The High Court admitted my appeal without framing any question of law, heard it, and then formulated questions in the judgment itself. Is that a good disposal under section 260A?
No. The Supreme Court held that an appeal lies to the High Court only where a substantial question of law is involved, that it is essential for the High Court to first formulate the question and thereafter proceed, and that without insisting on the statement of the question in the memorandum of appeal and formulating it at the time of admission the High Court is not empowered to decide the appeal generally. Framing the questions after arguments had concluded, for the purpose of writing the judgment, was clearly against the scheme of the section. The judgment was set aside and the appeals remitted.
Decided by the Supreme Court (Supreme Court of India - Ruma Pal, Arijit Pasayat and C.K. Thakker JJ) on 2005-01-28, reported as [2005] 273 ITR 50 (SC); Appeal (Civil) No. 4232 of 2003, with SLP (C) Nos. 13009-13012 of 2003, 13021-13022 of 2003, 2763-2766 of 2004 and 13015-13016 of 2003 in which leave was granted. It bears on section 260A, section 50B, section 365 (Act of 2025), section CPC s.100 of the Income Tax Act 1961, in Appeals and How Tax Law Is Read matters.
The appeal to the High Court is the stage at which most tax disputes finally end, and the library carries a great many decisions that arrived through section 260A without anyone examining how the section works. This is the judgment that says what the section requires, and it does it in a form a practitioner can act on. Three propositions matter. The question must be stated in the memorandum of appeal and formulated by the court at admission, so an appeal admitted at large and given questions in the judgment has not been heard in accordance with the section at all. The hearing is confined to the question formulated, subject only to the proviso that lets the court take up another for reasons recorded, which is the safety valve and the thing to ask for when the court moves off the framed question. And findings of fact are beyond the High Court's reach in this jurisdiction, which is the answer to an appeal that is really an attempt to re-argue the evidence. The case is equally available to both sides: the Revenue uses it against a High Court that has re-examined the Tribunal's findings, and the assessee uses it where points argued were never dealt with. What it does not do is decide anything, and that limit is on the face of the judgment.
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The appellants had been partners of a firm, Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works, which stood dissolved with effect from 6 December 1987 by efflux of time under the deed of partnership. According to the Revenue the erstwhile partners then continued the business as an association of persons, described in the proceedings as A.O.P.-13. That entity continued until the assets of the firm were sold with effect from 21 November 1994, pursuant to orders of the High Court in winding-up proceedings under section 583(4)(a) of the Companies Act, 1956 and a scheme framed under them. Several members of A.O.P.-13 bid, individually or in groups, and the bid of three of them, described as A.O.P.-3, was accepted by order of 21 September 1994; after deposit of the bid amount of Rs.92 crores the assets were treated as sold to A.O.P.-3 from 21 November 1994. All the appeals related to assessment year 1995-96. The appellants had filed returns as individuals. The Assessing Officer held that the share of income from A.O.P.-13 was to be included along with the share of income from capital gains, the basic dispute being whether the amount received had an element of capital gain. The Revenue treated the consideration, after statutory adjustments, as a receipt from a slump sale taxable as capital gains. The Tribunal at Bangalore having decided various points, both the assessees and the Revenue appealed to the Karnataka High Court, which disposed of all the appeals by a common judgment. No substantial question of law was formulated when the appeals were admitted; the questions were formulated only after arguments had concluded, for the purpose of rendering the judgment.
The impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside and the matter remitted to the High Court to be dealt with afresh keeping in view the prescriptions of section 260A, the Court making it clear that it had expressed no opinion on the merits. The Court held that an appeal to the High Court lies only where a substantial question of law is involved; that it is essential for the High Court to first formulate the question of law and thereafter proceed in the matter; and that without insisting on the statement of the substantial question of law in the memorandum of appeal and formulating it at the time of admission, the High Court is not empowered to decide the appeal generally without adhering to the procedure prescribed by section 260A. It added that the High Court must make every effort to distinguish between a question of law and a substantial question of law; that in exercise of powers under section 260A the findings of fact of the Tribunal cannot be disturbed; that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to litigation but a substantive statutory right to be regulated in accordance with the law in force at the relevant time; that the conditions mentioned in section 260A must be strictly fulfilled before an appeal can be maintained under it; and that such an appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. Adopting the tests laid down in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v Century Spinning & Mfg. Co. Ltd., it recorded that there is no scope for interference by the High Court with a finding which could be treated as a finding of fact. On reading the impugned judgment it was clear that no substantial question of law was formulated at the time of admission and that the High Court had formulated questions subsequently after conclusion of arguments for the purpose of adjudication, which was clearly against the scheme of section 260A; and the grievance that certain points urged had not been dealt with appeared to be correct. Interim protection against recovery was continued for three months, with liberty to the parties to move the High Court.
