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Case lawITAT › NXP India Pvt Ltd v DCIT — the Dispute Resolution Panel's theory that the employee is charged at VESTING, so the employer's stock compensation cost must be disallowed for non-deduction, did not survive; but the Tribunal's own reasoning will not bear weight
ITATHelps taxpayerValidity unconfirmeds.17(2)(vi)s.17(2)(iiia)s.40(a)(ia)s.192s.37(1)s.15

NXP India Pvt Ltd v DCIT — the Dispute Resolution Panel's theory that the employee is charged at VESTING, so the employer's stock compensation cost must be disallowed for non-deduction, did not survive; but the Tribunal's own reasoning will not bear weight

The Dispute Resolution Panel says that because ESOP expenditure is allowable to the employer at vesting, the perquisite must be taxable in the employee's hands at vesting too, and has disallowed our stock compensation cost because we deducted only on exercise. Is there authority on that?

The Dispute Resolution Panel says that because ESOP expenditure is allowable to the employer at vesting, the perquisite must be taxable in the employee's hands at vesting too, and has disallowed our stock compensation cost because we deducted only on exercise. Is there authority on that?

There is one order on stage one — the perquisite that arises on employee share benefits — and it went against the Panel, but a practitioner should read it with care. It concerns the Panel's argument that the employee's charge follows the employer's deduction to the vesting date. The Bangalore Tribunal allowed the assessee's ground and deleted the disallowance of Rs 65,23,426 of stock compensation expense. Its stated reason, however, rests on the Supreme Court's decision in CIT v. Infosys Technologies Ltd., which construed the law as it stood before 1 April 2000, and the concluding paragraph contradicts itself on whether that decision applies. The value of the order is that the Panel's vesting theory did not prevail; its reasoning is not a foundation for advice.

Decided by the ITAT (Shri N.V. Vasudevan, Vice-President and Shri Chandra Poojari, Accountant Member (Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore Benches 'B')) on 2020-04-27, reported as IT(TP)A No. 692/Bang/2017 and IT(TP)A No. 2861/Bang/2017, assessment years 2012-13 and 2013-14 (ITAT Bangalore). It bears on section 17(2)(vi), section 17(2)(iiia), section 40(a)(ia), section 192, section 37(1), section 15 of the Income Tax Act 1961, in Deductions & Disallowances, Salary & Perquisites, TDS Defaults and Assessment & Scrutiny matters.

Validity check could not be completed. Validity check could not be completed, and this entry should be treated as a warning as much as an authority. No appeal against the order was searched for and no later judicial treatment of it was located. The proposition stated in the concluding sentence of paragraph 16.1 is inconsistent with s.17(2)(vi) and Rule 3(8), both of which were in force for the years before the Tribunal, and the paragraph contradicts itself on whether CIT v. Infosys Technologies Ltd. applies at all. The Supreme Court decision it relies on is already in this library under its own entry and construed the law before 1 April 2000. What can safely be taken from this order is that the Dispute Resolution Panel's argument — that because the employer's deduction runs to vesting the employee's charge must too — did not carry the day here.

Why it matters

The Panel's argument is a real one and it is being made. It runs: the Special Bench in Biocon holds the discount is allowable to the employer over the vesting period; the same transaction cannot be an ascertained expense in the company's hands and no income in the employee's; therefore the perquisite is taxable to the employee at vesting, and if the employer did not deduct then the expenditure must be disallowed under s.40(a)(ia). The employer's ground in answer was that under s.17 perquisite taxation arises only at the time of EXERCISE of the option. The Tribunal allowed that ground. But it did so on the footing that CIT v. Infosys Technologies Ltd. applied, and that decision turned on the absence, before 1 April 2000, of any mechanism for valuing the option — a gap that Explanation (c) to s.17(2)(vi) and Rule 3(8) have since filled. Paragraph 16.1 first says the Supreme Court ratio "cannot be applied for the assessment year 2011-2012" and then, three sentences later, that it "is squarely applicable to the facts of the case"; and the sentence in which the Tribunal states its conclusion says the shares "could not be treated as perquisite as there was no benefit and value of benefit, if any, was unascertainable at the time when the options were exercised", which cannot be right for a year in which s.17(2)(vi) and Rule 3(8) were both in force. Use the order for what it decided — the disallowance went — and not for what its language appears to say about whether an ESOP is a perquisite at all.

Binding on the AO and CIT(A) within the Tribunal's jurisdiction. Persuasive elsewhere.

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