Section 154

What a section 154 notice is

Rectification. Correcting a mistake apparent from the record. It is a low-severity notice in the rectification family under the Income Tax Act 1961.

If you ignore it: The mistake stands.

Time to reply: this notice type carries no standard period. The date is printed on the notice itself and you must read it off the document. This is a window to APPLY, not to reply. Verify the period and whether the AO has a disposal time limit.

Under the Income Tax Act 2025: section 287. But read that as reference, not as the provision to cite. Under s.536(2) of the 2025 Act, a proceeding for any tax year beginning before 1 April 2026 stays under the Income Tax Act 1961 from the notice through to the appeal — so a notice arriving today for an earlier year is a 1961 Act matter, whatever today's date is.

Section 154 — the law in short

What the courts have decided on section 154, in one screen. Read this first; open an entry when you need the facts, the reasoning and the source.

• CIT v Vatika Township P Ltd Supreme CourtHelps taxpayer
  An amendment adds a new levy. Does it reach back to earlier years?
  Not unless the statute says so. Legislation is presumed not to operate retrospectively, and that presumption applies with full force where the amendment imposes a new burden. Only clarificatory or beneficial amendments may be read back.
• Brij Lal v CIT Supreme CourtCuts both ways
  My settlement application was admitted years before the Commission passed its final order — can it charge me section 234B interest for that whole period, and reopen the settled order later to add interest it forgot?
  No to both. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held on 21 October 2010 that sections 234A, 234B and 234C do apply to Settlement Commission proceedings, but only up to the order admitting the case under section 245D(1). Parliament did not extend the liability beyond the date of the settlement application, so no interest runs between admission and the final order under section 245D(4). Hindustan Bulk Carrier, which had taken the section 245D(4) date as the terminus, does not survive on that point. And the Commission cannot reopen its concluded proceedings under section 154 to levy interest it did not levy at the time, section 245I making its order final.
• ACIT v Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd Supreme CourtHelps taxpayer
  A binding decision that covers my point was never considered when my order was passed. Is that a mistake apparent from the record?
  Yes. The Supreme Court held that non-consideration of a decision of the jurisdictional High Court or of the Supreme Court can be a mistake apparent from the record, and upheld the Tribunal recalling its own order on that ground. The section actually applied was s.254(2); the same test - patent, manifest and self-evident - is the one used under s.154.
• Honda Siel Power Products Ltd v CIT Supreme CourtHelps taxpayer
  The Tribunal decided against me without dealing with a coordinate bench decision I had actually filed in the paper book. Can it recall that order under section 254(2), or is that a review it cannot do?
  It can. The Supreme Court held that where a coordinate bench decision was placed before the Tribunal and the Tribunal overlooked it, the resulting order carries a manifest error and section 254(2) permits the Tribunal to set it right. The purpose of the sub-section is that no party, assessee or Department, should suffer because of a mistake by the Tribunal. That is atonement for the Tribunal's own error, not the exercise of an inherent power of review, and the High Court was wrong to strike the rectification down as a disguised review.
• S.A. Builders Ltd v CIT (Appeals) Supreme CourtCuts both ways
  I passed borrowed money to my sister concern interest-free. Can the AO disallow the interest I paid?
  Only if the advance fails the commercial expediency test. Interest on borrowed funds advanced interest-free to a sister concern is deductible under s.36(1)(iii) where the advance was made on grounds of commercial expediency, an expression of wide import covering what a prudent businessman spends for the purposes of business, with no need for a legal obligation.
• Hind Wire Industries Ltd v CIT Supreme CourtHelps taxpayer
  My assessment was rectified once already. I want a second rectification, and four years have gone since the original assessment but not since the rectified one. Am I out of time?
  No. The Supreme Court held that the word order in section 154(7) is not qualified and does not necessarily mean the original order; it can be any order, including the amended or rectified order. So where an assessment of 21 September 1979 had been rectified on 12 July 1982, an application made on 4 July 1986 was in time, being within four years of the rectified order. The Calcutta High Court, which had counted from the original assessment, was set aside and the Tribunal restored. The Court followed its own sales tax decisions in International Cotton Corporation and H.R. Sri Ramulu.
• T. S. Balaram, ITO v Volkart Brothers Supreme CourtHelps taxpayer
  What actually counts as a 'mistake apparent from the record' under s.154?
  An obvious and patent mistake. Not one that must be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where two opinions are conceivable. A decision on a debatable point of law cannot be rectified.
• Kern Enterprise Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My client's New Zealand company filed Indian returns and paid tax believing its place of effective management was in India, and New Zealand has since taxed the same income. Can it get the Indian tax back?
  Yes, on these facts. The Madras High Court quashed the order refusing rectification and refund, holding that CBDT Circular No. 8 of 2017 — under which section 6(3)(ii) does not apply to a company with turnover or gross receipts of Rs 50 crore or less in a financial year — is binding on the Department, so the company was not liable to Indian tax at all and the tax it had paid ought to have been refunded, with the Court adding that tax paid in excess must be refunded notwithstanding the procedure in section 155(14A) where the income was taxed in a foreign country.
• Surajit Ghosh v ITO, Ward-29(4), Kolkata High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  A section 154 order was passed on me in 2022 rectifying a 2015 assessment, with no notice and no DIN. What can I do about it four years later?
  The Calcutta High Court set the order aside. An order passed beyond the four years in s.154(7) suffers from a jurisdictional error, so it can be challenged in writ even after long delay, and the Court also recorded the Department's failure to comply with s.154(3) by not showing that any prior notice was served, and the absence of a Document Identification Number required by the CBDT circular dated 14 August 2019.
• M/s Sivasakthi Threads v Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  A survey during a search on a connected group threw up excess stock, and it was added for AY 2007-08. The department says my unabsorbed depreciation cannot be set off against it, and now cites section 79A. Is that right?