The Court began with the text, setting out the whole of section 260A and then reading its sub-sections as a sequence rather than as a list. The memorandum of appeal must precisely state the substantial question of law involved. Where the High Court is satisfied that such a question is involved, it shall formulate that question. The appeal shall be heard only on the question so formulated. The High Court shall decide the question so formulated and deliver judgment on it containing the grounds on which the decision is founded. Read in that order the sub-sections describe a gate and a track. The question is what admits the appeal, and it is also what confines the hearing. Nothing in the section contemplates an appeal admitted at large and given a shape afterwards, because if the question is settled only at the end there is no moment at which the High Court can have been satisfied that the case involved one, and no hearing that was confined to it. The Court then pointed at the sub-section that shows why the sequence matters to the other side. Section 260A(4) entitles the respondent, at the hearing, to argue that the case does not involve the question formulated. That right presupposes a question in existence before the hearing begins. Frame the question afterwards and the respondent has lost an entitlement the statute gave him without anyone noticing. Having fixed the procedure, the Court dealt with the substance of the jurisdiction. The expression substantial question of law is not defined, but it has acquired a definite connotation, and the tests in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta are adopted: whether it affects substantial rights directly or indirectly, whether it is of general public importance, whether it is an open question not settled by this Court or the Privy Council or the Federal Court, whether the issue is free from difficulty, and whether it calls for a discussion of an alternative view. To those the Court adds the limits: findings of fact are beyond disturbance under section 260A, the right of appeal is a creature of statute to be regulated by the law in force at the relevant time, the conditions in the section must be strictly fulfilled, and equity does not enlarge them. The disposal follows from the finding rather than from any view of the dispute. Because the procedure had not been followed and because points urged had not been addressed, the judgment could not stand; and because the merits had never been properly examined, the Court declined to examine them itself.
It is essential for the High Court to first formulate question of law and thereafter proceed in the matter. Without insisting on the statement of substantial question of law in the memorandum of appeal and formulating the same at the time of admission, the High Court is not empowered to generally decide the appeal under Section 260A without adhering to the procedure prescribed under Section 260A.
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Handle my notice → Ask a CA on WhatsAppNo. The Supreme Court held that an appeal lies to the High Court only where a substantial question of law is involved, that it is essential for the High Court to first formulate the question and thereafter proceed, and that without insisting on the statement of the question in the memorandum of appeal and formulating it at the time of admission the High Court is not empowered to decide the appeal generally. Framing the questions after arguments had concluded, for the purpose of writing the judgment, was clearly against the scheme of the section. The judgment was set aside and the appeals remitted. This was decided by the Supreme Court (Supreme Court of India - Ruma Pal, Arijit Pasayat and C.K. Thakker JJ) and bears on section 260A, section 50B, section 365 (Act of 2025), section CPC s.100 of the Income Tax Act 1961. It is reported as [2005] 273 ITR 50 (SC); Appeal (Civil) No. 4232 of 2003, with SLP (C) Nos. 13009-13012 of 2003, 13021-13022 of 2003, 2763-2766 of 2004 and 13015-13016 of 2003 in which leave was granted. The appeal to the High Court is the stage at which most tax disputes finally end, and the library carries a great many decisions that arrived through section 260A without anyone examining how the section works. This is the judgment that says what the section requires, and it does it in a form a practitioner can act on. Three propositions matter. The question must be stated in the memorandum of appeal and formulated by the court at admission, so an appeal admitted at large and given questions in the judgment has not been heard in accordance with the section at all. The hearing is confined to the question formulated, subject only to the proviso that lets the court take up another for reasons recorded, which is the safety valve and the thing to ask for when the court moves off the framed question. And findings of fact are beyond the High Court's reach in this jurisdiction, which is the answer to an appeal that is really an attempt to re-argue the evidence. The case is equally available to both sides: the Revenue uses it against a High Court that has re-examined the Tribunal's findings, and the assessee uses it where points argued were never dealt with. What it does not do is decide anything, and that limit is on the face of the judgment. If it applies to you, the first step is this: Look at the admission order before you look at the judgment. If no substantial question of law was formulated when the appeal was admitted, that is the ground, and it is available whichever side you are on.
