When my loss arose, the law let me carry it forward indefinitely. The rule was later cut to eight years. Do I keep the old benefit as a vested right?
No. The Supreme Court held that it is a cardinal principle of tax law that the law to be applied is that in force in the assessment year, unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication. When the assessment for 1960-61 was made and the set-off provision invoked, it was the provision as it stood in that year - as amended in 1957 to allow only eight years - that governed. There was no question of a vested right under the earlier law. An assessment for one year is not, absent a contrary provision, affected by the law in force in another year, and a right claimed under the law of a particular year is ordinarily available only in a proceeding for that year.
Decided by the Supreme Court (Supreme Court of India - N.L. Untwalia and R.S. Pathak JJ; judgment by Pathak J) on 1979-10-10, reported as (1979) 120 ITR 921; 1980 AIR 251; 1980 SCR (1) 906; 1980 (1) SCC 139; (1979) 2 Taxman 417; 1980 SCC (Tax) 67; (1980) Tax LR 3. It bears on section 24(2)(iii) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, section 72, section 4 of the Income Tax Act 1961, in Assessment & Scrutiny and How Tax Law Is Read matters.
This is the short, hard authority on which year's law applies, and it is cited far outside the set-off context. It disposes of the vested right argument in its most attractive form - the loss had genuinely arisen when the law was more generous - by locating the right in the assessment proceeding rather than in the year the loss was suffered. It also settles a practical point: an appellate direction that a loss be carried forward is worth only what the law of the year of set-off allows, because such a direction assumes rather than creates the right. The one qualification, drawn from the way the Court distinguished Helen Rubber Industries, is that a transitional or savings provision may divide the years between two regimes and produce a different result.
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The assessee was a company manufacturing jute goods. The case concerns assessment year 1960-61, the accounting period being the financial year ended 31 March 1960. In the assessment for 1959-60 the Income Tax Officer had set off unabsorbed business losses of Rs 1,58,845 for 1949-50 and Rs 5,70,952 for 1950-51 against that year's business income and directed that Rs 15,50,189 of loss still unabsorbed be carried forward. For 1960-61 the company claimed to set that unabsorbed loss against the current year's business income. The officer rejected the claim because the loss related to 1950-51 and could not be carried forward for more than eight years. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal both dismissed the appeals, and on a reference the Calcutta High Court, by judgment of 25 March 1971, answered against the assessee. Before this Court the assessee argued that under section 24(2)(iii) as it stood before its amendment with effect from 1 April 1957 it had acquired a vested right to carry the unabsorbed loss forward from year to year until it was completely set off, that the amendment limiting the period to eight years could not divest that right, and that the 1957 amendment was not retrospective. The Court set out the legislative history: before the Finance Act 1955 the section allowed a business loss to be carried forward for not more than six years, with shorter periods for certain years ending with 1943-44; section 16 of the Finance Act 1955 amended it so that a loss not wholly set off could be carried forward from year to year; and the Finance (No 2) Act 1957 amended it again with effect from 1 April 1957 so that a loss could not be carried forward for more than eight years.
The appeal was dismissed. The claim rested on a misconception of the fundamental basis underlying every income tax assessment. The law to be applied is that in force in the assessment year unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication, following Isthmian Steamship Lines and Karimtharuvi Tea Estate. So when the assessment for 1960-61 was made and section 24(2) invoked, the provision as amended by the Finance (No 2) Act 1957 applied, and the assessee had no vested right under the earlier law. An assessment for one assessment year cannot, in the absence of a contrary provision, be affected by the law in force in another assessment year, and a right claimed under the law in force in a particular assessment year is ordinarily available only in relation to a proceeding pertaining to that year. The unabsorbed loss of Rs 15,50,189 of assessment year 1950-51 could not be carried forward for more than eight years and could not be set off in 1960-61. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner's direction in the 1959-60 order that the loss be carried forward assumed that the law permitted it to be carried into future years, and since that was not the law the assessee could derive no advantage from the direction. Helen Rubber Industries was distinguished.
