The payee will not give me the accountant's certificate in Form 26A, so I am stuck as an assessee in default. Can the High Court order it to sign?
Not where the payee does not have the records to certify from. The Delhi High Court held that the Form 26A certificate is not a routine administrative letter but a certification of specific statutory facts made after examining the payee's return, accounts and documents. Mandamus lies to enforce a clear legal right and a corresponding public duty; it does not lie to command an authority to certify facts it cannot verify. Proof that the payee filed its return, and bank statements showing receipts, are not proof that the particular sum was taken into account in computing its income. The review petition was dismissed, no error apparent being shown.
Decided by the High Court (High Court of Delhi at New Delhi; Sanjeev Narula J) on 2026-05-19, reported as W.P.(C) 15188/2024, Review Petition 231/2026, Delhi High Court. It bears on section 201(1), section 139 of the Income Tax Act 1961, in TDS Defaults matters.
Deductors regularly find themselves unable to get out of section 201(1) because the payee will not, or cannot, sign Form 26A. This order sets out what a court will and will not do about it. It identifies the four ingredients of the first proviso to section 201(1) that the certificate has to speak to: that the payee filed a return under section 139, that it took the relevant sum into account in computing income in that return, that it paid the tax due on the income declared, and that the payer holds an accountant's certificate to that effect in the prescribed form under rule 31ACB. It draws the distinction that decides most of these disputes, between proof that a return was filed and proof that a specific receipt from a specific payer went into it. And it makes clear that delay matters more here than in most tax litigation, because the relief depends on ledgers and tax treatment of old transactions, so a claim brought years later may fail on feasibility alone.
Binding within that High Court's jurisdiction. Persuasive elsewhere.
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The petitioner had a licence agreement dated 3 April 2009 with the Airports Authority of India for the use of Salem Airport, which came to an end on 2 April 2015. It had not deducted tax at source on payments to the Authority, and to escape being treated as an assessee in default it needed the accountant's certificate in Annexure-A to Form 26A. In 2024 it filed a writ petition seeking a mandamus to the Executive Director (Finance) of the Authority to issue that certificate. On 28 November 2024 the petition was dismissed on three grounds: delay and laches, since the arrangement had ended in 2015; the Authority's communication that its physical records for periods before 1 April 2013 had been destroyed in the 2015 floods and that revenue accounting before migration to SAP-ERP was in an earlier AIMS package from which details could not be retrieved; and the position that the first proviso to section 201(1) took effect only on 1 July 2012, so for much of the claim there was no statutory foundation. The Court had also recorded the Authority's stand that it could not verify whether the corresponding income had been taken into account in computing its taxable income. An appeal was dismissed by a Division Bench on 4 November 2025. On 16 January 2026 the Division Bench disposed of a review before it on the petitioner's statement that it would move the single judge relying on RTI replies of 12 March 2025 and 7 April 2025. This was that review.
The review petition was dismissed, no ground for review being made out. Because the intra-court appeal had been dismissed on merits, the appellate judgment was the final and binding adjudication and the earlier order stood merged in it, so the principles in Kunhayammed would ordinarily apply; but as the petitioner relied on the Division Bench order of 16 January 2026 and arguments were addressed on merits, the Court examined the matter on merits as well. The RTI reply of 12 March 2025 showed only that the Authority had filed returns for assessment years 2008-09 to 2013-14 with aggregate figures; it did not show that the petitioner's payments were taken into account in computing its income, and there is a material distinction between proof of filing a return and proof that a specific receipt from a specific payer was accounted for in it. The reply of 7 April 2025 recorded several claimed entries as not received, including sums of Rs 5,00,000, Rs 15,00,000, Rs 44,639 and Rs 3,50,000, and disclosed mismatches in instrument numbers and amounts, so it showed that reconciliation of old entries, ledgers and tax treatment would be needed. The allegation that the Authority had concocted the destruction of records was held wholly unwarranted. Each of the four grounds of review, on suppression and new facts, on the effect of the Tribunal's remand of 26 July 2018, on delay and laches, and on the applicability of the first proviso for assessment year 2013-14, was rejected.
