The approval under the proviso was a single general approval covering a class of notices, and we already gave the department this information once. Are either of those answers?
Neither. The Court held that an approval given in respect of the points or matters enumerated is good whether the information sought is specific or general - 'so long as that is so, the requirement of law is satisfied'. It also rejected the argument that information already available with the department need not be furnished again, and held that a bank's duty of secrecy yields to disclosure under compulsion of law.
Decided by the High Court (T.S. Thakur J) on 2001-01-04, reported as (2002) 174 CTR (Kar) 418 (writ petitions; connected matter W.P. No. 38360 of 1999). It bears on section 133(6), section 133 of the Income Tax Act 1961, in Evidence & Burden of Proof and Assessment & Scrutiny matters.
These are the three practical objections a bank or a professional actually raises to a s.133(6) notice - the approval was not case-specific, you already have this, and we owe our client confidentiality. This judgment answers all three, and the Supreme Court approved the construction of the section that it and the Division Bench adopted.
Binding within that High Court's jurisdiction. Persuasive elsewhere.
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Banks challenged notices under s.133(6) requiring information about their customers' accounts. Three contentions were pressed: that the demand amounted to a roving enquiry in proceedings not before the officer; that the information sought was already available with the department in one form or another and need not be furnished again without disclosing the basis of the demand; and that the approval under the second proviso, being general, did not answer the statutory requirement. The banks also relied on their obligation to maintain secrecy in banking transactions.
The writ petitions were dismissed without costs. Section 133(6) is wide enough to empower the officer to call for information even when no proceeding is actually before him. The approval granted under the second proviso is and must be deemed to be in regard to the information on the points enumerated, regardless of whether it constitutes specific or general information, and so long as that is so the requirement of law is satisfied. The contention that the information was already with the department, and the contention that the enquiry was a roving one, were both held to be covered against the petitioners by the Court's earlier decision. The banks' obligation of secrecy was held to be subject to the recognised exceptions, including disclosure under the compulsion of law.
The Court read the second proviso as attaching to the subject matter of the demand - the points or matters on which information is required - rather than to the individual notice or the individual person served. Once the sanctioning authority has applied itself to those points or matters, the safeguard has operated, and nothing in the proviso requires the approval to descend to each addressee. On the roving-enquiry and already-available contentions the Court did not reason afresh but held that its own earlier decision squarely covered both aspects. On secrecy, the Court took the duty as a qualified one, subject to disclosure compelled by statute, and s.133(6) is such a statute.
The approval granted is and must be deemed to be in regard to the information on the points that have been enumerated
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Handle my notice → Ask a CA on WhatsAppNeither. The Court held that an approval given in respect of the points or matters enumerated is good whether the information sought is specific or general - 'so long as that is so, the requirement of law is satisfied'. It also rejected the argument that information already available with the department need not be furnished again, and held that a bank's duty of secrecy yields to disclosure under compulsion of law. This was decided by the High Court (T.S. Thakur J) and bears on section 133(6), section 133 of the Income Tax Act 1961. It is reported as (2002) 174 CTR (Kar) 418 (writ petitions; connected matter W.P. No. 38360 of 1999). These are the three practical objections a bank or a professional actually raises to a s.133(6) notice - the approval was not case-specific, you already have this, and we owe our client confidentiality. This judgment answers all three, and the Supreme Court approved the construction of the section that it and the Division Bench adopted. If it applies to you, the first step is this: Do not build the reply on the approval being general rather than notice-specific; that argument has been rejected here.
Banks challenged notices under s.133(6) requiring information about their customers' accounts. Three contentions were pressed: that the demand amounted to a roving enquiry in proceedings not before the officer; that the information sought was already available with the department in one form or another and need not be furnished again without disclosing the basis of the demand; and that the approval under the second proviso, being general, did not answer the statutory requirement. The banks also relied on their obligation to maintain secrecy in banking transactions. The matter was decided on 2001-01-04 by the High Court (T.S. Thakur J). On those facts the High Court held as follows. The writ petitions were dismissed without costs. Section 133(6) is wide enough to empower the officer to call for information even when no proceeding is actually before him. The approval granted under the second proviso is and must be deemed to be in regard to the information on the points enumerated, regardless of whether it constitutes specific or general information, and so long as that is so the requirement of law is satisfied. The contention that the information was already with the department, and the contention that the enquiry was a roving one, were both held to be covered against the petitioners by the Court's earlier decision. The banks' obligation of secrecy was held to be subject to the recognised exceptions, including disclosure under the compulsion of law.