The reasoning is compact and rests on locating the right in time. The assessee's argument put the right at the moment the loss arose and treated the later amendment as taking away something already earned. The Court answered that an income tax assessment is made for a particular assessment year and is governed by the law of that year; a right under the law of an earlier year is ordinarily available only in a proceeding for that earlier year, so nothing was taken away because nothing had accrued for the later year. That is why the concession that the 1957 amendment was prospective did not help - prospective operation means it applies to assessment years after it came into force, and 1960-61 was such a year. The appellate direction was met by the same reasoning: a direction to carry a loss forward has meaning only if the law of the year of set-off permits the carry forward into that year's assessment. Helen Rubber Industries was distinguished on its transitional footing: there paragraph 3 of the Taxation Laws (Removal of Difficulties) Order 1950 divided the previous years governed by the Travancore Income Tax Act 1946 from those governed by the Indian Income Tax Act 1922 as extended to Travancore in 1950, and it was because of that Order that the two-year carry forward under the Travancore law, which had expired before the Indian Act began to apply, could not be extended to six years.
It is a cardinal principle of the tax law that the law to be applied is that in force in the assessment year unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication.
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Handle my notice → Ask a CA on WhatsAppNo. The Supreme Court held that it is a cardinal principle of tax law that the law to be applied is that in force in the assessment year, unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication. When the assessment for 1960-61 was made and the set-off provision invoked, it was the provision as it stood in that year - as amended in 1957 to allow only eight years - that governed. There was no question of a vested right under the earlier law. An assessment for one year is not, absent a contrary provision, affected by the law in force in another year, and a right claimed under the law of a particular year is ordinarily available only in a proceeding for that year. This was decided by the Supreme Court (Supreme Court of India - N.L. Untwalia and R.S. Pathak JJ; judgment by Pathak J) and bears on section 24(2)(iii) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, section 72, section 4 of the Income Tax Act 1961. It is reported as (1979) 120 ITR 921; 1980 AIR 251; 1980 SCR (1) 906; 1980 (1) SCC 139; (1979) 2 Taxman 417; 1980 SCC (Tax) 67; (1980) Tax LR 3. This is the short, hard authority on which year's law applies, and it is cited far outside the set-off context. It disposes of the vested right argument in its most attractive form - the loss had genuinely arisen when the law was more generous - by locating the right in the assessment proceeding rather than in the year the loss was suffered. It also settles a practical point: an appellate direction that a loss be carried forward is worth only what the law of the year of set-off allows, because such a direction assumes rather than creates the right. The one qualification, drawn from the way the Court distinguished Helen Rubber Industries, is that a transitional or savings provision may divide the years between two regimes and produce a different result. If it applies to you, the first step is this: Test every carry-forward claim against the provision in force in the year you want the set-off, not the year the loss arose.
The assessee was a company manufacturing jute goods. The case concerns assessment year 1960-61, the accounting period being the financial year ended 31 March 1960. In the assessment for 1959-60 the Income Tax Officer had set off unabsorbed business losses of Rs 1,58,845 for 1949-50 and Rs 5,70,952 for 1950-51 against that year's business income and directed that Rs 15,50,189 of loss still unabsorbed be carried forward. For 1960-61 the company claimed to set that unabsorbed loss against the current year's business income. The officer rejected the claim because the loss related to 1950-51 and could not be carried forward for more than eight years. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal both dismissed the appeals, and on a reference the Calcutta High Court, by judgment of 25 March 1971, answered against the assessee. Before this Court the assessee argued that under section 24(2)(iii) as it stood before its amendment with effect from 1 April 1957 it had acquired a vested right to carry the unabsorbed loss forward from year to year until it was completely set off, that the amendment limiting the period to eight years could not divest that right, and that the 1957 amendment was not retrospective. The Court set out the legislative history: before the Finance Act 1955 the section allowed a business loss to be carried forward for not more than six years, with shorter periods for certain years ending with 1943-44; section 16 of the Finance Act 1955 amended it so that a loss not wholly set off could be carried forward from year to year; and the Finance (No 2) Act 1957 amended it again with effect from 1 April 1957 so that a loss could not be carried forward for more than eight years. The matter was decided on 1979-10-10 by the Supreme Court (Supreme Court of India - N.L. Untwalia and R.S. Pathak JJ; judgment by Pathak J). On those facts the Supreme Court held as follows. The appeal was dismissed. The claim rested on a misconception of the fundamental basis underlying every income tax assessment. The law to be applied is that in force in the assessment year unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication, following Isthmian Steamship Lines and Karimtharuvi Tea Estate. So when the assessment for 1960-61 was made and section 24(2) invoked, the provision as amended by the Finance (No 2) Act 1957 applied, and the assessee had no vested right under the earlier law. An assessment for one assessment year cannot, in the absence of a contrary provision, be affected by the law in force in another assessment year, and a right claimed under the law in force in a particular assessment year is ordinarily available only in relation to a proceeding pertaining to that year. The unabsorbed loss of Rs 15,50,189 of assessment year 1950-51 could not be carried forward for more than eight years and could not be set off in 1960-61. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner's direction in the 1959-60 order that the loss be carried forward assumed that the law permitted it to be carried into future years, and since that was not the law the assessee could derive no advantage from the direction. Helen Rubber Industries was distinguished.
