The judgment or order itself could not be retrieved from any source open to this library, so no check of its later treatment was possible. The entry records where the search was tried. 32 entries in this library carry this status. Each note below says what was found and where it was checked.
The judgment itself has not been located in a reported source, so no later treatment of it can be checked and its text has not been read. What can be said is this. The order it is said to have set aside — Swagatma Enclave (P.) Ltd. v. Initiating Officer, Jaipur [2026] 185 taxmann.com 441 (SAFEMA - New Delhi), 1 April 2026, decided by Justice Munishwar Nath Bhandari, Chairman, and G.C. Mishra, Member, in the companion appeals of the three companies — carries no record of having been set aside or reversed. That order therefore still stands unreversed, and it went in favour of the revenue on the admissibility of the s.132(4) statements, on the effect of the retraction and on the absence of cross-examination. Whether the Union has taken the High Court decision further is not known. Two consequences follow for anyone relying on this page. The propositions set out above — that a retracted statement untested by cross-examination is, standing alone, no evidence at all; that the power in s.19(1)(b) of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act to summon and examine a witness becomes a duty where such a statement is the only material against a party; and that findings returned under s.69 of the Income-tax Act carry evidentiary value which the Initiating Officer cannot disregard — should be checked against a certified copy before they go into a pleading, and the case should not be cited on the strength of this entry alone. And because the outcome was a remand for a fresh inquiry rather than a finding that the properties were not benami within s.2(9) of that Act, the decision goes to the quality of the material before the Initiating Officer under s.24 and not to the character of the transaction. An attachment confirmed under s.26 on evidence that has been properly tested is untouched by it, and a party whose matter is remanded should expect the inquiry to be done over again rather than to end.
Unverified, and now for a stronger reason than before. The order is not merely uncited: it could not be found in a full-text subscription research database at all. Three searches were run - the party name, which returns a large number of unrelated records; the appeal number 267/Del/2023, which returns none; and the party name narrowed by 'house rent allowance', which returns nothing on point. The absence across all three is consistent with the digest's own '(UR)' marking, but it also means no primary text of the order has ever been read for this entry, so its holding must not be restated as though it were sourced. A taxguru survey does cite the order by its appeal number and sets it alongside Bajrang Prasad Ramdharani v. Asstt. CIT (ITA 715/Ahd/2013), Abhay Kumar Mittal v. Dy. CIT (ITA 3385/Del/2019) and Meena Vaswani v. Asstt. CIT (ITA 1983/Mum/2015), the last of which refused the exemption on cash rent paid to a mother; an author citing an order in a survey is not a court applying it. Abhay Kumar Mittal has now been read in full and its particulars are confirmed - [2022] 136 taxmann.com 78/194 ITD 224 (Delhi)(Trib.), ITA No. 3385/Del/2019, AY 2013-14, decided 8 February 2022, A.D. Jain (Vice President) and Dr. B.R.R. Kumar (Accountant Member), the assessee's appeal allowed. That decision is itself unverified: it carries no later treatment and cites no authority at all.
The judgment of 5 July 2023 is not carried in a subscription case-law database, so no citator entry, parallel citation or later treatment of it could be checked; six searches have now been run, including one on the company name with the name of a judge said to have sat, which returns nothing at all. The prior-intimation rule it is reported to apply is itself settled in Bombay: Jet Privilege (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2021] 131 taxmann.com 119 (Bom.) held that intimation under s.245 must precede the set-off and can be neither simultaneous nor subsequent, following Suresh B. Jain v. A.N. Shaikh [1987] 165 ITR 151 (Bom.), confirmed by a Division Bench at [1987] 165 ITR 86, and Hindustan Unilever Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2015] 60 taxmann.com 326 / 233 Taxman 353 / 377 ITR 281 (Bom.); and the same Court applied it between these same parties in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. ADIT [2021] 133 taxmann.com 320 / [2022] 284 Taxman 647 (Bombay). Separately, P. S. Srijan Height Developers v. ACIT, previously identified here only by its writ number, is now traced to a law report citation: [2026] 186 taxmann.com 1210 (Calcutta), decided 4 May 2026 and recorded as partly in favour of the assessee. Its text is outside the subscription plan used and has not been read, so what it holds is still second-hand. None of that is later treatment of this judgment, and absence of contrary authority is not later approval.
Validity check could not be completed. No later treatment was searched for or located, and the Speaking to Minutes Order of 29 April 2021 noted on the face of the report could not be retrieved, so it is not known whether the text as read is the final text. The operative reasoning depends on CBDT Circular 4/2021 of 23 March 2021, and any later circular modifying that definition would displace it; no check for a later circular was made.
The judgment could not be found in a subscription case-law database, so no citator entry, parallel citation or later treatment could be checked. Five searches have now been run on the party name, alone and in combination, and on the judge with the court, and none returned it. The judge-and-court search is a useful control: it returns twenty Gauhati High Court decisions running to 22 June 2026, so that database does carry this Court's recent output, and a judgment of 27 July 2026 is simply not in it yet - or the coram recorded here is wrong. An earlier search of news sources found no appeal, stay or doubting of this judgment, but absence of contrary reporting is not later approval. The same search did show that the Supreme Court, by a batch order of 10 April 2026, set aside High Court rulings that had struck down reassessment notices issued by Jurisdictional Assessing Officers, following Act No. 4 of 2026 - but that concerns s.151A and the faceless allocation of notices, not the reason to believe or s.151 sanction grounds on which this case is reported to turn.
