Section 144C

Section 144C — the law in short

What the courts have decided on section 144C, in one screen. Read this first; open an entry when you need the facts, the reasoning and the source.

• ACIT v Shelf Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Supreme CourtCuts both waysSuperseded by amendment
  Has the Supreme Court settled whether the s.144C nine-month DRP process runs over and above the s.153 limitation?
  A two-judge bench heard the Revenue's appeals against the Bombay High Court in Shelf Drilling and delivered a split verdict. One judge held the s.144C timelines operate independently of s.153(3); the other held the whole s.144C procedure must finish within the s.153(3) period. The matter was referred to the Chief Justice of India for an appropriate bench, so there is no binding ratio.
• Benteler Automotive India Pvt Ltd v Union of India High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The DRP issued its directions years ago and the Assessing Officer has still not passed a final assessment order. Is the assessment now dead, or can he pass one whenever he likes?
  It is dead. Section 144C(13) requires the Assessing Officer, on receipt of the DRP's directions under s.144C(5), to complete the assessment in conformity with them within one month from the end of the month in which the directions are received, and he need not give any further hearing. Where that month passed — here even after the extension of the outer date under the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act 2020 — and no order was passed, the Bombay High Court held the assessment barred by limitation and quashed the pending proceedings on the assessee's writ petition.
• Genpact India P Ltd v DCIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  My refund came out of an appeal effect order and was paid years late. Can the department refuse the extra interest by blaming its own portal?
  No. Where the refund arises from giving effect to an appellate order, the additional interest is statutory. It can be refused only in the one situation the Act allows, namely delay attributable to the assessee. A broken departmental portal, an amalgamation the department was told about, and the pandemic are not delays attributable to the assessee.
• GE Oil & Gas India P Ltd v Addl/Jt/Dy/Asst CIT High CourtCuts both waysPartly overruled — read this first
  You are an eligible assessee with a transfer pricing adjustment and the faceless unit passed a final order instead of a draft. What relief will the court give?
  The order goes, but not always as a clean quashing. The Madras High Court set aside a final order passed three days after the show cause notice cum draft assessment order and directed that the impugned order be treated as a draft assessment order, leaving the assessee to work out its remedies against it under s.144B.
• Shelf Drilling Ron Tappmeyer v ACIT High CourtCuts both waysSuperseded by amendment
  Does the DRP route under s.144C buy the Assessing Officer extra time, or must the whole assessment still finish within the s.153 limitation?
  Non-resident assessees argued that the overall limitation in s.153 continued to govern even where the s.144C route was taken, so that once that date had passed no final assessment order could be made at all. The Bombay High Court agreed, holding that it could not accept that s.153 is excluded from operating on s.144C, and that the non obstante clauses in s.144C(4) and (13) serve only the limited purpose of compelling a prompt final order once the Dispute Resolution Panel has spoken. Because in each petition the draft order came only days before the limitation date of 30 September 2021, no final assessment order could be passed at all, and the Court directed that the returns of income as filed be accepted, leaving the Revenue free to take any other steps in accordance with law.
• Blackstone Capital Partners Singapore VI v ACIT High CourtHelps taxpayerUnder appeal
  I hold a valid TRC. Can the AO go behind it and reopen my assessment for lack of substance?
  No. A valid tax residency certificate is statutorily the only evidence required to be eligible for treaty benefit, and the Indian authorities cannot disregard a certificate issued by another State's tax authority. Since Article 13(4) of the India-Singapore treaty then protected the capital gains, no income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment and the s.148 notice was invalidated.
• CIT v Roca Bathroom Products High CourtCuts both waysSuperseded by amendment
  Are proceedings before the Dispute Resolution Panel outside the ordinary limitation for completing an assessment?
  A Division Bench of the Madras High Court affirmed the single judge and held that the DRP process is not unfettered by limitation: the proceedings remain circumscribed by the limits of time fixed by s.153. It is the decision the Bombay High Court followed in Shelf Drilling, and it is the High Court line the Revenue has carried to the Supreme Court.