The reasoning is compact and rests on locating the right in time. The assessee's argument put the right at the moment the loss arose and treated the later amendment as taking away something already earned. The Court answered that an income tax assessment is made for a particular assessment year and is governed by the law of that year; a right under the law of an earlier year is ordinarily available only in a proceeding for that earlier year, so nothing was taken away because nothing had accrued for the later year. That is why the concession that the 1957 amendment was prospective did not help - prospective operation means it applies to assessment years after it came into force, and 1960-61 was such a year. The appellate direction was met by the same reasoning: a direction to carry a loss forward has meaning only if the law of the year of set-off permits the carry forward into that year's assessment. Helen Rubber Industries was distinguished on its transitional footing: there paragraph 3 of the Taxation Laws (Removal of Difficulties) Order 1950 divided the previous years governed by the Travancore Income Tax Act 1946 from those governed by the Indian Income Tax Act 1922 as extended to Travancore in 1950, and it was because of that Order that the two-year carry forward under the Travancore law, which had expired before the Indian Act began to apply, could not be extended to six years. In the words reproduced by the source cited on this page: "It is a cardinal principle of the tax law that the law to be applied is that in force in the assessment year unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication."
It was decided by the Supreme Court on 1979-10-10 and is reported as (1979) 120 ITR 921; 1980 AIR 251; 1980 SCR (1) 906; 1980 (1) SCC 139; (1979) 2 Taxman 417; 1980 SCC (Tax) 67; (1980) Tax LR 3. Binding on every court and authority in India. A Supreme Court decision binds every assessing officer, every Commissioner (Appeals), every bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and every High Court in India. An officer who declines to follow it is acting contrary to law, and that refusal is itself a ground of appeal. On section 24(2)(iii) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, section 72, section 4, the practical question is whether the facts of your own notice match the facts of this case closely enough for the same rule to apply.
It helps the department, and it appears in this library for that reason — you need to know what the Assessing Officer will cite against you. The appeal was dismissed. The claim rested on a misconception of the fundamental basis underlying every income tax assessment. The law to be applied is that in force in the assessment year unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication, following Isthmian Steamship Lines and Karimtharuvi Tea Estate. So when the assessment for 1960-61 was made and section 24(2) invoked, the provision as amended by the Finance (No 2) Act 1957 applied, and the assessee had no vested right under the earlier law. An assessment for one assessment year cannot, in the absence of a contrary provision, be affected by the law in force in another assessment year, and a right claimed under the law in force in a particular assessment year is ordinarily available only in relation to a proceeding pertaining to that year. The unabsorbed loss of Rs 15,50,189 of assessment year 1950-51 could not be carried forward for more than eight years and could not be set off in 1960-61. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner's direction in the 1959-60 order that the loss be carried forward assumed that the law permitted it to be carried into future years, and since that was not the law the assessee could derive no advantage from the direction. Helen Rubber Industries was distinguished. It arises in Assessment & Scrutiny and How Tax Law Is Read matters, on section 24(2)(iii) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, section 72, section 4 of the Income Tax Act 1961, and was decided by Supreme Court of India - N.L. Untwalia and R.S. Pathak JJ; judgment by Pathak J. Before relying on it, read the source linked on this page and check whether it has since been distinguished, overruled or overtaken by an amendment to the Income Tax Act. In practice the steps that follow from it are these. Do not rely on a direction in an earlier year's order that a loss be carried forward; it only assumes that the law of the later year permits the set-off. Look for a transitional or savings provision when a change of regime is involved - that is what distinguished Helen Rubber Industries - and quote it, since without one the general rule applies. When you say an amendment is not retrospective, be clear what that gets you. It was common ground here that the 1957 amendment was prospective, and the assessee still lost, because the assessment year in question was after it.