The appellants had been partners of a firm, Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works, which stood dissolved with effect from 6 December 1987 by efflux of time under the deed of partnership. According to the Revenue the erstwhile partners then continued the business as an association of persons, described in the proceedings as A.O.P.-13. That entity continued until the assets of the firm were sold with effect from 21 November 1994, pursuant to orders of the High Court in winding-up proceedings under section 583(4)(a) of the Companies Act, 1956 and a scheme framed under them. Several members of A.O.P.-13 bid, individually or in groups, and the bid of three of them, described as A.O.P.-3, was accepted by order of 21 September 1994; after deposit of the bid amount of Rs.92 crores the assets were treated as sold to A.O.P.-3 from 21 November 1994. All the appeals related to assessment year 1995-96. The appellants had filed returns as individuals. The Assessing Officer held that the share of income from A.O.P.-13 was to be included along with the share of income from capital gains, the basic dispute being whether the amount received had an element of capital gain. The Revenue treated the consideration, after statutory adjustments, as a receipt from a slump sale taxable as capital gains. The Tribunal at Bangalore having decided various points, both the assessees and the Revenue appealed to the Karnataka High Court, which disposed of all the appeals by a common judgment. No substantial question of law was formulated when the appeals were admitted; the questions were formulated only after arguments had concluded, for the purpose of rendering the judgment. The matter was decided on 2005-01-28 by the Supreme Court (Supreme Court of India - Ruma Pal, Arijit Pasayat and C.K. Thakker JJ). On those facts the Supreme Court held as follows. The impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside and the matter remitted to the High Court to be dealt with afresh keeping in view the prescriptions of section 260A, the Court making it clear that it had expressed no opinion on the merits. The Court held that an appeal to the High Court lies only where a substantial question of law is involved; that it is essential for the High Court to first formulate the question of law and thereafter proceed in the matter; and that without insisting on the statement of the substantial question of law in the memorandum of appeal and formulating it at the time of admission, the High Court is not empowered to decide the appeal generally without adhering to the procedure prescribed by section 260A. It added that the High Court must make every effort to distinguish between a question of law and a substantial question of law; that in exercise of powers under section 260A the findings of fact of the Tribunal cannot be disturbed; that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to litigation but a substantive statutory right to be regulated in accordance with the law in force at the relevant time; that the conditions mentioned in section 260A must be strictly fulfilled before an appeal can be maintained under it; and that such an appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. Adopting the tests laid down in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v Century Spinning & Mfg. Co. Ltd., it recorded that there is no scope for interference by the High Court with a finding which could be treated as a finding of fact. On reading the impugned judgment it was clear that no substantial question of law was formulated at the time of admission and that the High Court had formulated questions subsequently after conclusion of arguments for the purpose of adjudication, which was clearly against the scheme of section 260A; and the grievance that certain points urged had not been dealt with appeared to be correct. Interim protection against recovery was continued for three months, with liberty to the parties to move the High Court.
