHelps taxpayer
  Can the officer reject a s.270AA immunity application without a hearing and without saying which clause of s.270A(9) applies?
  No. The Rajasthan High Court held that the Deputy Commissioner had violated the proviso to s.270AA(4) by giving no opportunity of hearing, that his order was wholly laconic and did not indicate under which part of s.270A(9) the case was said to fall, and that the revisional authority had, without cogent reasons, cursorily placed the case within clauses (a) and (c). On the facts the amount had not been detected by the department at all - it was disclosed voluntarily during scrutiny after ten other issues had been raised without any addition - so clauses (a) and (c) were not attracted. The Court quashed both orders and directed that immunity under s.270AA be granted.
• Reddy Vanga Ventures LLP v PCIT High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The officer declared your return invalid for want of an audit report when your turnover was below the audit threshold. What is the remedy?
  The High Court quashed the orders invalidating the return and the order in revision, and remitted the matter to the Assessing Officer to re-examine the turnover. Where the record, including the officer's own finding, showed that the turnover was below the threshold at which audit is required, the premise on which the return had been held defective under s.139(9) did not stand.
• Pramod R Agrawal v PCIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  I left a legitimate deduction out of my return and the assessment is over. Can the Commissioner allow it under s.264?
  Yes. The Bombay High Court held that s.264 confers wide jurisdiction, that it is not confined to correcting the errors of subordinate authorities, and that it covers a claim the assessee failed to make in the return and discovered only later. The rejection was quashed and the Commissioner was directed to decide the application afresh, by a reasoned order, after a hearing.
• Pacific Energy Private Limited v ITO High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The reassessment cannot increase my tax at all because I am assessed on book profit anyway. Is there anything in the Act that lets me have the proceedings dropped rather than fight them?
  Yes — s.152(2). Where an assessment is reopened under s.147, an assessee who has not impugned any part of the original assessment order under ss.246 to 248 or s.264 may claim that the proceedings be dropped on showing that he has been assessed on an amount not lower than what he would rightly be liable for even if the income said to have escaped had been taken into account. On that footing the Bombay High Court held the officer had no jurisdiction to reopen and quashed the notice and the order rejecting the objections.
• Prakash B. Kamat v PCIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The department wants to recover the company's tax dues from me because I was a director. Can they?
  No, not on directorship alone. Section 179(1) is subject to an escape clause, and once the director puts material on record showing the non-recovery was not due to his gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty, the burden is discharged and the officer must deal with that material.
• Anil Kumar Malhotra v Union of India High CourtHelps departmentNo later treatment found
  My stay application was rejected on the 20% ground while my appeal is pending. Can I go straight to the High Court under Article 226 saying the assessment breached natural justice?
  This Court said no. Having already filed the statutory appeal, the assessee cannot simultaneously attack the assessment order in writ under the guise of challenging the rejection of his stay application; that is resort to two forums at once. The remedy against the rejection is the review route in clause 4(C) of the Office Memorandum dated 29.02.2016 read with a revision under s.264, and the writ petitions were dismissed with liberty to take that route.
• Rajeev Behl v PCIT High CourtHelps departmentNo later treatment found
  The department is recovering the company's tax from me as a director. I resigned, and an MOU and an arbitral award put the tax liability on another director. Is that a defence under s.179?
  No. The burden under s.179(1) is on the director to prove that the non-recovery cannot be attributed to his gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty - it is not for the Revenue to prove that he was guilty of it. And a private arrangement between directors, even one affirmed by an arbitral award upheld by the High Court, governs rights in personam and cannot bind a statutory authority; income-tax liability cannot be apportioned by private agreement.
• Aafreen Fatima Fazal Abbas Sayed v ACIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  I let the 30 days to appeal my 143(1) intimation lapse. Can I still go to the PCIT under s.264?
  Yes. Section 264(4) bars revision only in the situations it lists, essentially where an appeal is pending or has been decided; letting the appeal period run out without filing is not one of them. The revision application had to be decided on merits, and no formal waiver of the right of appeal could be demanded, because a right not exercised does not need to be waived.
• Paradigm Geophysical Pty Ltd v CIT (International Taxation)-3 High CourtCuts both waysNo later treatment found
  For AY 2012-13 the officer moved us out of s.44BB into s.44DA. Does the Finance Act 2010 proviso really do that?
  Yes. From 1 April 2011, income falling within the scope of s.44DA(1) is excluded from s.44BB, and if a non-resident's income is royalty or fees for technical services it is taxable under s.44DA or s.115A. But the exclusion only bites if the receipt really is royalty or FTS, and services for a mining or like project are carved out of the FTS definition in Explanation 2 to s.9(1)(vii) altogether.