  No, on both counts, for a year before AY 2022-23. The Madras High Court held that unabsorbed depreciation carried forward takes the character of current year depreciation under s.32(2) and, read with ss.71 and 72, can be set off against income of the current year other than capital gains — including an addition of unaccounted stock in business; and it recorded that s.79A, inserted by the Finance Act 2022 with effect from 1 April 2022, does not assist the Revenue for an earlier year.
• Manohar Lal Poddar v Union of India High CourtHelps taxpayer
  Two years after Form 5 the Assessing Officer has issued a section 154 notice saying the tax on my settled additions was computed at the wrong rate. Can he reopen a completed Vivad se Vishwas settlement?
  No. Section 154(1)(a) allows an income-tax authority to amend an order passed by it under the Income-tax Act, 1961; the certificate issued by the designated authority under section 5 of the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 is not such an order. The Patna High Court set aside both the rectification order and the section 264 revision order upholding it, and directed the refund to be paid within four weeks with statutory interest.
• Optum Global Solutions India Pvt Ltd v PCIT High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  You signed an APA and filed a modified return under s.92CD. The Commissioner has now issued a s.263 notice on the old assessment order. Can he?
  Not on this reasoning. Once a modified return is filed under the APA it has to be treated as a return filed under s.139, and the earlier return and earlier assessment order lose their efficacy for all practical purposes; a fresh assessment order is what has to be passed. Allowing the s.263 notice on the superseded order to run would make the APA and the modified return inconsequential, and nothing stops the Assessing Officer from taking the very same points while re-scrutinising the modified return. Both writ petitions were allowed and the show cause notices set aside.
• Anvar Ali Poolakkodan v ITO — interest on delayed compensation is an accrual to compensation, taxable as capital gains and covered by s.10(37) High CourtHelps taxpayerHigh Courts differ
  The Tribunal split my client's land acquisition interest into 9 per cent as capital gains and 15 per cent as income from other sources. Is that right?
  The Kerala High Court says no. It held that interest amounts received in respect of delayed payment of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act are treated as accruals to the principal compensation amount and are classified as capital gains, so that where the land compulsorily acquired is agricultural land the interest also gets the benefit of s.10(37). Because such interest is not interest as defined in s.2(28A), s.56 is not attracted at all.
• International Hospital Ltd v DCIT High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The department is now citing Mahagun Realtors to say an assessment on the amalgamating company is curable. Has the Supreme Court moved away from Maruti Suzuki?
  On the Delhi High Court's considered view in this batch, no. Mahagun Realtors turned on the conduct of that assessee — who suppressed the amalgamation at search, filed a return in the amalgamating company's name recording 'not applicable' against business reorganisation, and litigated throughout in that name — and did not dilute or strike a discordant chord with Maruti Suzuki. Where the successor did tell the department of the merger and the notice or order still went out in the dead company's name, the defect remains fatal.
• Srirangapattinam Desigan Srinivasan v DCIT (CPC-TDS) High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  I bought a flat, deducted one per cent under s.194-IA, and CPC has hit me with a demand because the seller's PAN was not linked to Aadhaar. Is there a High Court decision I can put in front of the officer?
  Yes. The Madras High Court disposed of a writ against exactly such a demand by holding that nothing survived for adjudication once Circular No. 6/2024 applied and the department had itself reprocessed the statement and reported no defaults. The judgment is worth having chiefly because it reproduces Circular No. 6/2024 in full, with its file number and date, which is otherwise hard to source.
• Munchener Ruckversicherungs Gesellshaft AG v CIT (International Taxation) High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The deductor credited the TDS late, so it turned up in 26AS only after I had filed. The department says I should have revised my return, and refuses credit because I never offered the income to tax. Is there a way back?
  Yes - s.155(14). The Delhi High Court held that s.155(14) places the Assessing Officer under a statutory obligation to amend the assessment or intimation once the certificate or the updated Form 26AS is produced, and that the sub-section neither contemplates nor mandates the original return being amended or revised. It also held that the Commissioner was wrong to require the income to be offered to tax where the assessee had consistently and uncontestedly said the receipt was not taxable in India.
• Avana Global FZCO v DCIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  My refund was simply taken against another year's demand and I was never told. Does the notice have to come first?
  Yes. Section 245(1) permits a set-off only after an intimation in writing of the proposed action. The Bombay High Court held that adjustments made without that intimation are contrary to the words of the statute and to its own settled decisions, made the rule absolute and ordered the refunds paid within four weeks. It also noted that no reasons had been recorded under s.245(2) either.
• Genpact India P Ltd v DCIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  My refund came out of an appeal effect order and was paid years late. Can the department refuse the extra interest by blaming its own portal?
  No. Where the refund arises from giving effect to an appellate order, the additional interest is statutory. It can be refused only in the one situation the Act allows, namely delay attributable to the assessee. A broken departmental portal, an amalgamation the department was told about, and the pandemic are not delays attributable to the assessee.
• G R Infraprojects Limited v ACIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  I withdrew my education cess claim after the Finance Act 2022 inserted section 155(18). Can the officer still treat it as under-reported income and levy penalty?
  The Rajasthan High Court set the penalty aside and directed that immunity under s.270AA be granted. Where the company withdrew its cess claim by letter dated 19 March 2022, before s.155(18) came into force on 1 April 2022, and accepted the proposed variation, it was entitled to immunity from penalty under s.270A, and the initiation was in any event non est because the officer never specified which limb of s.270A(9) was attracted.
• Pramod R Agrawal v PCIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  I left a legitimate deduction out of my return and the assessment is over. Can the Commissioner allow it under s.264?
