A search was made on someone else and my papers were found. From which date are my six years counted - the search, or when my Assessing Officer got the papers?
From the date your Assessing Officer received the material. The Supreme Court held that the proviso to section 153C(1) does not deal only with abatement: it also fixes the date from which the six year period is reckoned for the person who was not searched. The Revenue's argument that the proviso is confined to abatement, so that the period relates back to the date of the search on the other person, was held insubstantial and without merit. The Court approved the Delhi High Court's reasoning in SSP Aviation and dismissed the Revenue's appeals.
Decided by the Supreme Court (Supreme Court of India - S. Ravindra Bhat and Aravind Kumar JJ; judgment by S. Ravindra Bhat J) on 2023-09-26, reported as 2023 INSC 882; Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 6644 of 2016, with SLP (C) Nos. 14447 of 2016 and 23621 of 2016 and Diary No. 30718 of 2023. It bears on section 153C, section 153A, section 132, section 132A, section 260A of the Income Tax Act 1961, in Search, Survey & Block Assessment and Assessment & Scrutiny matters.
This is the Supreme Court's settlement of a point that decided a large number of section 153C assessments: how far back the department can go against a third party. Read the Revenue's way, the six years ran from the search on someone else, so a delay of years in handing the material over would silently push the third party's exposure back to ten years or more. The Court refused that, and its reason is as useful as its conclusion - the prejudice is disproportionate to a person who is drawn into the proceedings unwittingly and in many cases has no concern with the search at all, and would have to preserve records far longer than the law requires. Such disastrous and harsh consequences cannot be attributed to Parliament. The judgment also puts the Delhi High Court's SSP Aviation reasoning beyond argument in other High Courts.
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Search and seizure proceedings were carried out at the premises of the KOUTON Group on 19 February 2009. On scrutiny, the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over the searched party formed the opinion that some documents and material belonging to the respondent assessees were involved. Notices were then issued to those assessees by the Assessing Officers having jurisdiction over them, on 25 February 2010 in two of the matters, 12 March 2009 in a third and 11 August 2014 in the fourth. The assessees contended that the period for which they were required to file returns commenced only from the date the materials were forwarded to their own Assessing Officers. The Revenue contended that the six year period ran from the date the search under section 132 was conducted on the main assessee. The Tribunal accepted the assessees' position and the Delhi High Court dismissed the Revenue's appeals under section 260A. The Revenue came to the Supreme Court in four sets of matters, relying on the Delhi High Court's Division Bench decision in SSP Aviation Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (2012) 346 ITR 177 for the proposition that the date in the proviso to section 153C(1) is relatable to the second proviso to section 153A only so far as abatement is concerned.
The appeals were dismissed, without order as to costs. On a plain interpretation of section 153C(1), the parliamentary intent in enacting the proviso was to cater not merely to the question of abatement but also to the date from which the six year period is to be reckoned in respect of the third party whose premises were not searched. The Revenue's argument that the proviso is confined in its application to abatement was held insubstantial and without merit. For the person other than the searched person, the relevant date is the date on which the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over him receives the books of account, documents or assets seized or requisitioned, and both the pendency and abatement question and the six year computation are examined by reference to that date. The reasoning of the Delhi High Court in SSP Aviation, set out at length in the judgment, was approved as supported by a plain reading of section 153C.
The Court set out sections 153A and 153C. Section 153C provides that where the Assessing Officer is satisfied that seized money or valuables belong to, or seized books or documents pertain to or contain information relating to, a person other than the searched person, the material is handed over to the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over that other person, who then proceeds under section 153A if satisfied the material has a bearing on the determination of that person's total income for the six assessment years. Its proviso directs that, in the case of such other person, the reference in the second proviso to section 153A(1) to the date of initiation of the search or of the requisition shall be construed as a reference to the date of receiving the seized material by the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over him. The Court read that substitution as doing both jobs, fixing the reckoning date as well as the abatement date. It then tested the Revenue's construction by its consequence. Without the SSP Aviation reading, the Assessing Officer holding the searched party's material could take his own time to forward the papers, and if the date then related back to the seizure the prejudice to the third party would be disproportionate: a person drawn in unwittingly, often with no concern in the search at all, would in a case of a four-year delay have to preserve records for as long as ten years, which the law does not require. Such disastrous and harsh consequences cannot be attributed to Parliament.
