The search on me was illegal. Can I stop the department using what it took?
No. Indian tax law has no exclusionary rule. The Supreme Court upheld s.132 and rule 112 and held that even if a search contravened the section, the material seized was liable to be used, subject to law, before the income-tax authorities against the person from whose custody it was taken. Illegality in the search goes to relief against the search, not to the admissibility of what it produced.
Decided by the Supreme Court (Supreme Court of India — A.N. Ray, CJ, Y.V. Chandrachud, P.N. Bhagwati, A. Alagiriswami and D.G. Palekar, JJ; the judgment of the Court was delivered by Palekar J. Writ Petition Nos. 446 of 1971 and 86 of 1972 under Article 32, heard with Civil Appeals Nos. 1319 and 1320 of 1968 from a judgment of the Delhi High Court dated 22 March 1968 under Article 226) on 1973-12-14, reported as (1974) 93 ITR 505 / 1974 CTR 25 (SC); AIR 1974 SC 348; (1974) 1 SCC 345; [1974] 2 SCR 704. It bears on section 132, section 132(1), section 132(5), section 135, section Rule 112, section Rule 112A, section Constitution Art. 14, section Constitution Art. 19(1)(f), section Constitution Art. 19(1)(g), section Constitution Art. 31 of the Income Tax Act 1961, in Search, Survey & Block Assessment and Evidence & Burden of Proof matters.
This is the department's standing answer to a search writ, and you should assume it will be quoted at you. It means that a petition attacking the warrant is worth filing for the return of documents, for costs, and for the record — but it will not, on its own, delete the addition. The argument that survives is a different one: the material still has to be relevant, genuine and proved, and the assessee still has to be confronted with it. Attack the weight and the process, not the admissibility.
Binding on every court and authority in India.
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Four matters were decided together: two writ petitions under Article 32 and two appeals from orders of the Delhi High Court under Article 226. In each, relief was claimed against action taken under s.132 by way of search and seizure of premises, on the ground that the authorisation, the search and the seizure were all illegal. Account books and documents were seized in every case, and in the writ petitions cash, jewellery and other valuables as well. The challenge was constitutional — that ss.132(1) and (5) and rules 112 and 112A infringe Articles 14, 19(1)(f), 19(1)(g) and 31 — and, separately, factual, that the particular searches breached s.132 and rule 112 so that the material seized should not be used. In Writ Petition No. 446 of 1971 the petitioner, Pooran Mal, was a partner in firms in Bombay and Delhi whose Delhi residence and business premises were searched; the search there had been ordered because he had recently built a godown of about 6,700 square feet near his residence on which a large investment was estimated to have come from income not disclosed in his books or returns.
All four matters — the two writ petitions and the two appeals — were dismissed with costs. Section 132 and rule 112 were upheld: the restrictions are reasonable and not violative of Article 19(1)(f) or (g), and ss.132(1) and (5) do not discriminate contrary to Article 14, because s.132(5) provides only a provisional summary enquiry to decide how much of the seized wealth may be retained against tax already incurred, regular assessment following in the same way as for any other evader. Under s.135 the Director of Inspection is competent to make enquiries under the Act and is invested with the powers of an Income Tax Officer for that purpose, so he could entertain the reasonable belief required by s.132(1). On evidence, the Court held that where the test of admissibility lies in relevancy, evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is not liable to be shut out unless there is an express or necessarily implied prohibition in the Constitution or other law; so even assuming the search and seizure contravened s.132, the material seized was liable to be used, subject to law, before the income-tax authorities against the person from whose custody it was seized, and no writ of prohibition against such use could be granted. On the facts the Court also held that finding undisclosed property on a search would not justify the authorisation if there were no ground for a reasonable belief, but that here the grounds recorded before the authorisation were shown to the Court and were sufficient, and that the searches were not made out to be mala fide, oppressive or excessive.
