The communication went to an e-mail address nobody reads and was put on the portal. Was I served, or only issued?
The rules make an electronic record displayed on the designated website an authenticated communication in its own right, and the systems notification treats the e-Proceeding tab as where the document is placed with e-mail as something that may also be done. So the argument is not that a forbidden mode was used. It is that the thirty days the first proviso exists to give were never given, and that time runs from when you actually had the document - which is how limitation for a revision petition has been counted.
What the rules treat as a communication. Rule 127A, headed 'Authentication of notices and other documents', provides that every notice or other document communicated in electronic form shall be deemed to be authenticated in two situations. The first is e-mail, where the name and office of the authority is printed on the e-mail body or on the attachment 'and the e-mail is issued from the designated e-mail address of such income-tax authority'. The second is an electronic record, where the name and office 'is displayed as a part of the electronic record, if the notice or other document is contained as text or remark in the electronic record itself' or is printed on the attachment, 'and such electronic record is displayed on the designated website'. The second limb is the portal. On the face of the rule, a document displayed on the designated website is an authenticated communication and not a nullity.
What the systems notification says about delivery. Notification No. 4/2017 dated 3 April 2017 of the Principal Director General of Income-tax (Systems) sets the procedure. Paragraph 13(a) provides that all notices, questionnaires, letters and orders issued from the ITBA modules 'will be visible to Assessee after login under “E-Proceeding” Tab in the Efiling website...and may also be sent by the designated e-mail address...to the registered e-mail address of the Assessee.' Paragraph 13(b) provides that a text message alerting the assessee 'may also be sent' on the mobile number registered on the e-filing website. Paragraph 13(n) provides that the time and place of despatch and receipt of an electronic record or electronic communication have the same meaning as in section 13 of the Information Technology Act, 2000. Read as it stands, portal visibility is the thing that always happens and the e-mail and the text message are things that may also happen. That is the paragraph the Department will put against you, and it is better to meet it than to be shown it. These paragraphs were read from a commentary site reproducing the notification; the Department's own copy of it could not be opened.
Which addresses are permitted at all. Rule 127 restricts electronic delivery to the e-mail address in the return of income, an address available on a company's website, or one the addressee has furnished. An address given in the return which has since gone dead is formally inside that list, so the complaint is not that the Department used an address it was not allowed to use. This library carries the rule and the issue-versus-service distinction separately.
Where a dead or wrong address has actually cost the Department the order. The Allahabad High Court, in a judgment of 27 February 2024 reported as ABCAUS 3882 (2024) (02) HC, quashed a s.148A(d) order and the s.148 notice that followed where notices went to a former accountant's address although the assessee had updated its address on the e-filing portal three years earlier. The report records the Court holding that 'a notice issued under Section 148A(b) of the Act to the registered email ID of the assessee is not an empty formality as the issuance of the notice and service of such notice upon the assessee are jurisdictional requirement that must be mandatorily complied with', and that the residual limb - any e-mail address made available by the assessee - is available only where the registered address cannot be determined from the earlier limbs. The report does not print the cause title or the writ petition number, so no case entry was written for it here; look it up in full before citing it. Note also that the hierarchy discussed there is the definition of a registered e-mail address for faceless assessment, and the Department's own pages for s.144B that could be opened serve the section omitted with effect from 1 April 1989 rather than the faceless assessment provision.
When the clock starts. A Delhi High Court judgment reported as ABCAUS 2010 (2017) (07) HC dealt with a return processed under s.143(1) on 6 December 2013 where the refund was credited on 25 April 2014 and the assessee obtained a copy of the intimation on 13 April 2015. The Commissioner rejected the revision petition as barred, counting a year from the refund. The Court held that limitation ran from the date the assessee actually had the document, the report recording that 'the expression “the date on which he otherwise came to know of it” as per section 264(3), refers to the date on which the assessee actually have a copy of the intimation.' That sentence is the report's rendering, not necessarily the Court's own words. The same logic is in s.220(1), which runs the thirty days to pay from service of the notice of demand and not from the date on it.
How to run it. The realistic shape of the argument is not that portal display is a nullity. It is that the first proviso to s.143(1)(a) exists to obtain a response, that the second proviso requires the response to be considered, and that a communication which reached nobody produced no response to consider - so the adjustment was made without the opportunity the section requires, whatever label is put on the delivery. Run it as reinforcement of the thirty-day ground rather than instead of it, and put the profile update on record in the same week so the Department cannot say the default is continuing.
Most e-filing disputes now turn on a document that was on the portal and an inbox that nobody watched. A practitioner who argues that portal display is not communication at all will be shown Rule 127A and paragraph 13(a) and will lose the ground. The argument that survives is narrower and better: the opportunity the proviso exists to give was not given, and time runs from receipt.
My return was only processed under 143(1). Does that stop the department reopening it later?
The assessment order charges interest under s.215 (or s.217, or s.139(8)). Can I appeal against the interest, and if not, how do I get it reduced?
The Assessing Officer has disallowed the whole difference between the statutory minimum cane price and the State advised price my sugar co-operative paid its members. Can he?
The Commissioner dismissed my revision and the officer will not issue a demand notice so I cannot appeal. Is the revisional order beyond the reach of a writ because it is administrative?
My return was only processed under section 143(1) and now the officer wants to reopen it. Can I say he is changing his opinion?
I paid the original demand in full, got a refund when I won in appeal, and repaid on a fresh demand after losing in reference. The department now wants s.220(2) interest for the period in between. Must I pay it?
I did not tick s.115BAA in the return and filed Form 10-IC late. Can I still get the concessional rate?
I paid the demand on time, won in appeal, got a refund, then lost on reference and paid again on a fresh demand. Can the department charge me s.220(2) interest for the period in between?
Every page in this library links to what it was written from, so you can check it rather than take our word for it.