• Piramal Enterprises Ltd v Addl/Jt/Dy/Asst CIT High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  You asked for a video hearing after the show cause notice and the order came anyway. Is that fatal?
  Yes. Once you have responded to a show cause notice under s.144B and asked for a personal hearing, the request must be taken into account, and ordinarily it will not be refused. An order passed without dealing with that request is unsustainable, and the fact that a further remedy exists later in the process does not cure it.
• SHL (India) v DCIT High CourtCuts both waysUnder appeal
  If the Assessing Officer passes a final assessment order on an eligible assessee without first issuing a draft order, can s.292B save it?
  After a transfer pricing adjustment was proposed, the Assessing Officer passed a final order under s.143(3) without first forwarding a draft assessment order under s.144C(1). The Bombay High Court quashed the order, the demand notice and the penalty notice as void ab initio, and held that s.292B cannot confer jurisdiction that the officer never had.
• Pfizer Healthcare India P Ltd v JCIT High CourtHelps taxpayerSuperseded by amendment
  The TPO's order was one day late. Does that kill the transfer pricing addition?
  Yes. The sixty days run backwards from the s.153 limitation date, excluding that date itself, so an order passed on the sixtieth day is out of time. The requirement is mandatory, not directory, limitation goes to jurisdiction, and an order a single day late is non est along with everything built on it. That was the law when the case was decided and it remains the reasoning of the judgment, but as at 8 September 2026 the arithmetic no longer holds where the limitation date is 31 March or 31 December: s.92CA(3AA), inserted retrospectively from 1 June 2007 by the Finance Act 2026, fixes the count for those two dates and gives the officer one day more. It says nothing about a 30 September expiry, where this decision still governs.
• JCB India Ltd v DCIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The Tribunal remanded my transfer pricing issue. The Assessing Officer has now passed a final assessment order straight off the TPO's fresh order, without any draft order. Is that good?
  No. Section 144C(1) requires a draft assessment order after receipt of the TPO's report, and there is nothing in its language confining that requirement to the first round; it applies equally where the TPO has acted on a remand by the Tribunal. The Delhi High Court held the resulting final assessment orders were without jurisdiction, that the defect was an incurable illegality and not a mere irregularity which s.292B could cure, and that the correct course was not to send the parties back to the draft order stage but to quash.
• Turner International India Pvt Ltd v DCIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  After the Tribunal remanded my transfer pricing case, the assessing officer went straight to a final assessment order without a draft order. Is that order valid?
  No. The Delhi High Court set aside the final assessment orders for assessment years 2007-08 and 2008-09, the demand notices and the penalty proceedings, because the assessing officer did not first pass a draft assessment order as section 144C(1) mandatorily requires. The Court held the point was no longer res integra, following Zuari Cement, whose affirmation by the Supreme Court through dismissal of the Revenue's special leave petition it noted, along with Vijay Television, ESPN Star Sports and International Air Transport Association. It rejected the Revenue's argument that the omission was a curable defect to be remedied by a remand.
• Sony Ericsson Mobile Communications India P Ltd v CIT High CourtCuts both waysUnder appeal
  The TPO says my advertising spend is higher than comparables and has added the excess as brand building for my foreign parent. Can he do that?
  Not by that route. The bright line test — treating advertising, marketing and promotion spend above a comparable's level as a separate transaction of brand building for the foreign associated enterprise — has no statutory mandate, and the parameters the Special Bench laid down in L.G. Electronics do not bind either side. The Delhi High Court set the Tribunal's approach aside as based on an erroneous legal standard and sent the matters back for fresh consideration.
• Shell India Markets P Ltd v ACIT High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The TPO says we issued shares to our parent too cheaply. Can he tax the shortfall?
  No. The issue of equity to a non-resident parent is on capital account and gives rise to no income, and Chapter X is machinery for computing income at arm's length, not a charge. With no income there is nothing for the transfer pricing machinery to work on, and re-characterising the alleged shortfall as an interest-bearing loan has no statutory foundation.
