Our trust was assessed under section 161 on the beneficiaries' shares at the rate their shares alone attracted. Four years later the Assessing Officer rectified it under section 154 and applied each beneficiary's personal rate on his whole income. Could he do that in rectification?
Yes. The Gujarat High Court held that it is settled from CIT v. Kamalini Khatau that section 161(1) permits the Income-tax Officer to assess either the representative assessee or the person represented — the latter by force of section 166 — and that where he assesses the trustee, the assessment must be made in the same status as the beneficiary and at the rate applicable to that beneficiary's TOTAL income, which includes his income from outside the trust. Applying the rate relatable only to the beneficiary's share of the trust income was therefore a mistake apparent from the record, and calling for the beneficiaries' own assessment orders in order to work out that rate was not a fresh inquiry that took the case outside section 154. The Court also rejected the trust's reliance on the Central Board of Direct Taxes' circular of 24 February 1967, but in doing so it stated the principle the circular lays down: once the choice has been made to tax either the trustee or the beneficiary, it is not open to the Department to go behind it and assess the other at the same time. That principle was held simply to have no application, because the beneficiaries had not been assessed again — only the rate on the trustee's assessment had been corrected.
Decided by the High Court (R.K. Abichandani J (as printed in the report read; no second Judge is named)) on 2002-05-09, reported as [2002] 258 ITR 193 (Guj) (equivalent citation as printed on the report read); Income-tax Reference under s.256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It bears on section 161, section 161(1), section 166, section 154, section 119, section 64(v), section 256(1) of the Income Tax Act 1961, in Charitable Trusts & Exemption, Assessment & Scrutiny and How Tax Law Is Read matters.
Two separate things, and practitioners tend to want only the second. The first is a warning: an under-rated trust assessment is not safe. Where shares are determinate and the trustee is assessed under section 161(1), the words 'in like manner and to the same extent as it would be leviable upon and recoverable from the person represented by him' import the beneficiary's whole rate structure, and an order that applies the rate on the share alone is exposed to rectification under section 154 for as long as that section allows, with the tax here rising from Rs 35,103 to Rs 1,10,473 on the same income. The second is the authority on the 'trustee or beneficiary, but not both' line, and it is worth having because it is stated in a High Court's own voice rather than only in the Board's. The Court's route to it is instructive: the Board's instruction of 24 February 1967 was issued with reference to section 41 of the 1922 Act, which gave the Department an option to tax either the representative assessee or the beneficial owner and which the Court identified as corresponding to section 166 of the 1961 Act. Note carefully what the Court did with it — the principle was accepted and the argument rejected, because correcting the rate in the trustee's own assessment is not assessing 'the other' at the same time. So the protection is against a second assessment on the other person, not against an enhancement of the first. The reader should also note what defeated the assessee on the merits: the contention that income directed to be accumulated for nineteen years was not income at all was held to be unarguable, the Court holding that section 161(1) takes in income which accrues as well as income actually received, and that on the deed the share accrued and was credited each year while only the payment was deferred.
Binding within that High Court's jurisdiction. Persuasive elsewhere.
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The assessee was a family trust. For the assessment year 1980-81 its assessment was completed on 24 November 1980 on a total income of Rs 7,03,490. One half, Rs 3,51,745, was taxed in the hands of 25 beneficiaries under clause 3(B)(i)(a) of the trust deed of 23 April 1979 and Schedule I; the other half was assessed in the hands of the trustees under section 161 on the respective shares of the 23 beneficiaries named in clause 3(B)(i)(b) and Schedule II. The deed described the trust as a specific trust and directed that the Schedule II beneficiaries' half of the income, divided in the shares specified against each name, was to be accumulated and not paid for nineteen years, and kept as a separate specific corpus in each beneficiary's name. The 23 beneficiaries were three brothers, their Hindu undivided families, their wives and their children. The Income-tax Officer later noticed that the income falling to each beneficiary's share had been taxed at the rate applicable to that share instead of at the individual rate applicable to the beneficiary's total income, issued a section 154 notice on 30 October 1984 asking for the total income assessed in each of the 23 beneficiaries' cases, and by order of 19 November 1984 rectified the assessment, taking the tax from Rs 35,103 to Rs 1,10,473. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) allowed the trust's appeal, holding there was no mistake apparent from the record; the Tribunal restored the rectification; and the question whether the Income-tax Officer was justified in passing the order under section 154 came to the High Court on a reference under section 256(1).