• R. Banumathy v Commissioner of Income Tax-I High CourtHelps taxpayer
  My client missed the s.10(10C) exemption in the original return, filed a revised return that the officer lodged as invalid, and the Commissioner rejected the s.264 revision. Is there anything left?
  Yes. The Madras High Court set aside the s.264 order and directed refund of the excess tax, holding that the exemption under s.10(10C) up to five lakh rupees was available to the employee of a bank under an early retirement option scheme and that Rule 2BA cannot cut down the section. It added that where an assessee pays excess tax it is the Department's bounden duty to tell him of the reliefs he is entitled to and to refund the excess.
• Naresh Bhavani Shah (HUF) v CIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The HUF's money was invested in the karta's own name, so the TDS certificate and the 26AS entry carry his individual PAN. The HUF offered the interest to tax and the karta claimed no credit. The department says PAN mismatch, no credit. What now?
  The credit was directed to be given to the HUF. The Court held that the ordinary route is Rule 37BA(2) - the deductee files a declaration with the deductor, and the deductor issues the certificate in the name of the person entitled to credit - and that this procedure must invariably be completed before credit can be claimed where the certificate shows someone else's name and PAN. But it also held there is no dearth of power in the department to give credit in a genuine case, and on these special facts it directed credit on the karta filing an affidavit that the money and the income were not his and that he had claimed no credit.
• Ganpati Fincap Services Pvt Ltd v CIT High CourtHelps department
  The same officer is the Assessing Officer of the searched person and of our client. Does he still have to record a satisfaction note, and does he need two?
  He must record one, and it must exist before the s.153C proceedings are started. He does not have to write two notes. The single note is recorded in his capacity as the Assessing Officer of the searched person, it is a note about the other person, and it is placed in the other person's file. It does not have to say in terms that the documents do not belong to the searched person.
• Utanka Roy v Director of Income Tax High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  I am a non-resident. I worked on a foreign employer's ship outside India for most of the year and was paid by that foreign company. The department says the salary is taxable in India. Where does salary accrue?
  Where the services are rendered. The Calcutta High Court held that for a non-resident, whose total income is governed by s.5(2), the place of accrual has to be found, and for that purpose the place where the services were rendered is what matters; the source of the income is not relevant. A marine engineer who had rendered services outside India for 286 days and had received his remuneration from a foreign company had received income outside India, and both the s.143(1) intimation and the s.264 order were set aside.
• Vijay Gupta v CIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  I made a mistake in my own return and paid tax I did not owe. The time to revise has gone. Can the Commissioner give me relief under section 264?
  Yes. The Delhi High Court held that the revisional power under section 264 is very wide and is not confined to correcting the officer's errors - it extends to errors made by the assessee, including a legitimate claim never made in the return and raised for the first time in the revision application. An intimation under section 143(1) is an "order" for section 264. Paying the Rs.500 fee late is a curable irregularity, not a bar. The Commissioner's rejection was set aside and the revision restored for fresh consideration on merits.
• Tamil Nadu Magnesite Ltd v CIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The Assessing Officer has rectified my old s.143(1)(a) intimation under s.154 after already completing a s.143(3) assessment. Can he do that?
  No. Once a notice under section 143(2) has gone out and a regular assessment has been made under section 143(3), the earlier intimation under section 143(1)(a) merges into that assessment and no longer stands as an order of its own. There is then nothing left for section 154 to rectify. The Madras High Court set aside a rectification made in December 1998 on an intimation of 7 March 1994, which had charged additional tax of Rs 4,70,346 more than three years after the scrutiny assessment of 22 November 1995 was over, and set aside the revisional order that had confirmed it. The rectification was held to be wholly without jurisdiction.
• Utkal Galvanizers P. Ltd. v ACIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The Assessing Officer has issued a section 154 notice on an item my CIT(A) appeal already dealt with. Can he do that?
  No. The Orissa High Court held that the scope of s.154(1A) is limited to mistakes apparent from the record and does not include a power to revise, review or reappraise the officer's own order, and that letting him rectify a matter already carried in appeal would let him override the appellate order. If the Revenue was dissatisfied with the CIT(A) it had to file a second appeal to the Tribunal.