  Yes. The Bombay High Court held that s.264 confers wide jurisdiction, that it is not confined to correcting the errors of subordinate authorities, and that it covers a claim the assessee failed to make in the return and discovered only later. The rejection was quashed and the Commissioner was directed to decide the application afresh, by a reasoned order, after a hearing.
• Mastek Limited v ACIT High CourtHelps taxpayerHigh Courts differ
  The officer says my section 154 notice is in time because he is rectifying the order giving effect to the appeal. Is that right where the point was never in appeal?
  The Gujarat High Court said no. Following its own decision in Poonjabhai Vanmalidas, it held that where the issue was not the subject matter of the appeal the appellate order does not subsume the original order, so the time for correcting the mistake relates back to the original order and not to the appellate or appeal effect order. It also held that a notice founded on the interpretation of a Supreme Court decision cannot be a mistake apparent from the record.
• Kartik Vijaysinh Sonavane v DCIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  My employer deducted TDS from my salary and never deposited it. The portal shows nothing in 26AS, I do not even have Form 16 for one of the years, and the department has adjusted my later refunds against the demand. Can they do that?
  No. Where the employer has in fact deducted the tax, the department is precluded from denying the deductee credit for it, and any recovery or adjustment already made must be refunded with statutory interest. The absence of the entry in the departmental system, and the absence of a Form 16 for one of the years, were both raised by the Revenue and neither saved the demand.
• Aafreen Fatima Fazal Abbas Sayed v ACIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  I let the 30 days to appeal my 143(1) intimation lapse. Can I still go to the PCIT under s.264?
  Yes. Section 264(4) bars revision only in the situations it lists, essentially where an appeal is pending or has been decided; letting the appeal period run out without filing is not one of them. The revision application had to be decided on merits, and no formal waiver of the right of appeal could be demanded, because a right not exercised does not need to be waived.
• CIT v M/s. Syndicate Bank High CourtHelps taxpayer
  My refund was paid but the s.244A interest due on it was left out. Is the department liable to pay interest on that omitted interest, or is that the forbidden interest on interest?
  The Karnataka High Court held the department is liable, and that this is not interest on interest. Following the three-Judge Bench in CIT v. HEG Ltd., it held that the interest component partakes of the character of the 'amount' that becomes due to the assessee under s.244A, so an order of refund must include the interest payable, and if it does not, the Revenue is liable to pay interest on the shortfall.
• CIT-LTU v Union Bank of India (Bombay High Court) — section 115JB did not apply to a banking company before the Finance Act 2012, because the machinery in sub-section (2) was unworkable for it High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The Assessing Officer has raised a MAT demand on my client bank for an assessment year before 2013-14. Can section 115JB apply at all to a company whose accounts are prepared under the Banking Regulation Act?
  Not for a year before the Finance Act 2012 amendment. The Bombay High Court held that section 115JB as it stood before that amendment would not be applicable to a banking company, because sub-section (2) required the profit and loss account to be prepared under Parts II and III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act 1956 while its first proviso required the same accounting policies, accounting standards and depreciation method and rates as were used for the accounts laid before the annual general meeting — accounts which a bank necessarily prepares under the Banking Regulation Act 1949. A bank could satisfy one requirement or the other but not both, so the machinery provision failed, and on the principle in B.C. Srinivasa Setty a case in which the computation provision cannot apply was not intended to fall within the charging section. All the Revenue's appeals were dismissed.
• Madhya Pradesh Audyogik Kendra Vikas Nigam Ltd v DCIT High CourtHelps departmentNo later treatment found
  The department has attached my bank account under s.226(3) because I did not pay the 20%. I say I have already paid more than that. Will the High Court interfere?
  Not if the payment you point to was self-assessment tax paid against your own returned income, and not against the assessment demand. The Court upheld the garnishee notice to the bank: the assessee was obliged under the CBDT circulars to pay 20% of the outstanding demand, it had not done so, and the department was therefore justified in proceeding under s.226(3).
• Rajesh Kourani v Union of India High CourtHelps departmentHigh Courts differ
  Is there High Court authority that the s.234E fee runs from 1 July 2012 whatever the 2015 amendment to s.200A did, and does paying the fee buy me out of s.271H penalty?
  Yes on the first, no on the second. The Gujarat High Court held that s.234E is the charging provision and s.200A merely machinery, that a machinery provision cannot override a charging provision, and that even before 1 June 2015 the Revenue could always calculate and collect the fee. It also held, against Karnataka, that the s.234E fee is not in lieu of the s.271H penalty — the two are independent levies.
• Gujarat State Fertilisers & Chemicals Ltd v Dy CIT High CourtHelps departmentNo later treatment found
  The department paid my s.244A interest years late. Can I claim interest on that delayed interest?
  The Gujarat High Court said no, and answered the question in favour of the Revenue. Applying the Supreme Court's clarification in CIT v. Gujarat Fluoro Chemicals, it held that since Parliament inserted s.244A to provide for interest on refunds, it is only that statutory interest that an assessee may claim from the Revenue, and no other interest on such statutory interest.
• Vijay Gupta v CIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  I made a mistake in my own return and paid tax I did not owe. The time to revise has gone. Can the Commissioner give me relief under section 264?
  Yes. The Delhi High Court held that the revisional power under section 264 is very wide and is not confined to correcting the officer's errors - it extends to errors made by the assessee, including a legitimate claim never made in the return and raised for the first time in the revision application. An intimation under section 143(1) is an "order" for section 264. Paying the Rs.500 fee late is a curable irregularity, not a bar. The Commissioner's rejection was set aside and the revision restored for fresh consideration on merits.
• CIT, Kolkata-I v Birla Corporation Ltd High CourtHelps taxpayerHigh Courts differ
  Part of my refund is self-assessment tax I paid under s.140A. The officer says no interest is payable on that. Is he right?