the Parliamentary intent to enact the proviso was to cater not merely to the question of abatement but also with regard to the date from which the six year period was to be reckoned
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Handle my notice → Ask a CA on WhatsAppFrom the date your Assessing Officer received the material. The Supreme Court held that the proviso to section 153C(1) does not deal only with abatement: it also fixes the date from which the six year period is reckoned for the person who was not searched. The Revenue's argument that the proviso is confined to abatement, so that the period relates back to the date of the search on the other person, was held insubstantial and without merit. The Court approved the Delhi High Court's reasoning in SSP Aviation and dismissed the Revenue's appeals. This was decided by the Supreme Court (Supreme Court of India - S. Ravindra Bhat and Aravind Kumar JJ; judgment by S. Ravindra Bhat J) and bears on section 153C, section 153A, section 132, section 132A, section 260A of the Income Tax Act 1961. It is reported as 2023 INSC 882; Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 6644 of 2016, with SLP (C) Nos. 14447 of 2016 and 23621 of 2016 and Diary No. 30718 of 2023. This is the Supreme Court's settlement of a point that decided a large number of section 153C assessments: how far back the department can go against a third party. Read the Revenue's way, the six years ran from the search on someone else, so a delay of years in handing the material over would silently push the third party's exposure back to ten years or more. The Court refused that, and its reason is as useful as its conclusion - the prejudice is disproportionate to a person who is drawn into the proceedings unwittingly and in many cases has no concern with the search at all, and would have to preserve records far longer than the law requires. Such disastrous and harsh consequences cannot be attributed to Parliament. The judgment also puts the Delhi High Court's SSP Aviation reasoning beyond argument in other High Courts. If it applies to you, the first step is this: Get the date of receipt on record first. Ask for the satisfaction note and the date on which the seized material was actually handed to your Assessing Officer, and compute the six years from that date.
Search and seizure proceedings were carried out at the premises of the KOUTON Group on 19 February 2009. On scrutiny, the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over the searched party formed the opinion that some documents and material belonging to the respondent assessees were involved. Notices were then issued to those assessees by the Assessing Officers having jurisdiction over them, on 25 February 2010 in two of the matters, 12 March 2009 in a third and 11 August 2014 in the fourth. The assessees contended that the period for which they were required to file returns commenced only from the date the materials were forwarded to their own Assessing Officers. The Revenue contended that the six year period ran from the date the search under section 132 was conducted on the main assessee. The Tribunal accepted the assessees' position and the Delhi High Court dismissed the Revenue's appeals under section 260A. The Revenue came to the Supreme Court in four sets of matters, relying on the Delhi High Court's Division Bench decision in SSP Aviation Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (2012) 346 ITR 177 for the proposition that the date in the proviso to section 153C(1) is relatable to the second proviso to section 153A only so far as abatement is concerned. The matter was decided on 2023-09-26 by the Supreme Court (Supreme Court of India - S. Ravindra Bhat and Aravind Kumar JJ; judgment by S. Ravindra Bhat J). On those facts the Supreme Court held as follows. The appeals were dismissed, without order as to costs. On a plain interpretation of section 153C(1), the parliamentary intent in enacting the proviso was to cater not merely to the question of abatement but also to the date from which the six year period is to be reckoned in respect of the third party whose premises were not searched. The Revenue's argument that the proviso is confined in its application to abatement was held insubstantial and without merit. For the person other than the searched person, the relevant date is the date on which the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over him receives the books of account, documents or assets seized or requisitioned, and both the pendency and abatement question and the six year computation are examined by reference to that date. The reasoning of the Delhi High Court in SSP Aviation, set out at length in the judgment, was approved as supported by a plain reading of section 153C.
The Court set out sections 153A and 153C. Section 153C provides that where the Assessing Officer is satisfied that seized money or valuables belong to, or seized books or documents pertain to or contain information relating to, a person other than the searched person, the material is handed over to the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over that other person, who then proceeds under section 153A if satisfied the material has a bearing on the determination of that person's total income for the six assessment years. Its proviso directs that, in the case of such other person, the reference in the second proviso to section 153A(1) to the date of initiation of the search or of the requisition shall be construed as a reference to the date of receiving the seized material by the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over him. The Court read that substitution as doing both jobs, fixing the reckoning date as well as the abatement date. It then tested the Revenue's construction by its consequence. Without the SSP Aviation reading, the Assessing Officer holding the searched party's material could take his own time to forward the papers, and if the date then related back to the seizure the prejudice to the third party would be disproportionate: a person drawn in unwittingly, often with no concern in the search at all, would in a case of a four-year delay have to preserve records for as long as ten years, which the law does not require. Such disastrous and harsh consequences cannot be attributed to Parliament. In the words reproduced by the source cited on this page: "the Parliamentary intent to enact the proviso was to cater not merely to the question of abatement but also with regard to the date from which the six year period was to be reckoned"
It was decided by the Supreme Court on 2023-09-26 and is reported as 2023 INSC 882; Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 6644 of 2016, with SLP (C) Nos. 14447 of 2016 and 23621 of 2016 and Diary No. 30718 of 2023. Binding on every court and authority in India. A Supreme Court decision binds every assessing officer, every Commissioner (Appeals), every bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and every High Court in India. An officer who declines to follow it is acting contrary to law, and that refusal is itself a ground of appeal. On section 153C, section 153A, section 132, section 132A, section 260A, the practical question is whether the facts of your own notice match the facts of this case closely enough for the same rule to apply.
