I went to the High Court instead of the Tribunal and the adjudication order is now months old. Is my s.46 appeal dead?
Not necessarily. The Delhi High Court relegated the petitioners to the appeal under s.46 after they gave up a challenge to the validity of the Act, held that the time the writ petition was pending is liable to be excluded under s.14 of the Limitation Act, fixed 28 February 2025 as the date by which the appeals were to be filed, and directed that appeals filed by then not be dismissed as barred by limitation or delay.
Decided by the High Court (Prathiba M. Singh J and Dharmesh Sharma J) on 2025-01-24, reported as W.P.(CRL) 960/2023 with CRL.M.A. 2053/2025 (High Court of Delhi). It bears on section Benami s.24, section Benami s.26, section Benami s.46, section Limitation Act s.14 of the Income Tax Act 1961, in Appeals matters.
It is the practical answer to the trap of having litigated the vires in the wrong forum. It confirms that an appeal under s.46 must be filed within forty-five days, that the Appellate Tribunal may entertain a late appeal on sufficient cause, and that a writ pursued in good faith buys the exclusion in s.14 of the Limitation Act.
Binding within that High Court's jurisdiction. Persuasive elsewhere.
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Twenty-one entities and one individual challenged the whole chain of benami proceedings against them: show-cause notices under s.24(1) and 24(2) issued between 14 and 30 December 2021, provisional attachment orders under s.24(3) of 16 to 31 December 2021, continuation orders under s.24(4) of 29 to 31 March 2022, the reference to the Adjudicating Authority under s.24(5) of 11 April 2022, orders under s.26(3) of April 2023 declaring the properties benami, and a notice of 13 November 2024 beginning confiscation. The writ petition also raised broad challenges to the provisions of the Act itself. The petitioners had not filed appeals to the Appellate Tribunal when that remedy was available, having chosen instead to dispute the vires of the foundational provisions before the High Court. By the time of hearing they no longer pressed the challenge to validity.
The petition was disposed of by relegating the petitioners to the appellate remedy under s.46 against the orders under s.26(3) (para 16). The period during which the writ petition remained pending is liable to be excluded from the limitation period in terms of s.14 of the Limitation Act, subject to the condition that appeals be preferred before the Appellate Tribunal by 28 February 2025; if filed by that date the appeals shall not be dismissed on the ground of being barred by limitation or delay (para 17). The petitioners were permitted to place the order before the Adjudicating Authority to seek time before the confiscation proceedings listed for 28 January 2025 continued (para 18). The appeals were to be adjudicated on merits by the Appellate Tribunal, the remaining challenges were not pressed, pending applications were disposed of and the next date of hearing was cancelled (paras 19 and 20).
The Court recorded that the petitioners would under normal circumstances have been entitled to file appeals before the Appellate Tribunal but had not availed of that remedy when it was available, choosing instead to dispute the vires of the foundational provisions. However ill-advised that course was, it could not be said not to be a good faith proceeding (para 14). The Court then set out s.46, noting that appeals have to be filed within forty-five days but that delay is condonable on sufficient cause being shown, and extracted s.46(1) and 46(2) in full (para 15). In the interest of justice, and because the petitioners no longer pressed the challenge to the validity of the provisions, they ought to be relegated to the appellate remedy (para 16). The exclusion under s.14 of the Limitation Act followed from the good faith finding, and the Court made the liberty conditional on a fixed outer date (para 17).
the appeals shall not be dismissed on the ground of being barred by limitation or delay.