Unverified, and the negative finding is now solid rather than untried. The order could not be found in a full-text subscription research database. A search on the party name returns twelve records, all unrelated. A search on the appeal number 528/AGR/2025 returns a single unrelated Agra Tribunal decision matched on the numeral alone. A search on the party name together with the section returns nothing. Searching the section itself returns the statutory text and a run of commentary, and the only Tribunal decision it surfaces is not a s.115BBH case: Raunaq Prakash Jain v. ITO [2024] 169 taxmann.com 298 (Jodhpur - Trib.), IT Appeal No. 1 (Jodh) of 2024, decided 28 November 2024, concerns assessment year 2021-22, before s.115BBH applied, and holds that Bitcoin was a capital asset under s.2(14) even before 1 April 2022 so that gains were chargeable as capital gains and s.54F relief was available (paras 8 and 9). So there is still no decision of any Tribunal or High Court construing s.115BBH - not on cost of acquisition, not on interest, not on anything else - and therefore no later treatment of an order that itself cannot be found. On the provision, two things are now verified from the Acts module. Section 115BBH allows no deduction for any expenditure 'other than cost of acquisition, if any', no allowance and no set off of any loss, and no carry forward of the loss. The 1961 Act is flagged as repealed, and s.115BBH corresponds to s.194 of the Income-tax Act 2025, 'Tax on certain incomes', where Table entry 4 reproduces the same rate and the same conditions, including the cost-of-acquisition carve-out. Live advice must be given under the new provision.
The order could not be found in a subscription case-law database on six searches, so no citator entry, parallel citation or later treatment could be checked; the search on the Bench did return other Andhra Pradesh decisions of the same judges from the same weeks, so the database does carry that Court's 2026 output. The decision is very recent, so it may not be carried yet. The proposition it rests on is, however, no longer unchecked. In Bipasa Tradelink (P.) Ltd. v. Assessment Unit, Income-tax Department, National Faceless Assessment Centre [2024] 165 taxmann.com 534 (Calcutta), W.P.A. No. 15202 of 2024, decided 26 July 2024 by Raja Basu Chowdhury J., the Court held at para 8 that the Standard Operating Procedure circulated by the Central Board of Direct Taxes through the National Faceless Assessment Centre on 3 August 2022 may not have statutory force but that the Faceless Assessment Unit is bound to adhere to it because the Board issued it, following the Division Bench of the same Court in Indu Goenka v. Assessment Unit, Income-tax Department [2023] 149 taxmann.com 462 / 292 Taxman 444 (Calcutta); and that it appears from clause N.1.3.1 of that Standard Operating Procedure that the time to respond to a show-cause notice is seven days. A response time of less than three days was held contrary to the Standard Operating Procedure and to natural justice, and the assessment was set aside and remanded to the Faceless Assessment Unit. There is a second line to the same effect: the BCAJ reports Wrode and Wire Pvt Ltd v. National Faceless Assessment Centre (Bombay High Court, Writ Petition No. 3533 of 2022, AY 2018-19, decided 24 April 2026). None of that is later treatment of this order; it is consistency, and it means the point of law can be cited from a judgment that can be read rather than from this one.
The clarification could not be found in a subscription database. Searches were run on the file number 225/233/2019/ITA-II, on the file number without the divisional suffix, on the substance (gross vehicle weight, unladen weight, heavy goods vehicle, section 44AE) and on section 44AE restricted to circulars and notifications; the last returned twenty-two CBDT instruments referring to section 44AE, none of them dated 14 August 2019 and none addressing this question. It may never have been issued as a published circular, notification or instruction, in which case it is an internal communication that a taxpayer cannot rely on as a Board circular. What can be confirmed is the statute: the rates, the 12,000 kilogram definition of a heavy goods vehicle and the Motor Vehicles Act definitions are in section 44AE itself and in Circular No. 8/2018, the Explanatory Notes to the Finance Act 2018. Note also that the Income-tax Act, 1961 stands repealed.
The statutory framework is confirmed and in force: section 285BAA was inserted into the Income-tax Act, 1961 by section 90 of the Finance Act, 2025, its counterpart in the Income-tax Act, 2025 is section 509, and rules 241 to 244 of the Income-tax Rules, 2026 carry the definitions, the reporting nexus, the reporting requirements and the due diligence procedures. The Guidance Note itself could not be found in a subscription database. Searches were run on 'Reporting Crypto-Asset Service Provider', which returned the section, the rules and the amending notification but no guidance note; on the guidance note's subject matter with the rule numbers, which returned nothing; and on its title restricted to circulars and notifications, which returned one unrelated IFSCA circular. Its date is also uncertain - it is reported as 24 July 2026 here and as 27 July 2026 in the companion entry on Notification No. 19/2026.