• Vijay Television P Ltd v DRP High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The AO skipped the draft order and passed a final one. Can a corrigendum cure that?
  No. The procedure in s.144C is mandatory and the draft order is the gateway to the eligible assessee's right to go to the DRP. Once a final order is passed, with a demand notice and penalty proceedings, the AO is functus officio and a corrigendum cannot convert it into a draft; the defect is an absence of power, not a curable mistake.
• CIT v Agnity India Technologies P Ltd High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The Transfer Pricing Officer has put Infosys into my comparables. I am a small captive software unit working only for my parent - can I get it thrown out?
  Yes. The Delhi High Court upheld the Tribunal's exclusion of Infosys Technologies Ltd from the comparable set of a captive software developer. Infosys was a giant with Rs.9,028 crore of revenue against the assessee's Rs.16.09 crore, it bore full entrepreneurial risk, owned branded products, spent heavily on advertising and research, and delivered half its work onsite. The assessee was a risk-free captive doing only offshore contract development for its parent. With Infosys and Satyam out, the one surviving comparable gave 11.11%, below the assessee's own 17% margin. No substantial question of law arose and the Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
• Tech Mahindra Ltd v DCIT — two independent answers to a secondary adjustment: the assessment year commenced before 1 April 2016, so the first proviso to s.92CE(1) shuts the section out; and there was no surviving primary adjustment for a consequential adjustment to attach to ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The TPO has re-characterised a payment to my associated enterprise as an interest-free loan and imputed notional interest on it, calling it a consequential adjustment. My year is well before 2016 and the underlying adjustment was itself deleted. Can he do that?
  No, on either of two grounds, and the ITAT Mumbai gave both on 24 August 2026 for assessment year 2008-09. First, there was nothing left for the imputed interest to attach to: the primary adjustment of Rs 440.12 crores on the exclusivity payment "was not ultimately made in the final assessment, pursuant to the directions of the Ld. DRP and after verification by the Ld.AO", and "Consequently, there was no surviving primary adjustment to which a consequential adjustment on account of notional interest could attach". Second, and independently, the year was out of range: "A.Y. 2008-09 is an assessment year commencing prior to 01/04/2016. Consequently, in view of proviso (ii) to section 92CE(1) of the Act, the provisions relating to secondary adjustment were not applicable to the transaction under consideration." The Tribunal deleted the notional-interest adjustment of Rs 72.34 lakhs on the exclusivity payment and the adjustment of Rs 69.82 crores on the upfront discount of Rs 524.93 crores carried forward from assessment year 2007-08, and applied the same reasoning mutatis mutandis to the transition fee. The appeal was partly allowed.
• Tetra Pak India Pvt Ltd v DCIT ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My APA has expired. The TPO now wants to benchmark an open year against the margin agreed in it. Can he?
  No. The Pune Bench held that comparing the operating profit margin agreed in an advance pricing agreement covering assessment years 2014-15 to 2018-19 with the actual operating margin earned in assessment year 2020-21, which is not a covered year of that agreement, is inappropriate and against the provisions of the Act. Section 92CC(4) read with sub-section (9A) confines an agreement to the years specified in it, and the confinement runs against the department as much as against the assessee. The issue was restored to the Assessing Officer and the TPO and the appeal was partly allowed.
• ACIT v Transworld Garnet India Private Limited ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The officer took the TPO's adjustment straight into a final order without giving me a draft order. The department says s.292B cures it. Does it?
  It does not, on this line of authority. The Tribunal held that once the assessee answers the description of an 'eligible assessee' under s.144C(15)(b) and a variation prejudicial to it is proposed, s.144C(1) is mandatory, and passing the final order without first forwarding a draft is a failure of a jurisdictional condition precedent, not a procedural lapse. Section 292B cures only technical or clerical defects in proceedings otherwise validly initiated and cannot confer a jurisdiction that was never lawfully assumed. The Revenue's alternative plea for a remand to let the officer start again was also rejected: a nullity cannot be revived by remand.
