How does s.15 actually work - fifteen days, or forty-five, and what if the supplier registered after the invoices?
Section 15 obliges the buyer to pay by the date agreed in writing and, where there is no such agreement, before the appointed day, which is fifteen days from acceptance or deemed acceptance; the proviso caps any agreed period at forty-five days. On the facts, the supplier's registration post-dated the invoices by a wide margin, the invoices running from 17 May 2013 to 15 July 2015 against registration with effect from 31 December 2016.
Decided by the High Court (A.P. Thaker J) on 2022-12-16, reported as Special Civil Application No. 2825 of 2020. It bears on section MSMED s.15, section MSMED s.16, section MSMED s.2(n), section MSMED s.18 of the Income Tax Act 1961, in How Tax Law Is Read matters.
It states the two limbs of s.15 in a single place and applies the registration-timing rule to a real sequence of invoices, which is the exercise a practitioner has to do on an MSME ledger before deciding whether s.43B(h) bites.
Binding within that High Court's jurisdiction. Persuasive elsewhere.
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The petitioner challenged an award of the State Level Industry Facilitation Council dated 3 May 2019. Respondent no. 3, the supplier, was registered in the 'E' category, that is as a small enterprise, with effect from 31 December 2016. The invoices on which the claim was founded had been raised separately and distinctly during the period from 17 May 2013 to 15 July 2015, so the supplies preceded the registration.
Could not be established. What the Court finally ordered on the challenge to the award has not been established, and only what it said in the course of its reasoning is set out here. What the Court states in the course of its reasoning is that, on a conjoint reading of s.15 and s.2(b) of the MSMED Act, s.15 casts an obligation upon the buyer to make payment to the supplier within the period agreed upon or within fifteen days of acceptance or deemed acceptance of the goods or services (para 14). In a later paragraph, numbered 51, the Court reproduces the rest of the section - that payment is to be made on or before the date agreed upon between the parties in writing and, in the absence of an agreement, before the appointed day - together with the proviso, that in no case shall the period agreed upon between the supplier and the buyer in writing exceed forty-five days from the day of acceptance or the day of deemed acceptance. Para 11 is not about s.15 at all: it records that s.18 provides for making a reference to the Facilitation Council by a party to a dispute with regard to any amount due under s.17.
The Court set out the structure of Chapter V - s.15 fixing the time for payment, s.16 attaching compound interest on default - and read s.15 together with the definition of the appointed day in s.2(b), so that the fifteen-day period is the default (para 14) and the forty-five day proviso is a ceiling on an agreed period rather than an entitlement (in the later paragraph reproducing the proviso, numbered 51). Against that framework it examined the dates, recording that the registration took effect on 31 December 2016 while the invoices ran from 17 May 2013 to 15 July 2015. The step from those dates to the disposition could not be read.
in no case the period agreed upon between the supplier and the buyer in writing shall exceed forty-five days
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Handle my notice → Ask a CA on WhatsAppSection 15 obliges the buyer to pay by the date agreed in writing and, where there is no such agreement, before the appointed day, which is fifteen days from acceptance or deemed acceptance; the proviso caps any agreed period at forty-five days. On the facts, the supplier's registration post-dated the invoices by a wide margin, the invoices running from 17 May 2013 to 15 July 2015 against registration with effect from 31 December 2016. This was decided by the High Court (A.P. Thaker J) and bears on section MSMED s.15, section MSMED s.16, section MSMED s.2(n), section MSMED s.18 of the Income Tax Act 1961. It is reported as Special Civil Application No. 2825 of 2020. It states the two limbs of s.15 in a single place and applies the registration-timing rule to a real sequence of invoices, which is the exercise a practitioner has to do on an MSME ledger before deciding whether s.43B(h) bites. If it applies to you, the first step is this: Establish first whether there is an agreement in writing fixing a payment date; if there is not, the fifteen-day limb applies and the forty-five day figure is irrelevant.