The office memorandum itself has not been located, and its terms cannot be checked. An internal memorandum circulating a Directorate's detection methodology may never have been published, so this is not evidence that it does not exist; it means only that its wording, its date and whether it still stands are unestablished. Do not quote it. Whether it is in force, has been superseded or has been modified is unknown. What is confirmed is the provision it restates, and that is where a reply should be anchored. Section 45(5A) of the Income-tax Act 1961 was inserted by the Finance Act 2017 with effect from assessment year 2018-19. It applies only to an individual or a Hindu undivided family who transfers a capital asset being land or building or both under a specified agreement, and it shifts the year of charge to the previous year in which the competent authority issues the completion certificate for the whole or part of the project, the full value of the consideration being the stamp duty value of that person's share on the date of that certificate plus any money received. The provision is carried into the Income-tax Act 2025 as section 67(14) to (16), applying to tax years beginning on or after 1 April 2026. Two limits on the provision travel with any use of the memorandum. The completion-certificate treatment is withdrawn altogether where the landowner transfers his share in the project on or before the date the certificate is issued: the gain then falls in the year of that transfer and the ordinary provisions, not s.45(5A), fix the consideration. And the definitions confine it - 'specified agreement' means a registered agreement, and 'competent authority' means the authority empowered to approve the building plan. An officer applying the section to a company or a firm, or to a year before assessment year 2018-19, is outside it.
This judgment could not be found in a subscription case-law database on six searches, so no citator entry, parallel citation or later treatment of it could be checked; the database does carry other decisions of this assessee, including Delhi High Court decisions of 8 October 2015 and 30 May 2017 and Delhi Tribunal decisions of 2 January 2025 and 2 March 2026. The proposition it is reported to apply is separately well founded, and both supporting authorities have now been checked. Pr. CIT v. Silver Line [2016] 65 taxmann.com 137 / 383 ITR 455 / 283 CTR 148 (Delhi), 4 November 2015, decided in favour of the assessee, holds that merely because an assessee participated in proceedings following a notice under s.148, the mandatory requirement of a notice under s.143(2) before finalising the order is not obviated; its report carries no citator banner recording any reversal or Supreme Court outcome, so it stands. Above it stands CIT v. Laxman Das Khandelwal [2019] 108 taxmann.com 183 / [2019] 266 Taxman 171 / [2019] 417 ITR 325 (SC), Civil Appeal Nos. 6261 and 6262 of 2019, decided 13 August 2019 by Uday Umesh Lalit and Vineet Saran, JJ., read here in full. The Court held at para 9 that s.292BB does not save the complete absence of notice: for it to apply the notice must have emanated from the department, it is only infirmities in the manner of service that the section cures, and it is not intended to cure the complete absence of notice itself. On that footing the Court affirmed, at para 10, the concurrent findings of the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the Tribunal that no notice under s.143(2) had ever been issued and that the assessment was therefore without jurisdiction, and dismissed the Revenue's appeals; its case review records Asstt. CIT v. Laxman Das Khandelwal [2019] 108 taxmann.com 182 (MP) as affirmed. The Finance Act 2026 validating provisions run the other way on adjacent defects - s.292BA on defects in the document identification number, retrospective from 1 October 2019, and s.292BC on approvals under ss.148, 148A, 151 and 153D, retrospective from 1 April 2021 - but neither extends to non-issuance of a notice under s.143(2). None of that is later treatment of this judgment.
This status is about the document, not about the law. The decision is a 2023 judgment of the Supreme Court, it is applied every week in the Tribunal, and its result is not in doubt. What could not be done was read the judgment to its end. Several separate copies were opened - the Court's own published file, the copy in the general case-law index and two further mirrors. Each stops at a different point and none reaches the concluding paragraphs, which is what a length limit looks like rather than anything missing from the judgment. The full-text index over the same copy confirms the position from the other side: it returns the passages of the judgment that exist, including passages well past the point at which the page views stop, and it returns nothing at all for the words of the disposal. So the Court's concluding sentence of holding, and its operative order, are not set out on this page. One Tribunal order, at Mumbai, reproduces the closing paragraph, and it gives its effect as setting aside the Delhi High Court's judgment of 19 December 2013 and the judgments of the High Courts of Delhi, Bombay and Karnataka that had followed it. That is the substance stated everywhere else as well. But it is a single document, and where a form of words rests on one document this library states the substance and leaves the words alone. What is corroborated stands on its own footing. Paragraph 27, quoted in full on this page, was reproduced word for word by the Delhi High Court on 23 January 2024 in ITA 660/2018 and ITA 634/2019, and again by the Tribunal at Mumbai in 2025. Those are courts and tribunals, not publishers, and that is the reason the passage is quoted here while the disposal is not. What is settled beyond argument is that the apportionment at 31 July 1999 did not survive, that the fee is capital and goes to section 35ABB, and that the High Court decisions the other way no longer stand. Every later High Court and Tribunal decision that could be read proceeds on that footing.
The instrument could not be found in a subscription research database that indexes Board circulars, notifications, instructions, office memoranda and press releases. Five searches were run there: on the instruction number itself, e-Verification Instruction No. 2(i) of 2024, which returned no records at all; on the series name, e-Verification Instruction, which returned only indirect-tax instructions and unrelated income-tax material; on the file-number style, CIT(e-Verification); and on two phrases taken from the text this entry attributes to the instruction, 'Value at Risk e-Verification Scheme' and 'Final Verification Report Value at Risk updated return'. None surfaced it. The later instruction of the same series, dated 11 March 2025 with a corrigendum of 12 March 2025, was not traceable either, which is consistent with the whole series being internal and unpublished. So the position is stronger than saying supersession could not be established: the instrument is not in the professional record at all, so its text cannot be checked against an authoritative copy, no successor can be traced, and no court can be shown to have considered it. What is published, and what a reader can be sent to, is the layer around it - the e-Verification Scheme, 2021 (S.O. 5187(E) [No. 137/2021/F. No. 370142/57/2021-TPL(Part-I)], dated 13 December 2021, made under s.135A(1) and (2)), the Board's press release of 1 February 2023 carrying frequently asked questions on the Scheme, the authorisation order F. No. 282/04/2022-IT(Inv.V), and the Board's press releases of 26 February 2024 and 4 March 2024 on the campaign. The provision the instruction cites was substituted with effect from 1 September 2024. The status stays unverified.
