Our counsel wants to cite a Bombay case that says s.133(6) cannot be used for a fishing enquiry. Is it still good?
No. This decision construed s.133(6) as it stood before the Finance Act 1995, when the sub-section spoke only of 'any proceeding' and had no second proviso. On that text the Court held the proceeding must be one in existence at the material time and that fishing information unrelated to any proceeding was not contemplated. The 1995 amendment inserted the words 'enquiry or' and the second proviso, and the Supreme Court has since construed the amended text the other way.
Decided by the High Court (Sujata V. Manohar J) on 1993-08-26, reported as [1994] 207 ITR 1077 (Bom). It bears on section 133(6), section 133 of the Income Tax Act 1961, in Evidence & Burden of Proof and Assessment & Scrutiny matters.
This is the case most often cited to a s.133(6) notice, and citing it now invites the reply that it has been legislatively displaced. It matters that you know that before the officer tells you. It remains the clearest statement of why the power was widened, and of the mischief the 1995 amendment was aimed at.
Binding within that High Court's jurisdiction. Persuasive elsewhere.
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The Second Income-tax Officer, Survey Circle, issued notices under s.133(6) to the petitioner, a financial services company, calling for information about its cardholders. No proceeding under the Act was pending against the petitioner or its cardholders at the time. The respondents argued that the information could be useful for proceedings that might be instituted in the future, so that the notices were within the sub-section.
The petition was allowed and made absolute, with costs to the petitioners, and the notices demanding cardholder information were struck down. The Court held that the reference in s.133(6), as it then stood, to 'any proceeding under this Act' is a reference to a proceeding in existence at the material time, and that a power to seek fishing information unrelated to any proceeding, or which would enable the department to decide whether to institute proceedings at all, is not contemplated by the sub-section.
The sub-section as it then read required the officer to form an opinion that the information would be useful for, or relevant to, any proceeding under the Act. The Court reasoned that an officer cannot form such an opinion about hypothetical future proceedings which may or may not take place; the formation of the statutory opinion presupposes an identified proceeding against which usefulness and relevance can be measured. It followed that the power was tied to a live proceeding, and that a demand made in order to decide whether to start one lay outside it.
the reference to 'any proceeding under this Act' is clearly a reference to a proceeding which is in existence
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Handle my notice → Ask a CA on WhatsAppNo. This decision construed s.133(6) as it stood before the Finance Act 1995, when the sub-section spoke only of 'any proceeding' and had no second proviso. On that text the Court held the proceeding must be one in existence at the material time and that fishing information unrelated to any proceeding was not contemplated. The 1995 amendment inserted the words 'enquiry or' and the second proviso, and the Supreme Court has since construed the amended text the other way. This was decided by the High Court (Sujata V. Manohar J) and bears on section 133(6), section 133 of the Income Tax Act 1961. It is reported as [1994] 207 ITR 1077 (Bom). This is the case most often cited to a s.133(6) notice, and citing it now invites the reply that it has been legislatively displaced. It matters that you know that before the officer tells you. It remains the clearest statement of why the power was widened, and of the mischief the 1995 amendment was aimed at. If it applies to you, the first step is this: Do not cite this decision against a post-1995 notice as though it governed; it was decided on an earlier text.
The Second Income-tax Officer, Survey Circle, issued notices under s.133(6) to the petitioner, a financial services company, calling for information about its cardholders. No proceeding under the Act was pending against the petitioner or its cardholders at the time. The respondents argued that the information could be useful for proceedings that might be instituted in the future, so that the notices were within the sub-section. The matter was decided on 1993-08-26 by the High Court (Sujata V. Manohar J). On those facts the High Court held as follows. The petition was allowed and made absolute, with costs to the petitioners, and the notices demanding cardholder information were struck down. The Court held that the reference in s.133(6), as it then stood, to 'any proceeding under this Act' is a reference to a proceeding in existence at the material time, and that a power to seek fishing information unrelated to any proceeding, or which would enable the department to decide whether to institute proceedings at all, is not contemplated by the sub-section.