The Court began with the text, setting out the whole of section 260A and then reading its sub-sections as a sequence rather than as a list. The memorandum of appeal must precisely state the substantial question of law involved. Where the High Court is satisfied that such a question is involved, it shall formulate that question. The appeal shall be heard only on the question so formulated. The High Court shall decide the question so formulated and deliver judgment on it containing the grounds on which the decision is founded. Read in that order the sub-sections describe a gate and a track. The question is what admits the appeal, and it is also what confines the hearing. Nothing in the section contemplates an appeal admitted at large and given a shape afterwards, because if the question is settled only at the end there is no moment at which the High Court can have been satisfied that the case involved one, and no hearing that was confined to it. The Court then pointed at the sub-section that shows why the sequence matters to the other side. Section 260A(4) entitles the respondent, at the hearing, to argue that the case does not involve the question formulated. That right presupposes a question in existence before the hearing begins. Frame the question afterwards and the respondent has lost an entitlement the statute gave him without anyone noticing. Having fixed the procedure, the Court dealt with the substance of the jurisdiction. The expression substantial question of law is not defined, but it has acquired a definite connotation, and the tests in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta are adopted: whether it affects substantial rights directly or indirectly, whether it is of general public importance, whether it is an open question not settled by this Court or the Privy Council or the Federal Court, whether the issue is free from difficulty, and whether it calls for a discussion of an alternative view. To those the Court adds the limits: findings of fact are beyond disturbance under section 260A, the right of appeal is a creature of statute to be regulated by the law in force at the relevant time, the conditions in the section must be strictly fulfilled, and equity does not enlarge them. The disposal follows from the finding rather than from any view of the dispute. Because the procedure had not been followed and because points urged had not been addressed, the judgment could not stand; and because the merits had never been properly examined, the Court declined to examine them itself. In the words reproduced by the source cited on this page: "It is essential for the High Court to first formulate question of law and thereafter proceed in the matter. Without insisting on the statement of substantial question of law in the memorandum of appeal and formulating the same at the time of admission, the High Court is not empowered to generally decide the appeal under Section 260A without adhering to the procedure prescribed under Section 260A." The decision followed or applied Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v Century Spinning & Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR (1962) SC 1314 - the five tests for a substantial question of law, adopted.
It was decided by the Supreme Court on 2005-01-28 and is reported as [2005] 273 ITR 50 (SC); Appeal (Civil) No. 4232 of 2003, with SLP (C) Nos. 13009-13012 of 2003, 13021-13022 of 2003, 2763-2766 of 2004 and 13015-13016 of 2003 in which leave was granted. Binding on every court and authority in India. A Supreme Court decision binds every assessing officer, every Commissioner (Appeals), every bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and every High Court in India. An officer who declines to follow it is acting contrary to law, and that refusal is itself a ground of appeal. On section 260A, section 50B, section 365 (Act of 2025), section CPC s.100, the practical question is whether the facts of your own notice match the facts of this case closely enough for the same rule to apply.
It helps the taxpayer. The impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside and the matter remitted to the High Court to be dealt with afresh keeping in view the prescriptions of section 260A, the Court making it clear that it had expressed no opinion on the merits. The Court held that an appeal to the High Court lies only where a substantial question of law is involved; that it is essential for the High Court to first formulate the question of law and thereafter proceed in the matter; and that without insisting on the statement of the substantial question of law in the memorandum of appeal and formulating it at the time of admission, the High Court is not empowered to decide the appeal generally without adhering to the procedure prescribed by section 260A. It added that the High Court must make every effort to distinguish between a question of law and a substantial question of law; that in exercise of powers under section 260A the findings of fact of the Tribunal cannot be disturbed; that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to litigation but a substantive statutory right to be regulated in accordance with the law in force at the relevant time; that the conditions mentioned in section 260A must be strictly fulfilled before an appeal can be maintained under it; and that such an appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. Adopting the tests laid down in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v Century Spinning & Mfg. Co. Ltd., it recorded that there is no scope for interference by the High Court with a finding which could be treated as a finding of fact. On reading the impugned judgment it was clear that no substantial question of law was formulated at the time of admission and that the High Court had formulated questions subsequently after conclusion of arguments for the purpose of adjudication, which was clearly against the scheme of section 260A; and the grievance that certain points urged had not been dealt with appeared to be correct. Interim protection against recovery was continued for three months, with liberty to the parties to move the High Court. It arises in Appeals and How Tax Law Is Read matters, on section 260A, section 50B, section 365 (Act of 2025), section CPC s.100 of the Income Tax Act 1961, and was decided by Supreme Court of India - Ruma Pal, Arijit Pasayat and C.K. Thakker JJ. Before relying on it, read the source linked on this page and check whether it has since been distinguished, overruled or overtaken by an amendment to the Income Tax Act. In practice the steps that follow from it are these. State the substantial question of law precisely in the memorandum of appeal. Section 260A(2)(c) requires it and the Court treated the requirement as part of what makes the appeal maintainable. If the High Court proposes to decide on a question it never framed, ask it to record reasons under the proviso to section 260A(4). The proviso allows the court to hear the appeal on another substantial question of law for reasons to be recorded, and reasons recorded are what distinguishes a lawful course from this one. As respondent, use section 260A(4) while it is still useful: you are entitled at the hearing to argue that the case does not involve the question formulated. That right is worth nothing if the question is framed after arguments close. Do not expect this ground to decide the dispute. The Court remitted the matter and said it had expressed no opinion on the merits; you win a fresh hearing. Ask for interim protection to be continued while the matter goes back. Here the Court kept the protection against recovery alive for three months and left the parties to apply to the High Court for more.