The order itself could not be retrieved from any source open to this library. It has been searched for on four separate passes - on the federation's short name, on its full name, on the statutory subject, and again in build 146 - and a comprehensive law-reporting database returns nothing. What exists is press reporting of the petition, not a text of any order of any court. No later treatment can be checked because the decision itself cannot be read, and the entry should not be relied on without the order.
No later decision applying, following or affirming this order was found, and the order itself could not be located in a subscription case-law database — searches on the party name, on an exact-phrase form of it and on the appeal number all came back without it. The decision it is reported as following, M/s Silver Wings Life Spaces v. DCIT, precedes it and is not later treatment. The underlying question remains genuinely divided at High Court level: the Rajasthan High Court in CIT v. Bajargan Traders supports treating a survey surrender connected to the business as business income, while the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Kim Pharma Pvt Ltd and the Madras High Court in SVS Oil Mills favour the deeming provisions, and there is no Supreme Court ruling on the point. On the rate, the position checked against the Acts module is this: section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act 1961 continues to read sixty per cent and that Act now stands repealed; its successor, section 195 of the Income-tax Act 2025, charges income referred to in sections 102 to 106 at thirty per cent, with no deduction for any expenditure, allowance or set-off of loss.
Pronounced 25 June 2024. Paragraphs 1 to 23 can be read, but no copy carrying the operative part of the order could be found, so there is no holding here to be applied, doubted or overruled, and none was looked for. The Tribunal's own record was tried for the closing paragraphs and could not be searched from outside. Whether the Revenue has gone further under s.19 against a deletion of this size is not known. Treat the case as open until the complete order is obtained.
The order has not been located in a reported source: searches on the party name, on the distinctive part of it and on the appeal number returned nothing, so no citator check is possible and no later treatment could be looked for. That absence is not adverse to the order, which is recent and unreported. Nothing was found either way. The proposition the entry records is orthodox. The first appellate authority's power of enhancement is confined to the items of income that were the subject matter of the assessment, on the Supreme Court's decision in CIT v. Shapoorji Pallonji Mistry, which has not been read for this entry and is recorded here only as the authority the order applies. Because the proposition rests on that judgment rather than on this order, a practitioner is not exposed by the order's unreported status: the argument can be made on the Supreme Court decision, with this order cited, if at all, as a recent application of it. Two cautions go with that. The line between re-examining an assessed item and introducing a new source is drawn on the facts of each case, so an unreported order applying it is weak authority for any particular set of facts. And nothing here settles what becomes of the underlying addition once the enhancement goes, or whether the same figure could have been reached by a route within s.251; those questions are open and this entry does not close them.
The order could not be located in a subscription case-law database — searches on the society's name, on the distinctive part of it, and on the parallel decision the entry names all returned nothing — so no citator check is possible and no later treatment could be looked for. The statutory position the result turns on has been checked against the Acts module and is as stated: section 80AC of the Income-tax Act 1961 provides that for an assessment year commencing on or after 1 April 2018, a deduction admissible under any provision of Chapter VI-A under the heading 'C.—Deductions in respect of certain incomes' — which is where section 80P sits — is not allowed unless the assessee furnishes a return for that assessment year on or before the due date specified under section 139(1). For assessment years from 1 April 2006 but before 1 April 2018 the condition reached only sections 80-IA, 80-IAB, 80-IB, 80-IC, 80-ID and 80-IE, so it did not touch section 80P. The 1961 Act now stands repealed; the corresponding provision in the Income-tax Act 2025 is section 122.
The decision has not been doubted and is applied as settled. It is the Supreme Court authority behind a long line of orders in Kerala on notices issued to co-operative banks and societies: the Cochin Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal set out paragraphs 19 to 22 of it in Kalpakancherry Service Co-operative Bank on 23 August 2017, in Kakkoor Service Co-operative Bank on the same day, in Palakuzha Service Co-operative Bank on 8 November 2017, in Mekkadampu Service Co-operative Bank, Arthunkal and Vettackal on 8 July 2019 and in Ranny Service Co-operative Bank on 4 November 2019; the Panaji Bench did the same in West Chalakudy Service Co-operative Bank on 3 October 2017. The Kerala High Court applied it in Enanalloor Service Co-operative Bank and thirty-three connected appeals decided on 19 February 2020 by C.K. Abdul Rehim and Amit Rawal JJ, dismissing all of them. Some thirty court documents reproduce the same four paragraphs in the same words. The status recorded here is about sourcing and not about authority. The judgment's own text could not be read on the Supreme Court's judgment store or on any public index of its judgments, and the record has therefore been built from the paragraphs as reproduced, identically, by courts and Tribunal benches that had the judgment before them. Every sentence quoted on this page, and the order dismissing the appeal, appears in that form in more than one independently published decision. What could not be established, and is therefore not stated, is the coram, the wording of the opening paragraphs, and the citation of the Division Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court that was under appeal. The Income-tax Act, 1961 was repealed on 1 April 2026 by section 536(1) of the Income-tax Act, 2025, and section 536(2)(c) continues it for proceedings in respect of any tax year beginning before that date. The successor to section 133(6) in the 2025 Act has not been established on the department's own page for that section and is therefore not given here.