Searched for later treatment; none was found. That is not the same as a source affirming it. A citator search returns 397 later decisions citing this judgment. None of the named decisions was found applying or following it. In CIT, Mumbai v M/s Sarkar Builders (Supreme Court, 15 May 2015) the Court set out the principle in order to hold it inapplicable: 'In M/s. Reliance Jute and Industries Ltd. v. C.I.T. ... this Court had, no doubt, pointed out the cardinal principle of tax law that the law to be applied has to be the law in force in the assessment year. However, this is qualified by the exception when it is provided otherwise expressly or by necessary implication', and it then held that on the scheme of section 80-IB(1) 'the aforesaid cardinal principle of tax law is not to be applied as, by necessary implication, application thereof stands excluded'. In Pr. CIT-1 v ACB (India) Power Ltd (Delhi High Court, 22 August 2025) the judgment appears only as a parenthetical 'see also' attached to a quoted statement of the principle. In ACIT v Ramco Industries Limited (Chennai Tribunal, 7 April 2025) it appears only inside the passage of PCIT v Era Infrastructure that the Tribunal reproduced and adopted wholesale. Nothing overruling or doubting it was found either: a name search coupled with the word overruled returned 34 decisions in which the word attaches to other cases. No source could be cited for that finding. Checking whether an authority still stands matters as much as knowing what it held: a decision may be overruled on one point and survive on another, or the provision it interprets may have been amended since. Read the source and the editor's note on this page before relying on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal.
Until build 87 this library carried a second entry on the same judgment, at /caselaw/case/reliance-jute-v-cit-law-of-the-assessment-year-applies/, which asked: When my loss arose the law let me carry it forward indefinitely. The law was later amended to cap it at eight years. Do I keep the old benefit as a vested right? It was the shorter of the two write-ups and has been merged into this one. That address now redirects here, and every citation, section and subject it carried that this entry did not has been folded in. The Court stated the principle with the qualification unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication but did not explore what amounts to such a provision, beyond distinguishing Helen Rubber Industries on the transitional order that operated there. It did not consider the position where a statute expressly saves accrued rights, nor whether any different result would follow for a loss whose carry forward period had not expired when the law changed. The batch line lists sections 4 and 2(9), which the judgment does not discuss. The reported citation list on the source page is plainly imperfect, giving among other things a criminal-series reference; only those that read cleanly are reproduced here. This library shows the verification state of every entry openly. This entry has not yet been read in full by a chartered accountant. The summary reflects the sources listed on this page. Read the source before you rely on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
The appeal was dismissed. The claim rested on a misconception of the fundamental basis underlying every income tax assessment. The law to be applied is that in force in the assessment year unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication, following Isthmian Steamship Lines and Karimtharuvi Tea Estate. So when the assessment for 1960-61 was made and section 24(2) invoked, the provision as amended by the Finance (No 2) Act 1957 applied, and the assessee had no vested right under the earlier law. An assessment for one assessment year cannot, in the absence of a contrary provision, be affected by the law in force in another assessment year, and a right claimed under the law in force in a particular assessment year is ordinarily available only in relation to a proceeding pertaining to that year. The unabsorbed loss of Rs 15,50,189 of assessment year 1950-51 could not be carried forward for more than eight years and could not be set off in 1960-61. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner's direction in the 1959-60 order that the loss be carried forward assumed that the law permitted it to be carried into future years, and since that was not the law the assessee could derive no advantage from the direction. Helen Rubber Industries was distinguished.
TaxSphere, “Reliance Jute & Industries Ltd v CIT”, https://taxnotice.vittsphere.com/caselaw/case/reliance-jute-v-cit-law-of-the-assessment-year-applies/ (validity last checked 2026-08-29)
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