Still good law. The decision stands and is the authority on the point. More than a hundred later judgments cite it, and it is applied outside the Income-tax Act as well: the Orissa High Court used it in Employees' State Insurance Corporation v Nityananda Swain on 6 May 2011 for an appeal under the Employees' State Insurance Act read with section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on the footing that where a substantial question of law arises the court must formulate it. Two qualifications are worth carrying alongside it. The first is the proviso to section 260A(4), which the judgment itself sets out: the High Court may, for reasons to be recorded, hear the appeal on any other substantial question of law not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such a question. So a question may be added later; what the judgment forbids is disposing of the appeal without formulating any question at all, and formulating questions only after arguments have closed in order to write the judgment. The second is that the Court was dealing with section 260A as it stood when the High Court took up those appeals for admission, and it noted the changes made by the Finance Act 1999 with effect from 1 June 1999, including the insertion of sub-section (7) applying the Code of Civil Procedure. What the case gives a practitioner is a ground of challenge to a High Court judgment, and it is a ground that goes to the manner of disposal rather than to the merits. The Supreme Court set the judgment aside and remitted the appeals to be dealt with afresh, and expressly said it had expressed no opinion on the merits. It also preserved the interim protection against recovery for three months and left the parties to apply to the High Court for whatever further protection the facts warranted, which is the practical point for anyone whose demand is live while the matter goes back. The Income-tax Act, 1961 was repealed on 1 April 2026 by section 536(1) of the Income-tax Act, 2025, and section 536(2)(c) continues it for proceedings about tax years beginning before that date. The appeal to the High Court is now section 365 of the 2025 Act. No source could be cited for that finding. Checking whether an authority still stands matters as much as knowing what it held: a decision may be overruled on one point and survive on another, or the provision it interprets may have been amended since. Read the source and the editor's note on this page before relying on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal.