The reference was answered in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue: the Income-tax Officer was justified in passing the rectification order under section 154. It is settled from CIT v. Kamalini Khatau that it is implicit in section 161(1) that the officer may assess the representative assessee as regards the income in respect of which he is the representative, and that he may assess either the representative assessee or the person represented, by virtue of section 166. Where the trustee is assessed, the assessment is to be made in the same status as the beneficiary whose interest is taxed in the trustee's hands, and the beneficiary's total income — his share of the trust income together with his other income — has to be taken into account to fix the rate. Applying the rate relatable only to the share was a mistake apparent from the record; obtaining the beneficiaries' assessment orders in order to determine the rate was not an impermissible inquiry. The Central Board of Direct Taxes' instruction of 24 February 1967, which lays down that once the choice is made to tax either the trustee or the beneficiary it is not open to the Department to go behind it and assess the other at the same time, had no application, because the beneficiaries were not assessed again. The contention that income directed to be accumulated for nineteen years was not income was held to raise no arguable or debatable point, section 161(1) taking in income which accrues as well as income received. The reference was disposed of with no order as to costs.
The Court began from the settled position taken from Khatau's case at paragraph 13: section 161(1) implicitly permits assessment of the representative assessee, and section 166 permits assessment of the person represented, and where the officer chooses to assess the person represented in the name of the trust the computation of that person's total income is done under the provisions that would apply to him, the assessment of the trustee being made in the same status as the beneficiary. Since the income of all these beneficiaries was assessed in the hands of the trust under section 161(1) and no direct assessment was made on the beneficiaries, the beneficiary's total income — the share receivable under the deed plus his other income — had to be taken into account to ascertain the rate. Departing from that settled position in the original order was the mistake the section 154 notice was addressed to. On the circular, the Court examined the background the Board itself gave, identified section 41 of the 1922 Act as the option provision corresponding to section 166 of the 1961 Act, and held at paragraph 15 that the sentence relied on had been taken out of context: what the Board emphasised was that the Department could not, having chosen, assess the other at the same time, which had nothing to do with rectifying a mistake in the trustee's own assessment. It added that a circular cannot be enforced against the interpretation given by the Supreme Court or a High Court, following Hindustan Aeronautics. On accumulation, the Court held at paragraph 16 that section 161(1) takes into account not only income actually received but income which accrues; that under the deed the share was receivable and credited each year, only payment being deferred; and that M.R. Doshi, decided under section 64(v) on deferment of benefit beyond a child's minority, laid down nothing to the contrary. It also held at paragraph 17 that a contention never raised in the assessment proceedings could not be raised for the first time in rectification proceedings.
It is clear from the reading of the circular that the Board emphasised that once the choice is made by the Department to tax either the trustee or the beneficiary, it would not be open to go behind it and assess the other at the same time.
