The department got my foreign account details under an exchange-of-information agreement, so s.71(d)(iii) shut me out of the s.59 declaration window. Does Gautam Khaitan still answer me?
The Bombay High Court said that point was not decided in Gautam Khaitan and left it open. On the notice of motion it refused a stay of the s.10(1) notices, but directed that no coercive measures be taken while the department proceeds, and kept the Article 14 and Article 20 challenge for the hearing of the writ petition itself. Nothing was decided on the merits.
Decided by the High Court (Ujjal Bhuyan J and Milind N. Jadhav J) on 2020-03-13, reported as Notice of Motion No. 283 of 2019 in Writ Petition No. 1300 of 2018, High Court of Judicature at Bombay. It bears on section BMA s.10(1), section BMA s.59, section BMA s.62, section BMA s.71(d)(iii), section Constitution Art. 14, section Constitution Art. 20 of the Income Tax Act 1961, in Assessment & Scrutiny, Demand, Recovery & Stay and How Tax Law Is Read matters.
Gautam Khaitan is read by the department as closing the retrospectivity argument on the footing that the commencement date was advanced only so the s.59 compliance window could operate. This order records that the answer does not obviously reach a taxpayer whom s.71(d)(iii) barred from that very window - and that the constitutional challenge to that bar is still live in the Bombay High Court.
Binding within that High Court's jurisdiction. Persuasive elsewhere.
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The proceedings concerned foreign accounts said to be held through Red House Finance Limited, Singapore. Information had come to the Indian authorities from Singapore and from the British Virgin Islands under international agreements. A search followed in November 2015, and on 20 December 2017 notices were issued under s.10(1) of the Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015 for assessment year 2017-18 (paras 2 and 12). The petitioners filed a writ petition challenging the notices and the validity of provisions of the Act, and took out a notice of motion for a stay of the notices pending the hearing of the petition. Their case was that they had been statutorily debarred from making a declaration under s.59 because s.71(d)(iii) withholds the benefit of the declaration scheme where information about the asset had been received under an agreement made under s.90 or s.90A, and that this exclusion was arbitrary and discriminatory and offended Articles 14 and 20. The Revenue answered that the grievance was hypothetical: the petitioners had at no stage admitted holding undisclosed foreign assets and had consistently denied them, and the information had been detected after the Act came into force.
Interim relief was refused and the notice of motion discharged (para 47). The Court declined to apply Union of India v. Gautam Khaitan, holding that the point the petitioners raised was not before the Supreme Court there (paras 43 to 44). It directed that while the respondents may proceed pursuant to the notices dated 20 December 2017, 'no coercive measures may be taken against the petitioners if the occasion so arises' (para 44), and directed the Registry to list the writ petition for hearing. The Article 14 and Article 20 challenge was not decided.
The Court recorded the Supreme Court's clarification in Gautam Khaitan that the commencement date had been advanced from 1 April 2016 to 1 July 2015 only to enable assessees to take the benefit of s.59, and then held that the present facts were distinguishable because the issue the petitioners raised - that they were statutorily barred from making a declaration under s.59 - was not an issue in Gautam Khaitan (paras 43 to 44). At the interim stage it weighed the Revenue's point that the petitioners had never admitted holding undisclosed foreign assets, which made the complaint of exclusion from the declaration scheme academic on the record as it then stood. Having refused a stay, it balanced the position by restraining coercive measures and left the constitutional questions to the hearing of the petition.