• S.D.S. Mongia v Central Board of Direct Taxes — a receipt excluded by s.10(13) does not become taxable because the assessee offered it, and Article 226 can correct that even where the s.264 revision is time-barred High CourtHelps taxpayer
  My client offered a superannuation fund receipt to tax for several years before realising it was exempt. His section 264 revision has been rejected as time-barred and the assessment years are closed. Is there anything left?
  The Delhi High Court gave relief on exactly those facts. It upheld the Commissioner's rejection of the section 264 revision as barred by limitation, but held that the constraints felt by the Commissioner under section 264 do not impinge on the Court's powers under Article 226; that Article 265 mandates that no person shall be taxed without the authority of law; and that since there was no authority to tax the annuities the petitioner had received, it was appropriate to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction to correct the injustice even though the injustice was of the assessee's own making.
• Malik Packaging v CIT High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The officer completed a best judgment assessment under s.144 because I did not attend in answer to the s.143(2) notice. Was he required to give me a separate show cause notice first?
  Yes. The proviso to s.144(1) requires that the opportunity of being heard be given by serving a notice calling on the assessee to show cause, on a date and time specified, why the assessment should not be completed to the best of the officer's judgment. Where the record showed no notice other than the s.143(2) notice had been issued, the Allahabad High Court held that no notice under the proviso had been issued, set aside the Commissioner's order refusing relief under s.264 and directed him to pass a fresh order in accordance with law.
• Dr. Prannoy Roy v CIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  I paid the whole tax before the due date but filed the return eleven months late. The Assessing Officer has still charged interest under s.234A. Can he?
  No, not on tax already in the Revenue's hands before the due date. The Delhi High Court held that s.234A creates a compensatory levy, not a penalty, so where the tax was deposited before the due date of filing the return the Revenue has suffered no loss and no interest under s.234A is payable; interest runs only on tax not deposited before that date.
• Sudhir Sareen v CIT High CourtHelps departmentNo later treatment found
  You never asked the Assessing Officer for more time, the return went invalid for want of proof of tax, and you have gone to the Commissioner under s.264. Will that work?
  No. The Delhi High Court held that the power to extend time and to condone the delay in rectifying a defect under s.139(9) is conferred on the Assessing Officer, and the Commissioner in revision under s.264 is not the forum in which to ask for it for the first time. Where the assessee had not applied to the Assessing Officer at all, no fault could be found with the officer's order or with the Commissioner's refusal.
• Kerala State Bamboo Corporation Ltd v CIT High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  You missed the fifteen days on a s.139(9) notice and the officer has written back that your return is invalid. Is there anything left to do?
  Yes. The proviso to s.139(9) lets the Assessing Officer condone the delay and treat the return as valid where the defect is cured after the fifteen days but before the assessment is made. The Kerala High Court held that the consequence of invalidity does not bite until the assessment is completed or the time for completing it runs out, so a cure filed before that date can still be accepted, and an application seeking reconsideration must be dealt with as a petition under the proviso even if it is not labelled one.
• V. Parthasarathy v. Addl. Commissioner of Income-tax (Andhra Pradesh High Court, 11 September 1975) — 'discontinuance' in section 176(4) covers temporary and involuntary cessation, so an advocate elevated to the Bench has discontinued his profession High CourtHelps departmentNo later treatment found
  I stopped practising only because I was appointed a judge, and I went back to the Bar when I retired. Surely that is a suspension and not a discontinuance, so section 176(4) cannot apply to fees I received while I was on the Bench?
  That argument was run and rejected. The Andhra Pradesh High Court held that both 'discontinuance' and 'cessation' in section 176(4) take in temporary as well as permanent discontinuance, that the length of time for which the profession is stopped is not an element of the concept, and that the question whether the cessation was voluntary or involuntary has no bearing on the application of the sub-section. It also rejected the reading that the sub-section is confined to discontinuance by retirement or death, holding that the words 'on account of' govern cessation of the profession, retirement and death equally. The writ petition was dismissed.
• Statutory position — s.150(2): a finding or direction cannot revive a year that was already time-barred when the order under appeal was passed, and from 1 February 2026 the notice itself has a deadline CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both waysSuperseded by amendment
  The officer has reopened a very old year and says he is only giving effect to a finding in an appellate order, so limitation does not apply. Is that right, and what stops him?
