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Case law › High Court › Millennia Developers (P) Ltd v DCIT
High CourtHelps departmentNo later treatment founds.37(1)Explanation 1 to 37(1)s.260A

Millennia Developers (P) Ltd v DCIT

I paid a 'regularisation fee' to the municipal corporation for deviations from the sanctioned plan. The Assessing Officer says it is a penalty. Can I deduct it?

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I paid a 'regularisation fee' to the municipal corporation for deviations from the sanctioned plan. The Assessing Officer says it is a penalty. Can I deduct it?

Not if the payment is made under a power to COMPOUND an offence. The Karnataka High Court held that a fee paid under Bye-law 6.0 of the Bangalore Mahanagara Palike Building Bye-laws to regularise construction deviations is an amount paid to compound an offence under s.483(b) of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act 1976, is therefore a penalty whatever it is called, and can never qualify for deduction under s.37.

Decided by the High Court (D.V. Shylendra Kumar J and N. Ananda J) on 2010-01-19, reported as Karnataka High Court, appeal under s.260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961; assessment year 2005-06. No law-report citation appears in the text read.. It bears on section 37(1), section Explanation 1 to 37(1), section 260A of the Income Tax Act 1961, in Deductions & Disallowances and How Tax Law Is Read matters.

Searched for later treatment; none was found. That is not the same as a source affirming it. A citedby search returns only two later decisions, both of the Bangalore Tribunal; no High Court has taken the judgment up, and neither Tribunal decision applies or follows it. In IG Petrochemicals Ltd v DCIT (ITAT Bangalore, 25 May 2022) the judgment reaches the Tribunal only second-hand: at para 12 the Bench is recording what the CIT(A) had done - 'Ld. CIT(A) observed that this issue was already covered against the assessee by the judgement of Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Millennia Developers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax (188 Taxman 388)' - and the assessee's own concession at para 13 was framed in the same terms. The Tribunal's operative paragraph does not name the judgment at all; it disallows on its own characterisation, 'penalty charges paid by assessee, which is penal in nature in violation of law, which is to be disallowed. Accordingly, we confirm the order of Ld. CIT(A) to the extent of penalty charges', and remits the development-charges component for fresh examination - so the order below was partly set aside, not simply upheld on the strength of the judgment. The other citing decision is adverse in substance: in M/s Muneer Enterprises v ITO (ITAT Bangalore, 1 December 2021) the judgment appears only in the list of authorities the Assessing Officer had relied on, and the Tribunal rejected that reliance, holding the payments compensatory rather than penal and allowing the deduction under s.37(1) on coordinate-bench authority (NMDC Ltd, Ramgad Minerals). A probe for a High Court taking the contrary view - that a regularisation or compounding fee for unauthorised construction is deductible under s.37 - returned only CIT v Mamta Enterprises (Karnataka High Court, 30 October 2003), the earlier decision of the same Court to the same effect. Nothing overruling, doubting or confining the judgment was found either, so the judgment stands untouched: it is simply untested by any later Bench.

Why it matters

This is the case the Revenue reaches for on every regularisation, compounding or compounding-fee payment, and its reasoning is structural rather than factual: the Court did not ask whether the payment hurt the assessee or whether the deviation was small, it asked which statutory power the payment was made under. That makes the enabling provision, not the receipt, the battleground. The counter-line is Prakash Cotton Mills v CIT (1993) and CIT v Ahmedabad Cotton Mfg. Co., where the Supreme Court requires the scheme of the relevant statute to be examined to see whether the impost is compensatory or penal, and the compensatory component to be allowed. Note also the amendment underneath: from AY 2022-23, clause (iii) of Explanation 3 to s.37(1) expressly puts expenditure incurred 'to compound an offence under any law for the time being in force, in India or outside India' inside Explanation 1, so for AY 2022-23 onwards this reasoning is written into the statute and the compensatory argument is much harder to run on a compounding payment.

Binding within that High Court's jurisdiction. Persuasive elsewhere.

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Related

Other authorities on the same sections.
Every authority on the provisions this decision turns on: all 148 on s.260A · all 75 on s.37(1)