• DCIT v Kantar GDC India Private Limited ITATHelps departmentNo later treatment found
  The TPO is charging notional interest on my overdue receivables from my associated enterprise. Can I argue for a 90-day credit period by analogy to the secondary adjustment repatriation window in s.92CE and Rule 10CB?
  No, on this Tribunal's view. Section 92CE read with Rule 10CB operates only where a primary adjustment has been made in one of the specific situations the section lists, and the 90-day repatriation window attaches to that specific machinery; it cannot be borrowed as a general benchmark for the credit period allowable on outstanding receivables. The Tribunal instead directed the officer to adopt the credit period the TPO himself had adopted in the assessee's own case for the immediately preceding year that had reached the Tribunal.
• McDonald's Corporation v ACIT ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  You are withdrawing your appeals because MAP has settled the issue. What do you ask the Tribunal for in case the department does not implement the resolution?
  Ask for liberty to revive, and it will be given. The Delhi Bench permitted withdrawal of three appeals following a competent authority agreement under Article 27 of the India-United States treaty and dismissed them as withdrawn, but expressly with liberty to revive them again in the unlikely event that the MAP resolution is not given effect to, or if the dispute remains unresolved for any reason.
• Sky High Appeal XLIII Leasing v ACIT ITATHelps taxpayer
  Can the officer apply the PPT to my India-Ireland treaty claim just because both countries signed the MLI?
  No, on this Tribunal's view. The India-Ireland treaty is a covered tax agreement under the MLI, but the Tribunal held that no MLI provision — including the PPT — can be given effect in India without a separate notification under s.90(1), and none had been issued. The treaty benefits on aircraft lease rentals were allowed, the Tribunal also holding the lessors had no permanent establishment in India and that Article 8 covers the rental of aircraft in international traffic.
• Beauty Etoile Private Limited v Assessment Unit ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The TPO has used the 30 per cent EBITDA cap in s.94B as his benchmarking method and has applied it to interest I capitalised to work in progress rather than claimed. Can he do either?
  Neither. Section 94B is a restriction on the deduction of interest, not a method of determining an arm's length price, and it cannot be imported into the 'other method' under Rule 10AB, which requires a price charged or paid in an uncontrolled transaction with or between non-associated enterprises. And s.94B bites only on interest which is deductible in computing business income, so interest capitalised to work in progress and not claimed as a deduction in the year cannot be brought into the disallowance at all.
• VVF (India) Limited v NFAC — the secondary adjustment on a corporate guarantee deleted in the same order that sent the guarantee fee itself back to the TPO, and Rule 10CB's interest clock identified as running from the s.139(1) due date ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The TPO has fixed a guarantee commission rate I dispute AND imputed interest on the delay as a secondary adjustment. Can the secondary adjustment stand while the underlying rate is still being fought over?
  The ITAT Mumbai deleted it. On 14 February 2025, for assessment year 2020-21, the Tribunal remitted the corporate guarantee adjustment itself to the Assessing Officer and Transfer Pricing Officer for fresh adjudication in the light of the OECD's February 2020 report on the transfer pricing of financial transactions, holding that the Transfer Pricing Officer's use of external bank guarantee rates with a discount was "not in accordance with the transfer pricing principles". In the very next paragraph it dealt with the secondary adjustment separately and allowed the ground, noting "that as per rule 10CB computation of interest commences from the due date of filing the return of income" and that for the year under consideration that due date was 15 February 2021, and concluding that it did "not find any basis for making the secondary adjustment for the year under consideration". The appeal was partly allowed for statistical purposes.
• Novateur Electrical and Digital Systems Pvt Ltd v ACIT ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My case was moved between charges during a restructuring and the department says that gives it extra time under Explanation 1 to s.153 because of s.129. Is that right?