Downgraded from good law. The status previously rested on the ruling being reported again in December 2024 and on no appeal, stay or contrary ruling having surfaced. Absence of contrary authority is not later approval, and a news re-report is not a decision. The order itself could not be located in a subscription case-law database on five searches, so no citator entry could be checked and no decision applying, following or affirming it was found. The point of law it is reported to decide is nevertheless sound, and is now supported by an income-tax authority that can be read in full. In Kaneria Granito Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax [2016] 71 taxmann.com 276 / [2016] 241 Taxman 315 (Gujarat), Special Civil Application No. 14497 of 2014, decided 27 June 2016 by Akil Kureshi and A.J. Shastri, JJ., the Court held at para 5 that the power under s.226(3) is essentially in the nature of a garnishee order requiring the debtor of the assessee to pay the Assessing Officer direct, and at para 6 that where the accounts are cash credit or term loan accounts they were opened to enable the assessee to borrow from the bank, so that any money the bank makes available is a borrowing by the assessee and the bank and the assessee do not have a debtor-creditor relationship. The attachment notice was set aside. That decision follows K.M. Adam v. ITO [1958] 33 ITR 26 (Mad.), Jugal Kishore Das v. Union of India [W.P. No. 22849 of 2013, 8 October 2013] and Sargam Foods (P.) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [W.P. No. 4313 of 2008, 8 July 2010], and records at para 10 that this is the consistent view of various High Courts. The parallel line under the goods and services tax is to the same effect: Bindal Smelting (P.) Ltd. v. Additional Director General, DGGI [2020] 116 taxmann.com 28 (Punj. & Har.), Manish Scrap Traders v. Principal Commissioner [2022] 141 taxmann.com 153 (Guj.) and Anjani Cotton Industries v. Principal Commissioner [2023] 153 taxmann.com 334 (Guj.).
Unverified, and the reason is now firmer. The order could not be located in a subscription case-law database: a search on the party name returns exactly one record, and it is an insolvency matter concerning a company of the same name, not this tax order; a citation-based search returns nothing. The reported citation this entry carries is an ITR (Tribunal) short note, which that database does not carry, so no parallel citation exists to add and no citator check on the decision is possible. A name search of the digest that does carry it returns three entries, all limbs of the same 2023 Ahmedabad decision, none with an editorial note of an appeal, and nothing else on that host cites it. The closest later decision on the same proviso is Backbone Tarmet NG JV v. ITO (2024) 207 ITD 50 (Ahd.)(Trib.), which held the second proviso to s.40(a)(ia), introduced by the Finance Act 2012 with effect from 1 April 2013, to be retrospective and curative in nature - but it rests on Pr. CIT v. Arvind Lifestyle Brands Ltd. (Guj.) and does not name this decision, so it supports the reasoning without applying the decision, which is not enough to certify the entry. The provision enquiry could not be completed: no official page giving the present text of s.40(a)(ia) or of the second proviso could be opened, the departmental copy setting out clause (ia) without the thirty per cent restriction and tracing it only to 2004 and 2008. No source gives the date of the order.
No later decision applying or following this order has been found, and no reporter citation exists for it, so there is nothing to search on beyond the appeal numbers. The appeal numbers, the date and the Bench are as the order itself carries them and have not been corroborated against any report. Nothing has been found that narrows the Commissioner (Appeals)' power under s.249(3) to admit a belated appeal for sufficient cause. That is the absence of contrary authority, which is not the same as support, and it should not be presented as though it were. The order does not need later treatment to be useful, because it does not lay down anything new. It applies Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji, that where substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other substantial justice must prevail, to a delay of about thirteen to fourteen months caused by pandemic illness of the assessee and his family. Condonation always turns on the material actually pleaded, and the illness relied on here was evidenced before the Tribunal; a delay of the same length with nothing behind it would be decided differently. Two limits are worth stating to a client. This is a Tribunal order and it binds nobody outside the case. And it decides nothing at all on the merits: the delays were condoned and all three appeals were remitted to the Commissioner (Appeals) for fresh adjudication, so the cash deposits, the estimated addition and the penalties are all still to be fought. For a year governed by the Income-tax Act 2025 the successors of ss.249 and 250 should be identified before the application is drafted; that correspondence has not been established here.
The order could not be found in a subscription case-law database: searches on the proprietorship and on the party name return nothing for it, the only hit on the name being an unrelated forfeiture matter. There is no reporter citation to search on, the order being unreported, so no citator check is possible there; the order is weeks old and no later treatment exists to find. The particulars in this entry rest on a single published report. The provision question is now answered from the statute rather than from commentary. Section 58 of the Income-tax Act, 2025, as amended by the Finance Act, 2026, is the successor to sections 44AA, 44AB, 44AD, 44ADA and 44AE of the 1961 Act. Serial number 3 of its table charges 50 per cent of gross receipts for a specified profession as referred to in section 62(4), where gross receipts do not exceed fifty lakh rupees, or seventy-five lakh rupees where cash receipts do not exceed 5 per cent. Section 62(4)(a) lists the specified professions as legal, medical, engineering, architectural, accountancy, technical consultancy, interior decoration, information technology or company secretary. So the phrase 'technical consultancy' on which this order turns is carried into the 2025 Act, and an assessee within it is excluded from the business presumptive scheme, the definition of 'eligible assessee' in section 58(11)(a)(iii) excluding a person carrying on a specified profession.