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Handle my notice → Ask a CA on WhatsAppNot necessarily. The Delhi High Court relegated the petitioners to the appeal under s.46 after they gave up a challenge to the validity of the Act, held that the time the writ petition was pending is liable to be excluded under s.14 of the Limitation Act, fixed 28 February 2025 as the date by which the appeals were to be filed, and directed that appeals filed by then not be dismissed as barred by limitation or delay. This was decided by the High Court (Prathiba M. Singh J and Dharmesh Sharma J) and bears on section Benami s.24, section Benami s.26, section Benami s.46, section Limitation Act s.14 of the Income Tax Act 1961. It is reported as W.P.(CRL) 960/2023 with CRL.M.A. 2053/2025 (High Court of Delhi). It is the practical answer to the trap of having litigated the vires in the wrong forum. It confirms that an appeal under s.46 must be filed within forty-five days, that the Appellate Tribunal may entertain a late appeal on sufficient cause, and that a writ pursued in good faith buys the exclusion in s.14 of the Limitation Act. If it applies to you, the first step is this: Count the forty-five days under s.46(1) from the date of the Adjudicating Authority's order under s.26(3), not from its service.
Twenty-one entities and one individual challenged the whole chain of benami proceedings against them: show-cause notices under s.24(1) and 24(2) issued between 14 and 30 December 2021, provisional attachment orders under s.24(3) of 16 to 31 December 2021, continuation orders under s.24(4) of 29 to 31 March 2022, the reference to the Adjudicating Authority under s.24(5) of 11 April 2022, orders under s.26(3) of April 2023 declaring the properties benami, and a notice of 13 November 2024 beginning confiscation. The writ petition also raised broad challenges to the provisions of the Act itself. The petitioners had not filed appeals to the Appellate Tribunal when that remedy was available, having chosen instead to dispute the vires of the foundational provisions before the High Court. By the time of hearing they no longer pressed the challenge to validity. The matter was decided on 2025-01-24 by the High Court (Prathiba M. Singh J and Dharmesh Sharma J). On those facts the High Court held as follows. The petition was disposed of by relegating the petitioners to the appellate remedy under s.46 against the orders under s.26(3) (para 16). The period during which the writ petition remained pending is liable to be excluded from the limitation period in terms of s.14 of the Limitation Act, subject to the condition that appeals be preferred before the Appellate Tribunal by 28 February 2025; if filed by that date the appeals shall not be dismissed on the ground of being barred by limitation or delay (para 17). The petitioners were permitted to place the order before the Adjudicating Authority to seek time before the confiscation proceedings listed for 28 January 2025 continued (para 18). The appeals were to be adjudicated on merits by the Appellate Tribunal, the remaining challenges were not pressed, pending applications were disposed of and the next date of hearing was cancelled (paras 19 and 20).
The Court recorded that the petitioners would under normal circumstances have been entitled to file appeals before the Appellate Tribunal but had not availed of that remedy when it was available, choosing instead to dispute the vires of the foundational provisions. However ill-advised that course was, it could not be said not to be a good faith proceeding (para 14). The Court then set out s.46, noting that appeals have to be filed within forty-five days but that delay is condonable on sufficient cause being shown, and extracted s.46(1) and 46(2) in full (para 15). In the interest of justice, and because the petitioners no longer pressed the challenge to the validity of the provisions, they ought to be relegated to the appellate remedy (para 16). The exclusion under s.14 of the Limitation Act followed from the good faith finding, and the Court made the liberty conditional on a fixed outer date (para 17). In the words reproduced by the source cited on this page: "the appeals shall not be dismissed on the ground of being barred by limitation or delay."
It was decided by the High Court on 2025-01-24 and is reported as W.P.(CRL) 960/2023 with CRL.M.A. 2053/2025 (High Court of Delhi). Binding within that High Court's jurisdiction. Persuasive elsewhere. A High Court decision binds the assessing officer, the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal within that state, and is persuasive elsewhere. If your assessment is in a different jurisdiction, check whether your own High Court has taken the same view before relying on it. On section Benami s.24, section Benami s.26, section Benami s.46, section Limitation Act s.14, the practical question is whether the facts of your own notice match the facts of this case closely enough for the same rule to apply.