The sub-section as it then read required the officer to form an opinion that the information would be useful for, or relevant to, any proceeding under the Act. The Court reasoned that an officer cannot form such an opinion about hypothetical future proceedings which may or may not take place; the formation of the statutory opinion presupposes an identified proceeding against which usefulness and relevance can be measured. It followed that the power was tied to a live proceeding, and that a demand made in order to decide whether to start one lay outside it. In the words reproduced by the source cited on this page: "the reference to 'any proceeding under this Act' is clearly a reference to a proceeding which is in existence"
It was decided by the High Court on 1993-08-26 and is reported as [1994] 207 ITR 1077 (Bom). Binding within that High Court's jurisdiction. Persuasive elsewhere. A High Court decision binds the assessing officer, the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal within that state, and is persuasive elsewhere. If your assessment is in a different jurisdiction, check whether your own High Court has taken the same view before relying on it. On section 133(6), section 133, the practical question is whether the facts of your own notice match the facts of this case closely enough for the same rule to apply.
It helps the taxpayer. The petition was allowed and made absolute, with costs to the petitioners, and the notices demanding cardholder information were struck down. The Court held that the reference in s.133(6), as it then stood, to 'any proceeding under this Act' is a reference to a proceeding in existence at the material time, and that a power to seek fishing information unrelated to any proceeding, or which would enable the department to decide whether to institute proceedings at all, is not contemplated by the sub-section. It arises in Evidence & Burden of Proof and Assessment & Scrutiny matters, on section 133(6), section 133 of the Income Tax Act 1961, and was decided by Sujata V. Manohar J. Before relying on it, read the source linked on this page and check whether it has since been distinguished, overruled or overtaken by an amendment to the Income Tax Act. In practice the steps that follow from it are these. Use it only for the period before 1 July 1995, or to explain the shape of the amendment when arguing about the proviso. Against a current notice, run the proviso point - absence of approval - not the pendency point. If the department cites this case against you for any reason, check which text of the sub-section it was construing.
Superseded by amendment. The Finance Act 1995 inserted the words 'enquiry or' into s.133(6) and added the second proviso, which in terms contemplates the exercise of the power where no proceeding is pending. The department's own text of s.133 footnotes both changes to the Finance Act 1995. The Supreme Court, construing the amended sub-section in Karnataka Bank Ltd v Secretary, Government of India on 25 February 2002, held that no enquiry need have commenced before s.133(6) is invoked. The reasoning in this judgment therefore no longer governs a notice issued after the amendment. No decision was found expressly overruling it on its own text, which is the ordinary position for a judgment displaced by statute. No source could be cited for that finding. Checking whether an authority still stands matters as much as knowing what it held: a decision may be overruled on one point and survive on another, or the provision it interprets may have been amended since. Read the source and the editor's note on this page before relying on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal.
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The petition was allowed and made absolute, with costs to the petitioners, and the notices demanding cardholder information were struck down. The Court held that the reference in s.133(6), as it then stood, to 'any proceeding under this Act' is a reference to a proceeding in existence at the material time, and that a power to seek fishing information unrelated to any proceeding, or which would enable the department to decide whether to institute proceedings at all, is not contemplated by the sub-section.
TaxSphere, “D.B.S. Financial Services Pvt Ltd v M. George, ITO”, https://taxnotice.vittsphere.com/caselaw/case/dbs-financial-services-v-m-george-133-6-before-the-1995-amendment/ (validity last checked 2026-09-17)
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The bank has a s.133(6) notice asking for customer loan-repayment details and there is no assessment pending on anyone. Can the officer do that?
We are exempt from deducting tax on these deposits. Does that also mean we need not give the information?
The letter from the Investigation wing cites a provision that does not exist. Is it void for that?
The notice came from an Income-tax Officer (Intelligence), not from my Assessing Officer. Does he have the power?
