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Case lawITAT › Arthur Bernard Sebastine Pais v DCIT (CPC)
ITATHelps taxpayers.143(1)(a)s.44ADs.44ADAs.44AAs.194J

Arthur Bernard Sebastine Pais v DCIT (CPC)

CPC has processed my return, decided that my receipts belong under s.44ADA at 50 per cent instead of s.44AD at 8 per cent, and raised a demand. Can that be done in a s.143(1) intimation?

CPC has processed my return, decided that my receipts belong under s.44ADA at 50 per cent instead of s.44AD at 8 per cent, and raised a demand. Can that be done in a s.143(1) intimation?

No. The Tribunal held that the whole of the gross receipts had in fact been included in the return, under s.44AD, so the condition for an adjustment under s.143(1)(a)(vi) — that income appearing in Form 26AS has not been included in computing the total income — was simply absent, and the addition fell on that ground alone. It went further and said that whether the income has to be taxed under s.44AD or under s.44ADA cannot be the subject matter of a decision in processing under s.143(1)(a). Be careful what you take from this. The Tribunal expressly declined to decide whether the assessee's management consultancy receipts were assessable under s.44ADA or s.44AD, and nothing in the order holds that they were not professional receipts.

Decided by the ITAT (Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Bengaluru, SMC-B Bench) on 2019-10-16, reported as ITA No. 1683/Bang/2019. It bears on section 143(1)(a), section 44AD, section 44ADA, section 44AA, section 194J of the Income Tax Act 1961, in Presumptive Taxation & Audit and Assessment & Scrutiny matters.

Still good law. No decision doubting or overruling it was located. Its subject matter has largely been overtaken by statute: the proviso to s.143(1)(a) provides that no adjustment shall be made under sub-clause (vi) in relation to a return furnished for the assessment year commencing on or after the 1st day of April, 2018, so the particular adjustment in issue is not available for assessment year 2018-19 onwards. The order decides nothing about who is a professional for s.44ADA; on that substantive question see Neeraj Dewangan v ITO in this library, where liaison and coordination work was held to be technical consultancy within s.44AA(1) and so within s.44ADA. The s.44ADA gross receipts ceiling and the s.44AD turnover ceiling and rates have both been amended since assessment year 2017-18.

Why it matters

Recharacterising a s.44AD return as a s.44ADA return is one of the most common automated adjustments a small consultant meets, and it multiplies the taxable figure roughly sixfold. This order says the choice between the two sections is a substantive question that has to be decided in an assessment, with a hearing, and not in processing. It is a procedural answer rather than a substantive one, but it is the faster answer, and it puts the department to the trouble of opening a regular assessment if it wants to press the point. The order also matters for its silence: practitioners citing it for the proposition that a management consultant is outside s.44ADA are citing the assessee's argument, not the Tribunal's holding.

Binding on the AO and CIT(A) within the Tribunal's jurisdiction. Persuasive elsewhere.

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