On the evidence question the Court worked through the authorities rather than from first principle. It took the Privy Council in Kuruma v. Queen as propounding the rule that the test of admissibility, in civil and criminal cases alike, is whether the evidence is relevant to the matters in issue, and that if it is, the court is not concerned with how it was obtained — ammunition found on an unlawful search of Kuruma's person was therefore admissible on a charge of unlawful possession. It noted that the same court had recorded the majority view in Olmstead v. United States that the common law does not reject relevant evidence on that ground. It then took Herman King v. Queen, an appeal from Jamaica where the constitution itself guaranteed a right against search of person or property: even there, the court retained only a discretion to exclude evidence obtained by conduct of which the prosecution ought not to take advantage, and that discretion was a rule of prudence and fair play, not a rule of evidence. From these the Court drew the conclusion that in India, as in England, relevant evidence obtained on an illegal search is not shut out unless the Constitution or some other law expressly or by necessary implication forbids it. On the Article 14 challenge it held that s.132(5) creates no separate assessment procedure — only a provisional summary enquiry to work out how much of the seized wealth may be retained — so the utmost that can be said is that the Government secures its dues earlier, which is not a different procedure. On the allegations of oppression it accepted that search and seizure is a drastic process bound to produce unsavoury and inconvenient results, that latitude must be allowed where voluminous documents have to be examined to judge relevance, that an error of judgment in seizing documents is an irregularity and not an illegality, and that a search lasting about sixteen hours is not for that reason objectionable.
It would thus be seen that in India, as in England, where the test of admissibility of evidence lies in relevancy, unless there is an express or necessarily implied prohibition in the Constitution or other law evidence obtained as a result of illegal search or seizure is not liable to be shut out. In that view, even assuming, as was done by the High Court, that the search and seizure were in contravention of the provisions of section 132 of the Income-tax Act, still the material seized was liable to be used subject to law before the income-tax authorities against the person from whose custody it was seized and, therefore, no writ of prohibition in restraint of such use could be granted.
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Handle my notice → Ask a CA on WhatsAppNo. Indian tax law has no exclusionary rule. The Supreme Court upheld s.132 and rule 112 and held that even if a search contravened the section, the material seized was liable to be used, subject to law, before the income-tax authorities against the person from whose custody it was taken. Illegality in the search goes to relief against the search, not to the admissibility of what it produced. This was decided by the Supreme Court (Supreme Court of India — A.N. Ray, CJ, Y.V. Chandrachud, P.N. Bhagwati, A. Alagiriswami and D.G. Palekar, JJ; the judgment of the Court was delivered by Palekar J. Writ Petition Nos. 446 of 1971 and 86 of 1972 under Article 32, heard with Civil Appeals Nos. 1319 and 1320 of 1968 from a judgment of the Delhi High Court dated 22 March 1968 under Article 226) and bears on section 132, section 132(1), section 132(5), section 135, section Rule 112, section Rule 112A, section Constitution Art. 14, section Constitution Art. 19(1)(f), section Constitution Art. 19(1)(g), section Constitution Art. 31 of the Income Tax Act 1961. It is reported as (1974) 93 ITR 505 / 1974 CTR 25 (SC); AIR 1974 SC 348; (1974) 1 SCC 345; [1974] 2 SCR 704. This is the department's standing answer to a search writ, and you should assume it will be quoted at you. It means that a petition attacking the warrant is worth filing for the return of documents, for costs, and for the record — but it will not, on its own, delete the addition. The argument that survives is a different one: the material still has to be relevant, genuine and proved, and the assessee still has to be confronted with it. Attack the weight and the process, not the admissibility. If it applies to you, the first step is this: Separate the two claims: challenge the authorisation and the conduct of the search on their own footing, and challenge the addition on relevance, genuineness and cross-examination.