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Handle my notice → Ask a CA on WhatsAppYes. The Gujarat High Court held that it is settled from CIT v. Kamalini Khatau that section 161(1) permits the Income-tax Officer to assess either the representative assessee or the person represented — the latter by force of section 166 — and that where he assesses the trustee, the assessment must be made in the same status as the beneficiary and at the rate applicable to that beneficiary's TOTAL income, which includes his income from outside the trust. Applying the rate relatable only to the beneficiary's share of the trust income was therefore a mistake apparent from the record, and calling for the beneficiaries' own assessment orders in order to work out that rate was not a fresh inquiry that took the case outside section 154. The Court also rejected the trust's reliance on the Central Board of Direct Taxes' circular of 24 February 1967, but in doing so it stated the principle the circular lays down: once the choice has been made to tax either the trustee or the beneficiary, it is not open to the Department to go behind it and assess the other at the same time. That principle was held simply to have no application, because the beneficiaries had not been assessed again — only the rate on the trustee's assessment had been corrected. This was decided by the High Court (R.K. Abichandani J (as printed in the report read; no second Judge is named)) and bears on section 161, section 161(1), section 166, section 154, section 119, section 64(v), section 256(1) of the Income Tax Act 1961. It is reported as [2002] 258 ITR 193 (Guj) (equivalent citation as printed on the report read); Income-tax Reference under s.256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Two separate things, and practitioners tend to want only the second. The first is a warning: an under-rated trust assessment is not safe. Where shares are determinate and the trustee is assessed under section 161(1), the words 'in like manner and to the same extent as it would be leviable upon and recoverable from the person represented by him' import the beneficiary's whole rate structure, and an order that applies the rate on the share alone is exposed to rectification under section 154 for as long as that section allows, with the tax here rising from Rs 35,103 to Rs 1,10,473 on the same income. The second is the authority on the 'trustee or beneficiary, but not both' line, and it is worth having because it is stated in a High Court's own voice rather than only in the Board's. The Court's route to it is instructive: the Board's instruction of 24 February 1967 was issued with reference to section 41 of the 1922 Act, which gave the Department an option to tax either the representative assessee or the beneficial owner and which the Court identified as corresponding to section 166 of the 1961 Act. Note carefully what the Court did with it — the principle was accepted and the argument rejected, because correcting the rate in the trustee's own assessment is not assessing 'the other' at the same time. So the protection is against a second assessment on the other person, not against an enhancement of the first. The reader should also note what defeated the assessee on the merits: the contention that income directed to be accumulated for nineteen years was not income at all was held to be unarguable, the Court holding that section 161(1) takes in income which accrues as well as income actually received, and that on the deed the share accrued and was credited each year while only the payment was deferred. If it applies to you, the first step is this: When a trust with determinate shares is assessed under section 161(1), compute each beneficiary's total income including his outside income and check the rate applied in the order. If the rate is that on the share alone, expect rectification and provide for it.
The assessee was a family trust. For the assessment year 1980-81 its assessment was completed on 24 November 1980 on a total income of Rs 7,03,490. One half, Rs 3,51,745, was taxed in the hands of 25 beneficiaries under clause 3(B)(i)(a) of the trust deed of 23 April 1979 and Schedule I; the other half was assessed in the hands of the trustees under section 161 on the respective shares of the 23 beneficiaries named in clause 3(B)(i)(b) and Schedule II. The deed described the trust as a specific trust and directed that the Schedule II beneficiaries' half of the income, divided in the shares specified against each name, was to be accumulated and not paid for nineteen years, and kept as a separate specific corpus in each beneficiary's name. The 23 beneficiaries were three brothers, their Hindu undivided families, their wives and their children. The Income-tax Officer later noticed that the income falling to each beneficiary's share had been taxed at the rate applicable to that share instead of at the individual rate applicable to the beneficiary's total income, issued a section 154 notice on 30 October 1984 asking for the total income assessed in each of the 23 beneficiaries' cases, and by order of 19 November 1984 rectified the assessment, taking the tax from Rs 35,103 to Rs 1,10,473. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) allowed the trust's appeal, holding there was no mistake apparent from the record; the Tribunal restored the rectification; and the question whether the Income-tax Officer was justified in passing the order under section 154 came to the High Court on a reference under section 256(1). The matter was decided on 2002-05-09 by the High Court (R.K. Abichandani J (as printed in the report read; no second Judge is named)). On those facts the High Court held as follows. The reference was answered in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue: the Income-tax Officer was justified in passing the rectification order under section 154. It is settled from CIT v. Kamalini Khatau that it is implicit in section 161(1) that the officer may assess the representative assessee as regards the income in respect of which he is the representative, and that he may assess either the representative assessee or the person represented, by virtue of section 166. Where the trustee is assessed, the assessment is to be made in the same status as the beneficiary whose interest is taxed in the trustee's hands, and the beneficiary's total income — his share of the trust income together with his other income — has to be taken into account to fix the rate. Applying the rate relatable only to the share was a mistake apparent from the record; obtaining the beneficiaries' assessment orders in order to determine the rate was not an impermissible inquiry. The Central Board of Direct Taxes' instruction of 24 February 1967, which lays down that once the choice is made to tax either the trustee or the beneficiary it is not open to the Department to go behind it and assess the other at the same time, had no application, because the beneficiaries were not assessed again. The contention that income directed to be accumulated for nineteen years was not income was held to raise no arguable or debatable point, section 161(1) taking in income which accrues as well as income received. The reference was disposed of with no order as to costs.