  Section 150(1) lifts the time limit in section 149: where an assessment, reassessment or recomputation is in consequence of or to give effect to a finding or direction in an order passed on appeal, reference or revision, or by a court, the section 148 notice may be issued at any time. Section 150(2) is the limit on that power and it is the provision that decides cases — sub-section (1) does not apply where the year in question could not have been assessed, by reason of any other time limit, at the moment the order that was the subject-matter of the appeal, reference or revision was made, so a year already dead on that date stays dead. The Supreme Court so held in K.M. Sharma, quashing notices for assessment years 1968-69 to 1971-72 and 1981-82, and the Constitution Bench in Murlidhar Bhagwan Das had already confined “finding” and “direction” to what was necessary for the year under appeal, so a remark about another year does not open it. Section 150 was substituted with retrospective effect from 1 February 2026: sub-section (1) is re-lettered and widened to a court in a proceeding under this Act, sub-section (2) gains a second measuring date, and a new sub-section (3) gives the department only three months from the end of the quarter in which the certified copy of the order reaches the jurisdictional Principal Commissioner or Commissioner. For a tax year beginning on or after 1 April 2026 the provision is section 283 of the Income-tax Act, 2025.
• Statutory position — s.275 as substituted: penalty limitation now runs from the end of the QUARTER CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  I am checking whether a penalty order is out of time. Is the old six-months-from-the-end-of-the-month rule still the test?
  No. Section 275 has been substituted, and under the substituted provision no penalty order under Chapter XXI may be passed after the expiry of six months from the end of the QUARTER in which the triggering event occurs, with five separate triggers in clauses (a) to (e). The financial-year limb and the month-end limb of the old sub-section (1), and the old proviso giving one year from the end of the financial year in which the appellate order was received, are gone.
• Statutory position — s.234D: interest on a refund granted under s.143(1) that regular assessment shows should not have been granted — the rate, the period, the reduction under sub-section (2), and Explanation 2 for assessment years commencing before 1 June 2003 CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  We were given a refund when the return was processed under s.143(1). On scrutiny the Assessing Officer has now raised a demand and has also charged interest under s.234D on the refund. Is that right, for how long does the interest run, and can he do it for an assessment year that is older than the section itself?
  Yes, on the conditions in sub-section (1). Section 234D charges simple interest where a refund is granted to the assessee under s.143(1) and either (a) no refund is due on regular assessment, or (b) the amount refunded under s.143(1) exceeds the amount refundable on regular assessment. The rate is one-half per cent, on the whole or the excess amount so refunded, for every month or part of a month comprised in the period from the date of grant of refund to the date of such regular assessment. The section was inserted by the Finance Act, 2003 with effect from 1 June 2003, and the words "one-half per cent" were substituted for "two-third" by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2003 with effect from 8 September 2003 — both recorded in footnotes printed against the section. Sub-section (2) provides that where, as a result of an order under s.154, s.155, s.250, s.254, s.260, s.262, s.263 or s.264, or an order of the Settlement Commission under s.245D(4), the refund granted under s.143(1) is held to be correctly allowed either in whole or in part, the interest chargeable under sub-section (1) shall be reduced accordingly. Explanation 1 makes a first-time assessment under s.147 or s.153A a regular assessment for the purposes of the section. Explanation 2, which the later editions of the section print and the earlier ones do not, reads: "For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the provisions of this section shall also apply to an assessment year commencing before the 1st day of June, 2003 if the proceedings in respect of such assessment year is completed after the said date." Which amending Act inserted Explanation 2, and from what date, is not established here — the editions of the section that print it carry no footnotes, and the editions that carry footnotes do not print it.
• EPCOS Electronic Components SA v UOI High CourtHelps taxpayerOverruled
  My return was accepted as filed and no demand was raised. Is a s.264 revision still open to me?
  Yes. An intimation under s.143(1) that simply accepts the return is still an order capable of revision, and 'prejudicial to the interest of the assessee' does not mean 'raised a demand'. The prejudice was that the assessee had paid more than the applicable treaty provisions required, even though the tax computed in the intimation was unchanged.
• United Airlines v CIT High CourtHelps departmentOverruled
  My airline pays landing and parking charges at an Indian airport. Do I have to deduct tax at source on them as rent under section 194-I?
  Yes, on this Delhi High Court view. It dismissed the writ petition against the Commissioner's order under section 264 and held that landing and parking charges are rent within Explanation (i) to section 194-I. That Explanation gives rent a wider meaning than in common parlance: any payment, by whatever name called, under any agreement or arrangement for the use of any land. When the wheels of an aircraft touch the airfield, use of the airport's land begins, and parking is use of land too. The definition is a legal fiction and must be applied literally; arguments about the intention behind the provision are out of place in a taxing statute.

Listed strongest first: Supreme Court, then High Court, then Tribunal, then CBDT. Nothing here has yet been read in full by a chartered accountant — open an entry to see where it came from.