Four matters were decided together: two writ petitions under Article 32 and two appeals from orders of the Delhi High Court under Article 226. In each, relief was claimed against action taken under s.132 by way of search and seizure of premises, on the ground that the authorisation, the search and the seizure were all illegal. Account books and documents were seized in every case, and in the writ petitions cash, jewellery and other valuables as well. The challenge was constitutional — that ss.132(1) and (5) and rules 112 and 112A infringe Articles 14, 19(1)(f), 19(1)(g) and 31 — and, separately, factual, that the particular searches breached s.132 and rule 112 so that the material seized should not be used. In Writ Petition No. 446 of 1971 the petitioner, Pooran Mal, was a partner in firms in Bombay and Delhi whose Delhi residence and business premises were searched; the search there had been ordered because he had recently built a godown of about 6,700 square feet near his residence on which a large investment was estimated to have come from income not disclosed in his books or returns. The matter was decided on 1973-12-14 by the Supreme Court (Supreme Court of India — A.N. Ray, CJ, Y.V. Chandrachud, P.N. Bhagwati, A. Alagiriswami and D.G. Palekar, JJ; the judgment of the Court was delivered by Palekar J. Writ Petition Nos. 446 of 1971 and 86 of 1972 under Article 32, heard with Civil Appeals Nos. 1319 and 1320 of 1968 from a judgment of the Delhi High Court dated 22 March 1968 under Article 226). On those facts the Supreme Court held as follows. All four matters — the two writ petitions and the two appeals — were dismissed with costs. Section 132 and rule 112 were upheld: the restrictions are reasonable and not violative of Article 19(1)(f) or (g), and ss.132(1) and (5) do not discriminate contrary to Article 14, because s.132(5) provides only a provisional summary enquiry to decide how much of the seized wealth may be retained against tax already incurred, regular assessment following in the same way as for any other evader. Under s.135 the Director of Inspection is competent to make enquiries under the Act and is invested with the powers of an Income Tax Officer for that purpose, so he could entertain the reasonable belief required by s.132(1). On evidence, the Court held that where the test of admissibility lies in relevancy, evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is not liable to be shut out unless there is an express or necessarily implied prohibition in the Constitution or other law; so even assuming the search and seizure contravened s.132, the material seized was liable to be used, subject to law, before the income-tax authorities against the person from whose custody it was seized, and no writ of prohibition against such use could be granted. On the facts the Court also held that finding undisclosed property on a search would not justify the authorisation if there were no ground for a reasonable belief, but that here the grounds recorded before the authorisation were shown to the Court and were sufficient, and that the searches were not made out to be mala fide, oppressive or excessive.
On the evidence question the Court worked through the authorities rather than from first principle. It took the Privy Council in Kuruma v. Queen as propounding the rule that the test of admissibility, in civil and criminal cases alike, is whether the evidence is relevant to the matters in issue, and that if it is, the court is not concerned with how it was obtained — ammunition found on an unlawful search of Kuruma's person was therefore admissible on a charge of unlawful possession. It noted that the same court had recorded the majority view in Olmstead v. United States that the common law does not reject relevant evidence on that ground. It then took Herman King v. Queen, an appeal from Jamaica where the constitution itself guaranteed a right against search of person or property: even there, the court retained only a discretion to exclude evidence obtained by conduct of which the prosecution ought not to take advantage, and that discretion was a rule of prudence and fair play, not a rule of evidence. From these the Court drew the conclusion that in India, as in England, relevant evidence obtained on an illegal search is not shut out unless the Constitution or some other law expressly or by necessary implication forbids it. On the Article 14 challenge it held that s.132(5) creates no separate assessment procedure — only a provisional summary enquiry to work out how much of the seized wealth may be retained — so the utmost that can be said is that the Government secures its dues earlier, which is not a different procedure. On the allegations of oppression it accepted that search and seizure is a drastic process bound to produce unsavoury and inconvenient results, that latitude must be allowed where voluminous documents have to be examined to judge relevance, that an error of judgment in seizing documents is an irregularity and not an illegality, and that a search lasting about sixteen hours is not for that reason objectionable. In the words reproduced by the source cited on this page: "It would thus be seen that in India, as in England, where the test of admissibility of evidence lies in relevancy, unless there is an express or necessarily implied prohibition in the Constitution or other law evidence obtained as a result of illegal search or seizure is not liable to be shut out. In that view, even assuming, as was done by the High Court, that the search and seizure were in contravention of the provisions of section 132 of the Income-tax Act, still the material seized was liable to be used subject to law before the income-tax authorities against the person from whose custody it was seized and, therefore, no writ of prohibition in restraint of such use could be granted." The decision followed or applied M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra [1954] SCR 1077 / AIR 1954 SC 300; Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. Ramkishan Shrikrishan Jhaver [1967] 66 ITR 664 (SC); Kuruma v. Queen [1955] AC 197 (PC); Herman King v. Queen [1969] 1 AC 304 (PC); Babindra Kumar Ghose v. Emperor [1909] ILR 37 Cal. 467; Emperor v. Allahdad Khan [1913] ILR 35 All. 358.