The petitioner challenged an award of the State Level Industry Facilitation Council dated 3 May 2019. Respondent no. 3, the supplier, was registered in the 'E' category, that is as a small enterprise, with effect from 31 December 2016. The invoices on which the claim was founded had been raised separately and distinctly during the period from 17 May 2013 to 15 July 2015, so the supplies preceded the registration. The matter was decided on 2022-12-16 by the High Court (A.P. Thaker J). On those facts the High Court held as follows. Could not be established. What the Court finally ordered on the challenge to the award has not been established, and only what it said in the course of its reasoning is set out here. What the Court states in the course of its reasoning is that, on a conjoint reading of s.15 and s.2(b) of the MSMED Act, s.15 casts an obligation upon the buyer to make payment to the supplier within the period agreed upon or within fifteen days of acceptance or deemed acceptance of the goods or services (para 14). In a later paragraph, numbered 51, the Court reproduces the rest of the section - that payment is to be made on or before the date agreed upon between the parties in writing and, in the absence of an agreement, before the appointed day - together with the proviso, that in no case shall the period agreed upon between the supplier and the buyer in writing exceed forty-five days from the day of acceptance or the day of deemed acceptance. Para 11 is not about s.15 at all: it records that s.18 provides for making a reference to the Facilitation Council by a party to a dispute with regard to any amount due under s.17.
The Court set out the structure of Chapter V - s.15 fixing the time for payment, s.16 attaching compound interest on default - and read s.15 together with the definition of the appointed day in s.2(b), so that the fifteen-day period is the default (para 14) and the forty-five day proviso is a ceiling on an agreed period rather than an entitlement (in the later paragraph reproducing the proviso, numbered 51). Against that framework it examined the dates, recording that the registration took effect on 31 December 2016 while the invoices ran from 17 May 2013 to 15 July 2015. The step from those dates to the disposition could not be read. In the words reproduced by the source cited on this page: "in no case the period agreed upon between the supplier and the buyer in writing shall exceed forty-five days"
It was decided by the High Court on 2022-12-16 and is reported as Special Civil Application No. 2825 of 2020. Binding within that High Court's jurisdiction. Persuasive elsewhere. A High Court decision binds the assessing officer, the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal within that state, and is persuasive elsewhere. If your assessment is in a different jurisdiction, check whether your own High Court has taken the same view before relying on it. On section MSMED s.15, section MSMED s.16, section MSMED s.2(n), section MSMED s.18, the practical question is whether the facts of your own notice match the facts of this case closely enough for the same rule to apply.
It cuts both ways and is cited by both sides. Could not be established. What the Court finally ordered on the challenge to the award has not been established, and only what it said in the course of its reasoning is set out here. What the Court states in the course of its reasoning is that, on a conjoint reading of s.15 and s.2(b) of the MSMED Act, s.15 casts an obligation upon the buyer to make payment to the supplier within the period agreed upon or within fifteen days of acceptance or deemed acceptance of the goods or services (para 14). In a later paragraph, numbered 51, the Court reproduces the rest of the section - that payment is to be made on or before the date agreed upon between the parties in writing and, in the absence of an agreement, before the appointed day - together with the proviso, that in no case shall the period agreed upon between the supplier and the buyer in writing exceed forty-five days from the day of acceptance or the day of deemed acceptance. Para 11 is not about s.15 at all: it records that s.18 provides for making a reference to the Facilitation Council by a party to a dispute with regard to any amount due under s.17. It arises in How Tax Law Is Read matters, on section MSMED s.15, section MSMED s.16, section MSMED s.2(n), section MSMED s.18 of the Income Tax Act 1961, and was decided by A.P. Thaker J. Before relying on it, read the source linked on this page and check whether it has since been distinguished, overruled or overtaken by an amendment to the Income Tax Act. In practice the steps that follow from it are these. Where there is such an agreement, the forty-five day cap in the proviso overrides any longer period the parties wrote down. Date the registration and date each invoice; do not work from the registration certificate alone. Do not cite this judgment for its disposition without checking it - the operative part could not be read (see the editor's note).
Searched for later treatment; none was found. That is not the same as a source affirming it. No later decision applying or doubting this judgment has been traced. That is a statement about what has been looked for and not a certificate: the judgment is a single-judge decision of the Gujarat High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction over a Facilitation Council award, and it binds nobody outside the case. There is a second and more practical reason for caution. The final order is not established here. What is established is the Court's restatement of s.15 - that the buyer must pay by the date agreed in writing and, where there is no written agreement, before the appointed day, which is fifteen days from acceptance or deemed acceptance, and that the proviso caps any agreed period at forty-five days - and the dates it recorded, namely that the supplier was registered as a small enterprise with effect from 31 December 2016 while the invoices ran from 17 May 2013 to 15 July 2015. The step from those dates to the disposition is not established. The judgment should therefore be read from the court's own record before it is cited for anything beyond its statement of s.15, and it should not be cited at all for a proposition about what registration after the supplies does to a claim. Two further limits. The judgment construes the MSMED Act and says nothing about s.43B(h) of the Income-tax Act, which is where the timing question usually matters to a tax practitioner; the link runs only through the definition of the appointed day, which s.43B(h) borrows. And the paragraph numbering of this judgment is not stable in the texts in circulation, so any paragraph locator taken from this entry should be checked against the judgment before it goes into a submission. No source could be cited for that finding. Checking whether an authority still stands matters as much as knowing what it held: a decision may be overruled on one point and survive on another, or the provision it interprets may have been amended since. Read the source and the editor's note on this page before relying on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal.