  No. The Calcutta High Court held that s.244A(1)(b) is a residuary clause that covers a refund of excess self-assessment tax paid under s.140A, and that interest runs from the date the tax was paid to the date the refund is granted — a starting point since narrowed by s.244A(1)(aa) for periods from 1 June 2016. The Explanation to clause (b) does not stand in the way, because it operates only where the tax was paid pursuant to a notice of demand under s.156.
• Indus Finance Corporation Ltd v CIT High CourtHelps department
  The appeal has been decided against me. Can I now file a section 154 application raising the point I dropped in that appeal?
  No. Section 154(1A) permits rectification only in relation to a matter OTHER than one considered and decided in appeal or revision, and the Madras High Court held that what is excluded from rectification is what has already been the subject matter of appeal. A point that was raised in the appeal and then abandoned is a new plea dressed up as a rectification, not a mistake apparent from the record, and a section 154 application is not a second chance at a plea you gave up.
• CIT v M.B. Stockholding Pvt Ltd High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The Assessing Officer has added the current year's profit up to the date of the advance to the opening reserves in working out 'accumulated profits' for s.2(22)(e), which is what pushes the deemed dividend up. Is there any authority against him?
  Yes, but it is thin and you must use it with your eyes open. The Gujarat High Court, considering Explanation 2 to s.2(22)(e), confirmed a Tribunal direction to the Assessing Officer not to include the current profit as part of accumulated profits, on the footing accepted by the Tribunal that profit accrues only when the books of account are closed. The Revenue's own argument, recorded in the judgment, was the opposite — that Explanation 2 requires the current year's profit up to the date of distribution to be taken into account.
• India Trade Promotion Organisation v DGIT (Exemptions) High CourtHelps taxpayerUnder appeal
  My institution advances an object of general public utility but charges fees and ends up with a surplus — does the proviso to section 2(15) knock out my exemption?
  Not by itself. The Delhi High Court upheld the constitutional validity of the first proviso to section 2(15) but read it down: it bites only where the dominant and prime objective of the institution is profit making, whether directly through trade, commerce or business or indirectly through rendering services in relation to them. Charging a fee, or generating a surplus, does not by itself make an institution non-charitable. Because the India Trade Promotion Organisation's driving force was promoting the nation's trade rather than earning profit, its exemption under section 10(23C)(iv) was restored and a mandamus issued to grant approval within six weeks.
• CIT, Kanpur v M/s Motilal Duli Chand High CourtHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The Supreme Court has since decided the point the other way. Can the Tribunal recall its order, or is that a review?
  The Allahabad High Court held it is not a review. Where the Tribunal decided on the strength of an earlier Supreme Court decision and the Supreme Court has since interpreted the law differently, the Tribunal's order suffers from a mistake apparent from the record and a rectification application under s.254(2) is maintainable. The Court relied on CBDT Circular No. 68 dated 17 November 1971 and on Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange.
• Court On Its Own Motion v CIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  CPC has refused my TDS credit and adjusted the refund against an old demand. What did the Delhi High Court actually direct?
  Taking up the problem on its own motion, the Delhi High Court issued directions on both limbs. A TDS claim supported by the deductor's certificate is not to be rejected merely because the uploaded information does not tally, and unmatched challans are to be verified and corrected within a fixed time. And s.245 is a two-stage provision: prior intimation of the proposed adjustment, a reply from the assessee, consideration of that reply by the Assessing Officer, an order under s.245, and communication of the outcome. A computerised set-off without that sequence does not comply with the section.
• Sanjay Ghai v ACIT High CourtHelps taxpayerSuperseded by amendment
  The s.179 order against me is mostly interest and penalty, not tax. Can the department recover those from me as a director?
  On the section as it stood before 1 June 2013, no. The Delhi High Court held that 'tax due' in s.179(1) means tax as defined by s.2(43) and does not carry interest or penalty with it, so the director could not be made liable for anything more than the tax. That position has since been displaced by the Explanation to s.179 - read the validity note and the amendment warning before relying on this.
• CIT v Jagat Novel Exhibitors Pvt Ltd — the Commissioner (Appeals) must actually decide the section 249(4)(b) exemption and record reasons; admitting the appeal is not a silent exercise of the discretion High CourtCuts both ways
  No return was filed and no advance tax was paid, but the Commissioner (Appeals) admitted the appeal and decided it. The department now says the appeal was never maintainable. Can the Tribunal presume that the Commissioner (Appeals) exercised her power to exempt?
  No. The Delhi High Court held that the proviso to s.249(4)(b) requires the Commissioner (Appeals) to decide, and to record in writing, whether there were good and sufficient reasons to exempt the assessee from paying an amount equal to the advance tax, and that this is mandatory. The Tribunal in that case had reasoned that because the Commissioner (Appeals) had admitted and adjudicated the appeals, it could be assumed she had exercised her discretion and found good and sufficient reasons; the High Court held the requirement had simply not been complied with. Note carefully that at paragraph 24 the Court expressly declined to dispose of the appeals on this reasoning and said it had referred to the section only to clarify the legal position.
• Tamil Nadu Magnesite Ltd v CIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The Assessing Officer has rectified my old s.143(1)(a) intimation under s.154 after already completing a s.143(3) assessment. Can he do that?
  No. Once a notice under section 143(2) has gone out and a regular assessment has been made under section 143(3), the earlier intimation under section 143(1)(a) merges into that assessment and no longer stands as an order of its own. There is then nothing left for section 154 to rectify. The Madras High Court set aside a rectification made in December 1998 on an intimation of 7 March 1994, which had charged additional tax of Rs 4,70,346 more than three years after the scrutiny assessment of 22 November 1995 was over, and set aside the revisional order that had confirmed it. The rectification was held to be wholly without jurisdiction.
