Is the mechanical-approval argument under s.153D a certainty? My approval covers several years in one order, given on the day the draft orders went up.
It is not a certainty. On facts of exactly that kind — one approval covering multiple assessment years, granted on the same day as or immediately after the Assessing Officer's proposal and with reference to the draft assessment orders — the Ahmedabad Bench found no infirmity in the s.153D approval and dismissed the ground. The library should carry this because the s.153D line is not one-way at Tribunal level.
Decided by the ITAT (Dr. B.R.R. Kumar, Vice-President and Suchitra R. Kamble, Judicial Member ('B' Bench, Ahmedabad)) on 2026-04-30, reported as IT(SS)A No. 98/Ahd/2025 and IT(SS)A No. 116/Ahd/2025, assessment year 2015-16 (ITAT Ahmedabad). It bears on section 153D, section 153A, section 56(2)(ix) of the Income Tax Act 1961, in Search, Survey & Block Assessment, Assessment & Scrutiny and Appeals matters.
Every other s.153D decision in this library goes the assessee's way, and a practitioner reading only those will over-promise. This order is the counterweight. Two things about it matter more than its result. First, its reasoning is thin: the Bench recorded the assessee's argument that the approving authority had examined neither the seized material nor the statements nor the appraisal report nor the assessment records, noted that the Departmental Representative simply relied on the order of the Commissioner (Appeals), and then dismissed the ground by following two coordinate-bench orders without discussing them or the assessee's specific complaints. Second, the facts here are materially milder than the mass-approval cases: the approval was granted 'primarily with reference to draft assessment orders', which is the very thing the Delhi High Court in MDLR Hotels found missing when it said there was no whisper of the seized material in either the proposal or the approval. So the practical lesson is that the argument is fact-sensitive and evidentiary — how many orders, how many assessees, what the letter says it looked at — and not a formula. The regime point: the assessment was framed under s.153A, so the search fell in the s.153A/s.153C regime for searches initiated between 1 June 2003 and 31 August 2024; the order does not state the date of the search.
Binding on the AO and CIT(A) within the Tribunal's jurisdiction. Persuasive elsewhere.
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The assessments for assessment year 2015-16 were framed under s.153A after prior approval under s.153D was obtained from the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax. The approval on record had been granted for multiple assessment years through a common order, on the same day as or immediately after the Assessing Officer's proposal, and primarily with reference to the draft assessment orders. As grounds 1 and 2 the assessees challenged the validity of that approval and of the consequential assessment, contending that it had been granted mechanically and without application of mind because the approving authority had examined neither the seized material, nor the statements, nor the appraisal report, nor the assessment records, and had merely granted approval on the draft orders. The Departmental Representative relied on the order of the Commissioner (Appeals). Separately the appeals raised a substantive question on s.56(2)(ix) and forfeited advances.
Grounds 1 and 2 were dismissed. Following the Tribunal's order in Neelu Sanjay Gupta v. DCIT, IT(SS) No. 147/Ahd/2019 dated 26 November 2024, and the coordinate bench order in Subhash Stone Products v. ACIT, ITA No. 108/Allahabad/2019 dated 31 October 2025, the Bench found no infirmity in the approval granted under s.153D (para 6.4). Both appeals were partly allowed on other grounds (para 8).
The Bench recorded the fact of the approval and its character — common to several assessment years, contemporaneous with the proposal, and referable to the draft assessment orders (para 6.1); recorded the assessee's contention that it was mechanical because the approving authority had looked at none of the underlying material (para 6.2); recorded that the Departmental Representative relied on the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) (para 6.3); and then stated that there was no merit in the grounds and that, respectfully following the two coordinate-bench orders named, no infirmity was found in the approval (para 6.4). No independent analysis of the approval's language, of the number of orders it covered, or of the assessee's specific complaints appears in the order.
We find that there is no merit in the grounds taken by the assessee. Reliance is being placed on the order of the Tribunal in the case of Neelu Sanjay Gupta Vs. DCIT, in IT(SS) No. 147/Ahd/2019 dated 26.11.2024 and the order of the co-ordinate bench in the case of Subhash Stone Products Vs. ACIT in ITA No. 108/Allahabad/2019 dated 31.10.2025. Respectfully following the above decisions, we do not find any infirmity in the approval granted under section 153D of the Act. Hence, these grounds of appeal of the assessee are dismissed.