  No. The extension in Explanation 1 to s.153 for time taken in reopening a proceeding or in giving an opportunity of being reheard is available only where the assessee has demanded a rehearing under the proviso to s.129 — and s.129 applies only to a change of the incumbent of an office, not to a change of jurisdiction, which is s.127. Where the case simply moved from one jurisdiction to another and no rehearing was asked for, no time is excluded and the assessment is time-barred.
• Computer Modelling Group Ltd. v. ACIT — for a year after 1 April 2012, the proviso to s.209(1)(d) is not attracted where tax was in fact deducted at source ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My non-resident client's Indian customers did deduct tax at source, but the Assessing Officer has still charged s.234B interest for an assessment year after 2012-13, saying the Finance Act, 2012 proviso removes the s.209(1)(d) credit. Is that right?
  No. The Delhi Tribunal held that the proviso inserted in s.209(1)(d) by the Finance Act, 2012 with effect from 1 April 2012 'would apply only in a scenario where person responsible for deducting tax has paid or credited such income without deduction of tax', and that where the income was received by the assessee after deduction of tax at source the proviso is not applicable. Reading s.209(1)(d) with its proviso, it held that where in the case of a non-resident company the tax deductible at source has been paid, it is not permissible for the Revenue to charge interest under s.234B for an alleged failure to pay advance tax, and it allowed the ground for both assessment year 2012-13 and assessment year 2019-20.
• Valeo v ACIT (International Taxation), Chennai ITATHelps departmentNo later treatment found
  My French client offered dividend from its Indian subsidiaries at 5 per cent under the most favoured nation clause and claimed a refund. After the Supreme Court's decision in Nestle SA, what happens to that claim?
  It fails. The Chennai Tribunal applied Nestle SA and dismissed the ground, holding that the 5 per cent rate claimed under Article 11(2) of the India-France DTAA read with the Protocol most favoured nation clause, imported from India's treaties with Slovenia, Lithuania and Colombia, could not be given effect without a separate notification under s.90(1). The dividend therefore remains taxable at the treaty rate as notified, and the refund claimed on the 5 per cent basis goes.
• Iomedia India Pvt Ltd v ACIT ITATCuts both waysNo later treatment found
  I opted into the safe harbour and billed my AE at the prescribed mark-up. The TPO has still made an adjustment for interest on receivables collected late. Can he do that?
  Yes. Safe harbour under s.92CB and the Rule 10T series covers only an 'eligible international transaction' as exhaustively defined in Rule 10TC, and interest on outstanding receivables is not among clauses (i) to (x) of that definition. So the adjustment on delayed receivables is not subsumed in the mark-up offered under the safe harbour rules. On quantum, the Tribunal substituted LIBOR plus 200 basis points for the LIBOR plus 400 basis points adopted by the TPO and DRP.
• Linklaters LLP v ACIT (International Taxation), Mumbai ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The Assessing Officer has taxed my client, a UK limited liability partnership, under the Independent Personal Services Article of the treaty because its partners are professionals. Can that Article apply to a firm at all?
  No, on this Tribunal's view. The Mumbai Tribunal held that Article 15 of the India-United Kingdom DTAA deals only with the taxability of independent personal services or independent activity of a similar character and not with a partnership firm, and that the assessee, not being an individual, was outside it. On the same order the Tribunal also held, following its own decisions in the assessee's earlier years, that the remuneration received for providing legal services was not fees for technical services and that the treaty overrode the Act.
• Mondelez India Foods P. Ltd v Addl CIT ITATHelps taxpayerSuperseded by amendment
  The TPO's order is dated one day inside the sixty-day window as I count it, but the department counts it differently. Is the order time barred, and if it is, does the assessment fall with it?