no coercive measures may be taken against the petitioners if the occasion so arises
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Handle my notice → Ask a CA on WhatsAppThe Bombay High Court said that point was not decided in Gautam Khaitan and left it open. On the notice of motion it refused a stay of the s.10(1) notices, but directed that no coercive measures be taken while the department proceeds, and kept the Article 14 and Article 20 challenge for the hearing of the writ petition itself. Nothing was decided on the merits. This was decided by the High Court (Ujjal Bhuyan J and Milind N. Jadhav J) and bears on section BMA s.10(1), section BMA s.59, section BMA s.62, section BMA s.71(d)(iii), section Constitution Art. 14, section Constitution Art. 20 of the Income Tax Act 1961. It is reported as Notice of Motion No. 283 of 2019 in Writ Petition No. 1300 of 2018, High Court of Judicature at Bombay. Gautam Khaitan is read by the department as closing the retrospectivity argument on the footing that the commencement date was advanced only so the s.59 compliance window could operate. This order records that the answer does not obviously reach a taxpayer whom s.71(d)(iii) barred from that very window - and that the constitutional challenge to that bar is still live in the Bombay High Court. If it applies to you, the first step is this: Check whether s.71(d)(iii) applied to your client - it turns on information having been received under an agreement made under s.90 or s.90A before the declaration.
The proceedings concerned foreign accounts said to be held through Red House Finance Limited, Singapore. Information had come to the Indian authorities from Singapore and from the British Virgin Islands under international agreements. A search followed in November 2015, and on 20 December 2017 notices were issued under s.10(1) of the Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015 for assessment year 2017-18 (paras 2 and 12). The petitioners filed a writ petition challenging the notices and the validity of provisions of the Act, and took out a notice of motion for a stay of the notices pending the hearing of the petition. Their case was that they had been statutorily debarred from making a declaration under s.59 because s.71(d)(iii) withholds the benefit of the declaration scheme where information about the asset had been received under an agreement made under s.90 or s.90A, and that this exclusion was arbitrary and discriminatory and offended Articles 14 and 20. The Revenue answered that the grievance was hypothetical: the petitioners had at no stage admitted holding undisclosed foreign assets and had consistently denied them, and the information had been detected after the Act came into force. The matter was decided on 2020-03-13 by the High Court (Ujjal Bhuyan J and Milind N. Jadhav J). On those facts the High Court held as follows. Interim relief was refused and the notice of motion discharged (para 47). The Court declined to apply Union of India v. Gautam Khaitan, holding that the point the petitioners raised was not before the Supreme Court there (paras 43 to 44). It directed that while the respondents may proceed pursuant to the notices dated 20 December 2017, 'no coercive measures may be taken against the petitioners if the occasion so arises' (para 44), and directed the Registry to list the writ petition for hearing. The Article 14 and Article 20 challenge was not decided.
The Court recorded the Supreme Court's clarification in Gautam Khaitan that the commencement date had been advanced from 1 April 2016 to 1 July 2015 only to enable assessees to take the benefit of s.59, and then held that the present facts were distinguishable because the issue the petitioners raised - that they were statutorily barred from making a declaration under s.59 - was not an issue in Gautam Khaitan (paras 43 to 44). At the interim stage it weighed the Revenue's point that the petitioners had never admitted holding undisclosed foreign assets, which made the complaint of exclusion from the declaration scheme academic on the record as it then stood. Having refused a stay, it balanced the position by restraining coercive measures and left the constitutional questions to the hearing of the petition. In the words reproduced by the source cited on this page: "no coercive measures may be taken against the petitioners if the occasion so arises"
It was decided by the High Court on 2020-03-13 and is reported as Notice of Motion No. 283 of 2019 in Writ Petition No. 1300 of 2018, High Court of Judicature at Bombay. Binding within that High Court's jurisdiction. Persuasive elsewhere. A High Court decision binds the assessing officer, the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal within that state, and is persuasive elsewhere. If your assessment is in a different jurisdiction, check whether your own High Court has taken the same view before relying on it. On section BMA s.10(1), section BMA s.59, section BMA s.62, section BMA s.71(d)(iii), section Constitution Art. 14, section Constitution Art. 20, the practical question is whether the facts of your own notice match the facts of this case closely enough for the same rule to apply.