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Handle my notice → Ask a CA on WhatsAppIt is not a certainty. On facts of exactly that kind — one approval covering multiple assessment years, granted on the same day as or immediately after the Assessing Officer's proposal and with reference to the draft assessment orders — the Ahmedabad Bench found no infirmity in the s.153D approval and dismissed the ground. The library should carry this because the s.153D line is not one-way at Tribunal level. This was decided by the ITAT (Dr. B.R.R. Kumar, Vice-President and Suchitra R. Kamble, Judicial Member ('B' Bench, Ahmedabad)) and bears on section 153D, section 153A, section 56(2)(ix) of the Income Tax Act 1961. It is reported as IT(SS)A No. 98/Ahd/2025 and IT(SS)A No. 116/Ahd/2025, assessment year 2015-16 (ITAT Ahmedabad). Every other s.153D decision in this library goes the assessee's way, and a practitioner reading only those will over-promise. This order is the counterweight. Two things about it matter more than its result. First, its reasoning is thin: the Bench recorded the assessee's argument that the approving authority had examined neither the seized material nor the statements nor the appraisal report nor the assessment records, noted that the Departmental Representative simply relied on the order of the Commissioner (Appeals), and then dismissed the ground by following two coordinate-bench orders without discussing them or the assessee's specific complaints. Second, the facts here are materially milder than the mass-approval cases: the approval was granted 'primarily with reference to draft assessment orders', which is the very thing the Delhi High Court in MDLR Hotels found missing when it said there was no whisper of the seized material in either the proposal or the approval. So the practical lesson is that the argument is fact-sensitive and evidentiary — how many orders, how many assessees, what the letter says it looked at — and not a formula. The regime point: the assessment was framed under s.153A, so the search fell in the s.153A/s.153C regime for searches initiated between 1 June 2003 and 31 August 2024; the order does not state the date of the search. If it applies to you, the first step is this: Do not plead s.153D as a slogan. Plead the specific defect: how many draft orders the letter covered, how many assessees and years, what the letter says it examined, and how long the authority had.
The assessments for assessment year 2015-16 were framed under s.153A after prior approval under s.153D was obtained from the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax. The approval on record had been granted for multiple assessment years through a common order, on the same day as or immediately after the Assessing Officer's proposal, and primarily with reference to the draft assessment orders. As grounds 1 and 2 the assessees challenged the validity of that approval and of the consequential assessment, contending that it had been granted mechanically and without application of mind because the approving authority had examined neither the seized material, nor the statements, nor the appraisal report, nor the assessment records, and had merely granted approval on the draft orders. The Departmental Representative relied on the order of the Commissioner (Appeals). Separately the appeals raised a substantive question on s.56(2)(ix) and forfeited advances. The matter was decided on 2026-04-30 by the ITAT (Dr. B.R.R. Kumar, Vice-President and Suchitra R. Kamble, Judicial Member ('B' Bench, Ahmedabad)). On those facts the ITAT held as follows. Grounds 1 and 2 were dismissed. Following the Tribunal's order in Neelu Sanjay Gupta v. DCIT, IT(SS) No. 147/Ahd/2019 dated 26 November 2024, and the coordinate bench order in Subhash Stone Products v. ACIT, ITA No. 108/Allahabad/2019 dated 31 October 2025, the Bench found no infirmity in the approval granted under s.153D (para 6.4). Both appeals were partly allowed on other grounds (para 8).
The Bench recorded the fact of the approval and its character — common to several assessment years, contemporaneous with the proposal, and referable to the draft assessment orders (para 6.1); recorded the assessee's contention that it was mechanical because the approving authority had looked at none of the underlying material (para 6.2); recorded that the Departmental Representative relied on the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) (para 6.3); and then stated that there was no merit in the grounds and that, respectfully following the two coordinate-bench orders named, no infirmity was found in the approval (para 6.4). No independent analysis of the approval's language, of the number of orders it covered, or of the assessee's specific complaints appears in the order. In the words reproduced by the source cited on this page: "We find that there is no merit in the grounds taken by the assessee. Reliance is being placed on the order of the Tribunal in the case of Neelu Sanjay Gupta Vs. DCIT, in IT(SS) No. 147/Ahd/2019 dated 26.11.2024 and the order of the co-ordinate bench in the case of Subhash Stone Products Vs. ACIT in ITA No. 108/Allahabad/2019 dated 31.10.2025. Respectfully following the above decisions, we do not find any infirmity in the approval granted under section 153D of the Act. Hence, these grounds of appeal of the assessee are dismissed." The decision followed or applied Neelu Sanjay Gupta v. DCIT, IT(SS) No. 147/Ahd/2019, order dated 26 November 2024 (ITAT Ahmedabad) — followed; Subhash Stone Products v. ACIT, ITA No. 108/Allahabad/2019, order dated 31 October 2025 (ITAT) — followed.