The Court began with the limits of review under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure: discovery of new and important matter or evidence which despite due diligence was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced, a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or any other sufficient reason. Review is not an appeal in disguise, nor a chance to reargue the merits or repair omissions, and it cannot be invoked merely because another view is possible. Measured against that, the RTI replies were obtained after the order under review, with no explanation why the information could not have been sought earlier, and even taken at face value they did not establish what the petitioner needed. The Court then set out the statutory scheme. Section 201(1) deems a person who fails to deduct tax to be an assessee in default, and the first proviso relieves him only where the payee has filed its return under section 139, has taken the relevant sum into account in computing income in that return, has paid the tax due on the income declared, and the payer furnishes an accountant's certificate in the prescribed form, which rule 31ACB fixes as Form 26A. That certificate is a certification of specific statutory facts after examination of the payee's return, accounts and documents. From that the constitutional point followed: a court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot compel an authority to certify facts that remain unverified, because mandamus enforces a clear legal right and a corresponding public duty and does not command a factual certification made without the records on which it could responsibly rest. To grant the relief would require the Court, or the Authority at its direction, to reconstruct the accounting for transactions between 2008 and 2014, which lies outside both review jurisdiction and the proper remit of mandamus. The Tribunal's order of 2018 pointed the same way: it had remanded to the Assessing Officer the question whether the Authority had disclosed the payments, which showed that verification was for the tax authority and created no automatic duty on the Authority to certify. Finally, even if the proviso applied for one assessment year, the ingredients still had to be established, and the record contained a payment of 19 February 2014 that would fall in a later year than the one pleaded.
A writ of mandamus lies to enforce a clear legal right and a corresponding public duty. It does not lie to command an authority to issue a factual certification in the absence of the records
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Handle my notice → Ask a CA on WhatsAppNot where the payee does not have the records to certify from. The Delhi High Court held that the Form 26A certificate is not a routine administrative letter but a certification of specific statutory facts made after examining the payee's return, accounts and documents. Mandamus lies to enforce a clear legal right and a corresponding public duty; it does not lie to command an authority to certify facts it cannot verify. Proof that the payee filed its return, and bank statements showing receipts, are not proof that the particular sum was taken into account in computing its income. The review petition was dismissed, no error apparent being shown. This was decided by the High Court (High Court of Delhi at New Delhi; Sanjeev Narula J) and bears on section 201(1), section 139 of the Income Tax Act 1961. It is reported as W.P.(C) 15188/2024, Review Petition 231/2026, Delhi High Court. Deductors regularly find themselves unable to get out of section 201(1) because the payee will not, or cannot, sign Form 26A. This order sets out what a court will and will not do about it. It identifies the four ingredients of the first proviso to section 201(1) that the certificate has to speak to: that the payee filed a return under section 139, that it took the relevant sum into account in computing income in that return, that it paid the tax due on the income declared, and that the payer holds an accountant's certificate to that effect in the prescribed form under rule 31ACB. It draws the distinction that decides most of these disputes, between proof that a return was filed and proof that a specific receipt from a specific payer went into it. And it makes clear that delay matters more here than in most tax litigation, because the relief depends on ledgers and tax treatment of old transactions, so a claim brought years later may fail on feasibility alone. If it applies to you, the first step is this: Ask the payee for Form 26A while the year is current and the records are live; the further back the transaction, the less likely a court is to help.
The petitioner had a licence agreement dated 3 April 2009 with the Airports Authority of India for the use of Salem Airport, which came to an end on 2 April 2015. It had not deducted tax at source on payments to the Authority, and to escape being treated as an assessee in default it needed the accountant's certificate in Annexure-A to Form 26A. In 2024 it filed a writ petition seeking a mandamus to the Executive Director (Finance) of the Authority to issue that certificate. On 28 November 2024 the petition was dismissed on three grounds: delay and laches, since the arrangement had ended in 2015; the Authority's communication that its physical records for periods before 1 April 2013 had been destroyed in the 2015 floods and that revenue accounting before migration to SAP-ERP was in an earlier AIMS package from which details could not be retrieved; and the position that the first proviso to section 201(1) took effect only on 1 July 2012, so for much of the claim there was no statutory foundation. The Court had also recorded the Authority's stand that it could not verify whether the corresponding income had been taken into account in computing its taxable income. An appeal was dismissed by a Division Bench on 4 November 2025. On 16 January 2026 the Division Bench disposed of a review before it on the petitioner's statement that it would move the single judge relying on RTI replies of 12 March 2025 and 7 April 2025. This was that review. The matter was decided on 2026-05-19 by the High Court (High Court of Delhi at New Delhi; Sanjeev Narula J). On those facts the High Court held as follows. The review petition was dismissed, no ground for review being made out. Because the intra-court appeal had been dismissed on merits, the appellate judgment was the final and binding adjudication and the earlier order stood merged in it, so the principles in Kunhayammed would ordinarily apply; but as the petitioner relied on the Division Bench order of 16 January 2026 and arguments were addressed on merits, the Court examined the matter on merits as well. The RTI reply of 12 March 2025 showed only that the Authority had filed returns for assessment years 2008-09 to 2013-14 with aggregate figures; it did not show that the petitioner's payments were taken into account in computing its income, and there is a material distinction between proof of filing a return and proof that a specific receipt from a specific payer was accounted for in it. The reply of 7 April 2025 recorded several claimed entries as not received, including sums of Rs 5,00,000, Rs 15,00,000, Rs 44,639 and Rs 3,50,000, and disclosed mismatches in instrument numbers and amounts, so it showed that reconciliation of old entries, ledgers and tax treatment would be needed. The allegation that the Authority had concocted the destruction of records was held wholly unwarranted. Each of the four grounds of review, on suppression and new facts, on the effect of the Tribunal's remand of 26 July 2018, on delay and laches, and on the applicability of the first proviso for assessment year 2013-14, was rejected.