It helps the taxpayer. The appeals were dismissed, without order as to costs. On a plain interpretation of section 153C(1), the parliamentary intent in enacting the proviso was to cater not merely to the question of abatement but also to the date from which the six year period is to be reckoned in respect of the third party whose premises were not searched. The Revenue's argument that the proviso is confined in its application to abatement was held insubstantial and without merit. For the person other than the searched person, the relevant date is the date on which the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over him receives the books of account, documents or assets seized or requisitioned, and both the pendency and abatement question and the six year computation are examined by reference to that date. The reasoning of the Delhi High Court in SSP Aviation, set out at length in the judgment, was approved as supported by a plain reading of section 153C. It arises in Search, Survey & Block Assessment and Assessment & Scrutiny matters, on section 153C, section 153A, section 132, section 132A, section 260A of the Income Tax Act 1961, and was decided by Supreme Court of India - S. Ravindra Bhat and Aravind Kumar JJ; judgment by S. Ravindra Bhat J. Before relying on it, read the source linked on this page and check whether it has since been distinguished, overruled or overtaken by an amendment to the Income Tax Act. In practice the steps that follow from it are these. Check every year covered by the notice against that date, and take the objection that any year outside the block is beyond jurisdiction, before the assessment is framed. Keep the abatement question separate. The proviso serves both purposes, so a pending proceeding of yours abates by reference to the same receipt date, not the search date. Where the handover was delayed by years, put the delay itself in the record - the Court treated the prejudice from delayed transmission as the reason the Revenue's construction fails.
Still good law. A reportable Supreme Court judgment of September 2023 on the construction of the proviso to section 153C(1). I have not checked for any later decision or amendment. Note that section 153A applies to searches initiated on or before 31 March 2021, so the case governs the pre-2021 block assessment scheme; searches after that date fall under the assessment scheme that replaced it, on which this judgment does not speak. Correction to the statement earlier in this note that this judgment does not speak to a search initiated after 31 March 2021: it does, through s.149. Date scope: s.153A(1) by its closing limb, and s.153C by its sub-section (3), reach no search initiated on or after 1 April 2021, but this entry is not spent by that — a search initiated between 1 April 2021 and 31 August 2024 is, by force of s.152(3), a reassessment under ss.147 to 151 as they stood immediately before the Finance (No. 2) Act 2024, and the first proviso to s.149(1) in that frozen form bars a s.148 notice for any assessment year beginning on or before 1 April 2021 which could not have been reached within the time limits of s.153A or s.153C as they stood before the Finance Act 2021, so the reckoning of the block of assessment years worked out here is imported into that middle window and continues to decide those cases and must not be treated as spent; only a search initiated on or after 1 September 2024, which falls under the substituted Chapter XIV-B, is outside it. No source could be cited for that finding. Checking whether an authority still stands matters as much as knowing what it held: a decision may be overruled on one point and survive on another, or the provision it interprets may have been amended since. Read the source and the editor's note on this page before relying on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal.
The Court decided only the reckoning date. It did not consider what material is sufficient to found the satisfaction under section 153C, nor whether these particular assessments were otherwise valid, and it recorded that the facts in each of the four appeals differ while taking the lead matter's facts for the discussion. The harvested text contains an evident typographical error, referring to a notice under Section 154 A where section 153A is plainly meant. The batch line gave no reporter citations for this judgment, so the neutral citation and the case numbers from the judgment's own first page are used instead. This library shows the verification state of every entry openly. This entry has not yet been read in full by a chartered accountant. The summary reflects the sources listed on this page. Read the source before you rely on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
The appeals were dismissed, without order as to costs. On a plain interpretation of section 153C(1), the parliamentary intent in enacting the proviso was to cater not merely to the question of abatement but also to the date from which the six year period is to be reckoned in respect of the third party whose premises were not searched. The Revenue's argument that the proviso is confined in its application to abatement was held insubstantial and without merit. For the person other than the searched person, the relevant date is the date on which the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over him receives the books of account, documents or assets seized or requisitioned, and both the pendency and abatement question and the six year computation are examined by reference to that date. The reasoning of the Delhi High Court in SSP Aviation, set out at length in the judgment, was approved as supported by a plain reading of section 153C.
TaxSphere, “CIT v Jasjit Singh”, https://taxnotice.vittsphere.com/caselaw/case/cit-v-jasjit-singh/ (validity last checked 2026-08-29)
The judgment itself is a government work and may be quoted freely. The summary, the validity note and the reasoning on this page are this library's own writing: quote them with attribution, and please do not present either as the words of the court — this page keeps the two apart and so should a quotation of it.
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My client was searched in May 2024 and has a section 148 notice for assessment year 2015-16. Which limitation applies, and is the notice good?
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The notice has come from an officer in a place I have nothing to do with. Can I say he has no jurisdiction, who decides that, and have I already lost the point by filing my return and answering him?
A search was carried out at my client's premises in March 2025 and the notice quotes section 158BC. My whole file of authority is on section 153A. Which law actually applies to him?