• CIT v Tony Electronics Limited High CourtHelps departmentHigh Courts differ
  The mistake is in my original assessment order from years ago. Is the section 154 notice time barred if an appeal order intervened?
  Not necessarily. The Delhi High Court held that once an appeal is decided the assessment order merges into the appellate order, so for s.154(7) the four years run from the appellate order, and it is no answer that the error occurred in the original assessment and was not the subject matter of the appeal. Hind Wire Industries decides that the word 'order' in s.154(7) is unqualified and means any order, including an amended or rectified one.
• Utkal Galvanizers P. Ltd. v ACIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The Assessing Officer has issued a section 154 notice on an item my CIT(A) appeal already dealt with. Can he do that?
  No. The Orissa High Court held that the scope of s.154(1A) is limited to mistakes apparent from the record and does not include a power to revise, review or reappraise the officer's own order, and that letting him rectify a matter already carried in appeal would let him override the appellate order. If the Revenue was dissatisfied with the CIT(A) it had to file a second appeal to the Tribunal.
• CIT v Smt. Premlata Jalani High CourtHelps taxpayer
  My capital gain arose after 15 March, so I could not have paid advance tax on it in any instalment. The Assessing Officer has charged s.234C interest from the first instalment date. Can he?
  No. The Rajasthan High Court held that the liability to pay advance tax on a capital gain arises only once the gain has accrued, so interest under s.234C on the shortfall attributable to that gain can run only from the date the advance tax on it became payable, and not from any earlier instalment date. Where the gain arose after 15 March, the proviso required only that the tax be paid by 31 March, and interest ran for that period alone.
• CESC Ltd v DCIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The Assessing Officer has issued a section 154 notice to rectify my section 143(1)(a) intimation after a scrutiny notice under section 143(2) was already served. Can he do that?
  No. The Calcutta High Court quashed the section 154 notices. Once a notice under section 143(2) has been issued the department cannot fall back on the summary procedure of section 143(1)(a), and rectifying the intimation is only another way of activating that procedure, so it is equally impermissible. The Court added a second and independent reason: where a regular assessment under section 143(3) has been completed on the same item, the order under section 143(1)(a) ceases to be operative and merges in the final order, so there is nothing left to rectify. The notices for the four years before the Court were quashed.
• Ganesh Chhababhai Vallabhai Patel v. CIT (Gujarat High Court) — a s.161(1) assessment on the trustee carries the rate applicable to the beneficiary's TOTAL income, and s.154 rectification lies where it did not High CourtHelps departmentNo later treatment found
  Our trust was assessed under section 161 on the beneficiaries' shares at the rate their shares alone attracted. Four years later the Assessing Officer rectified it under section 154 and applied each beneficiary's personal rate on his whole income. Could he do that in rectification?
  Yes. The Gujarat High Court held that it is settled from CIT v. Kamalini Khatau that section 161(1) permits the Income-tax Officer to assess either the representative assessee or the person represented — the latter by force of section 166 — and that where he assesses the trustee, the assessment must be made in the same status as the beneficiary and at the rate applicable to that beneficiary's TOTAL income, which includes his income from outside the trust. Applying the rate relatable only to the beneficiary's share of the trust income was therefore a mistake apparent from the record, and calling for the beneficiaries' own assessment orders in order to work out that rate was not a fresh inquiry that took the case outside section 154. The Court also rejected the trust's reliance on the Central Board of Direct Taxes' circular of 24 February 1967, but in doing so it stated the principle the circular lays down: once the choice has been made to tax either the trustee or the beneficiary, it is not open to the Department to go behind it and assess the other at the same time. That principle was held simply to have no application, because the beneficiaries had not been assessed again — only the rate on the trustee's assessment had been corrected.
• Bhura Mal Raj Mal v CIT High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The officer has passed a s.154 order shifting my TDS credit to the next year because the payer's accounting year is different from mine. Can he do that by rectification?
  No. The Rajasthan High Court held that the credit belongs to the year in which the income is assessed in the recipient's hands, not the year fixed by the payer's accounting year or the date on the certificate, and in any event the point was at best debatable, so s.154 could not be used at all. The consequential withdrawal of s.214 interest and charging of s.215 interest also fell.
• S.R.F. Charitable Trust v Union of India High CourtHelps taxpayer
  The department adjusted my return under section 143(1)(a) simply because I did not attach proof of my claims. Can it do that?
  No. The Delhi High Court held that an adjustment under the first proviso to section 143(1)(a) can be made only where the claim is prima facie inadmissible on the information available in the return, the accounts or the accompanying documents. The conclusion must flow from the return as filed. No power is given to disallow a claim merely because proof has not been furnished. If the officer wants proof he must ask for it, which means issuing a notice under section 143(2). The intimation was quashed.
• Vaishali Baban Bhosale v ITO ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My s.89 relief on salary arrears was disallowed in the intimation because Form 10E was not filed with the return. Is it lost?
  Not necessarily. The Pune Tribunal restored the claim to the Assessing Officer with a direction to verify it and allow the relief, where the assessee had filed Form 10E only years after the intimation. The Bench followed coordinate bench decisions holding that a delay in filing the form should not by itself defeat a relief the assessee is otherwise entitled to.
• Avendus Enhanced Return Fund v ACIT — a Category III AIF is assessed in its own name, and a s.14A disallowance the fund overstated in its own return goes back to the Assessing Officer for verification ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My client is a Category III Alternative Investment Fund. It filed its own return, overstated a section 14A disallowance by more than a crore, and the Assessing Officer and the Commissioner (Appeals) both refused to correct it, citing Goetze. Is a revised computation before the Assessing Officer really worthless?