It helps the taxpayer. The petition was disposed of by relegating the petitioners to the appellate remedy under s.46 against the orders under s.26(3) (para 16). The period during which the writ petition remained pending is liable to be excluded from the limitation period in terms of s.14 of the Limitation Act, subject to the condition that appeals be preferred before the Appellate Tribunal by 28 February 2025; if filed by that date the appeals shall not be dismissed on the ground of being barred by limitation or delay (para 17). The petitioners were permitted to place the order before the Adjudicating Authority to seek time before the confiscation proceedings listed for 28 January 2025 continued (para 18). The appeals were to be adjudicated on merits by the Appellate Tribunal, the remaining challenges were not pressed, pending applications were disposed of and the next date of hearing was cancelled (paras 19 and 20). It arises in Appeals matters, on section Benami s.24, section Benami s.26, section Benami s.46, section Limitation Act s.14 of the Income Tax Act 1961, and was decided by Prathiba M. Singh J and Dharmesh Sharma J. Before relying on it, read the source linked on this page and check whether it has since been distinguished, overruled or overtaken by an amendment to the Income Tax Act. In practice the steps that follow from it are these. If you have been in the writ court, plead s.14 of the Limitation Act expressly and plead good faith; the High Court's finding here was that the writ, however ill-advised, was a good faith proceeding. Ask the writ court for a date by which the appeal may be filed and a direction that it not be dismissed on limitation, which is the form of relief granted here. Where confiscation proceedings are already listed, place the order of relegation before the Adjudicating Authority and ask for time, as the Court permitted at para 18. Do not carry the vires challenge into the Tribunal; the relegation here was on the footing that the validity challenge was no longer pressed.
Searched for later treatment; none was found. That is not the same as a source affirming it. No decision applying, affirming, doubting or overruling this order was located from the documents opened. The order does not rest on Union of India v. Ganpati Dealcom and is not affected by the recall of that judgment on 18 October 2024 in Review Petition (Civil) No. 359 of 2023, 2024 INSC 799. The relief is in substance directions on limitation in the petitioners' own appeals and the outer date of 28 February 2025 has passed, so the order is now useful for its reasoning on s.46 and s.14 of the Limitation Act rather than as a precedent granting time. No source could be cited for that finding. Checking whether an authority still stands matters as much as knowing what it held: a decision may be overruled on one point and survive on another, or the provision it interprets may have been amended since. Read the source and the editor's note on this page before relying on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal.
The document carries no neutral citation. It is an order on a writ petition, complete over eleven pages, and it decides nothing on the merits of the benami allegations - the Court expressly left the appeals to be adjudicated on merits by the Appellate Tribunal. The discovery note recorded the exclusion of the writ period but not that the Court grounded it in s.14 of the Limitation Act, which it does at para 17, nor the good faith finding at para 14 on which that exclusion rests. The judgment does not discuss Ganpati Dealcom or the retrospectivity of the 2016 amendment. This library shows the verification state of every entry openly. This entry has not yet been read in full by a chartered accountant. The summary reflects the sources listed on this page. Read the source before you rely on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
The petition was disposed of by relegating the petitioners to the appellate remedy under s.46 against the orders under s.26(3) (para 16). The period during which the writ petition remained pending is liable to be excluded from the limitation period in terms of s.14 of the Limitation Act, subject to the condition that appeals be preferred before the Appellate Tribunal by 28 February 2025; if filed by that date the appeals shall not be dismissed on the ground of being barred by limitation or delay (para 17). The petitioners were permitted to place the order before the Adjudicating Authority to seek time before the confiscation proceedings listed for 28 January 2025 continued (para 18). The appeals were to be adjudicated on merits by the Appellate Tribunal, the remaining challenges were not pressed, pending applications were disposed of and the next date of hearing was cancelled (paras 19 and 20).
TaxSphere, “Porter Buildcon Pvt Ltd v Union of India”, https://taxnotice.vittsphere.com/caselaw/case/porter-buildcon-v-uoi-benami-s46-appeal-limitation/ (validity last checked 2026-09-16)
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