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Case law › CBDT Circulars & Instructions › Statutory position — rule 24 of the ITAT Rules, 1963: the Tribunal may dispose of the appeal on merits when the appellant does not appear, it may not dismiss it for default, and the proviso gives it the power to recall
CBDT Circulars & InstructionsCuts both waysRule 24 ITAT Rules 1963Rule 27 ITAT Rules 1963s.255s.254(1)s.254(2)s.253s.250

Statutory position — rule 24 of the ITAT Rules, 1963: the Tribunal may dispose of the appeal on merits when the appellant does not appear, it may not dismiss it for default, and the proviso gives it the power to recall

My appeal was called on a day my counsel was in another court and the Tribunal passed an order against me without hearing anybody on my side. Can that order be recalled, and under what?

The Income-tax Act, 1961 was repealed on 1 April 2026. It still governs income earned up to 31 March 2026, and every proceeding about those years however late — assessment, reassessment, rectification, penalty, revision and appeal alike. Income earned from 1 April 2026 is governed by the Income-tax Act, 2025. What changed, and which Act governs your year →

My appeal was called on a day my counsel was in another court and the Tribunal passed an order against me without hearing anybody on my side. Can that order be recalled, and under what?

Under the proviso to rule 24, and it is expressed as a duty rather than a discretion. Rule 24 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963, headed 'Hearing of appeal ex parte for default by the appellant', provides that where, on the day fixed for hearing or on any other date to which the hearing may be adjourned, the appellant does not appear in person or through an authorised representative when the appeal is called on for hearing, the Tribunal may dispose of the appeal on merits after hearing the respondent. The proviso then provides that where an appeal has been disposed of as provided above and the appellant appears afterwards and satisfies the Tribunal that there was sufficient cause for his non-appearance when the appeal was called on for hearing, the Tribunal shall make an order setting aside the ex parte order and restoring the appeal. Rule 25 is the mirror image for a default by the respondent. What the rule does not permit is a dismissal for want of prosecution: the only course open on non-appearance is disposal on merits after hearing the other side.

Decided by the CBDT Circulars & Instructions (Not applicable — statutory text) on 1987-08-01, reported as Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963, rules 24 and 25, made in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (5) of section 255 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It bears on section Rule 24 ITAT Rules 1963, section Rule 27 ITAT Rules 1963, section 255, section 254(1), section 254(2), section 253, section 250 of the Income Tax Act 1961, in Appeals and Evidence & Burden of Proof matters.

Still good law. The rule stands in the form substituted by the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Amendment Rules, 1987 with effect from 1 August 1987, and the text read carries that substitution note against both rule 24 and rule 25. No later amendment to either rule was found. The date on this entry is that substitution date and nothing else. The content of the rule is not left to rest on a single reading. This library already carries the Bombay High Court's decision in a writ petition of 2013 in which the court, construing this very rule, recorded that in terms of rule 24 the option of dismissing an appeal for default is not available to the Tribunal, and went on to hold that an order which was irregular for that reason was nonetheless not a nullity and bound the parties until set aside. The library also carries the Supreme Court decision holding a rule permitting dismissal for default to be beyond the appellate power, on the ground that the appellate authority is bound to dispose of the appeal on the merits on questions of fact and of law. Those two decisions are the independent confirmation of what the rule provides, and a reader who wants the authority rather than the text should go to them. Two limits are worth stating. The proviso prescribes no period within which the application to recall must be made, and nothing in the rule imports the period that governs a rectification application; whether a delay defeats an application is left to the Tribunal's satisfaction on sufficient cause. Second, the rule says nothing about what happens to the limitation for a further appeal while a recall application is pending, and nothing is asserted about it here. The Rules are made under section 255(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Whether corresponding rules have been made under the Income-tax Act, 2025, and in what terms, has not been established, and no successor is given.

Why it matters

The distinction that decides these cases is between disposing of an appeal and dismissing it. Rule 24 authorises the first and not the second. A Tribunal faced with an empty appellant's chair is to hear the departmental representative and decide the grounds; it is not given the option of recording that nobody appeared and dismissing the appeal for want of prosecution. Orders in the second form are still passed, and an appellant who receives one is not in the same position as an appellant whose grounds were considered and rejected — the order is irregular on the face of the rule, and this library carries both the High Court authority saying so and the Supreme Court authority behind it. The second point is which application to file. An appellant who missed the hearing instinctively reaches for the rectification power, because that is the application everyone knows. It is the wrong one. The proviso to rule 24 is its own remedy with its own test: did the appellant appear afterwards, and has he satisfied the Tribunal that there was sufficient cause for the non-appearance? Nothing has to be shown to be apparent from the record. And the proviso carries no period, whereas the rectification power does — which is exactly how an appellant loses everything, by letting the rectification period run while assuming that was his route, and finding, as one appellant did before the Bombay High Court, that the application could not be entertained at all. The third point is the word 'shall'. Once sufficient cause is established the Tribunal is to set aside the ex parte order and restore the appeal; the rule does not leave that to discretion. What is discretionary is the satisfaction, and that is where the application has to do its work. An affidavit from the counsel with the other court's cause list attached, or a medical record, or proof that the notice of hearing went to a superseded address, is what turns a request into a case. A bare statement that there was a professional difficulty is not.

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Related

Other authorities on the same sections.
Every authority on the provisions this decision turns on: all 45 on s.250 · all 24 on s.253 · all 20 on s.254(2)