  No. The Mumbai Tribunal set aside the appellate order and restored the issue to the Assessing Officer, holding that Goetze (India) is confined to the powers of the Assessing Officer while the Bombay High Court in Pruthvi Brokers & Shareholders has held that the appellate authorities are competent to entertain a legitimate claim even if it was not made through a revised return. It did not decide the merits: because the nature and quantum of the exempt income, the applicability of section 115BBDA and the consequential section 14A disallowance all required verification from the assessment records, the matter went back with all contentions open. Note what the case also shows on the facts — a Category III AIF is assessed in its own name, on its own income, under the ordinary provisions; the section 115UB pass-through has nothing to do with it.
• Awadhesh Kumar Dixit v DCIT ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My client retired from a nationalised bank in April 2018 and CPC capped his leave encashment exemption at Rs 3,00,000. The Rs 25,00,000 limit came only in May 2023. Can he still get it for AY 2019-20?
  This Tribunal said yes. It held that the enhanced ceiling of Rs 25,00,000 notified under s.10(10AA)(ii) is a remedial and beneficial measure and directed the Assessing Officer to allow exemption up to Rs 25,00,000 or the actual amount received, whichever is lower, even though the assessee had retired on 30 April 2018, nearly five years before the notification.
• Khalsae-Vehicles Pvt. Ltd. v DCIT, Circle-3(1)(1) ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  I filed Form 10-ID and my first return under s.115BAB after the s.139(1) due date but within the s.139(4) time. The CPC has now denied me the 15 per cent rate in a later year. Is the option gone for good?
  Not on these facts. The Delhi Tribunal held that where the substantive conditions of s.115BAB are undisputedly satisfied, the failure to file Form 10-ID on or before the s.139(1) due date is a procedural lapse and is not a fatal flaw, and allowed the appeal for AY 2023-24. The Form there had been filed in the very first year, along with a first return that was belated but within the s.139(4) window.
• CDO Jain Education Society v ACIT (CPC) ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My institution filed its audit report on time but in Form 10B when Form 10BB was the right form, and the CPC has denied the exemption and raised a demand on the gross receipts. Is filing the wrong audit form fatal?
  No. Where the accounts were in fact audited by a chartered accountant and an audit report was uploaded within time, the choice of the wrong form is a procedural lapse and not a failure of the substantive condition, and exemption cannot be denied on that ground alone. The Tribunal set aside the appellate order and directed the Assessing Officer to verify substantive compliance and, if satisfied, to condone the procedural lapse, allow the exemption and reduce the demand to nil.
• Lodha Maharana Pratap Nagar Co-operative Housing Society Limited v ITO ITATCuts both waysNo later treatment found
  The CPC taxed my society's receipts from members. Can I get that corrected under section 154, or have I lost the claim by not making it in the return?
  Section 154 will not carry it. The Mumbai Tribunal agreed with the Assessing Officer and the CIT(A) that mutuality and eligibility under s.80P require examination of foundational facts and cannot be a mistake apparent from the record. But the claim was not lost: Goetze (India) restricts only the Assessing Officer, not the appellate authorities, so the Tribunal restored the matter to the Assessing Officer to examine the claim on merits.
• Rashmikant Bhaichandbhai Shah v ITO, Ward-5(3)(2), Ahmedabad ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The CPC disallowed my s.80GGA deduction in the s.143(1) intimation because I have business income. Can I still get relief for the same donation under s.35(1)(ii), and can I raise it in a s.154 application?
  The Ahmedabad Bench restored the matter to the Assessing Officer with a direction to examine the alternative claim under s.35(1)(ii) and to grant it if the assessee is found eligible. The Bench proceeded on the footing, recorded from the intimation, that s.80GGA is not available where the assessee has business income, and held that the authorities should assist an assessee in claiming eligible deductions rather than punish him for a bona fide mistake.
• Pudhureddiyur Raju Kalaimani v ITO ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  CPC denied my leave encashment exemption under s.10(10AA) because Form 26AS shows the gross salary, and the Department says I resigned and joined another employer in the same year. Can I still get it?
  Yes on both points. Leave encashment received on resignation is exempt under s.10(10AA), and nothing in the statute disentitles an employee who takes up fresh employment in the same year; what matters is that the receipt was on cessation of employment. A Form 26AS mismatch thrown up in s.143(1) processing is not a sustainable ground to tax the amount where the claim is supported by the employer's Form 16.
• Kae Capital Fund v ITO — the live question whether a SEBI 1996-Regulations venture capital fund is an "investment fund" under s.115UB, and why the Tribunal never reached it ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The Commissioner (Appeals) has directed the Assessing Officer to allow my fund's section 10(23FB) exemption only if it proves it is not an investment fund under Explanation 1 to section 115UB, without ever hearing us. Has anyone decided whether a SEBI venture capital fund registered under the 1996 Regulations is inside section 115UB?
  Not in this order, and that is the point to take from it. The Mumbai Tribunal set the Commissioner (Appeals)' order aside and restored the appeal for de novo adjudication because a request for a personal hearing through video conferencing had been made and not granted, which clause 12 of the Faceless Appeal Scheme, 2021 does not permit — the Commissioner (Appeals) "shall allow such request". Having remitted on that ground the Tribunal expressly held that the assessee's other grievances did not call for adjudication at that stage. So the substantive question — whether a fund holding a certificate under the SEBI (Venture Capital Funds) Regulations, 1996 that has not migrated to the SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012 is an "investment fund" within clause (a) of Explanation 1 to section 115UB, and so loses section 10(23FB) by the proviso inserted with effect from 1 April 2016 — remains undecided.
• MCM Developers v DCIT, Central Circle-1, Aurangabad ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The assessment order said s.269ST and s.271DA. The AO has now passed a s.154 order changing it to s.269SS and s.271D. Can he do that?