It was decided by the ITAT on 2026-04-30 and is reported as IT(SS)A No. 98/Ahd/2025 and IT(SS)A No. 116/Ahd/2025, assessment year 2015-16 (ITAT Ahmedabad). Binding on the AO and CIT(A) within the Tribunal's jurisdiction. Persuasive elsewhere. A Tribunal decision binds the assessing officer and the Commissioner (Appeals) within that Tribunal's jurisdiction, and is persuasive before other benches. It is not binding on a High Court, and a contrary co-ordinate bench decision will be argued against you, so check whether the point has been taken the other way before you build a reply around it. On section 153D, section 153A, section 56(2)(ix), the practical question is whether the facts of your own notice match the facts of this case closely enough for the same rule to apply.
It helps the department, and it appears in this library for that reason — you need to know what the Assessing Officer will cite against you. Grounds 1 and 2 were dismissed. Following the Tribunal's order in Neelu Sanjay Gupta v. DCIT, IT(SS) No. 147/Ahd/2019 dated 26 November 2024, and the coordinate bench order in Subhash Stone Products v. ACIT, ITA No. 108/Allahabad/2019 dated 31 October 2025, the Bench found no infirmity in the approval granted under s.153D (para 6.4). Both appeals were partly allowed on other grounds (para 8). It arises in Search, Survey & Block Assessment, Assessment & Scrutiny and Appeals matters, on section 153D, section 153A, section 56(2)(ix) of the Income Tax Act 1961, and was decided by Dr. B.R.R. Kumar, Vice-President and Suchitra R. Kamble, Judicial Member ('B' Bench, Ahmedabad). Before relying on it, read the source linked on this page and check whether it has since been distinguished, overruled or overtaken by an amendment to the Income Tax Act. In practice the steps that follow from it are these. If the approval refers to the draft assessment orders on their face, expect to have to say more — that alone did not persuade this Bench. Put the assessee's specific complaint on the record in evidence, not in argument: seek the proposal, the covering note, the appraisal report reference and the approval, so the Bench has something to weigh. Cite the High Court authority, not only Tribunal orders. This Bench followed two coordinate-bench decisions; a High Court decision from the jurisdictional court is harder to pass over. Always argue the merits as well. Here the assessees still succeeded in part on the substantive point about s.56(2)(ix) and forfeited advances, which is what the appeals actually turned on. For a search initiated on or after 1 September 2024 there is no s.153D at all; check instead whether the prior approval required by s.158BC(3) was taken before the block notice issued.
Validity check could not be completed. Validity check could not be completed, and the label does not carry what matters here. Tribunal benches are divided on s.153D. This order upholds a common, contemporaneous approval on draft orders; the Delhi High Court in PCIT v. MDLR Hotels (30 July 2024) and the Delhi Bench in Sohan Lal Singla (8 May 2025), both read in this batch, go the other way on comparable facts, as do ACIT v. Serajuddin & Co and PCIT v. Shiv Kumar Nayyar already in the library. The two coordinate-bench orders this Bench followed (Neelu Sanjay Gupta and Subhash Stone Products) were not retrieved and their reasoning has not been read. No appeal under s.260A against this order was searched for. No source could be cited for that finding. Checking whether an authority still stands matters as much as knowing what it held: a decision may be overruled on one point and survive on another, or the provision it interprets may have been amended since. Read the source and the editor's note on this page before relying on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal.
Read twice; the second read returned paras 6 to 6.5 in full and without ellipses, and the holding recorded here comes from that. The order runs two connected appeals together and the cause title in the retrieved text names both Dhiren Rambhai Bharwad and Dharnidhar Developers against IT(SS)A Nos. 98/Ahd/2025 and 116/Ahd/2025 for assessment year 2015-16 without allocating a number to each appellant; a later pass wanting to cite one appellant alone should re-check that allocation. The order does not state the date of the search or the date of the s.153D approval, and it does not reproduce the text of the approval — only that it was granted for multiple assessment years by a common order, on the same day as or immediately after the proposal, primarily with reference to the draft assessment orders. Paragraph 6.5 in the retrieved text begins the discussion of s.56 and appears to belong to a different ground; the paragraph numbering in this order is not clean. This library shows the verification state of every entry openly. This entry has not yet been read in full by a chartered accountant. The summary reflects the sources listed on this page. Read the source before you rely on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
Grounds 1 and 2 were dismissed. Following the Tribunal's order in Neelu Sanjay Gupta v. DCIT, IT(SS) No. 147/Ahd/2019 dated 26 November 2024, and the coordinate bench order in Subhash Stone Products v. ACIT, ITA No. 108/Allahabad/2019 dated 31 October 2025, the Bench found no infirmity in the approval granted under s.153D (para 6.4). Both appeals were partly allowed on other grounds (para 8).
Every entry in this library links to where it was found, so you can check it yourself rather than take our word for it.
The seized documents say nothing about the years being assessed. Can s.153C still be used for them?
The search was before June 2015 but the notice came later. Which version of s.153C applies?
Search assessment for a year already completed, but nothing incriminating was found. Can the officer still add?
Is an assessment on an amalgamated company always void?