  On the counting the Tribunal applied Pfizer Healthcare and the Madras High Court Division Bench in DCIT v Saint Gobain India: the s.153 expiry date is EXCLUDED, sixty days are counted back from it, and the TPO must pass his order BEFORE the sixtieth day. On that arithmetic a 31 March 2014 assessment deadline meant a TPO order by 29 January 2014, and the order of 30 January 2014 was barred by one day. THAT ARITHMETIC HAS SINCE BEEN REVERSED RETROSPECTIVELY: s.92CA(3AA), inserted by the Finance Act 2026 (Act 4 of 2026) with effect from 1 June 2007 and expressly notwithstanding any judgment of any court, deems the sixty days to be counted so that a 31 March (non-leap year) deadline permits a TPO order up to 30 January, a 31 March (leap year) deadline up to 31 January, and a 31 December deadline up to 1 November. The second holding survives the amendment: where the TPO's order IS invalid, there is no order under s.92CA(3), so there is no 'eligible assessee' within s.144C(15)(b), no reference to the DRP could be made, and the subsequent proceedings are without jurisdiction.
• Statutory position — the Finance Act, 2026 and reassessment: s.147A, s.292BC, the thirty-day floor in s.148(1), and ss.153(10) and 153B(1A) CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both waysUnder appeal
  The Finance Act 2026 seems to have changed the reassessment rules backwards in time. What exactly did it change, from which dates, and which of my grounds has it taken away?
  The Finance Act, 2026 (No. 4 of 2026), assented to on 30 March 2026, amended the Income-tax Act, 1961 through clauses 4 to 33, and six of those clauses are about assessment and reassessment. Clause 9 inserted section 147A, deemed in force from 1 April 2021, which makes the Assessing Officer for sections 148 and 148A an officer other than the National Faceless Assessment Centre or a section 144B(3) assessment unit, notwithstanding any judgment, section 151A or any scheme under it; clause 33 inserted section 292BC, also deemed in force from 1 April 2021, which makes an approval in any assessment or reassessment administrative and supervisory in nature and immune to attack for insufficient reasons or a missing digital signature. Clause 10 gave the section 148 notice a thirty-day floor from 30 March 2026, clause 11 substituted section 150 from 1 February 2026, and clauses 12 and 13 inserted section 153(10) and section 153B(1A), reaching back to 2009, to fix when a draft order under section 144C(1) may be made. Sections 147, 148A, 149, 151 and 151A were not amended at all. Section 147A has since been struck down by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Jyoti Sareen v. Union of India on 10 September 2026, and that judgment was stayed by the Supreme Court on 18 September 2026, which hears the appeal on 3 December 2026.
• Statutory position — section 158BC: the sixty-day notice, the two approvals, and the traps that kill a block assessment CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  My client has a section 158BC notice for a March 2025 search. How long has he got, what happens if he files late, and is there a section 153D approval to attack?
  The notice must give a period not exceeding sixty days for the block return, and that period can be extended by a further thirty days only in the narrow audit case described in the fifth proviso. If the return goes in after the period allowed, the second proviso says in terms that it 'shall not be deemed to be a return under section 139' — so a late block return is non est, with consequences that run all the way to the notice under section 143(2). There is no section 153D approval in a block assessment; the approvals are elsewhere — section 158BC(3) requires the prior approval of the Additional or Joint Commissioner or Director BEFORE the section 158BC notice is issued, and section 158BG requires the previous approval of the same rank BEFORE the assessment order is passed.
• Statutory position — s.144C(15)(b): who is an "eligible assessee", the two limbs, and the substitution by Act No. 12 of 2020 with effect from 1 April 2020 that brought in every non-resident not being a company CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  The Assessing Officer has forwarded a draft order to our partnership firm, which is non-resident but is not a company, and there is no Transfer Pricing Officer's order in the case. Is the firm an eligible assessee at all, and does it matter which assessment year we are in?