The judgment was read on its own text from the first line to the last. The page carries no headnote or summary block above the opinion, so everything on this record comes from the judgment of Pasayat J. One thing about the source is worth recording. The judgment sets out the whole of section 260A as it then stood, sub-section by sub-section, and then does something a practitioner can use directly: it maps the income-tax provision onto the Code of Civil Procedure, stating that sections 260A(1), 260A(2)(c), 260A(3) and 260A(4) correspond to sections 100(1), 100(3), 100(4) and 100(5) of the Code. That mapping is the Court's own and it is the reason the case is cited in second appeals that have nothing to do with tax. The reported citation was settled from outside the judgment, which carries only the appeal number and the numbers of the special leave petitions in which leave was granted. The report at [2005] 273 ITR 50 is the one the High Courts print when they apply the decision - among them the Calcutta High Court, the Delhi High Court, the Karnataka High Court and the Madras High Court, and the Orissa High Court when it carried the reasoning into a second appeal under another Act - and it is given here on the strength of those reproductions rather than on the strength of any single report. The word substantial carries the weight in this case and the judgment says why. It records that the expression has acquired a definite connotation through judicial pronouncement, adopts the five tests from Sir Chunilal V. Mehta, and then adds three propositions of its own that are easy to overlook: that in exercise of powers under section 260A the findings of fact of the Tribunal cannot be disturbed; that the right of appeal is neither natural nor inherent but a substantive statutory right to be regulated by the law in force at the relevant time; and that the conditions in section 260A must be strictly fulfilled before an appeal can be maintained and such an appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. One caution for anyone citing it, and it is why this record is marked as a trap. Winning on this ground wins a rehearing and nothing else. The Supreme Court set the High Court's judgment aside, remitted the matter, and said in terms that it had expressed no opinion on the merits. An assessee who succeeds on the formulation point is back before the same High Court on the same facts, with the difference that the questions will now be framed at the outset and the appeal heard on them. The judgment decides nothing on the merits and says so. The dispute was whether the consideration received when the assets of a dissolved firm were sold under a scheme framed in winding-up proceedings bore an element of capital gain, and whether anything could be taxed as a slump sale before section 50B was amended with effect from 1 April 2000. Neither question was answered. The Court recorded that the appellants' argument on the non-applicability of the slump sale principle had not been considered by the High Court and that there was no reference to the plea about the position before 1 April 2000, and it remitted the appeals for that reason. It does not decide what the consequence is where a High Court formulates a question at admission but then decides the appeal on a different one without recording reasons under the proviso to section 260A(4). The vice here was that no question was formulated at admission at all. It does not say what is to happen to the respondent's right, preserved by section 260A(4), to argue at the hearing that the case does not involve the question formulated, where the question is framed only after arguments are over. The Court's objection is put in terms of the scheme of the section rather than of prejudice to the respondent. It gives no exhaustive definition of a substantial question of law. It adopts the tests in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v Century Spinning & Mfg. Co. Ltd. and records that the expression has not been defined anywhere in the statute. It does not identify the assessment years of each appellant, the amounts in dispute, or which of the connected appeals were the assessees' and which the Revenue's, beyond recording that the High Court disposed of appeals by both sides by a common judgment and that all the appeals relate to assessment year 1995-96. This library shows the verification state of every entry openly. This entry has not yet been read in full by a chartered accountant. The summary reflects the sources listed on this page. Read the source before you rely on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
The impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside and the matter remitted to the High Court to be dealt with afresh keeping in view the prescriptions of section 260A, the Court making it clear that it had expressed no opinion on the merits. The Court held that an appeal to the High Court lies only where a substantial question of law is involved; that it is essential for the High Court to first formulate the question of law and thereafter proceed in the matter; and that without insisting on the statement of the substantial question of law in the memorandum of appeal and formulating it at the time of admission, the High Court is not empowered to decide the appeal generally without adhering to the procedure prescribed by section 260A. It added that the High Court must make every effort to distinguish between a question of law and a substantial question of law; that in exercise of powers under section 260A the findings of fact of the Tribunal cannot be disturbed; that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to litigation but a substantive statutory right to be regulated in accordance with the law in force at the relevant time; that the conditions mentioned in section 260A must be strictly fulfilled before an appeal can be maintained under it; and that such an appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. Adopting the tests laid down in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v Century Spinning & Mfg. Co. Ltd., it recorded that there is no scope for interference by the High Court with a finding which could be treated as a finding of fact. On reading the impugned judgment it was clear that no substantial question of law was formulated at the time of admission and that the High Court had formulated questions subsequently after conclusion of arguments for the purpose of adjudication, which was clearly against the scheme of section 260A; and the grievance that certain points urged had not been dealt with appeared to be correct. Interim protection against recovery was continued for three months, with liberty to the parties to move the High Court.
TaxSphere, “M. Janardhana Rao v JCIT”, https://taxnotice.vittsphere.com/caselaw/case/m-janardhana-rao-v-jcit-the-high-court-must-frame-the-question-first/ (validity last checked 2026-09-23)
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I am a share broker. I bought shares for a client, he never paid, and I have written the whole amount off. The assessing officer allows me only the brokerage and says the value of the shares was never my income, so it was never my debt. Is that right?
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