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Case lawConcepts › The clock runs from the last panchnama — but only if that panchnama records a search

The clock runs from the last panchnama — but only if that panchnama records a search

The search party came back weeks later just to break the seals and hand back the keys. Does that second panchnama give the department another year?

The search party came back weeks later just to break the seals and hand back the keys. Does that second panchnama give the department another year?

Not if nothing was searched for on that day. Limitation in a search assessment is tied to the execution of the last of the authorisations, and under s.153B(2)(a) — and under Explanation 2(a) to the old s.158BE — the authorisation is deemed executed on the conclusion of the search as recorded in the last panchnama. A document drawn up only to give effect to the revocation of a s.132(3) restraint order records no search, so it is not that panchnama and it does not move the date.

This is an explainer, not a judgment. It states the law in our own words, which is exactly why it needs checking. Everything below was written from the sources listed at the foot of this page, and no chartered accountant has yet signed it off. Read the source before you rely on it in a reply or an appeal.

Three different regimes have governed search assessments, and the first thing to fix is which one your client is in. Chapter XIV-B block assessment applied to searches initiated up to 31 May 2003, with the time limit in s.158BE. Searches from 1 June 2003 to 31 March 2021 were assessed under s.153A, with the time limit in s.153B. Chapter XIV-B was revived by the Finance (No. 2) Act 2024 for searches initiated on or after 1 September 2024, and the corpus covers that regime at block-assessment-search-chapter-xiv-b. The panchnama point below was decided under the old s.158BE, but the operative words were carried into s.153B, so the reasoning travels.

The deeming provision is what makes the panchnama matter. Section 153B(2) provides that the authorisation shall be deemed to have been executed, in the case of a search, "on the conclusion of search as recorded in the last panchnama drawn in relation to any person". Explanation 2(a) to the old s.158BE was in almost identical terms: the authorisation was deemed executed "in the case of search, on the conclusion of search as recorded in the last panchnama drawn in relation to any person in whose case the warrant of authorisation has been issued". Note what the words do not say. They do not say the clock runs from the last panchnama; they say it runs from the conclusion of the search, and the panchnama is the record of that conclusion. A panchnama that records no search records no conclusion of a search.

That is the whole of the Delhi High Court's decision in CIT v. S.K. Katyal, which the corpus now holds at cit-v-sk-katyal-panchnama-that-records-no-search. The search there ran for one day, 17 November 2000. A restraint order under s.132(3) was served on a sealed cash box. On 3 January 2001 the restraint was revoked, the seals were found intact and removed, the keys were handed back, and a second panchnama was drawn on the same warrant. The court held that this second document was not a panchnama of the type Explanation 2(a) speaks of, so the assessment made on 30 January 2003 was out of time. The court's own summary of the case law, at paragraph 26 of the judgment, is worth having in front of you when you argue the point: "These decisions clearly establish (i) a search is essentially an invasion of the privacy of the person whose property or person is subjected to search; (ii) normally, a search must be continuous; (iii) if it cannot be continuous for some plausible reason, the hiatus in the search must be explained; (iv) if no cogent or plausible reason is shown for the hiatus in the search, the second or "resumed" search would be illegal; (v) by merely mentioning in the panchnama that a search has been temporarily suspended does not, ipso facto, continue the search. It would have to be seen as a fact as to whether the search continued or had concluded; (vi) merely because a panchnama is drawn up on a particular date, it does not mean that a search was conducted and/or concluded on that date; (vii) the panchnama must be a record of a search or seizure for it to qualify as the panchnama mentioned in Explanation 2(a) to Section 158BE of the said Act."

The restraint order under s.132(3) is the hinge, and it is worth being precise about it. Where physical possession cannot be taken because of volume, weight, physical characteristics or dangerous nature, the second proviso to s.132(1) allows a prohibitory order which is deemed to be a seizure. Where a prohibitory order is served for any other reason, it is served under s.132(3), and the Explanation to that sub-section says in terms that serving such an order "shall not be deemed to be seizure". By s.132(8A) an order under s.132(3) cannot remain in force beyond sixty days unless extended for recorded reasons with the approval of the Director or Commissioner. So a s.132(3) order neither seizes anything nor, of itself, keeps a search alive. The Delhi High Court answered the revenue's contrary argument with a question: if a search ends only when a restraint order is revoked, when does a search end in a case where no restraint order was ever passed?

The "paper panchnama" challenge follows from all this. What you are alleging is that a printed panchnama form was filled in on a date on which no exploratory activity took place, in order to shift the starting point of limitation. The facts that carry it are on the face of the document: paragraph 8 gives the start and closing times and says whether the closure was temporary or final; the column for things found but not seized will list items already inventorised on the earlier date; the entry for a fresh s.132(3) order will be blank. Add the unexplained gap. In Katyal the gap was about six weeks and the court said that even if a search had taken place on the later date, it could not be regarded as legal, following the Kerala High Court's view in Dr C. Balakrishnan Nair that an unexplained hiatus of fourteen days made a resumed search illegal.

One caution on the current regime, and it cuts two ways. Section 158BE as printed on incometaxindia.gov.in still provides that the order under s.158BC shall be passed "within twelve months from the end of the month in which the last of the authorisations for search under section 132, or requisition under section 132A, was executed or made, as the case may be". That text is superseded: the Finance Act 2025 substituted "from the end of the quarter" for "from the end of the month", with effect from 1 February 2025, so for a current search the twelve months run from the end of the quarter and a limitation computed off the departmental website will be wrong. The deeming, on the other hand, does survive the revival. It sits in the Explanation to s.158B, which provides that the last of the authorisations shall be deemed to have been executed, "in the case of search, on the conclusion of search as recorded in the last panchnama drawn in relation to any person in whose case the warrant of authorisation has been issued" — the same words the Katyal reasoning turns on. So the argument travels into the revived Chapter XIV-B intact; only the length and the starting point of the period have changed. Read both sections as they stand for your search date rather than off the website's cached text.

Why it matters

In a search assessment the limitation plea is often the strongest point on the file, and it turns entirely on which panchnama counts. The department will produce the latest dated panchnama and stop there. If that document records nothing but the removal of seals, the return of keys or the revocation of a restraint order, it does not fix the date, and an assessment that looks comfortably in time is out of time. The point has to be taken before the Tribunal, because it is the last fact-finding authority and the High Court will not disturb its finding on whether a search actually took place.

What to do

Where people go wrong

Unsettled, or not pinned down. This does not tell you how a properly explained gap is to be justified — no decision was located setting out what reasons the department must record for splitting a search. The Income-tax Act 2025 equivalents of s.132, s.153B and s.158BE were not traced on any page fetched, so no clause numbers under that Act are given. Nothing here covers the separate s.153C timeline, which the corpus deals with at when-the-s153c-clock-starts-for-the-other-person.

Authorities on these sections

Judgments in this library that turn on the same provisions.

Where this came from

Every page in this library links to what it was written from, so you can check it rather than take our word for it.