The Court began from the settled position taken from Khatau's case at paragraph 13: section 161(1) implicitly permits assessment of the representative assessee, and section 166 permits assessment of the person represented, and where the officer chooses to assess the person represented in the name of the trust the computation of that person's total income is done under the provisions that would apply to him, the assessment of the trustee being made in the same status as the beneficiary. Since the income of all these beneficiaries was assessed in the hands of the trust under section 161(1) and no direct assessment was made on the beneficiaries, the beneficiary's total income — the share receivable under the deed plus his other income — had to be taken into account to ascertain the rate. Departing from that settled position in the original order was the mistake the section 154 notice was addressed to. On the circular, the Court examined the background the Board itself gave, identified section 41 of the 1922 Act as the option provision corresponding to section 166 of the 1961 Act, and held at paragraph 15 that the sentence relied on had been taken out of context: what the Board emphasised was that the Department could not, having chosen, assess the other at the same time, which had nothing to do with rectifying a mistake in the trustee's own assessment. It added that a circular cannot be enforced against the interpretation given by the Supreme Court or a High Court, following Hindustan Aeronautics. On accumulation, the Court held at paragraph 16 that section 161(1) takes into account not only income actually received but income which accrues; that under the deed the share was receivable and credited each year, only payment being deferred; and that M.R. Doshi, decided under section 64(v) on deferment of benefit beyond a child's minority, laid down nothing to the contrary. It also held at paragraph 17 that a contention never raised in the assessment proceedings could not be raised for the first time in rectification proceedings. In the words reproduced by the source cited on this page: "It is clear from the reading of the circular that the Board emphasised that once the choice is made by the Department to tax either the trustee or the beneficiary, it would not be open to go behind it and assess the other at the same time." The decision followed or applied CIT v. Kamalini Khatau [1994] 209 ITR 101 (SC) — followed and applied; Jyotendrasinhji v. S.I. Tripathi [1993] 201 ITR 611 (SC) — cited by the Revenue for the overriding effect of section 166; CWT v. Trustees of H.E.H. Nizam's Family (Remainder Wealth) Trust [1977] 108 ITR 555 (SC) — cited for the threefold consequence of 'in the like manner and to the same extent'; Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. CIT [2000] 243 ITR 808 (SC) — applied on the limits of a Board circular; CIT v. M.R. Doshi [1995] 211 ITR 1 (SC) — distinguished as a decision on section 64(v); T.S. Balaram, ITO v. Volkart Brothers [1971] 82 ITR 50 (SC) — cited on the limits of section 154.
It was decided by the High Court on 2002-05-09 and is reported as [2002] 258 ITR 193 (Guj) (equivalent citation as printed on the report read); Income-tax Reference under s.256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Binding within that High Court's jurisdiction. Persuasive elsewhere. A High Court decision binds the assessing officer, the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal within that state, and is persuasive elsewhere. If your assessment is in a different jurisdiction, check whether your own High Court has taken the same view before relying on it. On section 161, section 161(1), section 166, section 154, section 119, section 64(v), section 256(1), the practical question is whether the facts of your own notice match the facts of this case closely enough for the same rule to apply.