It was decided by the Supreme Court on 1973-12-14 and is reported as (1974) 93 ITR 505 / 1974 CTR 25 (SC); AIR 1974 SC 348; (1974) 1 SCC 345; [1974] 2 SCR 704. Binding on every court and authority in India. A Supreme Court decision binds every assessing officer, every Commissioner (Appeals), every bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and every High Court in India. An officer who declines to follow it is acting contrary to law, and that refusal is itself a ground of appeal. On section 132, section 132(1), section 132(5), section 135, section Rule 112, section Rule 112A, section Constitution Art. 14, section Constitution Art. 19(1)(f), section Constitution Art. 19(1)(g), section Constitution Art. 31, the practical question is whether the facts of your own notice match the facts of this case closely enough for the same rule to apply.
It helps the department, and it appears in this library for that reason — you need to know what the Assessing Officer will cite against you. All four matters — the two writ petitions and the two appeals — were dismissed with costs. Section 132 and rule 112 were upheld: the restrictions are reasonable and not violative of Article 19(1)(f) or (g), and ss.132(1) and (5) do not discriminate contrary to Article 14, because s.132(5) provides only a provisional summary enquiry to decide how much of the seized wealth may be retained against tax already incurred, regular assessment following in the same way as for any other evader. Under s.135 the Director of Inspection is competent to make enquiries under the Act and is invested with the powers of an Income Tax Officer for that purpose, so he could entertain the reasonable belief required by s.132(1). On evidence, the Court held that where the test of admissibility lies in relevancy, evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is not liable to be shut out unless there is an express or necessarily implied prohibition in the Constitution or other law; so even assuming the search and seizure contravened s.132, the material seized was liable to be used, subject to law, before the income-tax authorities against the person from whose custody it was seized, and no writ of prohibition against such use could be granted. On the facts the Court also held that finding undisclosed property on a search would not justify the authorisation if there were no ground for a reasonable belief, but that here the grounds recorded before the authorisation were shown to the Court and were sufficient, and that the searches were not made out to be mala fide, oppressive or excessive. It arises in Search, Survey & Block Assessment and Evidence & Burden of Proof matters, on section 132, section 132(1), section 132(5), section 135, section Rule 112, section Rule 112A, section Constitution Art. 14, section Constitution Art. 19(1)(f), section Constitution Art. 19(1)(g), section Constitution Art. 31 of the Income Tax Act 1961, and was decided by Supreme Court of India — A.N. Ray, CJ, Y.V. Chandrachud, P.N. Bhagwati, A. Alagiriswami and D.G. Palekar, JJ; the judgment of the Court was delivered by Palekar J. Writ Petition Nos. 446 of 1971 and 86 of 1972 under Article 32, heard with Civil Appeals Nos. 1319 and 1320 of 1968 from a judgment of the Delhi High Court dated 22 March 1968 under Article 226. Before relying on it, read the source linked on this page and check whether it has since been distinguished, overruled or overtaken by an amendment to the Income Tax Act. In practice the steps that follow from it are these. Do not build an appeal on the proposition that illegally seized material must be excluded — no such rule exists in Indian tax law. Where the search was irregular, use it on weight: press for the source of each document, the person who produced it, and the opportunity to test it. If the argument is that a statute itself forbids the use of the material, identify the express or implied prohibition and plead it, because that is the exception the Court left open.