A WARNING ABOUT THE DISPOSITION. The operative part of this judgment is not established. The text runs as far as a passage on the scope of supervisory jurisdiction and ends mid-sentence, and no conclusion on the challenge to the award of 3 May 2019 has been established. An account in circulation has it that the award was quashed for want of jurisdiction, because respondent no. 3 registered after the transactions were complete. That account sits comfortably with the dates the judgment itself records - registration with effect from 31 December 2016, invoices from 17 May 2013 to 15 July 2015 - but it has not been confirmed against the operative paragraphs, and it is therefore not stated here as the holding. Anyone who intends to rely on the disposition must read the judgment from the court's own record first. WHAT THIS ENTRY CAN BE USED FOR. The s.15 passages are the Court's restatement or reproduction of the statute, and they should be treated as such rather than as a construction of it. They are useful because they put the two limbs in one place: the default period of fifteen days from acceptance or deemed acceptance under s.2(b), and the forty-five day figure as a ceiling on a period agreed in writing rather than as an entitlement. The Court also sets the section in its chapter - s.15 fixing the time for payment and s.16 attaching compound interest on default - and records that s.18 provides for a reference to the Facilitation Council by a party to a dispute over an amount due under s.17. WHY A TAX READER IS HERE. The MSMED time limits are the input to s.43B(h) of the Income-tax Act, which denies the deduction for a sum payable to a micro or small enterprise unless it is paid within the time allowed by s.15. That is the only route by which this judgment touches an income-tax assessment, and the judgment itself says nothing about the Income-tax Act. Work the ledger the way this Court worked it: date the registration, date each invoice, and ask whether there was an agreement in writing at all before reaching for the forty-five day figure. ON THE PARAGRAPH NUMBERS. They are not stable across the texts of this judgment in circulation, so the numbers given here should be checked before they are cited. The attributions in this entry have been corrected once already: paragraph 11 is about s.18 and not s.15; paragraph 14 carries only the fifteen-day limb, on a conjoint reading of s.15 and s.2(b), and not the forty-five day words; and the sentence quoted on this page, which was previously pinned to paragraph 14, sits in a later paragraph that expressly reproduces the proviso. This library shows the verification state of every entry openly. This entry has not yet been read in full by a chartered accountant. The summary reflects the sources listed on this page. Read the source before you rely on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
Could not be established. What the Court finally ordered on the challenge to the award has not been established, and only what it said in the course of its reasoning is set out here. What the Court states in the course of its reasoning is that, on a conjoint reading of s.15 and s.2(b) of the MSMED Act, s.15 casts an obligation upon the buyer to make payment to the supplier within the period agreed upon or within fifteen days of acceptance or deemed acceptance of the goods or services (para 14). In a later paragraph, numbered 51, the Court reproduces the rest of the section - that payment is to be made on or before the date agreed upon between the parties in writing and, in the absence of an agreement, before the appointed day - together with the proviso, that in no case shall the period agreed upon between the supplier and the buyer in writing exceed forty-five days from the day of acceptance or the day of deemed acceptance. Para 11 is not about s.15 at all: it records that s.18 provides for making a reference to the Facilitation Council by a party to a dispute with regard to any amount due under s.17.
TaxSphere, “Anupam Industries Ltd v State Level Industry Facilitation Council”, https://taxnotice.vittsphere.com/caselaw/case/anupam-industries-v-state-level-industry-facilitation-council-s15-registration/ (validity last checked 2026-09-17)
The judgment itself is a government work and may be quoted freely. The summary, the validity note and the reasoning on this page are this library's own writing: quote them with attribution, and please do not present either as the words of the court — this page keeps the two apart and so should a quotation of it.
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The supplier registered under the MSMED Act part-way through the relationship. Which supplies does the Act protect?
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