It helps the department, and it appears in this library for that reason — you need to know what the Assessing Officer will cite against you. The reference was answered in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue: the Income-tax Officer was justified in passing the rectification order under section 154. It is settled from CIT v. Kamalini Khatau that it is implicit in section 161(1) that the officer may assess the representative assessee as regards the income in respect of which he is the representative, and that he may assess either the representative assessee or the person represented, by virtue of section 166. Where the trustee is assessed, the assessment is to be made in the same status as the beneficiary whose interest is taxed in the trustee's hands, and the beneficiary's total income — his share of the trust income together with his other income — has to be taken into account to fix the rate. Applying the rate relatable only to the share was a mistake apparent from the record; obtaining the beneficiaries' assessment orders in order to determine the rate was not an impermissible inquiry. The Central Board of Direct Taxes' instruction of 24 February 1967, which lays down that once the choice is made to tax either the trustee or the beneficiary it is not open to the Department to go behind it and assess the other at the same time, had no application, because the beneficiaries were not assessed again. The contention that income directed to be accumulated for nineteen years was not income was held to raise no arguable or debatable point, section 161(1) taking in income which accrues as well as income received. The reference was disposed of with no order as to costs. It arises in Charitable Trusts & Exemption, Assessment & Scrutiny and How Tax Law Is Read matters, on section 161, section 161(1), section 166, section 154, section 119, section 64(v), section 256(1) of the Income Tax Act 1961, and was decided by R.K. Abichandani J (as printed in the report read; no second Judge is named). Before relying on it, read the source linked on this page and check whether it has since been distinguished, overruled or overtaken by an amendment to the Income Tax Act. In practice the steps that follow from it are these. Do not resist a section 154 notice on the ground that the beneficiaries' own assessment records have to be looked at. The Court held that calling for those orders to determine the applicable rate is not the kind of inquiry that takes a case outside section 154. If the Department seeks to assess the beneficiary after assessing the trustee on the same income, or the reverse, take the Board's instruction of 24 February 1967 as described by this Court, and put the earlier order and challan on record — but take section 161(2) as the primary ground, because the Court's words about the instruction were said in the course of holding the instruction wholly irrelevant to the case before it. Do not stretch that principle to cover an enhancement of the same assessment. This decision is direct authority that correcting the rate in the trustee's own assessment is not assessing 'the other at the same time'. Do not argue that income directed to be accumulated is not income. The Court held that argument unarguable in this context and disposed of the reliance on M.R. Doshi, which turned on section 64(v) and the deferment of benefit beyond a child's minority. Where you rely on a Board circular, be ready for the answer applied here: a circular cannot be enforced against the interpretation given by the Supreme Court or a High Court to a provision of law.
Searched for later treatment; none was found. That is not the same as a source affirming it. Only two later documents cite this judgment, and neither applies it. In T. Neeraj Trust v ITO (Chennai Tribunal, 5 December 2012) the Bench set the decision out at paragraph 11 while discussing the authorities, but rested its dismissal of the Revenue's appeals on the jurisdictional Madras High Court decision in Muthukrishnan, 260 ITR 526, holding that a minor beneficiary who cannot receive income before majority cannot be taxed on it; this judgment was noted only for the point that the objection 'was never raised at the time of assessment'. In Kotak Mahindra Old Mutual Life Insurance Ltd v ITO (Mumbai Tribunal, 10 May 2007) it appears only in the Departmental Representative's submission in support of penalty, and the Bench rejected that footing, holding the issue a genuine difference of opinion. Nothing overruling, doubting or confining the judgment has been found either, so it stands undisturbed; but no later decision applying or following it has been traced, on the s.161(1) rate point or on the s.154 limb. A practitioner relying on it should expect to argue it rather than hand it up. Two limits go to its use. It is a decision of the Gujarat High Court on a reference under s.256(1) for assessment year 1980-81, so it binds within that jurisdiction and is persuasive elsewhere. And the rate proposition rests on the Supreme Court's construction of s.161(1) in CIT v. Kamalini Khatau, which is the authority to take to a Bench outside Gujarat; this judgment is the application of it. For a year governed by the Income-tax Act 2025 the successors of ss.161, 166 and 154 should be identified before the point is taken; that correspondence has not been established here. No source could be cited for that finding. Checking whether an authority still stands matters as much as knowing what it held: a decision may be overruled on one point and survive on another, or the provision it interprets may have been amended since. Read the source and the editor's note on this page before relying on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal.