The Court read the second proviso as attaching to the subject matter of the demand - the points or matters on which information is required - rather than to the individual notice or the individual person served. Once the sanctioning authority has applied itself to those points or matters, the safeguard has operated, and nothing in the proviso requires the approval to descend to each addressee. On the roving-enquiry and already-available contentions the Court did not reason afresh but held that its own earlier decision squarely covered both aspects. On secrecy, the Court took the duty as a qualified one, subject to disclosure compelled by statute, and s.133(6) is such a statute. In the words reproduced by the source cited on this page: "The approval granted is and must be deemed to be in regard to the information on the points that have been enumerated"
It was decided by the High Court on 2001-01-04 and is reported as (2002) 174 CTR (Kar) 418 (writ petitions; connected matter W.P. No. 38360 of 1999). Binding within that High Court's jurisdiction. Persuasive elsewhere. A High Court decision binds the assessing officer, the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal within that state, and is persuasive elsewhere. If your assessment is in a different jurisdiction, check whether your own High Court has taken the same view before relying on it. On section 133(6), section 133, the practical question is whether the facts of your own notice match the facts of this case closely enough for the same rule to apply.
It helps the department, and it appears in this library for that reason — you need to know what the Assessing Officer will cite against you. The writ petitions were dismissed without costs. Section 133(6) is wide enough to empower the officer to call for information even when no proceeding is actually before him. The approval granted under the second proviso is and must be deemed to be in regard to the information on the points enumerated, regardless of whether it constitutes specific or general information, and so long as that is so the requirement of law is satisfied. The contention that the information was already with the department, and the contention that the enquiry was a roving one, were both held to be covered against the petitioners by the Court's earlier decision. The banks' obligation of secrecy was held to be subject to the recognised exceptions, including disclosure under the compulsion of law. It arises in Evidence & Burden of Proof and Assessment & Scrutiny matters, on section 133(6), section 133 of the Income Tax Act 1961, and was decided by T.S. Thakur J. Before relying on it, read the source linked on this page and check whether it has since been distinguished, overruled or overtaken by an amendment to the Income Tax Act. In practice the steps that follow from it are these. If the information genuinely is already with the department, furnish it again and say where and when it was furnished before - the objection goes to burden, not to jurisdiction. For a bank or a custodian, record in the reply that disclosure is being made under compulsion of law; that preserves the position with the customer without resisting the notice. Reserve any objection to the absence of approval altogether - the total absence of approval is a different and better point than the approval's generality.
Still good law. The Supreme Court, dismissing the banks' special leave petitions on 25 February 2002, said it agreed with the construction of the section placed on it by the single judge and the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court. Nothing doubting or overruling this decision was found. Note that on the separate question whether approval was obtained at all, the Amritsar Bench of the Tribunal in Amrik Singh v ITO, decided 11 May 2016, held that an enquiry with no approval at all is an illegal exercise of power - this decision does not touch that case. No source could be cited for that finding. Checking whether an authority still stands matters as much as knowing what it held: a decision may be overruled on one point and survive on another, or the provision it interprets may have been amended since. Read the source and the editor's note on this page before relying on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal.
This is the single judge's order; the writ appeals from it were decided by the Division Bench in U.G. Upadhya v DIT on 7 December 2001, and the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions on 25 February 2002. The judgment is short and its paragraph numbering as retrieved runs only to a handful of paragraphs; the approval passage is at para 4 and the contentions are set out at para 2. The Court's answer to the roving-enquiry and already-available points is by adoption of its own earlier decision, which the order refers to without setting out the name on the text retrieved - that earlier decision could not be identified from this document. This library shows the verification state of every entry openly. This entry has not yet been read in full by a chartered accountant. The summary reflects the sources listed on this page. Read the source before you rely on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
The writ petitions were dismissed without costs. Section 133(6) is wide enough to empower the officer to call for information even when no proceeding is actually before him. The approval granted under the second proviso is and must be deemed to be in regard to the information on the points enumerated, regardless of whether it constitutes specific or general information, and so long as that is so the requirement of law is satisfied. The contention that the information was already with the department, and the contention that the enquiry was a roving one, were both held to be covered against the petitioners by the Court's earlier decision. The banks' obligation of secrecy was held to be subject to the recognised exceptions, including disclosure under the compulsion of law.
TaxSphere, “Karnataka Bank Ltd v Secretary, Government of India (Karnataka High Court)”, https://taxnotice.vittsphere.com/caselaw/case/karnataka-bank-v-secretary-govt-of-india-hc-133-6-general-approval/ (validity last checked 2026-09-17)
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The bank has a s.133(6) notice asking for customer loan-repayment details and there is no assessment pending on anyone. Can the officer do that?
We are exempt from deducting tax on these deposits. Does that also mean we need not give the information?
Our counsel wants to cite a Bombay case that says s.133(6) cannot be used for a fishing enquiry. Is it still good?
The letter from the Investigation wing cites a provision that does not exist. Is it void for that?