Still good law. Followed by the Madras High Court in Chandran Somasundaram v. Principal Director of Income-tax [2022] 145 taxmann.com 6 / [2023] 450 ITR 188 (Mad.), decided 20 October 2022, which records this decision as followed at its para 27 and applies it both to the allegations of high-handedness during a search and to the proposition that even if a search had been illegal the evidence seized can validly be used in the assessments that follow. In that case the privacy argument based on K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India was put to the Court by counsel and did not displace this decision. Treat the privacy objection as a submission, not a holding. No source could be cited for that finding. Checking whether an authority still stands matters as much as knowing what it held: a decision may be overruled on one point and survive on another, or the provision it interprets may have been amended since. Read the source and the editor's note on this page before relying on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal.
The judgment was read in full. It is a Constitution Bench of five — A.N. Ray, CJ, Chandrachud, Bhagwati, Alagiriswami and Palekar, JJ, Palekar J delivering — where the entry previously said the judges were not named. Four matters were decided together, two writ petitions under Article 32 and two appeals from the Delhi High Court under Article 226, all dismissed with costs; the report's heading names only the two writ petitions. The report carries no numbered paragraphs, so the quotation below is identified by its position in the judgment. One point on its text: the sentence as printed reads 'in the Constitution or other law of evidence obtained as a result of illegal search or seizure is not liable to be shut out', which appears to have lost a comma after 'other law'; it is quoted as printed and nothing has been altered. The itatonline digest spells the name 'Poran Mal'; the report spells it 'Pooran Mal'. This entry does not tell you what relief remains where a search is held illegal — whether documents must be returned, whether copies may be retained, or what costs follow; on these facts nothing was returned, because the searches were upheld. It does not identify which statutes contain the 'express or necessarily implied prohibition' the Court left as an exception. And it does not tell you how the Court would treat a search authorised without any recorded ground: the Court accepted in terms that finding undisclosed property on a search would not justify the authorisation if there were no ground for a reasonable belief, but it did not have to apply that proposition, because the grounds recorded before the authorisation were produced and found sufficient. This library shows the verification state of every entry openly. This entry has not yet been read in full by a chartered accountant. The summary reflects the sources listed on this page. Read the source before you rely on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
All four matters — the two writ petitions and the two appeals — were dismissed with costs. Section 132 and rule 112 were upheld: the restrictions are reasonable and not violative of Article 19(1)(f) or (g), and ss.132(1) and (5) do not discriminate contrary to Article 14, because s.132(5) provides only a provisional summary enquiry to decide how much of the seized wealth may be retained against tax already incurred, regular assessment following in the same way as for any other evader. Under s.135 the Director of Inspection is competent to make enquiries under the Act and is invested with the powers of an Income Tax Officer for that purpose, so he could entertain the reasonable belief required by s.132(1). On evidence, the Court held that where the test of admissibility lies in relevancy, evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is not liable to be shut out unless there is an express or necessarily implied prohibition in the Constitution or other law; so even assuming the search and seizure contravened s.132, the material seized was liable to be used, subject to law, before the income-tax authorities against the person from whose custody it was seized, and no writ of prohibition against such use could be granted. On the facts the Court also held that finding undisclosed property on a search would not justify the authorisation if there were no ground for a reasonable belief, but that here the grounds recorded before the authorisation were shown to the Court and were sufficient, and that the searches were not made out to be mala fide, oppressive or excessive.
TaxSphere, “Pooran Mal v Director of Inspection”, https://taxnotice.vittsphere.com/caselaw/case/pooran-mal-v-director-of-inspection-illegal-search-evidence/ (validity last checked 2026-08-22)
The judgment itself is a government work and may be quoted freely. The summary, the validity note and the reasoning on this page are this library's own writing: quote them with attribution, and please do not present either as the words of the court — this page keeps the two apart and so should a quotation of it.
Every entry in this library links to where it was found, so you can check it yourself rather than take our word for it.
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