  It matters a great deal which year you are in. As s.144C(15)(b) stands on the departmental edition stamped Year 2025 it reads: "(b) 'eligible assessee' means,— (i) any person in whose case the variation referred to in sub-section (1) arises as a consequence of the order of the Transfer Pricing Officer passed under sub-section (3) of section 92CA; and (ii) any non-resident not being a company, or any foreign company:". Sub-clause (ii) in that form was substituted by Act No. 12 of 2020 with effect from 1 April 2020 — footnote 97 on the departmental edition stamped Year 2021 reads verbatim "Sub. by the Act No. 12 of 2020, w.e.f. 1-4-2020.", and footnote 91 on the Year 2022 edition repeats it. Before that substitution, and as printed on the editions stamped Year 2009 and Year 2019 (No. 2), sub-clause (ii) read simply "any foreign company". So a non-resident firm, a non-resident individual, a non-resident association of persons — any non-resident that is not a company — became an eligible assessee in its own right on 1 April 2020 and was not one before, unless it was brought in by limb (i). Limb (i) is independent of status: it catches ANY person, resident or not, company or not, where the variation in sub-section (1) arises as a consequence of an order of the Transfer Pricing Officer under s.92CA(3). Two things were added with effect from 1 September 2024 by Act No. 15 of 2024: a proviso to clause (b) reading "Provided that such eligible assessee shall not include person referred to in sub-section (1) of section 158BA or other person referred to in section 158BD.", and s.144C(16), "The provisions of this section shall not apply to any proceedings under Chapter XIV-B."
• Statutory position — s.144C(1) to (5): the Assessing Officer must, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Act, forward a draft order to an eligible assessee before he makes any prejudicial variation, and the assessee has thirty days to accept or to object to the Dispute Resolution Panel AND to the Assessing Officer CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  The Assessing Officer has served a final assessment order on our foreign company raising a transfer pricing addition, without ever serving a draft order. Was he obliged to serve one first, and what was I supposed to do with it if he had?
  He was obliged to serve one first, if the company is an eligible assessee and the variation is prejudicial. Section 144C(1), as printed on the departmental edition stamped Year 2025, reads: "The Assessing Officer shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act, in the first instance, forward a draft of the proposed order of assessment (hereafter in this section referred to as the draft order) to the eligible assessee if he proposes to make, on or after the 1st day of October, 2009, any variation which is prejudicial to the interest of such assessee." Three things follow from the words themselves. The obligation is cast in the mandatory "shall"; it operates "notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act", so it overrides the ordinary assessment machinery; and it bites "in the first instance", that is, before and not after the order that would otherwise be the assessment order. Sub-section (2) gives the eligible assessee thirty days of the receipt by him of the draft order to do one of two things: "(a) file his acceptance of the variations to the Assessing Officer; or (b) file his objections, if any, to such variation with,— (i) the Dispute Resolution Panel; and (ii) the Assessing Officer." The "and" in clause (b) is conjunctive: an objection is filed with the Panel and with the Assessing Officer, not with one or the other. Sub-section (3) requires the officer to complete the assessment on the basis of the draft order if the assessee intimates acceptance of the variation or if no objections are received within the period specified in sub-section (2). Sub-section (4) fixes the time for that order — one month from the end of the month in which the acceptance is received or the period of filing objections expires, notwithstanding s.153 or s.153B. Sub-section (5) is the Panel's charging provision: where any objection is received under sub-section (2), the Panel "shall ... issue such directions, as it thinks fit, for the guidance of the Assessing Officer to enable him to complete the assessment".
• Statutory position — s.144C(2), (4), (5), (12) and (13): the thirty days to object run from receipt, but the officer's one month and the Panel's nine months both run from the END OF THE MONTH, and the two one-month clocks start on different events CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  We received a draft order on 12 March. Nobody objected. When was the final order due, and if we had objected, by when must the Dispute Resolution Panel have issued its directions and by when must the officer have given effect to them?