The order itself could not be located as a document in a subscription database on five searches, so its terms have not been checked against a primary text; the citation (2023) 331 CTR (SC) 717 comes from later judgments that cite it. Two of its particulars are now confirmed from a source independent of the news reporting: the Delhi Bench of the Tribunal, in Haier Appliances India (P.) Ltd. v. ACIT [2024] 168 taxmann.com 126 (Delhi - Trib.), decided 20 September 2024, lists in its cases referred to 'National Faceless Assessment Centre v. Automotive Manufacturers (P.) Ltd. [Civil Appeal No. 1829 of 2023, dated 21-3-2023]'. That fixes the appeal number and the date of 21 March 2023, which previously rested on secondary reports alone. It is a citation in a list of authorities relied on at para 6 and not later treatment, and the Tribunal does not discuss the order. It has been distinguished by the Kerala High Court in Noel Villas and Apartments v. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax [2026] 187 taxmann.com 911 (Ker), 8 June 2026, whose case review lists it among decisions distinguished at para 14. The ground of distinction matters: that Court held, following a Division Bench in Joint CIT v. Sujatha Revikumar (WA No. 2156 of 2024, 27 March 2025), that s.144B requires a draft assessment order to be served only on an 'eligible assessee' as defined in s.144C(15)(b), and that for an ordinary assessee the draft order is merely an internal document, a show-cause notice setting out the proposed variations being enough. It observed that the decisions relied on, including this one, did not discuss that distinction. No decision applying, following or affirming this order was found, so it stays unverified.
The judgment itself could not be found in a subscription database on five searches, and no citator entry for it could be checked; a search on the party name returns two documents in the whole database and neither is this decision. The Karnataka decision previously recorded as following it does not do so. In CIT, Belagaum v. S.M. Anand [2020] 120 taxmann.com 357 / [2020] 422 ITR 209 (Kar.), IT Appeal No. 100056 of 2014, decided 23 August 2019 by Mrs. S. Sujatha and N. K. Sudhindrarao, JJ., the judgment was read in full: 'CIT v. Shivpal Singh Chaudhary [2018] 409 ITR 87 (Punj. & Har.)' appears only in the list of authorities the assessee's senior counsel relied on at para 5, and the Court never discusses it. What the Karnataka Court followed, on the report's own case review, is Pr. CIT v. Perfect Circle India (P.) Ltd. (IT Appeal No. 707 of 2016, 7 January 2019), Hindustan Coca Cola Beverages (P.) Ltd. v. CIT [2007] 293 ITR 226 (SC), CIT v. Vatika Township (P.) Ltd. [2014] 367 ITR 466 (SC) and CIT v. Ansal Land Mark Township (P.) Ltd. [2015] 377 ITR 635 (Delhi); it distinguished the Kerala line in Prudential Logistics and Transports v. ITO [2014] 364 ITR 689 and Thomas George Muthoot v. CIT [2015] 235 Taxman 246. And the Karnataka Court answered the question in favour of the assessee expressly subject to the result of the appeal pending in the Supreme Court in the case of Tide Water Marine Intl. Inc. (Civil Appeal No. 1248 of 2016), so even that support is conditional. That appeal has now been traced to its source: the decision under challenge is CIT, Meerut v. Tide Water Marine Intl. Inc. [2009] 177 Taxman 150 (Uttaranchal), decided 28 July 2008 in favour of the assessee. Its citator records one thing only - that it was approved in [2011] 198 Taxman 518 (Uttaranchal) - and no Supreme Court decision against it. On that record the Supreme Court appeal is still undecided. Two things have since been established from a primary source, and they change this note. First, the decision has been identified: it is Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax-2, Chandigarh v. Shivpal Singh Chaudhary, ITA No. 558 of 2017, Punjab and Haryana High Court, decided 5 July 2018. Second, a later Division Bench of the same Court does apply it. In Pr. CIT-2, Chandigarh v. M/s Mobisoft Telesolutions Pvt Ltd, ITA No. 495 of 2017 (O&M), decided 3 October 2018 by Ajay Kumar Mittal and Avneesh Jhingan, JJ., the Court records at para 14: 'This Court in Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax-2, Chandigarh Vs. Shivpal Singh Chaudhary (ITA No. 558 of 2017) on 05.07.2018, agreeing with the view of Delhi High Court in CIT vs. Ansal Land Mark Township Private Limited, (2015) 377 ITR 635 (Delhi) held that the second proviso to Section 40(a)(ia) and first proviso to Section 201(1) of the Act though inserted by Finance Act, 2012, would be applicable retrospectively w.e.f. 01.04.2005.' That is a decision of the same High Court stating what this one held, and it is the first positive treatment traced. Note that the holding so recorded covers the first proviso to s.201(1) as well as the second proviso to s.40(a)(ia), and rests on agreement with Ansal Land Mark Township. The status is left at 'unverified' only because the judgment's own text has still not been read.