It cuts both ways and is cited by both sides. Interim relief was refused and the notice of motion discharged (para 47). The Court declined to apply Union of India v. Gautam Khaitan, holding that the point the petitioners raised was not before the Supreme Court there (paras 43 to 44). It directed that while the respondents may proceed pursuant to the notices dated 20 December 2017, 'no coercive measures may be taken against the petitioners if the occasion so arises' (para 44), and directed the Registry to list the writ petition for hearing. The Article 14 and Article 20 challenge was not decided. It arises in Assessment & Scrutiny, Demand, Recovery & Stay and How Tax Law Is Read matters, on section BMA s.10(1), section BMA s.59, section BMA s.62, section BMA s.71(d)(iii), section Constitution Art. 14, section Constitution Art. 20 of the Income Tax Act 1961, and was decided by Ujjal Bhuyan J and Milind N. Jadhav J. Before relying on it, read the source linked on this page and check whether it has since been distinguished, overruled or overtaken by an amendment to the Income Tax Act. In practice the steps that follow from it are these. If it did, plead the point specifically rather than relying on a general retrospectivity ground; this order holds it was not an issue in Gautam Khaitan. Expect the department's answer that the complaint is hypothetical where the assessee has never admitted holding an undisclosed foreign asset - that was the Revenue's submission here and it carried weight at the interim stage. Ask, as here, for protection against coercive measures rather than a stay of the assessment proceedings; that is what the Court granted. Track Writ Petition No. 1300 of 2018 - the order of 2 July 2026 in Chetan Satish Timblo directs the Timblo petition to be heard along with it.
Searched for later treatment; none was found. That is not the same as a source affirming it. No decision applying, doubting or overruling this order was located. What is known is that the underlying petition has not been disposed of: the Bombay High Court's order of 2 July 2026 in Chetan Satish Timblo v. Union of India, read for this library, directs that petition to be heard along with Writ Petition No. 1300 of 2018 and records that Rule has been issued and interim relief granted in petitions of that group. The s.71(d)(iii) point and the Article 14 and Article 20 challenge therefore remain undecided. No source could be cited for that finding. Checking whether an authority still stands matters as much as knowing what it held: a decision may be overruled on one point and survive on another, or the provision it interprets may have been amended since. Read the source and the editor's note on this page before relying on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal.
This is an interim order on a notice of motion and decides nothing about s.71(d)(iii). Its value is in what it refuses to do - it declines to treat Gautam Khaitan as an answer to a taxpayer who was shut out of the s.59 window - and a citation of it for anything more would be wrong. A first attempt to open the print version of the page returned a 403; the order was read at the ordinary document URL. The order does not set out the text of s.71(d)(iii) or the amounts involved. This library shows the verification state of every entry openly. This entry has not yet been read in full by a chartered accountant. The summary reflects the sources listed on this page. Read the source before you rely on it in a reply to an Assessing Officer or in an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
Interim relief was refused and the notice of motion discharged (para 47). The Court declined to apply Union of India v. Gautam Khaitan, holding that the point the petitioners raised was not before the Supreme Court there (paras 43 to 44). It directed that while the respondents may proceed pursuant to the notices dated 20 December 2017, 'no coercive measures may be taken against the petitioners if the occasion so arises' (para 44), and directed the Registry to list the writ petition for hearing. The Article 14 and Article 20 challenge was not decided.
TaxSphere, “Anila Rasiklal Mehta v Union of India”, https://taxnotice.vittsphere.com/caselaw/case/anila-rasiklal-mehta-v-uoi-bma-71d-declaration-bar/ (validity last checked 2026-09-16)
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The officer issued several s.10 notices over two years and assessed one of the years. Does it matter which year the notice falls in?
My foreign company was struck off and the bank account closed years before the Black Money Act commenced. Can they still prosecute me for it?
There is a look-out circular against me while my Black Money Act appeal is pending. Can I get it lifted, and does the appeal need money deposited first?
The s.10 notice does not say which year it relates to, and my foreign account was inherited and already put in a revised return. Can the assessment stand?