  No. The Tribunal held that mentioning s.269ST together with its own penalty section s.271DA is not a typographical error — it could only have been one if s.269ST had been typed alongside s.271D — so the original assessment order reflected a conscious application of mind. Substituting s.269SS and s.271D for them under s.154 was a change of opinion between two possible legal views, not the correction of a mistake apparent from the record, and the rectification order was quashed.
• Arun Dhir v DCIT — s.10(10A) contains no requirement that the commutation be received on superannuation, and the denial of a plainly available exemption is a mistake apparent from the record under s.154 ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  My client took a lump sum from his employer's pension policy in lieu of his pensionary rights and joined another group. The Assessing Officer says s.10(10A) only applies on superannuation and that in any event the client never appealed the assessment, so a s.154 application is not open to him. Is there anything I can do?
  On this Tribunal's view, yes on both counts. The ITAT Chandigarh held that section 10(10A) nowhere provides that the benefit accrues only on superannuation or retirement, so a lump sum received in lieu of pensionary benefit under a scheme formulated by the employer falls within s.10(10A)(ii); and it held that the refusal of a benefit admissible in law was a mistake apparent from the record which the Assessing Officer ought to have rectified under section 154, following coordinate-bench orders in the cases of other retirees of the same employer.
• Orient Craft Ltd v DCIT ITATHelps department
  I withdrew my appeal against the section 143(1) intimation because the case went into scrutiny. Can the Assessing Officer now rectify under section 154 to bring back the intimation addition the scrutiny order left out?
  Yes, on these facts. The Delhi Bench of the Tribunal held that there was no merger of the section 143(1) intimation into the section 143(3) assessment, because the two orders proceeded on different issues, and that the intimation stood final once the assessee withdrew its appeal against it. The scrutiny order had started from the returned income instead of the income determined by the intimation, leaving the intimation's addition of Rs 12,82,64,760 out of the assessed figure. That, the Tribunal held, was a mistake apparent from the record, and the Assessing Officer was entitled to correct it under section 154.
• Rashmi Subhash Jha v ITO — 'consultancy' is not 'technical consultancy', and deduction under s.194J does not make the receipt professional ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The CPC has re-cast my client's s.44AD return as a s.44ADA return under s.143(1)(a) because her clients deducted tax under s.194J. Is a consultant a professional for this purpose?
  No, on this order. The word 'consultancy' does not appear in s.44AA(1), which speaks of 'technical consultancy', and technical consultancy means the rendering of technical services; a consultant is therefore carrying on a business and may return income under s.44AD. The rate at which a client deducts tax while paying the assessee is of absolutely no relevance to the character of the receipt in the recipient's hands, and the adjustment made by the Assessing Officer and the CPC under s.143(1)(a) was held bad in law.
• Gram Sewa and Viklang Shayta Sanstha v DCIT ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The trust's Form 10B did not go with the return and the exemption has been refused. Does filing it in answer to the s.139(9) notice save the claim?
  Yes. The Tribunal held that the authorities were not justified in refusing the exemption under s.11 where the assessee had filed the audit report in answer to the defect notice under s.139(9) and before the assessment proceedings were completed. A highly technical view of the timing defeats the purpose of the requirement where substantive compliance has been made.
• Brinda Ramakrishna v ITO ITATHelps taxpayer
  I filed Form 67 late and my foreign tax credit was disallowed. Does missing the deadline kill the claim?
  No, on this decision. The Bangalore Tribunal held that Rule 128(9) does not provide for disallowance of foreign tax credit where Form 67 is filed late; filing Form 67 is directory, not mandatory; and the treaty overrides the Act, with the Rules unable to run contrary to the Act. The assessee had claimed credit of Rs 4,73,779 for Australian tax under section 90 read with Article 24 of the India-Australia treaty, filed Form 67 only on 18 April 2020, and had the credit refused. The Tribunal allowed the appeal, and also held the point could be taken in rectification proceedings under section 154.
• Dixit Rice Mill v DCIT (CPC) ITATCuts both ways
  Must an assessee first apply for rectification to CPC before appealing against a s.143(1) intimation?
  CPC made adjustments in a s.143(1) intimation without giving the assessee an opportunity, and the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal on the footing that the assessee should have applied online for rectification first. The Tribunal held that an appeal lies to the CIT(A) against a s.143(1) intimation and that there is no requirement in law to approach CPC for rectification before appealing.
• Subodh Gupta (HUF) v Pr CIT ITATCuts both waysNo later treatment found
  My mother gifted shares to my HUF. Is she a 'relative' of the HUF?
  No. For a Hindu undivided family the Explanation makes only a member of that family a 'relative'. The karta's mother was not a member - the gift deed itself recited that the gift was to the family of her son - so 75,000 shares gifted by her were chargeable under s.56(2)(vii), and the list of relatives that applies to an individual does not travel across to a receipt in the family's hands. The decision has a second limb: the Principal Commissioner's valuation by reference to a later sale price was rejected, fair market value has to be computed under Rule 11UA, and the computation was restored to the Assessing Officer, so the amount was never determined. The appeal was partly allowed.
• Smt. Vandana Manoj Shah v ITO, Ahmedabad ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The Assessing Officer has withdrawn my s.80E deduction by a s.154 rectification, saying the education loan was taken by my major married son and not by me. Can he do that under s.154?
  No, on this order. The Ahmedabad Tribunal held that deciding the nature of the loan and who took it would require a long drawn process of hearing, that the question is debatable, and that it therefore cannot be the subject matter of s.154 proceedings — and deleted the disallowance. The Tribunal did not decide the underlying question whether the deduction was in fact available.
• Shree Jagdamba Emery Stone v ITO ITATHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The officer refused you firm status because a document was missing that the Explanation to s.139(9) does not mention. Was he entitled to do that without giving you a chance to put it right?