The order could not be located in a subscription case-law database: three searches were run there, on the party name, on the firm and on the party name with the section, and none returned it. There is no citator check to run and no later decision applying it was found. There is, however, verified authority the other way on the cognate provision, and it is a High Court judgment. In Anandkumar v. ACIT [2020] 122 taxmann.com 252 / [2021] 278 Taxman 342 / [2021] 430 ITR 391 (Madras), decided 23 December 2020, the Madras High Court held that a partner who carries on no business of his own has no turnover and no gross receipts, that remuneration and interest from the firm, already debited in the firm's profit and loss account, cannot be treated as gross receipts of the partner, and that a claim to presumptive taxation under section 44AD on such receipts was rightly denied; it affirmed the Chennai Tribunal's order in Anand Kumar v. ACIT [IT Appeal No. 573 (Chny.) of 2018, dated 30 January 2019] and distinguished CIT v. Ramniklal Kothari [1969] 74 ITR 57 (SC). That judgment construes section 44AD, and this order construes section 44ADA, so it is not directly binding on the point; but its reasoning - that a partner's remuneration is not his own gross receipts - reaches the same words, and the High Court noted in passing that section 44ADA likewise operates on 'total gross receipts'. On quantum, the current gross receipts ceiling for the professional presumptive scheme is fifty lakh rupees, or seventy-five lakh rupees where cash receipts do not exceed 5 per cent, as set out in the table to section 58 of the Income-tax Act, 2025; the assessment year in this appeal, 2018-19, long predates that.
No later decision has been shown to apply, follow or affirm the order this entry describes, and that order could not be found in a subscription research database. What the database does carry under the appeal number given, IT Appeal No. 835 (Delhi) of 2016, is an order of 26 April 2019 for assessment year 2011-12 by a different Bench, reported at [2019] 107 taxmann.com 525 (Delhi - Trib.). That order contains the same figures as this entry - the Transfer Pricing Officer's adjustment of Rs. 2,81,01,754, the Dispute Resolution Panel figure of Rs. 2,09,91,628, the transaction value of Rs. 22,18,04,073 and five per cent of it at Rs. 1,10,90,204 - but it does not contain the conclusion this entry records. It excluded two comparables, retained a third, held the assessee entitled to a working capital adjustment, confirmed a small disallowance of gifts under s.40A(3) and partly allowed the appeal, without computing any residual adjustment or deleting one under the second proviso. On the statutory side, the mechanism in the second proviso to s.92C(2) is intact, but the permissible variation is a percentage notified for each year and is not fixed at five per cent; the current notified percentages could not be confirmed against the Act and are not asserted here. One further caution for anyone citing this entry. Because the order it describes could not be located, the arithmetic proposition should be pleaded from the statute and the rule — the third proviso to s.92C(2) read with the proviso to rule 10CA(7) — and supported by a decision that can be produced, rather than by this entry.
The order could not be located: it is not on indiankanoon and three searches of a subscription research database did not return it, so no citator check is possible and its citation, date and Bench rest on secondary reports plus the way later Benches cite it. Later treatment has now been looked for directly and is thin and unhelpful. The order is cited in five ITAT Nagpur orders of 8 June 2022 in the Tanwani group, in Krishna Murthy Vuppala v. ITO (ITAT Hyderabad, R.K. Panda VP, 20 March 2024) and in Periasamy Sivasakthi v. ITO, ITA No. 3163/CHNY/2025 (ITAT Chennai, Inturi Rama Rao AM and S.S. Viswanethra Ravi JM, 11 August 2026). In every one of them it appears in the list of authorities relied on by the assessee's counsel and in none of them does the Bench discuss or apply it; in the Chennai matter the appeal was dismissed, the Bench rejecting the argument that s.68 requires maintained books and holding that the addition could proceed under s.69/s.69A. So the order has been cited but not followed, and the argument it stands for has been rejected once. The Tribunal orders previously cited in support — the ITAT Raipur in Kuldeep Jiwan Mahant and ITO v. Sheetalaya — are said to delete s.68 additions on the same reasoning, which supports the principle but is not treatment of this order. The principle itself descends from CIT v. Bhaichand N. Gandhi [1982] 11 Taxman 59 (Bombay), that a bank passbook is not a book of the assessee. The successor provisions were checked against the Acts module: s.68 of the 1961 Act corresponds to s.102 of the Income-tax Act 2025, headed 'Unexplained credits', and s.69A corresponds to s.104, so the structure of the two charges survives the recast; the precise words of s.102 were not read and are not asserted here. The contrary note is CIT v. Arunkumar J. Muchhala (Bombay), which held an assessee cannot benefit from his own failure to maintain required books.
The judgment could not be found in the subscription database; three searches were run — the party name with the respondent's designation, the party name alone, and the party name with the section — and none returned it. What is established comes from Prithvi Singh Kandhal v. National Faceless Assessment Centre [2026] 187 taxmann.com 1033 (Rajasthan), decided 30 April 2026, which reproduces paras 11 and 12 and gives the cause title, the Special Civil Application number and the date. That later decision is not an application of this one: counsel relied on it, and the Rajasthan High Court declined to interfere, disposing of the petition on the ground that an efficacious alternative remedy was available. No decision applying, following or affirming this judgment was traced, and no appellate treatment or SLP was traced. The note previously carried here asserted that the Finance Act 2022 substituted s.144B so that no draft assessment order is served on a non-eligible assessee, that s.144B(9) was omitted with retrospective effect from 1 April 2021, and cited Noel Villas and Apartments v. ACIT, NFAC v. Mantra Industries Ltd and Sapna Flour Mills Ltd v. UOI. None of those claims could be corroborated in two earlier checks and none was verified in this read; they are recorded here as unverified rather than republished as established.
