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Case law › High Court › CIT v Noida Toll Bridge Co Ltd
High CourtHelps taxpayers.269SSs.271D

CIT v Noida Toll Bridge Co Ltd

My promoter paid a third party for me by account payee cheque and the amount was put through my books by journal entry. Is that a loan taken in cash?

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My promoter paid a third party for me by account payee cheque and the amount was put through my books by journal entry. Is that a loan taken in cash?

No. The Delhi High Court declined to entertain the Revenue's appeal and upheld the deletion of penalty of Rs 4.85 crore under section 271D. The Tribunal had found that the transaction was by account payee cheque, that no payment was made in cash by the assessee or on its behalf, that no loan was accepted in cash, and that the amount paid on the assessee's behalf by its promoter was passed through the books by a journal entry crediting the promoter's account. Those are findings of fact, and on them section 269SS was not attracted. The order gave rise to no question of law, much less a substantial question of law.

Decided by the High Court (Delhi High Court - D.K. Jain and Madan B. Lokur, JJ) on 2003-01-28, reported as [2003] 262 ITR 260 (Delhi); (2003) 184 CTR (Del) 266. It bears on section 269SS, section 271D of the Income Tax Act 1961, in Cash Transaction Limits and Penalty matters.

Still good law. The ratio is applied across Tribunal benches to this day. In Gopal S. Pandith v JCIT (Bangalore Tribunal, 21 October 2020) the Bench set out at paragraph 7 that 'The Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Noida Toll Bridge Co. Ltd. had held that passing of journal entry without actual receipt of cash would not attract provisions of section 269SS of the I.T.Act', and made that the operative rule of its own decision: 'In view of the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Noida Toll Bridge Co. Ltd., if the assessee had passed only a journal entry, the provisions of section 269SS would not be attracted and penalty u/s 271D of the I.T.Act cannot be imposed', restoring the matter for verification on that footing. It is applied on the same basis in ACIT v Satvinder Singh Washawan (Delhi, 21 June 2019), DCIT v Macrotech Construction P Ltd (Mumbai, 8 April 2021) and DCIT v Kiran Fine Jewellers Pvt Ltd (Jaipur, 26 June 2025), and treated as covering the issue directly in Rajkot Buildwell (P) Ltd (Delhi, 3 March 2011). Nothing overruling, doubting or confining it has been found. One thing a practitioner must check before relying on it. The Bombay High Court's decision on journal entries and section 269SS in the Triumph International line has itself been the subject of Supreme Court proceedings, and at least one Tribunal decision (BSC C&C Kurali Toll Road Ltd, Delhi, 18 May 2021) refers to a Bombay High Court decision having been altered by the Supreme Court. That development is not established in this entry and nothing here should be read as stating its outcome; check it directly before a journal-entry defence is run, particularly where the entry passes between related concerns rather than recording a payment actually made to a third party by account payee cheque. The distinction that carried this case was that no cash moved at any stage, and a journal entry that merely squares off inter-company balances may not attract the same answer.

Why it matters

This is the short and much-cited authority that section 269SS bites on cash and not on book entries. Where the money moves by account payee cheque - even a cheque drawn by somebody else in favour of a third party - and the liability is recorded in the assessee's books by journal entry, there is no acceptance of a loan or deposit otherwise than by account payee cheque and nothing for section 271D to penalise. The second point is procedural and just as useful: whether cash passed is a question of fact, so a Tribunal finding to that effect ends the matter on further appeal absent perversity. The same reasoning is applied to repayments under section 269T and section 271E, where the section again speaks of the mode of repayment.

Binding within that High Court's jurisdiction. Persuasive elsewhere.

Not yet CA-verified. This entry was found through the sources listed under the Sources tab, and the summary reflects what those sources say. Nobody has yet read the full judgment and signed it off. Check the source before relying on it.

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Related

Other authorities on the same sections.
Every authority on the provisions this decision turns on: all 23 on s.271D · all 21 on s.269SS