  No. The Tribunal held that the enumeration of defects in the Explanation below s.139(9) is not exhaustive but only illustrative, so a document the Explanation does not name can still be a defect; but precisely because it is a defect within s.139(9), the assessee must be given the opportunity to rectify it before the consequence is visited on him. The department could not deny firm status on a defect outside the Explanation without first offering that opportunity.
• Statutory position — s.219: advance tax is a payment of tax for the year, and credit for it must be given in the regular assessment CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  The assessment order taxes the year but the computation sheet has not given credit for the advance tax my client paid, or has credited it to the wrong year. What is the statutory basis for insisting on the credit?
  Section 219 is the answer and it is a single sentence: any sum, other than a penalty or interest, paid by or recovered from an assessee as advance tax in pursuance of Chapter XVII shall be treated as a payment of tax in respect of the income of the period which would be the previous year for an assessment for the assessment year next following the financial year in which it was payable, and credit therefor shall be given to the assessee in the regular assessment. So the section does two things: it characterises advance tax as a payment of tax rather than a deposit, and it fixes the year to which that payment belongs by reference to the financial year in which the tax was payable.
• Statutory position — s.200A: the CPC computes tax, interest and the s.234E fee on a TDS statement and issues an intimation CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both waysSuperseded by amendment
  CPC has sent me an intimation under section 200A with a late fee on it. What does section 200A actually let them compute, when did the fee limb go in, and can I appeal it?
  Section 200A is the machinery for processing a quarterly TDS statement under the Income-tax Act, 1961. Sub-section (1) runs (a) to (f): correct arithmetical errors and incorrect claims apparent from the statement, compute interest, compute the fee under section 234E, determine the sum payable or the refund, send an intimation, and grant the refund. The fee limb is clause (c), and the old clauses (c), (d) and (e) became (d), (e) and (f) when section 52 of the Finance Act, 2015 substituted clauses (c) to (f) for clauses (c) to (e) with effect from 1 June 2015 — so a submission that still calls the intimation clause (d) or the refund clause (e) is describing the law before that date. Under the 1961 Act the intimation cannot be sent after one year from the end of the financial year in which the statement is filed, and that limit sits in the proviso to sub-section (1), not in sub-section (2); under the successor provision, section 399 of the Income-tax Act, 2025, the same one-year limit is sub-section (2) itself. The intimation is deemed a notice of demand under the proviso to section 156, is appealable to the Commissioner (Appeals) under section 246A(1)(a), and can be rectified under section 154(1)(c). Whether a section 234E fee can be charged in a section 200A intimation for a quarter before 1 June 2015 is the point on which the High Courts have split — Karnataka and Kerala for the deductor, Gujarat, Rajasthan and Madras for the Revenue — and which High Court you are in decides it.
• CBDT Instruction No. 01/2016 - the six months in s.154(8) CBDT Circulars & InstructionsHelps taxpayer
  My rectification application has been sitting with the officer for more than six months. Has it lapsed?
  No. The Board issued this instruction precisely because officers were taking the view that an application not decided inside the six months in s.154(8) had lapsed and needed no action. The instruction records that view, rejects it, and directs that the six-month limit be strictly followed and monitored by supervisory officers.
• CBDT Instruction No. 02/2016 - rectification orders must be in writing CBDT Circulars & InstructionsHelps taxpayerNo later treatment found
  The officer says my rectification has been 'done in the system' but I have received no order. Is that enough?
  No. The Board found that rectification orders under s.154 were being passed by officers on the AST system without a copy of the order being given to the taxpayer, who was then unaware of the decision and unable to pursue it in appeal or by a further rectification. Pointing to s.154(4), which requires the order to be passed in writing, it directed that all rectification applications be disposed of after passing an order in writing, to be duly served on the taxpayer concerned, and not by merely making the necessary rectification on the AST system.
• Statutory position — s.234D: interest on a refund granted under s.143(1) that regular assessment shows should not have been granted — the rate, the period, the reduction under sub-section (2), and Explanation 2 for assessment years commencing before 1 June 2003 CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both ways
  We were given a refund when the return was processed under s.143(1). On scrutiny the Assessing Officer has now raised a demand and has also charged interest under s.234D on the refund. Is that right, for how long does the interest run, and can he do it for an assessment year that is older than the section itself?
  Yes, on the conditions in sub-section (1). Section 234D charges simple interest where a refund is granted to the assessee under s.143(1) and either (a) no refund is due on regular assessment, or (b) the amount refunded under s.143(1) exceeds the amount refundable on regular assessment. The rate is one-half per cent, on the whole or the excess amount so refunded, for every month or part of a month comprised in the period from the date of grant of refund to the date of such regular assessment. The section was inserted by the Finance Act, 2003 with effect from 1 June 2003, and the words "one-half per cent" were substituted for "two-third" by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2003 with effect from 8 September 2003 — both recorded in footnotes printed against the section. Sub-section (2) provides that where, as a result of an order under s.154, s.155, s.250, s.254, s.260, s.262, s.263 or s.264, or an order of the Settlement Commission under s.245D(4), the refund granted under s.143(1) is held to be correctly allowed either in whole or in part, the interest chargeable under sub-section (1) shall be reduced accordingly. Explanation 1 makes a first-time assessment under s.147 or s.153A a regular assessment for the purposes of the section. Explanation 2, which the later editions of the section print and the earlier ones do not, reads: "For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the provisions of this section shall also apply to an assessment year commencing before the 1st day of June, 2003 if the proceedings in respect of such assessment year is completed after the said date." Which amending Act inserted Explanation 2, and from what date, is not established here — the editions of the section that print it carry no footnotes, and the editions that carry footnotes do not print it.

Listed strongest first: Supreme Court, then High Court, then Tribunal, then CBDT. Nothing here has yet been read in full by a chartered accountant — open an entry to see where it came from.