The Court began with the limits of review under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure: discovery of new and important matter or evidence which despite due diligence was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced, a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or any other sufficient reason. Review is not an appeal in disguise, nor a chance to reargue the merits or repair omissions, and it cannot be invoked merely because another view is possible. Measured against that, the RTI replies were obtained after the order under review, with no explanation why the information could not have been sought earlier, and even taken at face value they did not establish what the petitioner needed. The Court then set out the statutory scheme. Section 201(1) deems a person who fails to deduct tax to be an assessee in default, and the first proviso relieves him only where the payee has filed its return under section 139, has taken the relevant sum into account in computing income in that return, has paid the tax due on the income declared, and the payer furnishes an accountant's certificate in the prescribed form, which rule 31ACB fixes as Form 26A. That certificate is a certification of specific statutory facts after examination of the payee's return, accounts and documents. From that the constitutional point followed: a court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot compel an authority to certify facts that remain unverified, because mandamus enforces a clear legal right and a corresponding public duty and does not command a factual certification made without the records on which it could responsibly rest. To grant the relief would require the Court, or the Authority at its direction, to reconstruct the accounting for transactions between 2008 and 2014, which lies outside both review jurisdiction and the proper remit of mandamus. The Tribunal's order of 2018 pointed the same way: it had remanded to the Assessing Officer the question whether the Authority had disclosed the payments, which showed that verification was for the tax authority and created no automatic duty on the Authority to certify. Finally, even if the proviso applied for one assessment year, the ingredients still had to be established, and the record contained a payment of 19 February 2014 that would fall in a later year than the one pleaded. In the words reproduced by the source cited on this page: "A writ of mandamus lies to enforce a clear legal right and a corresponding public duty. It does not lie to command an authority to issue a factual certification in the absence of the records"
It was decided by the High Court on 2026-05-19 and is reported as W.P.(C) 15188/2024, Review Petition 231/2026, Delhi High Court. Binding within that High Court's jurisdiction. Persuasive elsewhere. A High Court decision binds the assessing officer, the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal within that state, and is persuasive elsewhere. If your assessment is in a different jurisdiction, check whether your own High Court has taken the same view before relying on it. On section 201(1), section 139, the practical question is whether the facts of your own notice match the facts of this case closely enough for the same rule to apply.