  Four clocks, and only one of them runs from a date. Section 144C(2) gives the eligible assessee thirty days "of the receipt by him of the draft order" to file acceptance with the Assessing Officer or objections with the Panel and the Assessing Officer — that one runs from the date of receipt. The other three run from the end of a month, and that is where the counting goes wrong. Section 144C(4): where the assessee accepts or files no objection, "The Assessing Officer shall, notwithstanding anything contained in section 153 or section 153B, pass the assessment order under sub-section (3) within one month from the end of the month in which,— (a) the acceptance is received; or (b) the period of filing of objections under sub-section (2) expires." Section 144C(12): "No direction under sub-section (5) shall be issued after nine months from the end of the month in which the draft order is forwarded to the eligible assessee." Section 144C(13): "Upon receipt of the directions issued under sub-section (5), the Assessing Officer shall, in conformity with the directions, complete, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in section 153 or section 153B, the assessment without providing any further opportunity of being heard to the assessee, within one month from the end of the month in which such direction is received." Note the four different starting EVENTS. The thirty days in (2) start on RECEIPT by the assessee. The nine months in (12) start at the end of the month in which the draft order is FORWARDED — the officer's act of despatch, not the assessee's receipt, so the (2) clock and the (12) clock can start in different months on the same draft order. The one month in (4) starts at the end of the month in which the acceptance is received or the thirty-day period expires. The one month in (13) starts at the end of the month in which the DIRECTION is received by the officer. Both (4) and (13) run notwithstanding s.153 and s.153B.
• Statutory position — s.144C(8) with its Explanation, and s.144C(10) and (11): the Panel may confirm, reduce or ENHANCE but may not set aside or remit, the Explanation inserted by the Finance Act 2012 is retrospective to 1 April 2009, the direction binds the Assessing Officer, and no direction may issue without an opportunity of being heard — with what s.253 and s.246A provide about appeal CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  We are considering objecting to a draft order. Can the Dispute Resolution Panel make our position worse, can it send the matter back for fresh enquiry, and if we lose before it, do we appeal to the Commissioner (Appeals) or straight to the Tribunal?
  It can make your position worse; it cannot send the matter back; and the appeal lies to the Tribunal, not to the Commissioner (Appeals). Section 144C(8), as printed on the departmental edition stamped Year 2025, reads: "The Dispute Resolution Panel may confirm, reduce or enhance the variations proposed in the draft order so, however, that it shall not set aside any proposed variation or issue any direction under sub-section (5) for further enquiry and passing of the assessment order." The Explanation to that sub-section reads: "For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the power of the Dispute Resolution Panel to enhance the variation shall include and shall be deemed always to have included the power to consider any matter arising out of the assessment proceedings relating to the draft order, notwithstanding that such matter was raised or not by the eligible assessee." Footnote 76 on the departmental edition stamped Year 2014 records that Explanation verbatim as "Inserted by the Finance Act, 2012, w.r.e.f. 1-4-2009" — note the date: it is retrospective to 1 April 2009, the date the section itself was inserted from, and not 2012. The original edition stamped Year 2009 prints sub-section (8) with no Explanation at all. Sub-section (10): "Every direction issued by the Dispute Resolution Panel shall be binding on the Assessing Officer." Sub-section (11): "No direction under sub-section (5) shall be issued unless an opportunity of being heard is given to the assessee and the Assessing Officer on such directions which are prejudicial to the interest of the assessee or the interest of the revenue, respectively." Sub-section (9) resolves a difference of opinion among the members by the opinion of the majority. On appeal: s.246A(1)(a), on the departmental edition stamped Year 2025, excepts from the first appeal "an order passed in pursuance of directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel", and s.253(1)(d), on the edition stamped Year 2024 (No. 2), gives a direct right of appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against "an order passed by an Assessing Officer under sub-section (3), of section 143 or section 147 or section 153A or section 153C in pursuance of the directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel or an order passed under section 154 in respect of such order". Sub-sections (2A) and (3A) of s.253 are printed as "[***]" on the current editions, and the departmental edition stamped Year 2016 carries footnotes against both reading "Omtt. by Act No. 28 of 2016 (w.e.f. 1-6-2016)."

Listed strongest first: Supreme Court, then High Court, then Tribunal, then CBDT. Nothing here has yet been read in full by a chartered accountant — open an entry to see where it came from.