The judgment has not been reversed and is followed, but it is one side of a live conflict between High Courts and the reader should treat it as that. The Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench, in Vidarbha Veneere Industries Ltd v ITO, IT Appeal No. 34 of 2022, decided 1 April 2025, holds the opposite: that leasehold rights in land are a capital asset because section 2(14) speaks of property 'held by' and not 'owned by' an assessee, and that section 50C therefore applies to an assignment of leasehold rights. Tribunal benches outside Maharashtra have preferred the Karnataka view. The Pune Bench set this judgment out at length in Vimal Baburao Jadhav on 17 September 2021; the Delhi Bench applied it in Fashion Group International on 24 May 2023 and again in Neha Gupta on 17 October 2025, where the departmental representative relied on the Bombay decision and the Bench declined to follow it; the Mumbai Bench applied it in Vanraj Ranchhoddas Merchant on 29 December 2025 and deleted the section 50C addition. Where two non-jurisdictional High Courts differ, benches have applied CIT v Vegetable Products Ltd (1973) 88 ITR 192 (SC) and taken the construction favouring the assessee. The status recorded here is about sourcing and not about authority. The judgment's own text has not been read, either in the High Court's own record or in any reported source searched; what those carry is the later Tribunal orders that quote it. This record has been built from the passage as those orders reproduce it, and the sentences quoted on this page appear in that form in four separate decisions of three different benches. What could not be established, and is therefore not stated, is the coram, the paragraph numbering of the judgment as reported, and the Court's own words of disposal on the first, second and fourth substantial questions. The Income-tax Act, 1961 was repealed on 1 April 2026 by section 536(1) of the Income-tax Act, 2025, and section 536(2)(c) continues it for proceedings in respect of any tax year beginning before that date. The successor to section 50C in the 2025 Act has not been established and is therefore not given here.
Nothing applying, following or affirming this order has been traced, and the order itself could not be found in a subscription research database (three searches on the trust's name and on its distinctive elements returned nothing). That the Bench is reported to have followed an earlier coordinate-bench decision is treatment of that earlier decision, not of this one, so it cannot support 'good law'. Absence of contrary authority is not good law either. Two limits a reader should carry: the reported reasoning rests on a coordinate-bench view that a corpus donation is a capital receipt independently of registration, a point on which benches have not spoken with one voice; and nothing consulted addresses the conditions attaching to corpus donations introduced by the Finance Act 2021, which govern later years.
The order has now been read in full from the Tribunal's own text and the statement previously carried here, that it could not be found, is withdrawn. It has also survived a challenge. The Revenue applied under s.254(2) to have it recalled or rectified, and the Tribunal dismissed that application on 29 June 2026 in ITO, Ward 48(1), New Delhi v. Wahid Ali (M.A. No. 311/Del/2024 in ITA No. 1916/Del/2022, Satbeer Singh Godara JM and M. Balaganesh AM), holding that what the Revenue sought would require the evidence to be reappreciated afresh, which is not permissible; that order records in terms that the order of 8 January 2024 deleted the penalty of Rs 28,13,000 under s.271D. Dismissal of a rectification application is not an affirmation of the reasoning, no appeal to a High Court is disclosed, and nothing applying, following or affirming the order has been traced, so it stays unverified. What the searches do establish is that the point it decides is live and contested at Tribunal level, and that the better-reasoned authority runs the same way. The Bangalore Bench in Smt. Pushpalatha v. ITO [2024] 165 taxmann.com 767 (Bangalore - Trib.), IT Appeal No. 1192 (Bang.) of 2024, assessment year 2017-18, decided 26 July 2024, deleted a section 271D penalty on Rs. 49,10,000 received in cash at the execution of a sale deed for a property sold for Rs. 90 lakh. It held that 'otherwise' in the definition of 'specified sum' in section 269SS must be read ejusdem generis with 'advance', so that it cannot be stretched to cover sale consideration, and that the provision the Assessing Officer should have looked to was section 269ST rather than section 269SS (paras 10 and 12); it went on to hold, separately, that there was reasonable cause under section 273B (paras 14 to 16), and its final conclusion rests on both limbs together. That reading came to it from the Chennai Bench in ITO v. R. Dhinagharan (HUF), IT Appeal No. 3329 (Chny) of 2019, decided 29 December 2023, which worked through the Budget speech, the Memorandum to the Finance Bill 2015 and CBDT Circular No. 19 of 2015 and concluded that the 2015 amendment was aimed at advances and not at consideration paid before the sub-registrar at registration; the Hyderabad Bench in Ramkumar Reddy Satty v. ACIT, IT Appeal No. 488 (Hyd.) of 2023, decided 19 March 2024, took the same view. So the analysis of 'specified sum' that this order's source report does not carry out has been carried out elsewhere, and it points the same way. No High Court decision either way was located.
There is no backlog: every authority here has been searched for later treatment — a decision overruling or doubting it, an amendment overtaking the provision it construes, an SLP, a circular changing the administrative position. Where the answer was found, the entry carries it with the page it was checked against. Where it was not, the entry sits under validity check could not be completed and its note records what was searched and which sources refused — because an upgrade to “still good law” needs a page that actually applies or follows the decision, and finding nothing bad is not the same thing.
None of this is the same as being verified: no chartered accountant has yet read the certified copies and signed the summaries off, and every page still says so. It does mean that when a page says a decision still stands, someone went and looked, and can show you where.
