Three months from the end of the financial year in which the return is furnished. The period was six months until the Finance Act 2021 substituted "three" for "six" with effect from 1 April 2021, so the outer date can now be computed from the date of the return. Proving the negative is the harder half, and I found no decision holding that an ITBA system log is by itself sufficient proof that no notice was generated, or settling who must produce it.
The proviso to s.143(2) reads: "no notice under this sub-section shall be served on the assessee after the expiry of three months from the end of the financial year in which the return is furnished." The departmental text carries the footnote that "three" was substituted for "six" by Act No. 13 of 2021 - the Finance Act 2021 - with effect from 1 April 2021.
That makes the computation mechanical once you have the date of the return. A return furnished on 12 November 2024 falls in financial year 2024-25, which ends on 31 March 2025, so the outer date is 30 June 2025. A return furnished on 2 April 2025 falls in financial year 2025-26 and the outer date is 30 June 2026. The clock runs from the financial year in which the return is furnished, not from the assessment year and not from the date the return is processed.
In reassessment the same computation applies to the return filed in answer to the s.148 notice, and it applies equally where the assessee writes to the officer saying that the original return should be treated as the return in response - the entry in this library on PCIT v. Jai Shiv Shankar Traders turns on exactly that letter. So diarise the date of that letter: it is the date from which the officer's three months are counted.
The evidentiary half of the problem is not answered by the section. Nothing in s.143(2) says who must prove that a notice was issued, and I could not find a decision on whether an ITBA screen or system log, produced by either side, settles the question. What is settled is the consequence if the notice was not issued: s.292BB deems service, not issue, and the Supreme Court in CIT v. Laxman Das Khandelwal held that the complete absence of a s.143(2) notice is not curable. The commentary puts it as "it is only infirmities in manner of service of notice that section seeks to cure and it is not intended to cure complete absence of notice itself", and adds that the department "cannot take shelter by applying provisions of section 292BB that the assessee has participated in the proceedings".
That allocation of the legal burden does not tell you who has to put the record before the Tribunal, and in practice the point is decided by what the department produces. The fact of issue lies wholly within the department's own records - the assessment folder, the notice register, the ITBA generation and despatch details. The workable course, on the material I could reach, is to plead the ground specifically as non-issue rather than as non-receipt, to apply for inspection of the assessment record, and to ask the Bench to direct the Assessing Officer to produce the notice and the generation details. Where the department produces nothing, that is what the finding usually rests on. Where the department produces an ITBA extract showing a notice, the argument shifts to the date of generation against the outer date computed above.
What this does not give you is authority. If you intend to argue that the assessee's own ITBA download, or the absence of a notice in the e-proceedings tab, is by itself proof of non-generation, you will have to source that argument outside this library.
The three-month figure is what converts a vague complaint into a date, and a date is what an appeal ground needs. It also shortens the window considerably: an officer who had until 30 September under the old law now has until 30 June, and notices issued on the old assumption are still surfacing in appeals for the years since 2021.
We charge fees for our public utility work. Does that cost us charitable status under s.2(15)?
The only thing behind my reopening notice is the Valuation Officer's report. Is that enough?
Is a notice under s.143(2) a jurisdictional precondition, or merely a procedural step the Assessing Officer can skip?
My return was only processed under 143(1). Does that stop the department reopening it later?
I made unexplained investments after the close of my accounting year. Which year can the officer tax them in, and can he reopen an earlier year to do it?
The Income-tax Officer examined witnesses behind my back and used their statements against me. Is that material evidence at all?
How much am I actually required to disclose — and can they reopen because the officer drew the wrong conclusion?
The sanctioning authority just wrote 'yes' and signed. Is that a sanction?
Every page in this library links to what it was written from, so you can check it rather than take our word for it.