A TRAP IN THE PARAGRAPH NUMBERS. This judgment exists in two reports whose paragraph numbering is completely different, and a locator taken from one will not be found in the other. The report at [2002] 258 ITR 193 (Guj) runs from paragraph 1 to paragraph 18 in a flat sequence, with no lettered or sub-numbered paragraph anywhere in it, and the disposal at paragraph 18. The report at (2002) 175 CTR (Guj) 498 numbers the same judgment 1, 2, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 7.1, 8, 8.1, 9, 10, 11, 12. So paragraph 13 of the ITR report is paragraph 8 of the CTR report, paragraph 15 is paragraph 9, paragraph 16 is paragraph 10, paragraph 17 is paragraph 11, and the disposal at paragraph 18 is paragraph 12. Every paragraph number cited on this page is an ITR number. THE TWO REPORTS ARE NOT WORD-IDENTICAL. The CTR report prints 'department' in lower case where the ITR report prints 'Department', prints 'section 161(1)' where the other prints 'Section 161(1)', and gives 'Khatau's case (supra)' where the other gives 'Khatau's case [1994] 209 ITR 101'. The sentence quoted on this page is taken from the ITR report and cited to it; the same sentence appears in the CTR report in substance and in the same word order, with the lower-case spelling. Anyone checking the quotation against the other report should expect that and should not treat it as a discrepancy of substance. A CAUTION ON ATTRIBUTION. Paragraphs 10 and 12 of the ITR report are lists of the decisions cited by counsel on each side, and paragraph 15 reproduces the Board's own words from the 1967 circular - 'Once the choice is made by the Department to tax either the trustee or the beneficiary, it is no more open to the Department to go behind it and assess the other at the same time'. The sentence quoted on this page is the Court's own restatement in its own voice ('it would not be open'), not the circular's words ('it is no more open'), and it is not counsel's argument. ON THE BENCH. The report opens 'JUDGMENT R.K. Abichandani, J.' and names no second Judge, although the matter was a reference under s.256(1). The 'bench' field records what the report shows and supplies no name it does not give. ON THE YEAR. The assessment year in issue is 1980-81. Section 80L, which figures in the surrounding trust case law of that era, is not in issue here. This library shows the verification state of every entry openly. This entry has not yet been read in full by a chartered accountant. The summary reflects the sources listed on this page. Read the source before you rely on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
The reference was answered in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue: the Income-tax Officer was justified in passing the rectification order under section 154. It is settled from CIT v. Kamalini Khatau that it is implicit in section 161(1) that the officer may assess the representative assessee as regards the income in respect of which he is the representative, and that he may assess either the representative assessee or the person represented, by virtue of section 166. Where the trustee is assessed, the assessment is to be made in the same status as the beneficiary whose interest is taxed in the trustee's hands, and the beneficiary's total income — his share of the trust income together with his other income — has to be taken into account to fix the rate. Applying the rate relatable only to the share was a mistake apparent from the record; obtaining the beneficiaries' assessment orders in order to determine the rate was not an impermissible inquiry. The Central Board of Direct Taxes' instruction of 24 February 1967, which lays down that once the choice is made to tax either the trustee or the beneficiary it is not open to the Department to go behind it and assess the other at the same time, had no application, because the beneficiaries were not assessed again. The contention that income directed to be accumulated for nineteen years was not income was held to raise no arguable or debatable point, section 161(1) taking in income which accrues as well as income received. The reference was disposed of with no order as to costs.
TaxSphere, “Ganesh Chhababhai Vallabhai Patel v. CIT (Gujarat High Court) — a s.161(1) assessment on the trustee carries the rate applicable to the beneficiary's TOTAL income, and s.154 rectification lies where it did not”, https://taxnotice.vittsphere.com/caselaw/case/ganesh-chhababhai-vallabhai-patel-trustee-taxed-at-the-beneficiary-total-income-rate-and-s-154-rectification/ (validity last checked 2026-09-08)
The judgment itself is a government work and may be quoted freely. The summary, the validity note and the reasoning on this page are this library's own writing: quote them with attribution, and please do not present either as the words of the court — this page keeps the two apart and so should a quotation of it.
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The Assessing Officer has assessed our trust in one order on the whole of the trust income at slab rates of its own. The shares of the beneficiaries are fixed and known. Is that how section 161 works?
Our family trust has determinate shares, mostly interest and rent, and a small share of profit from a partnership business. The Assessing Officer has charged the entire trust income at the maximum marginal rate. Can he, when the shares are fixed?
The trustees of my settlement are being assessed on the trust income. The department has now also included the same income in my own assessment under s.64. Does s.161(2) stop it?
A discretionary trust distributed income to me during the year and the trustees have already been assessed on it. Can the Assessing Officer also assess me?