It helps the department, and it appears in this library for that reason — you need to know what the Assessing Officer will cite against you. The review petition was dismissed, no ground for review being made out. Because the intra-court appeal had been dismissed on merits, the appellate judgment was the final and binding adjudication and the earlier order stood merged in it, so the principles in Kunhayammed would ordinarily apply; but as the petitioner relied on the Division Bench order of 16 January 2026 and arguments were addressed on merits, the Court examined the matter on merits as well. The RTI reply of 12 March 2025 showed only that the Authority had filed returns for assessment years 2008-09 to 2013-14 with aggregate figures; it did not show that the petitioner's payments were taken into account in computing its income, and there is a material distinction between proof of filing a return and proof that a specific receipt from a specific payer was accounted for in it. The reply of 7 April 2025 recorded several claimed entries as not received, including sums of Rs 5,00,000, Rs 15,00,000, Rs 44,639 and Rs 3,50,000, and disclosed mismatches in instrument numbers and amounts, so it showed that reconciliation of old entries, ledgers and tax treatment would be needed. The allegation that the Authority had concocted the destruction of records was held wholly unwarranted. Each of the four grounds of review, on suppression and new facts, on the effect of the Tribunal's remand of 26 July 2018, on delay and laches, and on the applicability of the first proviso for assessment year 2013-14, was rejected. It arises in TDS Defaults matters, on section 201(1), section 139 of the Income Tax Act 1961, and was decided by High Court of Delhi at New Delhi; Sanjeev Narula J. Before relying on it, read the source linked on this page and check whether it has since been distinguished, overruled or overtaken by an amendment to the Income Tax Act. In practice the steps that follow from it are these. Assemble the four ingredients yourself before pressing the payee: its return for the year, evidence that your payment went into its computation, and evidence that the tax on that income was paid. Do not treat a return acknowledgement, a Form 26AS entry or a bank statement as proof that the receipt was accounted for; the Court held they show only that a return was filed or that money moved. Where the officer has been directed to verify whether the payee disclosed the receipt, follow that verification through with him rather than going to the writ court against the payee; the Court noted that the remand itself showed verification was the tax authority's job. If a writ is unavoidable, file it promptly and explain every year of delay, since laches was one of the grounds on which the original petition failed.
Still good law. An order of 19 May 2026 dismissing a review, delivered after the writ petition had been dismissed on 28 November 2024 and an intra-court appeal dismissed on 4 November 2025, so the position between these parties is concluded. The source page records no later citation of it. It applies settled law on review under Order XLVII Rule 1, on merger as explained in Kunhayammed v State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359, and on the limits of mandamus, to the first proviso to section 201(1) and rule 31ACB as they stand. Whether it has been taken further was not checked in this session. No source could be cited for that finding. Checking whether an authority still stands matters as much as knowing what it held: a decision may be overruled on one point and survive on another, or the provision it interprets may have been amended since. Read the source and the editor's note on this page before relying on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal.
This is an order dismissing a review petition, not the original decision. The reasoning that dismissed the writ petition is in the order of 28 November 2024 and in the Division Bench judgment of 4 November 2025, neither of which was read in this session; what is set out here about those orders comes from this order's own account of them. Because the case failed on the record before the Court, it decides nothing about the general question whether a payee can ever be compelled to issue Form 26A where the records do exist and the facts are admitted, and the Court did not have to say what remedy a deductor has against an unwilling but able payee. The batch line gave the sections as the first proviso to section 201(1), 139, 40(a)(ia), rule 31ACB and Form 26A; section 40(a)(ia) is not mentioned in the order. The order does not record the amounts of tax involved, the assessment years actually in dispute before the Assessing Officer, or what happened after the Tribunal's remand of 26 July 2018, which the Court noted the petitioner had not placed before it. It also notes but does not resolve the point that the first proviso to section 201(1) took effect only from 1 July 2012, so much of the claim predated it. This library shows the verification state of every entry openly. This entry has not yet been read in full by a chartered accountant. The summary reflects the sources listed on this page. Read the source before you rely on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
The review petition was dismissed, no ground for review being made out. Because the intra-court appeal had been dismissed on merits, the appellate judgment was the final and binding adjudication and the earlier order stood merged in it, so the principles in Kunhayammed would ordinarily apply; but as the petitioner relied on the Division Bench order of 16 January 2026 and arguments were addressed on merits, the Court examined the matter on merits as well. The RTI reply of 12 March 2025 showed only that the Authority had filed returns for assessment years 2008-09 to 2013-14 with aggregate figures; it did not show that the petitioner's payments were taken into account in computing its income, and there is a material distinction between proof of filing a return and proof that a specific receipt from a specific payer was accounted for in it. The reply of 7 April 2025 recorded several claimed entries as not received, including sums of Rs 5,00,000, Rs 15,00,000, Rs 44,639 and Rs 3,50,000, and disclosed mismatches in instrument numbers and amounts, so it showed that reconciliation of old entries, ledgers and tax treatment would be needed. The allegation that the Authority had concocted the destruction of records was held wholly unwarranted. Each of the four grounds of review, on suppression and new facts, on the effect of the Tribunal's remand of 26 July 2018, on delay and laches, and on the applicability of the first proviso for assessment year 2013-14, was rejected.
TaxSphere, “Kohinoor Educational Services Pvt Ltd v Union of India”, https://taxnotice.vittsphere.com/caselaw/case/kohinoor-educational-services-v-uoi-no-mandamus-for-form-26a/ (validity last checked 2026-08-29)
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